1) In the divorce proceedings, the husband filed a Compact Disc (CD) purporting to contain an audio-video
recording of the wife supposedly speaking with her lady friend, by name Sugandha, on phone and talking about the husband and his family in a manner, which the husband claims was derogatory, defamatory and constituted cruelty to him.
2) The wife opposed the CD being brought on record on the ground, firstly, that the contents of the CD were tampered with and were therefore not authentic ; and secondly, that the contents of the CD were not admissible in evidence since they were a
recording of a ‘private’ conversation that the wife had had with a friend, which had been secretly recorded by the husband, without the knowledge or consent of the wife, in breach of her fundamental right to privacy.
3) On the other hand, it is the husband's contention that although privacy
has been recognised by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, this right
is not absolute but is subject to exceptions. Relying upon other judicial
precedents, it is urged that the husband was entitled to establish cruelty on
the wife’s part and to prove his case seeking dissolution of marriage on that
ground ; and in these circumstances, the wife's right to privacy must give
way to the husband's right to bring evidence to prove his case, else the
husband would be denied the right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. It is of course also argued on behalf of the husband, that
section 14 of the Family Courts Act specifically empowers a Family Court
to receive evidence, if in its opinion such evidence will assist the court to
deal effectively with the dispute, regardless of whether the same is otherwise
relevant or admissible under the Evidence Act.
4) While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must
4) While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must
yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant
to court, to prove its case. It is a critical part of the hallowed concept of fair
trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence
before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is
essentially a personal right, the right to a fair trial has wider ramifications
and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public
justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out
evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead at the very threshold.
24. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the
event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest
between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise
under the expansive Article 21, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial.
5) If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy or some other cognate right, then in many a case the provisions of section 14 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It must be borne in mind that Family Courts have been established to deal with what are essentially
sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which
they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It
is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the
Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshalled would relate to the private affairs of the litigating parties. If section 14 is held not to apply in its full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person's right to privacy, then section 14 may as well be effaced from the statute. And yet, falling back upon the general rule of evidence, the test of admissibility would only be
relevance ; and accordingly, even ignoring section 14, fundamental considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. No purpose would therefore be served by emasculating the salutary provisions of section 14 of
the Family Courts Act by citing breach of privacy. Looking at it
dispassionately, even assuming evidence is collected in breach of privacy, at best and at worst, it is the process of collection of evidence that would be tainted not the evidence itself.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Dated : 30th June, 2020
CM(M) 40/2019 and CM APPL.No.1226/2019
DEEPTI KAPUR Vs KUNAL JULKA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI




