Supreme Court: Whether accused involved in matrimonial offence can be permitted to accept Job Abroad?

 After hearing learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the permission sought by the appellant to travel abroad to join as Cyber Security Architect with a company in Belgium should not be denied, merely on account of pendency of the aforesaid case against him. It is not in dispute that the appellant is in India for the last more than one year, still the investigation has not been completed. In case the appellant is not allowed to go abroad to join the service, as has been offered to him, his career prospects may be affected. However, we grant permission to the appellant subject to the following conditions:

(i) The appellant will deposit a sum of ` 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) with the Trial Court within two weeks which shall be kept in a fixed deposit in any nationalized bank initially for a period of one year and shall be renewed automatically thereafter, till either the appellant comes back or the trial is over. Specific order of the Trial Court shall be required to release that FDR;

(ii) The appellant shall furnish an undertaking before the Trial Court within two weeks that he will attend each and every hearing of the case, as and when chargesheet, if any, is filed and also attend the hearing personally in case the Court so requires; and

(iii) In case of his failure to comply with the undertaking given by him, the amount of ` 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakhs only) shall stand forfeited to the State, on passing of order by the Trial Court. {Para 5}

6. The order dated 24th September, 2024 passed by the High Court stands modified to the extent mentioned above.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2025

Date of Order: 09.12.2025

A.Mohammed Zaheer Vs. The State Rep . By The Inspector Of Police and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/94504/2025

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Supreme Court: Bail In matrimonial offences Can't Be Conditional On Payment Of Maintenance

 With the above, the counsel argues that the High Court while considering bail, should not have imposed a precondition on the appellant for paying maintenance (Rupees Four Thousand per month), as was recorded in the impugned order dated 17.07.2023. {Para 7}

9. When application for bail is filed, the Court is required

to impose such bail conditions which would ensure that the

appellant does not flee from justice and is available to face

Trial. Imposing conditions which are irrelevant for exercise

of power under Section 438 of the CrPC would not therefore be

warranted.

11. Having considered the above, we are of the view that the bail condition imposed by the High Court directing the appellant to pay Rupees Four Thousand per month as maintenance to the informant (respondent no.2) was not merited. The same is accordingly set aside and quashed. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No(s). 2025

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s).13083/2023

 SRIKANT KUMAR @ SHRIKANT KUMAR Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.

Dated: JANUARY 06, 2025.

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Relaxation of 'locus standi' rule for offences and proceedings arising out of marriage and its justification

 The concept of 'locus standi' in Indian law dictates who has the legal right to initiate court proceedings in a particular matter. Traditionally, the rule for matrimonial offenses and proceedings was strict, meaning only the directly affected spouses had the standing to file complaints or petitions. This often left vulnerable individuals, particularly women, facing challenges in seeking legal redressal for marital wrongs.

In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition of the need to relax the locus standi rule for offences and proceedings arising out of marriage. This relaxation aims to improve access to justice for victims of domestic violence, adultery, cruelty, and other matrimonial offenses.

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Whether the court can hold accused guilty U/S 498A of IPC if the wife was given cruelty due to her dark complexion?

 Though argument was raised that prosecution case could not be

believed on the ground that even after knowing the commission of cruelty

upon the victim, and cause of cruelty, the parents of victim never

reported the same to police station or to panchyaat body, and the

neighbouring people living around in-law’s house of deceased victim, but

this cannot be invariable rule that parent would immediately lodge a

complaint immediately after knowing commission of cruelty upon their daughter, ignoring possibilty of reconciliation mutually. It is ordinary conduct that parents would prefer to persuade their daughter ignoring the torture, and the cruelty for the future benefit of their daughter.

Causing cruelty to deceased victim for her black complexion even after her marriage by the in-law’s members would definitly attract Section 498A/34 I.P.C. against the in-law’s members, including accused husband.

In the High Court at Calcutta

Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present:-

The Hon’ble Justice Sahidullah Munshi.

And

The Hon’ble Justice Subhasis Dasgupta.

CRA No. 247 of 2006

Mazidul Miah @ Mia & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal

Judgment on : 25.06.2020

Subhasis Dasgupta, J:-

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Whether court can discard dying declaration even if doctor has given certificate that deceased was in fit state of mind at time of dying declaration?

