Kerala HC: Manner Of Attack & Injury Relevant To Ascertain If Accused Intentionally Attempted To Commit Murder U/S 307 of IPC

It is the well settled law that, in order to attract the offence under Section 307 of IPC, there must be an intentional attempt to commit murder. In the instant case, going through the manner in which the incident occurred and the attack at the instance of the 1st accused, either intention or knowledge to cause death of PW1 could not be found and the 1st accused only caused one injury that also on the shoulder of PW1, as borne from the wound certificate. Therefore, on no stretch of imagination, it is safe to conclude that the 1st accused committed the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. A. No. 972 of 2014

Decided On: 05.03.2026

Moosantepurakkal Manaf Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A. Badharudeen, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0922/2026,2026:KER:20486

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“Private Viewing” Isn’t Private Immunity: Supreme Court Recasts Child Pornography Law Under POCSO & IT Act (2024 INSC 716)

The Supreme Court’s reportable decision in Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161–2162 of 2024, decided on 23 September 2024) is a watershed moment in India’s cyber–child protection jurisprudence. It corrects a trend of quashing prosecutions on the premise that mere storage or private viewing of child sexual abuse material is not punishable unless there is proof of publication or transmission.

At its core, the judgment does two things for the legal system: first, it gives a structured, mens rea–centric interpretation of Section 15 of the POCSO Act (post-2019 amendment) as creating three distinct offences; second, it situates Section 67B of the IT Act as a broad anti-exploitation provision that criminalises not only dissemination, but also consumption-related conduct such as browsing and downloading.

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Distinguishing Murder from Culpable Homicide: A Supreme Court Clarification on Intention and Knowledge

 A Supreme Court Analysis of the Critical Distinction Under Sections 302 and 304 IPC

Citation: Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1302 | Bench: N.V. Anjaria, J. and K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

The Opening Shot: Facts That Changed a Life Sentence

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Supreme Court: Prosecution must prove recovery of the trace of poison consumed by or administered to the deceased to prove the offence of homicide or suicide

Non-recovery of trace of poison (pesticide)

41. There is one more aspect in this case. In a case of death due to consumption or administering of poison or insecticide or pesticide, be it homicidal or suicidal, recovery of the trace of such poison or insecticide or pesticide is crucial.

46. In this case, the doctors who had treated the deceased in the first nursing home and later on in the Mission Hospital, were not examined by the police. They were also not summoned as court witnesses. Their testimony could have been crucial. They could have thrown light into the nature of intake of the Organophosphate compound: whether by way of injection or consumed orally? Whether they could detect the smell of Organophosphate compound emanating from the patient? This serious lacuna is further compounded by the fact that the prosecution had failed to recover any syringe or needle from the crime scene. No container or bottle containing the pesticide were also recovered from the room where the deceased was found lying on the floor or in any part of the house. There is no evidence to suggest that police had made an endeavour to search for such container or bottle. If the deceased had injected the poison herself, considering the multiple injection marks over the front of both the elbows, then the syringe and the needle would have been there, in and around her. If she had orally consumed the poison, then also the bottle or the container of the poison would have been present in the crime scene or near about. There is absolutely no evidence in this regard. There is also no evidence to show as to how the deceased had acquired the pesticide. In addition to non-recovery of the syringe or the needle or the container, the police were unable to show the source from where the particular pesticide was obtained by the deceased. If the prosecution case is to be believed, then the syringe and the needle or the container must have been present in the scene of occurrence itself. Those were not found by the prosecution. Neither any trace of pesticide was seen by the investigating officer in the room. The FSL report as well as the chemical analysis report are silent as to whether any trace of the pesticide was detected from any of the seized articles. Prosecution is silent as to why no investigation was done in this regard. In a case of this nature, where the oral evidence including that of PW Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are not at all convincing, the absence of the container or the bottle containing the pesticide from where the deceased had orally consumed the pesticide, becomes very crucial. Similarly, recovery of syringe and needle if the deceased had injected the poison, is also crucial. As a general principle, it can be said that in a case of death by poisoning, be it homicidal or suicidal and which is based on circumstantial evidence, recovery of the trace of poison consumed by or administered to the deceased is of critical importance. It forms a part of the chain; rather it would complete the chain to prove homicide or suicide.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1427 of 2011

Decided On: 01.03.2024

Kumar Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bela M. Trivedi and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Citation: 2024:INSC:156:[2024]3S.C.R. 329,MANU/HP/1742/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Leading Supreme Court judgment under S 306 of IPC regarding abetment of suicide

Relevant legal provisions

31. In India attempt to commit suicide is an offence Under Section 309 Indian Penal Code. This Section provides that whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, he shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. But once the suicide is carried out i.e., the offence is complete, then obviously such a person would be beyond the reach of the law; question of penalising him would not arise. In such a case, whoever abets the commission of such suicide would be penalised Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code. Section 306 Indian Penal Code reads as under:

306. Abetment of suicide- if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

31.1. Thus, as per Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, if any person commits suicide, then whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

32. The crucial word in Section 306 of Indian Penal Code is 'abets'. 'Abetment' is defined in Section 107 of Indian Penal Code. Section 107 of Indian Penal Code reads thus:

107. Abetment of a thing- A person abets the doing of a thing, who-

First-Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.

32.1. From a reading of Section 107 Indian Penal Code what is deducible is that a person would be abetting the doing of a thing if he instigates any person to do that thing or if he encourages with one or more person or persons in any conspiracy for doing that thing or if he intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission doing of that thing. Explanation 1 clarifies that even if a person by way of wilful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact which he is otherwise bound to disclose voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Similarly, it is clarified by way of Explanation-2 that whoever does anything in order to facilitate the commission of an act, either prior to or at the time of commission of the act, is said to aid the doing of that act.

Case law

33. Suicide is distinguishable from homicide inasmuch as it amounts to killing of self. This Court in M. Mohan v. State   MANU/SC/0161/2011 : 2011:INSC:168 : (2011) 3 SCC 626 went into the meaning of the word suicide and held as under:

37. The word "suicide" in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. "Sui" means "self" and "cide" means "killing", thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.

34.1. Thus, this Court held that to 'instigate' means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of 'instigation', it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or that the words or act should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. But, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the Accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.

35. Again in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State   MANU/SC/1453/2009 : 2009:INSC:1040 : (2009) 16 SCC 605, this Court elaborated further and observed that to constitute 'instigation', a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by 'goading' or 'urging forward'. 

35.1. Thus, this Court has held that in order to prove that the Accused had abetted the commission of suicide by a person, the following has to be established:

(i) the Accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and

(ii) that the Accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.

36. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal   MANU/SC/1808/2009 : 2009:INSC:1228 : (2010) 1 SCC 707, this Court after referring to some of the previous decisions held that it has been the consistent view that before holding an Accused guilty of an offence Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the Accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 Indian Penal Code would not be sustainable. Thereafter, this Court held as under:

13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 Indian Penal Code there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code.

38. In Rajesh v. State of Haryana   MANU/SC/0047/2019 : 2019:INSC:60 : (2020) 15 SCC 359, this Court after referring to Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code held as follows:

9. Conviction Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the Accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 Indian Penal Code, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code.

39. Reverting back to the decision in M. Mohan (supra), this Court observed that abetment would involve a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the Accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Delineating the intention of the legislature and having regard to the ratio of the cases decided by this Court, it was concluded that in order to convict a person Under Section 306 Indian Penal Code there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the Accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.

40. Sounding a note of caution, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal   MANU/SC/0321/1994 : 1993:INSC:307 : (1994) 1 SCC 73 observed that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the Accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1427 of 2011

Decided On: 01.03.2024

Kumar Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bela M. Trivedi and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Citation: 2024:INSC:156:[2024]3S.C.R. 329,MANU/HP/1742/2024.

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What is the basic concept of corpus delicti and doli capax?

 "Corpus delicti" and "doli capax" are legal concepts related to criminal law and are often used to determine whether a crime has occurred and whether a person is capable of criminal intent. Here's an explanation of each concept:

1. Corpus Delicti:

• Definition: "Corpus delicti" is a Latin term that means "the body of the crime." It refers to the principle that before a person can be convicted of a crime, it must be established that a crime has actually occurred. In other words, it is the proof or evidence that a crime has been committed, and it typically consists of two elements: the occurrence of the prohibited act (actus reus) and the presence of criminal intent (mens rea).

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Whether the court can convict husband for abetment of suicide to wife in the absence of mens rea and overt acts?

To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under

Sec 107 of the IPC, the state of mind to commit a

particular crime must be visible, to determine the

culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to

be something on record to establish or show that the

appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance

of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the

deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed

to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and

conspicuous. However, what transpires in the present

matter is that both the Trial Court as well as the High

Court never examined whether appellant had the mens rea

for the crime, he is held to have committed.

Proceeding with the above understanding of the law

and applying the ratios to the facts in the present

case, what is apparent is that no overt act or illegal

omission is seen from the appellant’s side, in taking

due care of his deceased wife. The evidence also does

not indicate that the deceased faced persistent

harassment from her husband. Nothing to this effect is

testified by the parents or any of the other

prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court and the High

Court speculated on the unnatural death and without any

evidence concluded only through conjectures, that the

appellant is guilty of abetting the suicide of his

wife.

20. In such circumstances, we have no hesitation in

declaring that the Trial Court and the High Court erred

in concluding that the deceased was driven to commit

suicide, by the circumstances or atmosphere in the

matrimonial home. This is nothing more than an

inference, without any material support. Therefore, the

same cannot be the basis for sustaining conviction of

the appellant, under section 306 of the IPC.

 [REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.40 OF 2011

Gurcharan Singh  Vs The State of Punjab 

Author: Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Dated: OCTOBER 1, 2020

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Whether accused can be held guilty for the offence of murder if he had no intention to cause death?

In this backdrop, the short question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant's act of causing death of Smt. Anita and Khushal Singh tantamounts to offence of 'murder' as held by the trial court and the High Court or any lesser offence as urged by Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned senior Counsel for the Appellant. Sections 299 as well as 300, Indian Penal Code provide for situations in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury which the offender knows is likely to cause death. Both Sections 299 and 300 deal with instances in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom injury is inflicted. These provisions also deal with cases where there is no intention of either causing death or a bodily injury which is ordinarily sufficient to cause death. The absence of intention to cause death or bodily injury which is in the ordinary course of nature likely to cause death is, therefore, not conclusive. What is required to be seen is whether the act is one where the offender must be deemed to have had the knowledge that he was likely, by such act, to cause death.

 The Appellant is, thus, guilty of an act, the likely consequences of which including causing fatal injuries to the persons being in a close circuit, are attributable to him. The offence committed by the Appellant, thus, would amount to 'culpable homicide' within the meaning of Section 299, though punishable Under Section 304 Part 2 of the Indian Penal Code.

17. Incidents of celebratory firing are regretfully rising, for they are seen as a status symbol. A gun licensed for self-protection or safety and security of crops and cattle cannot be fired in celebratory events, it being a potential cause of fatal accidents. Such like misuse of fire arms convert a happy event to a pall of gloom. Appellant cannot escape the consequences of carrying the gun with live cartridges with the knowledge that firing at a marriage ceremony with people present there was imminently dangerous and was likely to cause death.

 Everybody, who carries a gun with live cartridges and even others know that firing a gun and that too in the presence of several people is an act, is likely to cause death, as indeed it did. Guns must be carried with a sense of responsibility and caution and are not meant to be used in such places like marriage ceremonies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2020 

Decided On: 18.03.2020

 Bhagwan Singh  Vs. State of Uttarakhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.

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Whether it is necessary to prove that accused caused death of Rape victim with mensrea for applicability of S 376A of IPC?

