Calcutta HC: Sharing screenshots of virtual Court proceedings on LinkedIn amounts to Contempt of Court

In course of the hearing today, this Court indicated to the parties the following

impropriety evident from the aforesaid screenshot/publication; ‐

[a] a screenshot of Court Proceeding has been taken which is equivalent to a

photograph of a Court Proceeding, without the leave of this Court.

[b] The screenshot was published in a personal web page of a website called

‘Linked In’ about two months ago without the leave or knowledge of this Court.

[b] an insinuation may be evident from the aforesaid writing on the page in

question seen with the screenshot.

The department is directed to number a suo motu contempt proceeding against Mr.

S. Kakrania, Advocate who shall answer the Rule that is issued herewith.

Formal drawing up of Rule and service of the same is dispensed with since Mr.

Kakrania is personally present in the hearing today. 

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction

ORIGINAL SIDE

GA NO.820 OF 2020

WITH

CS NO.2 OF 2017

LINDSAY INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD VS. LAXMI NIWAS MITTAL & ORS.

BEFORE:

The Hon’ble JUSTICE RAJASEKHAR MANTHA

Date: 12th August, 2020.

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How to ascertain territorial jurisdiction of court in defamation case?

Firstly, in my opinion the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is in fact misleading the Court by arguing that the interview having taken place at Delhi would give territorial jurisdiction to Delhi, inasmuch as, on a query of the Court as to whether such a plea is pleaded in the plaint, counsel for the appellant/plaintiff concedes that no plea is pleaded that part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi because appellant's/plaintiff's interview was taken at Delhi. Even assuming for the sake of argument such a plea has been taken/raised, even then in my opinion, that would not confer territorial jurisdiction to the courts at Delhi, inasmuch as, for a suit seeking compensation/damages for defamation, publication is a sine qua nonbecause it is only by publication of the alleged defamatory article that the alleged defamatory statement or article comes to the knowledge of the general public including those persons in whose estimation the plaintiff is brought down and is defamed. Therefore, mere interview in itself taken of the appellant/plaintiff does not result in arising of cause of action in Delhi, inasmuch as, defamation is caused only on account of the article which has been published in the Hindi newspaper Hindustan at Bhagalpur in Bihar and having circulation only at Bhagalpur in Bihar.

9. Facts of the judgment in the case of Jaharlal Pagalia (supra) in no manner applies to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, the said case did not pertain to any suit for defamation and arising of whole or part of cause of action for defamation merely because of giving/taking of an interview. As already stated above, it is only publication which results in defamation and without publication there is no defamation.

10. The next argument urged on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff was that since the respondent no. 1/defendant no. 1 has a head office/corporate office in Delhi, therefore, this Court would have territorial jurisdiction. This Court need not labor at length on this aspect because the issue is now well settled against the appellant/plaintiff for now over 27 years in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Roadways Limited (supra) and which holds that a mere plea of existence of a head office or a corporate office of a defendant company will not confer jurisdiction on a court if the defendant company has a branch office at the place where whole or part of cause of acting has arisen. In the present case, it is not disputed that the respondent no. 1/defendant no. 1 has an office at Bhagalpur in Bihar from where the Hindi newspaper Hindustan is published.

11. In view of the above discussion, there is no illegality which is found in the impugned order returning the plaint to be filed in the proper court of territorial jurisdiction.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Valmiki J. Mehta, J.)

Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Saha v. Hindustan Media Ventrues Ltd. & Ors. .

FAO No. 257/2017

Decided on July 6, 2017

2017 SCC OnLine Del 8970

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Whether publication of identity of victim without malafide intention amounts to offence under POCSO Act?

  The subject matter of this writ petition is revolving

round Ext.P15 order passed by the Commission for Protection

of Child Rights.      The question to be decided is whether it

suffers from any manner of illegality or arbitrariness enabling

this Court to interfere with the same.            The paramount

contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the petitioner has made the post in the face book which

contained the name of the child with bonafide and good

intentions. The intention of the petitioner was to book the real

culprit, who is a teacher in the school in question. It is also

stated that the name of the child is contained in Exts.P7 and

P8 and P9, which were received by the petitioner under the RTI

Act, and therefore mere posting of the same will not amount to

the offence under Sec.23 of the POCSO Act.             Therefore,

essence of the issue is dependent on Sec.23 of POCSO Act,

which reads as follows:

              "23. Procedure for media.--(1) No person shall

      make any report or present comments on any child

      from any form of media or studio or photographic

      facilities  without  having  complete    and authentic

      information, which may have the effect of lowering his

      reputation or infringing upon his privacy.



           (2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the

     identity of a child including his name, address,

     photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or

     any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of

     identity of the child:

           Provided that for reasons to be recorded in

     writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case

     under the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its

     opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

           (3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio

     or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally

     liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.