In our view, though dying declarations stand proved, the issue is whether we can convict the Accused only on the basis of these dying declarations. In a case of the present nature where the victim had 98% burns and the doctor has stated from the record that a painkiller was injected at 3.30 a.m. and the dying declaration had been recorded thereafter, there is a serious doubt whether the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. She was suffering from 98% burns. She must have been in great agony and once a sedative had been injected, the possibility of her being in a state of delusion cannot be completely ruled out. It would also be pertinent to mention that the endorsement made by the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement has been made not before the statement but after the statement was recorded. Normally it should be the other way round.

14. No doubt, a dying declaration is an extremely important piece of evidence and where the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary and not a result of any extraneous influence, the Court can convict the Accused only on the basis of a dying declaration. We need not refer to the entire law but it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/8463/2006 : (2006) 13 SCC 165 held as follows:

11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the Accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute Rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The Rule requiring corroboration is merely a Rule of prudence....

15. In the present case, as we have already held above, there was some doubt as to whether the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. No doubt, the doctor had stated that she was in a fit state of mind but he himself had, in his evidence, admitted that in the case of a victim with 98% burns, the shock may lead to delusion. Furthermore, in our view, the combined effect of the trauma with the administration of painkillers could lead to a case of possible delusion, and therefore, there is a need to look for corroborative evidence in the present case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 694-695 of 2011

Decided On: 09.04.2019

 Sampat Babso Kale Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 4 SCC 739

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Guidelines of Supreme court to prevent misuse of S 498A of IPC

Thus, after careful consideration of the whole issue, we consider it fit to give following directions:

i) (a) In every district one or more Family Welfare Committees be constituted by the District Legal Services Authorities preferably comprising of three members. The constitution and working of such committees may be reviewed from time to time and at least once in a year by the District and Sessions Judge of the district who is also the Chairman of the District Legal Services Authority.

(b) The Committees may be constituted out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens who may be found suitable and willing.

(c) The Committee members will not be called as witnesses.

(d) Every complaint Under Section 498A received by the police or the Magistrate be referred to and looked into by such committee. Such committee may have interaction with the parties personally or by means of telephone or any other mode of communication including electronic communication.

(e) Report of such committee be given to the Authority by whom the complaint is referred to it latest within one month from the date of receipt of complaint.

(f) The committee may give its brief report about the factual aspects and its opinion in the matter.

(g) Till report of the committee is received, no arrest should normally be effected.

(h) The report may be then considered by the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate on its own merit.

(i) Members of the committee may be given such basic minimum training as may be considered necessary by the Legal Services Authority from time to time.

(j) The Members of the committee may be given such honorarium as may be considered viable.

(k) It will be open to the District and Sessions Judge to utilize the cost fund wherever considered necessary and proper.

ii) Complaints Under Section 498A and other connected offences may be investigated only by a designated Investigating Officer of the area. Such designations may be made within one month from today. Such designated officer may be required to undergo training for such duration (not less than one week) as may be considered appropriate. The training may be completed within four months from today;

iii) In cases where a settlement is reached, it will be open to the District and Sessions Judge or any other senior Judicial Officer nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case if dispute primarily relates to matrimonial discord;

iv) If a bail application is fled with at least one clear day's notice to the Public Prosecutor/complainant, the same may be decided as far as possible on the same day. Recovery of disputed dowry items may not by itself be a ground for denial of bail if maintenance or other rights of wife/minor children can otherwise be protected. Needless to say that in dealing with bail matters, individual roles, prima facie truth of the allegations, requirement of further arrest/custody and interest of justice must be carefully weighed;

v) In respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of Red Corner Notice should not be a routine;

vi) It will be open to the District Judge or a designated senior judicial officer nominated by the District Judge to club all connected cases between the parties arising out of matrimonial disputes so that a holistic view is taken by the Court to whom all such cases are entrusted; and

vii) Personal appearance of all family members and particularly outstation members may not be required and the trial court ought to grant exemption from personal appearance or permit appearance by video conferencing without adversely affecting progress of the trial.

viii) These directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1265 of 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2013 of 2017)

Decided On: 27.07.2017

 Rajesh Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 3869

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When matrimonial offence which is condoned will revive?

 But condonation of a matrimonial offence is not to be likened to a full Presidential Pardon under Article 72 of the Constitution which, once granted, wipes out the guilt beyond the possibility of revival. Condonation is always subject to the implied condition that the offending spouse will not commit a fresh matrimonial offence, either of the same variety as the one condoned or of any other variety. "No matrimonial offence is erased by condonation. It is obscured but not obliterated" See Words and Phrases Legally Defined (Butterworlhs) 1969 Fd., Vol I, p. 305, ("Condonation") Since the condition of forgiveness is that no further matrimonial offence shall occur, it is not necessary that the fresh offence should be ejusdem generis with the original offence See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 12, p. 3061. Condoned cruelty can therefore be revived, say, by desertion or adultery."