The above cited principles have been minutely observed by us,

taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case

in hand. At the outset, we would highlight that the High Court while

confirming death has observed that the girl was found bleeding due to

forcible sexual intercourse — which fact, however, is not supported by

medical evidence. However, such erroneous finding has no impact on

conviction under Section 376A of the I.P.C. for a bare perusal of the section

shows that only the factum of death of the victim during the offence of rape is required, and such death need not be with any guilty intention or be a

natural consequence of the act of rape only. It is worded broadly enough to

include death by any act committed by the accused if done

contemporaneously with the crime of rape. Any other interpretation would

defeat the object of ensuring safety of women and would perpetuate the

earlier loophole of the rapists claiming lack of intention to cause death to

seek a reduced charge under Section 304 of I.P.C. as noted in the Report

of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, headed by Justice

J.S. Verma, former Chief Justice of India:

“22. While we believe that enhanced penalties in a substantial

number of sexual assault cases can be adjudged on the basis of

the law laid down in the aforesaid cases, certain situations

warrant a specific treatment. We believe that where the offence

of sexual assault, particularly ‘gang rapes’, is accompanied by

such brutality and violence that it leads to death or a Persistent

Vegetative State (or ‘PVS’ in medical terminology), punishment

must be severe – with the minimum punishment being life

imprisonment. While we appreciate the argument that where

such offences result in death, the case may also be tried under

Section 302 of the IPC as a ‘rarest of the rare’ case, we must

acknowledge that many such cases may actually fall within the

ambit of Section 304 (Part II) since the ‘intention to kill’ may

often not be established. In the case of violence resulting in

Persistent Vegetative State is concerned, we are reminded of

the moving story of Aruna Shanbagh, the young nurse who was

brutally raped and lived the rest of her life (i.e. almost 36 years)

in a Persistent Vegetative State.

23. In our opinion, such situations must be treated differently

because the concerted effort to rape and to inflict violence may

disclose an intention deserving an enhanced punishment. We

have therefore recommended that a specific provision, namely,

Section 376 (3) should be inserted in the Indian Penal Code to

deal with the offence of “rape followed by death or resulting in a

Persistent Vegetative State”.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1523-1524 OF 2019

Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 

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What are essential requirement for prosecuting director of company along with company for rash and negligent act?

 By applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal MANU/SC/0016/2015 : (2015) 4 SCC 609 it is clear that an individual either as a Director or a Managing Director or Chairman of the company can be made an Accused, along with the company, only if there is sufficient material to prove his active role coupled with the criminal intent. Further the criminal intent alleged must have direct nexus with the Accused. Further in the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU/SC/7923/2007 : (2008) 5 SCC 668 this Court has examined the vicarious liability of Directors for the charges levelled against the Company. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has held that, the Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, when the Accused is a Company. It is held that vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the Statute. It is further held that Statutes indisputably must provide fixing such vicarious liability. It is also held that, even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1263 of 2019 

Decided On: 23.08.2019

Shiv Kumar Jatia  Vs. State of NCT of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4463

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When accused should be released on anticipatory bail in prosecution for offence under MCOCA?

 It is no doubt true that the High Court has wide powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution when a petition is filed
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, seeking protection of
fundamental rights of the Petitioner. We have ascertained the
claim of the Petitioner from the facts placed before us. The
perusal of the overall material against the Petitioner taken at its
face value, does not disclose any sufficient or tangible material
which according to us would justify the invocation of the
provisions of the MCOCA against the Petitioner. There is no
material placed on record to establish him as a member of any
crime syndicate nor it is established that he was a participant in
the commission of an offence by establishing that he had the
knowledge of the happenings in the Civil Hospital’s canteen
which was allotted to him on paper but which he never physically
administered by him. The confessional statement attributes no
role to the Petitioner and the chargesheet is bereft of any material

to establish that the Petitioner was in control of the canteen since
the year 2013. In such circumstances, we are prima facie satisfied
that the order granting sanction to prosecute the Petitioner by the
Special Inspector General of Police, CID, Pune, suffers from nonapplication
of mind as no material is brought on record in the
form of Charge Sheet justifying invocation of the provisions of
MCOCA against the Petitioner. In absence of any mens rea,
knowledge or intention, if the Petitioner is subjected to the rigors
of trial and with the stringent provisions of being incarcerated in
the absence of a provision for anticipatory bail and the grant of
bail being subjected to stringent condition enumerated in Section
23 of the Act, in our considered view the Petitioner is entitled for
protection against his arrest in the said offence reserving the
question of determination of validity of Section 21(3), in
appropriate proceedings. In the result, in exercise of our writ
jurisdiction to protect the fundamental rights of the Petitioner
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and to protect
him from being arrested under the relevant C.R in respect of
which a charge-sheet has been filed and the Petitioner has been
shown to be an absconding accused, we direct that the Petitioner
shall not be arrested in absence of any material being available
against the Petitioner in the charge-sheet establishing his
culpability under the provisions of the Maharashtra Control of
Organized Crime Act, 1999.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.913 OF 2019

Surjitsingh Bhagatsingh Gambhir Vs.The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SHRI RANJIT MORE &
SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 13th SEPTEMBER, 2019.
 [Per: Smt. Bharati Dangre, J.]

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Whether offence committed due to Premenstrual Stress Syndrome (PMS) qualifies for the defence of insanity?

It is trite that while the burden of proof for the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused is beyond reasonable doubt, the accused has to merely probabilize his defense by preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court in Bhikari v. State of U.P., supra, has held that where plea of insanity is invoked by the accused it is for him to establish that fact. In Sudhakaran v. State of Kerala, supra, the Supreme Court held that for the act of a person of unsound mind the crucial point of time for ascertaining existence of circumstances bringing case within purview of Section 84 of the IPC is the time when the offence is committed. The Supreme Court in Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, supra, interpreting Section 105 Illustration (a) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 held that nature of burden of proof on the accused to prove insanity is no higher than that which rests upon a party in civil proceedings. Similarly in Elavarasan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, supra, the Supreme Court held that burden of bringing his/her case under Section 84 of the IPC lies upon person claiming benefit thereof. However, standard of proof which accused has to satisfy for discharge of burden under Section 105 is not same as is expected of prosecution. It is enough for accused to establish his defence on preponderance of probabilities, as in a civil case. 

30. Law is thus well settled that the burden which lays on the accused-appellant was not higher than that which rests upon a party in a civil suit. According to the position emerging from the evidence in the light of such settled law, the appellant has been able to probabilize her defence that at the time of incident she was suffering from unsoundness of mind and was labouring under a defect of reason triggered by premenstrual stress syndrome. Even if the material placed before the court is held to be not sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, it still raises a reasonable doubt as to the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused-appellant, thus making out a case for extending benefit of doubt to her.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)

D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1987

Decided On: 01.08.2018

 Kumari Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mohammad Rafiq and Goverdhan Bardhar, JJ.

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Whether court can acquit accused even if he has failed to prove that he was insane at the time of incident?

The   law   undoubtedly   presumes   that   every   person

committing an offence is sane and liable for his acts, though in

specified circumstances it may be rebuttable.  The doctrine of

burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity was

stated as follows in  Dahyabhai  Chhaganbhai  Thakkar   v.

State of Gujarat, (1964) 7 SCR 361 :

“(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused had committed the offence

with   the   requisite   mens   rea,   and   the   burden   of

proving that always rests on the prosecution from the

beginning to the end of the trial. 

(2)   There   is   a   rebuttable   presumption   that   the

accused   was   not   insane,   when   he   committed   the

crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the

Indian   Penal   Code:   the   accused   may   rebut   it   by

placing before the court all the relevant evidence oral,

documentary   or  circumstantial,   but   the  burden  of

proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a

party to civil proceedings. 

(3)  Even  if  the  accused  was  not  able  to   establish

conclusively   that   he   was   insane   at   the   time   he

committed the offence, the evidence placed before the

court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise

a   reasonable   doubt   in   the   mind   of   the   court   as

regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence,

including mens rea of the accused and in that case

the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on

the ground that the general burden of proof resting

on the prosecution was not discharged.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.814 OF 2017

DEVIDAS LOKA RATHOD . V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 

Dated:JULY 02, 2018.
Citation: (2018) 7 SCC 718

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What are essential ingredient of offence of abetment of suicide?

    In   the   prosecution   under
Section   306,   IPC,   much   more   material
is   required.   The   Courts   have   to   be
extremely   careful   as   the   main   person
is not available for cross­examination
by   the   appellant/accused.   Unless,
therefore,   there   is   specific
allegation   and   material   of   definite
nature   (not   imaginary   or   inferential
one), it would be hazardous to ask the
appellant/accused to face the trial. A
criminal   trial   is   not   exactly   a
pleasant   experience.   The   person   like
the  appellant   in   present   case   who   is
serving   in   a   responsible   post   would
certainly suffer great prejudice, were
he   to   face   prosecution   on   absurd
allegations of irrelevant nature."  

In   the   facts   of   the   present   case
also,   there   is   no   nexus   between   so   called
suicide   and   any   of   the   alleged   acts   on   the
part of the applicant. There is no proximity
either.   Even   if   the   allegations   in   the
suicide   note   are   read   in   its   entirety,   the
same   would   not   even   remotely   suggest   that,
the applicant abetted, intentionally aided or
instigated   in   an   alleged   suicide   by   Vithal
Waghmare. 
9. The   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of
S.S.   Chheena   V/s   Vijay   Kumar   Mahajan   and
another  (2010) 12 SCC 190, 
 in   para   25   observed   that,   the
abetment   involves   mental   process   of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding
a   person   in   doing   of   a   thing.   Without   a
positive   act   on   the   part   of   the   accused   to
instigate   or   aid   in   committing   suicide,


conviction cannot be sustained. the intention
of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in order
to   convict   a   person   under   Section   306   IPC
there  has to be a clear  mens rea  to commit
the offence. It also requires an active act
or   direct   act   which   led   the   deceased   to
commit suicide seeing no option and that act
must have been intended to push the deceased
into   such   a   position   that   he   committed
suicide.          
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5283 OF 2016
Dadarao S/o Hausaji Dakore, V The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : S.S. SHINDE & 
                            K.K. SONAWANE, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 6th March, 2017
      


Citation: 2017 ALLMR(CRI)1538

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When court should not convict accused for possessing counterfeit currency?

In the case in hand, conviction for the offence punishable under Section 489C of IPC read with Section 34 thereof came to be recorded by the learned Trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution. Section 489C of the IPC reads thus:

"489-C. Possession of forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes-Whoever has in his possession any forged or counterfeit currency-note or bank-note, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be forged, or counterfeit and intending to use the same as genuine or that it may be used as genuine, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both"

The first and foremost ingredient of this Section is that the accused must possess forged or counterfeit currency notes. However, mere possession is not enough to record conviction for the offence under Section 489C of the IPC. What is required to prove next is conscious possession of fake or counterfeit currency notes. Therefore, prosecution is obliged to establish by adducing cogent and clear evidence that at the time of possessing forged or counterfeit currency notes, accused persons were knowing that what they are possessing are forged or counterfeit currency notes. Such knowledge or reason for belief can also be established by surrounding circumstances emerging on record as conscious possession is a state of mind and the same is required to be inferred by all attending circumstances brought on record.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 426 of 2010 and Criminal Application No. 1634 of 2014

Decided On: 16.02.2017

 Allauddin Jallauddin Shaikh and Ors.

Vs.

State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Badar, J.

Citation:2017 ALLMR(CRI)947

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Whether publication of identity of victim without malafide intention amounts to offence under POCSO Act?

  The subject matter of this writ petition is revolving

round Ext.P15 order passed by the Commission for Protection

of Child Rights.      The question to be decided is whether it

suffers from any manner of illegality or arbitrariness enabling

this Court to interfere with the same.            The paramount

contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the petitioner has made the post in the face book which

contained the name of the child with bonafide and good

intentions. The intention of the petitioner was to book the real

culprit, who is a teacher in the school in question. It is also

stated that the name of the child is contained in Exts.P7 and

P8 and P9, which were received by the petitioner under the RTI

Act, and therefore mere posting of the same will not amount to

the offence under Sec.23 of the POCSO Act.             Therefore,

essence of the issue is dependent on Sec.23 of POCSO Act,

which reads as follows:

              "23. Procedure for media.--(1) No person shall

      make any report or present comments on any child

      from any form of media or studio or photographic

      facilities  without  having  complete    and authentic

      information, which may have the effect of lowering his

      reputation or infringing upon his privacy.