           (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of

     sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be

     punished with imprisonment of either description for a

     period of which shall not be less than six months but

     which may extend to one year or with fine or with

     both".

     10. On an evaluation of Sec.23, it is unequivocally clear,

a prohibition is made under sub-section (1) thereto, by which,

no person shall make any report or comments on any child

from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities

without having complete and authentic information, which may

have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his

privacy.   Further, as per sub-section (2), no reports in any

media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name,



address,   photograph,     family   details,  school    etc.  etc.

Therefore, the intention under Sec.23 is very clear that the

victim child shall not be exposed to any sort of publication so

as to affect her future and damn her career. In my considered

opinion, in order to constitute an offence under sub-section (4)

of Sec.23, no mens rea, culpability, and malafide or illegal

intention is required. Mere publication of the details of the

victim child will attract the offence under sub-section (4).

Therefore, the thrust of the contention advanced by the

petitioner that the petitioner did not have any malafide

intention to expose the child, cannot be sustained under law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                        MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

                         11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016

                           WP(C).No. 31378 of 2016 (V)
                             

                     SUDHEESH KUMAR.S.R.,
               

V

            STATE OF KERALA,
                     Citation: 2017 CRLJ 443 kerala

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What is acceptable mode of publication of assessment lists?

Nobody disputes that publication and the giving of notice to persons likely to be affected by the assessment list is a must. The appellants have admitted publication of the assessment lists in three newspapers. It is not their case that such publication did not serve the purpose of notifying those who might be affected by the assessment lists, of their existence. Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like Patna. The High Court's apprehension that "holding this provision as directory is likely to cause confusion and mischief in future and it is not for this Court to substitute the wisdom of the legislature with its own by holding that notice by newspaper will be sufficient in place of notice of the spot by beat of drum and placards" is unfounded both in law and in fact. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that words in statutory provisions take their colour from their context and object, keeping pace with the time when the word is being construed. When or where no other means of effective publication is available, no doubt, announcing the assessment list by beat of drum and by displaying placards would have to be complied with. Where equally efficacious, if not better, modes of publication are available, it would be ridiculous to insist on an obsolete form of publication as if it were a ritual. Had the High Court found that publication by newspapers was not effective enough to notify the public, the assessment list could not be given effect to unless publication were properly made. There is no such finding. On the other hand publication through newspapers is now an accepted form of giving general notice. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the portion of section 149 (1) which deals with the manner of publication, as opposed to the requirement for publication per se, is directory. Since there has been sufficient compliance in effecting the intention of the legislature to give notice to the public at large in the city of Patna, we cannot hold that the assessment lists prepared on the basis of the 1993 Rules are required to be set aside.

Supreme Court of India

Rai Vimal Krishna & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 7 July, 2003

Bench: Ruma Pal, B.N.Srikrishna.

           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  8263 of 2001

Citation:2003 AIR SCW 3360:2003(5)Scale 184:

2003(4) supreme 417

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When Court should not grant blanket injunction in case of publication which is in public interest?

In the written statement, a reference is made to the public 
notice issued by the Reserve Bank of India in several newspapers in 
respect of the restrictions put on the Janata Commercial Bank Ltd., 
Khamgaon,   with   which   the   close   connection   and   control   of   the 
plaintiff   and   his   family   members   is   sought   to   be   established.     The 
attempt   on   the   part   of   the   defendants   to   establish   the   defamatory 
allegations prima facie seems to be in good faith and for public good 
and interest by producing the material on record.  The Trial Court has 
committed an error in holding that the provision of law is that the 
defamatory articles are presumed to be false unless contrary is proved. 
It has also committed an error in pre­judging the issue by holding that 
the items published have no concern with the public interest or for 
public   good.     The   allegations   or   aspersions   made   in   the   articles 
prima  facie seem to  be  inter­linked.   The  grant of blanket order  of 
injunction cannot, therefore, be countenanced and it will have to be 

set   aside.     Shri   Sirpurkar,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the 
plaintiff,   has   relied   upon   several   decisions   referred   to   by   the   Trial 
Court in the impugned order.  However, I do not find it necessary to 
refer to those judgments at this stage. 
In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.  

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

 Sanj Daily Lokopchar,
through its owner
Kishor Babulbhai Ruparel,

Occupaation – Editor, Owner
and Publisher Sanj Daily
Lokopchar,
Office at Sunny Tower,
Main Road, Khamgaon,
Dist. Buldhana.

Versus
Gokulchand Govindlal Sananda,

Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.


Date of Pronouncing the Judgment :  10   October, 2014
 th 
 Citation;2015(2) MHLJ 390

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