59. Section 23(1)(b) of the Act, it may be urged, speaks of condonation but not of its revival and therefore the English doctrine of revival should not be imported into matters arising under the Act. Apparently, this argument may seem to receive some support from the circumstances that under the English law, until the passing of the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 which while abolishing the traditional bars to relief introduces defences in the nature of bars, at least one matrimonial offence, namely, adultery could not be revived if once condoned See Rayden on Divorce, 11th Ed. (1971) pp. 11, 12, 23,68,2403. But a closer examination of such an argument would reveal its weakness. The doctrine of condonation was established by the old ecclesiastical courts in Great Britain and was adopted by the English Courts from the canon law. 'Condonation' is a technical word which means and implies a conditional waiver of the right of the injured spouse to take matrimonial proceedings. It is not 'forgiveness' as commonly understood See Words and Phrases Legally Defined (Butterworths) 1969 Ed., p. 306 and the Cases cited therein. In England condoned adultery could not be revived because of the express provision contained in Section 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963 which was, later incorporated into Section42(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 19b5. In the absence of any such provision in the Act governing the charge of cruelty, the word 'condonation' must receive the meaning which it has borne for centuries in the world of law See Ferrers v. Ferrers (1791) 1 Hag. Con. 130 . 'Condonation under Section 23(1)(b) therefore means conditional forgiveness, the implied condition being that no further matrimonial offence shall be committed,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2224 of 1970

Decided On: 19.03.1975

Dr. N.G. Dastane

Vs.

Mrs. S. Dastane

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.L. Untwalia, P.K. Goswami and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation:1975 AIR 1534 1975 SCR (3) 967,1975 SCC (2) 326

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Leading Supreme court judgment on condonation of cruelty in matrimonial matters

 Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation there must be, therefore, two things : forgiveness and restoration. The Law and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes by D. Tolstoy Sixth Ed., p. 75. The evidence of condonation in this case is, in our opinion, as strong and satisfactory as the evidence of cruelty. But that evidence does not D consist in the mere fact that the spouses continued to share a common home during or for some time after the spell of cruelty. Cruelty, generally, does not consist of a single, isolated act but consists in most cases of a series of acts spread over a period of time. Law does not require that at the first appearance of accrual act, the other spouse must leave the matrimonial home lest the continued co-habitation be construed as condonation. Such a construction will hinder reconciliation and there- E by frustrate the benign purpose of marriage laws.

57. The evidence of condonation consists here in the fact that the spouses led a normal sexual life despite the respondent's -acts of cruelty. This is not a case where the spouses, after separation, indulged in a stray act of sexual intercourse, in which case the necessary intent to forgive and restore may be said to be lacking. Such stray acts may bear more than F one explanation. But if during co-habitation the spouses, uninfluenced by the conduct of the offending spouse, lead a life of intimacy which characterises normal matrimonial relationship, the intent to forgive and restore the offending spouse to the original status may reasonably be inferred. There is then no scope for imagining that the conception of the child could be the result of a single act of sexual intercourse and that such an act could be a stark animal act unaccompanied by the nobler graces of marital life. One might then as well imagine that the sexual act was undertaken just in order to kill boredom or even in a spirit of revenge. Such speculation is impermissible. Sex" plays an important role in marital life and cannot be separated from other factors which lend to matrimony a sense of fruition and fulfilment. Therefore, evidence showing that the spouses led a normal sexual life even after a series of acts of cruelty by one spouse is proof that the other spouse condoned that cruelty. Intercourse, of course, is not a necessary ingredient of condonation because there may be evidence otherwise to show that the offending spouse has been forgiven and has been received back into the position previously occupied in the home. But intercourse in circumstances as obtain here would raise a strong inference of condonation with its dual requirement, forgiveness and restoration. That inference stands uncontradicted, the appellant not having explained the circumstances in which he came to lead and live a normal sexual life with the respondent, even after a series of acts of cruelty on her part.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2224 of 1970

Decided On: 19.03.1975

Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.L. Untwalia, P.K. Goswami and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation:1975 AIR 1534 1975 SCR (3) 967,1975 SCC (2) 326

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Whether High court can quash prosecution U/S 498A of IPC if there is settlement between parties?