           (2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the

     identity of a child including his name, address,

     photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or

     any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of

     identity of the child:

           Provided that for reasons to be recorded in

     writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case

     under the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its

     opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

           (3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio

     or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally

     liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.

           (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of

     sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be

     punished with imprisonment of either description for a

     period of which shall not be less than six months but

     which may extend to one year or with fine or with

     both".

     10. On an evaluation of Sec.23, it is unequivocally clear,

a prohibition is made under sub-section (1) thereto, by which,

no person shall make any report or comments on any child

from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities

without having complete and authentic information, which may

have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his

privacy.   Further, as per sub-section (2), no reports in any

media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name,



address,   photograph,     family   details,  school    etc.  etc.

Therefore, the intention under Sec.23 is very clear that the

victim child shall not be exposed to any sort of publication so

as to affect her future and damn her career. In my considered

opinion, in order to constitute an offence under sub-section (4)

of Sec.23, no mens rea, culpability, and malafide or illegal

intention is required. Mere publication of the details of the

victim child will attract the offence under sub-section (4).

Therefore, the thrust of the contention advanced by the

petitioner that the petitioner did not have any malafide

intention to expose the child, cannot be sustained under law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                        MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

                         11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016

                           WP(C).No. 31378 of 2016 (V)
                             

                     SUDHEESH KUMAR.S.R.,
               

V

            STATE OF KERALA,
                     Citation: 2017 CRLJ 443 kerala

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Whether accused can be convicted for offence of abetment of suicide if prosecution has failed to prove mensrea for offence?

The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been
enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab
(2004)13 SCC 129, and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out
hereunder.
“12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a
thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that
mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing
of that thing. More active role which can be described as
instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before
a person can be said to be abetting the commission of
offence under Section 306 IPC.
13. In State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73,
this Court has observed that the courts should be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced
in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the
cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced
her to end the life by committing suicide. If it
transpires to the court that a victim committing
suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite common
to the society to which the victim belonged and such
petulance, discord and differences were not expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given
society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court
should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should
be found guilty.”
29. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier
pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal (supra) that courts have to be
extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each
case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the
victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life
by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing
suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord
and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to
which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step,
the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty.
The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State
of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707.
30. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a
person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to
commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act
leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option,
had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay
Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190.
31. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat (2013) 10
SCC 48, this Court, with reference to Section 113A of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law
amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet
the social challenge of saving the married woman from being
ill-treated or forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his
relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of
proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as ingrained
therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the
prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person
charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised.
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1135 OF 2016
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO. 8764 OF 2016)
GURCHARAN SINGH
V
STATE OF PUNJAB 
Dated:DECEMBER 2, 2016.
Citation: (2017) 1 SCC 433

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Whether dispute can be referred to arbitration even though disputed act is an offence?

The High Court dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the impugned order placing reliance, in particular, on two decisions of this Court, one Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra) and Medchi Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 269. In the first case, this Court held that the exercise of inherent power should be limited to very extreme exceptions. Further it was held that referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. It may be noted that the said judgment gets attracted only when the disputed act is an offence, which the High Court has failed to notice. No doubt, exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions but in a case where ingredients of alleged offences are not satisfied even prima facie, it cannot be said that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to quash the process issued by a Magistrate. In the case of Smt. Nagawwa (supra), it is laid down that in such a case, power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the process issued by a Magistrate.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.)  1072 of 2001

S.W. PALANITKAR Vs STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/10/2001

BENCH:

D.P. MOHAPATRA & SHIVARAJ V. PATIL

Citation;2001 ( 4 )   Suppl.  SCR  397

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