The Courts in India are now normally taking the view that
endeavour should be taken to promote conciliation and secure speedy
settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs such as,
matrimonial disputes between the couple or/and between the wife and
her in-laws. India being a vast country naturally has large number of
married persons resulting into high numbers of matrimonial disputes
due to differences in temperament, life-styles, opinions, thoughts etc.
between such couples, due to which majority is coming to the Court to
get redressal. In its 59th report, the Law Commission of India had
emphasized that while dealing with disputes concerning the family, the
Court ought to adopt an approach radically different from that
adopted in ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make
reasonable efforts at settlement before the commencement of the trial.
Further it is also the constitutional mandate for speedy disposal of
such disputes and to grant quick justice to the litigants. But, our
Courts are already over burdened due to pendency of large number of
cases because of which it becomes difficult for speedy disposal of
matrimonial disputes alone. As the matrimonial disputes are mainly
between the husband and the wife and personal matters are involved
in such disputes, so, it requires conciliatory procedure to bring a
settlement between them. Nowadays, mediation has played a very
important role in settling the disputes, especially, matrimonial
disputes and has yielded good results. The Court must exercise its
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to put an end to the
matrimonial litigations at the earliest so that the parties can live
peacefully.
12. Since the subject matter of this FIR is essentially matrimonial,
which now stands mutually and amicably settled between the parties,
therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in
question would be an exercise in futility and is a fit case for this Court
to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.
13. In the facts and circumstances of this case, in view of statement
made by the respondent No.2 and the settlement arrived at between the
parties, the FIR in question warrants to be put to an end and
proceedings emanating thereupon need to be quashed.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 CRL.M.C. 2129/2016
Date of Decision: October 20th, 2016
GIRISH PANDEY & ORS .
Versus
STATE & ANR 
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

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Whether one spouse is supposed to maintain logbook to note down matrimonial offences committed by other spouse?

The parties are required to make specific pleadings for the reason that
it enables the opposite party to specifically meet, verify, and if necessary,
challenge/deny the averments/ allegations. Otherwise, the opposite party
would remain in the dark and would not be able to effectively deal with the
accusations, allegations and averments made against him/her.
30. Apart from making the aforesaid specific allegations, the respondent
also made general allegations in his petition with regard to the alleged
general conduct and behaviour of the appellant. It may not always be
possible for a party to make specific allegations with regard to the date,
time, place of occurrence in relation to a generalized conduct, act or
omission – where such conduct is repeated continuously over a period of
time. Thus, the allegations that the appellant used to call the respondent
‘Hathi’ or ‘Mota Hathi’, cannot be given a particular date, time or place of 
utterance as, according to the respondent, such an utterance was repeatedly
made by the appellant. Similarly, it may not be possible to give specific
dates and times in relation to the allegations that the appellant denied sex to
the respondent consistently. When two parties are in a marital relationship,
neither is expected to maintain a logbook and note down therein each and
every instance of matrimonial offence committed by the other. When the
allegation is that a party showed uncooperative attitude towards his/her
spouse and family members; did not show respect to the other spouse and
his family members; misbehaved and abused with the opposite party and his
family members – in respect of such allegations, it may not be possible to
plead a specific date, time or place of occurrence. However, when
intolerable conduct/matrimonial offence manifests itself into an incident
which has larger proportions, the aggrieved party would be able to pin
pointedly – with particulars and details, recite and establish such
matrimonial offence.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment delivered on: 22.03.2016
 MAT. APP. 68/2012
SA ..... Appellant

versus
AA ..... Respondent

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
Citation: 2016 (3) ALLMR(JOURNAL)60

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When person who is accused in matrimonial offence can be permitted to go abroad?

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as
counsel for the complainant and I am of the opinion that the main allegations
under Section 494 IPC were against Pakhar Singh who had allegedly
married Mohinder Kaur in the year 1971. The complaint admittedly had
been filed after a period of about 37 years. There is no specific day, date
and time mentioned in the complaint regarding first or second marriage. The
culpability of petitioner No.2-Mohinder Kaur is to be determined on the
basis of her knowledge of the first marriage besides the establishment of the
factum of second marriage being void. The fact remains that she cannot be
penalized for the delay being caused in the adjudication of the private
complaint which has been filed after a gap of 37 years. The property of
Pakhar Singh is situated in India. Petitioner No.2 Mohinder Kaur has got a
claim in the same. The litigation regarding her property is pending. It is a
settled principle of law that an accused will be deemed to be innocent till
proved guilty but at the same time life and liberty of an accused has not to be
prejudiced on account of any act of the Court. Maintainability of the
complaint after a period of 37 years would certainly be a debatable issue.
This Court is not expressing any opinion regarding the rights of the parties in
the property of Pakhar Singh. Striking a balance between the liberty of
petitioner No.2 and her status of innocence during the pendency of the trial
vis-à-vis the right of complainant to prosecute petitioner No.2 by

establishing the allegations to logical end, I deem it appropriate to permit
petitioner No.2, a lady, to leave India for a period of six months in order to
enable her to visit her home in Canada. It is ordered that petitioner No.2 will
be required to deposit a sum of Rs. 5 lacs with the trial Court and surety
bond for a sum of Rs.1 lac to the satisfaction of the Court to return after six
months which will be determined by the Court. Her passport will be
released to her on furnishing the above said surety and security. It is ordered
that the amount of Rs.5 lacs deposited in the Court would be released to the
complainant besides the right of the State to forfeit the amount in case the
conditions of the bond are violated by petitioner No.2-Mohinder Kaur and
she does not return back after a period of six months.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH.
 CRM M-7234 of 2015(O&M)
Date of Decision: November 9, 2015
Pakhar Singh and another

 Vs.
State of Punjab and anr.

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M.S. BEDI.

Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL287

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When delay in lodging FIR in matrimonial offence is not fatal to case?

 On the basis of relevant facts the High Court appears to be
justified in holding that there is good explanation for the delay in
lodging the FIR on 22.11.1993 because PW-15 delayed the inquest
proceedings without valid reasons leading to delay in the postmortem
examination as well and only on knowledge of the injuries etc. the


mother of the deceased gathered strength to lodge the FIR. When the
deceased died leaving a son of ten months old the mother of the
deceased had many other things to worry for, including cremation of
the dead body and in such circumstances the High Court was justified
in criticizing the trial court for its hyper technical approach in
blaming the mother of the deceased for lodging a delayed complaint. It
will be useful to remember that delay in lodging the FIR or complaint
is not fatal in all cases. The Court must show some sensitivity in
cases of present nature where the victim’s closest relation - mother is
a poor helpless lady. Even a well to do person may suffer a state of
mental confusion when struck by such a tragedy. The prosecution in
such cases is likely to be delayed further if the deceased has left
behind children. The issues relating to their safety and custody often
require higher priority. Occurrences of the present nature require
lodging of criminal case against persons who are already in the
category of relation by virtue of matrimonial ties through the deceased
and it is not always easy to take a decision whether to lodge a
criminal case against a relation or not. Hence in such cases the
factum of delay has to be dealt with sympathetically keeping in mind
the mental condition of the close relations of the victim. The trial court
miserably failed on this count too.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1358 of 2008
Satish Shetty …..Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka …..Respondent
Dated:June 03, 2016.
SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

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When prosecution for misappropriation of streedhan can be quashed?

Para 4 of the complaint Annexure P. 1 reads "That immediately after the marriage the intention of all the accused became very clear when they started maltreating Inderpal Kaur and forced her to bring more dowry as the accused were not satisfied with the dowry which Inderpal Kaur received from her parents and entrusted the same to her husband and other accused. The property came 'Istri Dhan' and the accused with deceitful means have sold some of (he articles and the remaining converted to their own use. There is thus no specific allegation of entrustment of any particular article of dowry to any of the thee persons (Husband and both parents-in-law) arrayed as accused in the complaint. This Court has consistently held in Smt. Manna v. State of Haryana, 1987 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 219 and Shori Lal and others v. Smt. Nisha and another, 1989 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 276 that no case under Section 405 or Section 406,Indian Penal Code, is made out against the petitioner where the allegations regarding entrustment of articles are vague. Relevant observations read, "The matter does not rest here as the trial of the complaint leveals that no specific allegations regarding entrustment of the articles or maltreatment has been levelled against them. Simply because they were found wearing some ornaments of the complainant, it cannot be said that they have committed any offence underSections 405 and 406, Indian Penal Code, due to lack of prima facie proof of entrusting the property of them. Similarly, there is no specific allegation of entrustment of the articles forming Istri Dhan of the complainant to or against the parents of the husband. In this view of the matter complaint Annexure P. 1 needs to be quashed.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Gurvel Singh vs Rajinder Singh on 21 November, 1989

Equivalent citations: I (1990) DMC 139

Bench: S Bajaj

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Precaution to be taken by magistrate while issuing process against accused in case involving matrimonial offence

In Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. &
Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.2055 of 2014 decided on
6.9.2014), it was observed:
“9. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal
complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been
named and in the criminal complaint they have been
named without attributing any specific role to them.
The relationship of the appellants with the husband of
the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj vs. State of
Punjab & Ors. [(2000) 5 SCC 207], it was observed:-
“5………A tendency has, however, developed
for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the
deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths
which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the
case of the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety
to seek conviction for maximum people, the
parents of the deceased have been found to be
making efforts for involving other relations
which ultimately weaken the case of the
prosecution even against the real accused as
appears to have happened in the instant case.”
The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant
relatives without there being specific material. Only the
husband, his parents or at best close family members
may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the
wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible
material to support allegations made against such
distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is
not enough to summon them in absence of any specific
role and material to support such role.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.456 OF 2015

TARAMANI PARAKH Vs STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 

Dated;MARCH 16, 2015

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
Citation;2015CriLJ2031, 2015(2)Crimes104(SC), I(2015)DMC764SC,2015(2)BomCR(Cri)453,

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Whether persons not residing with husband can be charged for criminal breach of trust relating to streedhan of wife?

In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.

Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014

Decided On: 14.01.2015

 Gopal and Ors.Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.

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Landmark judgment relating to issue red corner notice in matrimonial offence

We have already held above that the Municipal Laws of a country reign supreme in matters of Extradition. It is thus for the State concerned to take a decision in regard to such Notices, keeping in view the Municipal Laws of the country. The High Court was, therefore, in our opinion, clearly wrong in holding that a Red Corner Notice should not be tinkered with. When a person complains of a violation of his Fundamental Right and/or otherwise of his fundamental right he is entitled to the right of judicial review. It ought not to be forgotten here that the dispute between the Appellant and the Respondent No. 6, being essentially a Matrimonial dispute, is a private dispute and no criminal extraditable offence can be made out of the same, in the absence of a specific request for extradition.

143. The High Court, thus, in our opinion, committed a serious error insofar as it failed to take into consideration the provisions of the Act, in the absence of any request having being made by the Govt. of USA to the Executive Government of the Union of India or any authorization made by the latter on its behalf.

144. A fundamental Right of a citizen whenever infringes, the High Courts having regard to their extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as also keeping in view that access to justice is a human right would not turn them away only because a Red Corner Notice was issued. The Superior Courts in criminal cases, thus are entitled to go into the manner in which such Red Corner Notice, if any, is sought to be enforced and/or whether the local police is threatening a citizen of India with arrest although they are not entitled to do so except in terms of the provisions Act as and when applicable.

145. Furthermore, if a violation of any order passed by a civil court is made the ground for issuance of a Red Corner Notice, indisputably, the court will enquire as to whether the same has undergone the tests laid down under Sections 13 and 44A of the Code of civil Procedure.

146. As regards the question of custody, we have, however noticed, hereinabove that although the family court at Bombay for all intent and purposes relying on or on the basis of the order passed by the Massachusetts Court directed custody of the girl in favour of her mother, the Bombay High Court has stayed the operation thereof. The Appellant therefore, must be held to be in lawful custody of his daughter unless any other or further order is passed by a court of competent jurisdiction.

147. Lastly, it is imperative to note that the State does not seek for enforcement of the custody and/ or restrain order passed by the Probate and Family Court, Massachusetts in view of the rigours contained in Sections 13 and 44A of the Code of civil Procedure.

Supreme Court of India

Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 7 August, 2009

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Mukundakam Sharma

Citation: 2009((3))ALT(Cri)472, 2009(3)ALT(Cri)472, II(2009)DMC292SC, 2010GLH(1)1, JT2009(11)SC279, 2009(11)SCALE467, (2009)9SCC551,

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Whether it is necessary to seal required conversation of CD in civil case?

Documentary evidence requirement of sealing the required conversation of CD is of essense in cirminal case. Such Procedure not required to be followed in civil trial.

Bombay High Court

Mrs.Havovi Kersi Sethna vs Mr.Kersi Gustad Sethna on 28 January, 2011

Bench: R. S. Dalvi

Citation: 2011(3) Bom CR 100

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