Beyond the Charge Sheet: Why Wildlife Offences Need Statutory Complaints, Not Police Reports

Explainer on this judgment 

Elvish Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0515/2026,2026 INSC 329.

Decided On: 19.03.2026

 1. Cognizance under Wildlife Act: Police Chargesheet Is Not a “Complaint”

The Supreme Court’s starting point is Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, which clearly says that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a complaint by specified authorities (Director, Chief Wildlife Warden, authorised officers, or a private person after 60‑days’ notice). This must be read with the CrPC definition of “complaint” in Section 2(d), which expressly excludes a police report under Section 173 CrPC. Therefore, a police chargesheet cannot be “converted” into a statutory complaint for the purpose of Section 55, and cognizance taken on such a chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible. The Court relies on earlier rulings like Murad Ali Khan and Jeewan Kumar Raut to reaffirm that special statutes with their own cognizance mechanism (Wildlife Act, TOHO, Drugs & Cosmetics, MMDR, etc.) must be strictly followed, and general CrPC provisions yield to this special procedure (generalia specialibus non derogant).

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Supreme Court: Snake venom or anti-bodies to snake venom will not come within the definition of a psychotropic substanceU/S 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act

 From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, the definition of a psychotropic substance Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act has a clear import that any substance or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or material has to be included in the list of substances which are specified under the Schedule of the NDPS Act. The conscious omission of the legislature in not placing snake venom or anti-bodies to snake venom under the Schedule of the NDPS Act, would clearly mean that that the said substances could not have been construed as psychotropic substances, by any stretch of imagination, warranting application of the provisions under the NDPS Act. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the recovery of the anti-bodies of snake venom from the co-Accused person(s) will not fall within the purview of a psychotropic substance and, hence, does not warrant invocation of the provisions of the NDPS Act.

{Para 36}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1661/2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11480/2025)

Decided On: 19.03.2026

Elvish Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0515/2026,2026 INSC 329

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Supreme Court: BNSS S.223(1) Proviso Mandatory; Cognizance Without Hearing Accused is Void Ab Initio

As already discussed, though the complaint under the PMLA was filed earlier, the cognizance was only taken subsequently, on 02.07.2024, by which time the BNSS had come into force. Admittedly, the Appellant has not been heard at the time of taking cognizance. The mandate of a legislation which ensures the right of an Accused to a fair trial, whose liberty is at stake, cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the contention of the learned ASG that prejudice caused due to non-hearing at the stage of cognizance will have to be shown by the Accused cannot be accepted, as it is not a mere irregularity that would attract either Section 506 or 511 of the BNSS, but is an illegality that would vitiate the very proceedings. {Para 37}

38. Based on the above discussion, the views expressed by the High Court are, therefore, liable to be set aside. We do find that the allegations against the Appellant are quite serious. However, non-compliance with the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS vitiates the very order taking cognizance, and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of the law. In fact, the Appellant has, at the earliest point in time, filed the application for recall of the order taking cognizance by placing reliance upon the said proviso. Had the Special Court allowed it, the trial would have proceeded further. Suffice it to state that the Appellant cannot be faulted for any delay that has occasioned.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2678 of 2026 

Decided On: 19.05.2026

Parvinder Singh Vs. Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: M.M. Sundresh, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 519,MANU/SC/0504/2026.

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Whether notification can create the power of direct cognizance where the parent statute itself did not expressly confer one?

 The statement means that a notification issued by the government cannot create a new legal power unless the Act itself has already granted that power in clear terms. In other words, if the parent statute does not authorize direct cognizance, an executive notification cannot manufacture that authority by itself because delegated legislation must remain within the limits of the statute from which it derives force.

Core idea

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Delay, Denial, and Direct Cognizance: Why the Bombay High Court Quashed the Prosecution in C.B. Healthcare v. Union of India

 

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Ms. C.B. Healthcare and Ors. v. Union of India is a significant reminder that prosecutions under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 must satisfy not only public health objectives but also the statutory safeguards built into the Act and the Rules. In a judgment delivered on 24 March 2026, Justice N.J. Jamadar quashed the criminal prosecution against the manufacturer and its partners, holding that the cumulative procedural lapses had destroyed the accused’s valuable right to challenge the analyst’s report and had rendered the continuation of prosecution an abuse of the process of court.

Facts and procedural history

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Important provisions of BNSS regarding information to police, investigation U/S 175 of BNSS, and cognizance of offence by Magistrate

 173. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given—

(i) orally, it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it;

(ii) by electronic communication, it shall be taken on record by him on being signed within three days by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may by rules prescribe in this behalf:

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Supreme Court: Trial Court Cannot Take Cognizance Of Offence Not Mentioned In Chargesheet Only Based On Private Witness's Affidavit

 After giving due consideration to the issue at hand, we find

that the impugned order needs interference. The Court at the

outset, would make it clear that in principle, there is no quarrel

to the proposition that the Trial Court is within its powers to

alter the charge or to frame alternative charges. Further, the High

Court also has the power to direct for fresh consideration. In the

present case, we find that the manner in which the exercise has

been conducted is not in accordance with law. After the matter

being remanded by the High Court, it was incumbent upon the Trial Court to form a satisfaction of its own with regard to applicability of Section 394 of the IPC independently, based on the materials produced either by the complainant or by the defence and from the investigating agency or in the alternative to conduct the inquiry of its own. In the present case, when the allegation was that witnesses had made certain statements before the Police, which was recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “Cr.P.C.”), it was the duty of the prosecution to produce all such statements to the Court, which was not done. Then obviously, the Trial Court was required to call upon the Police to produce the entire case diary recording the complete statements of all the witnesses. Thereafter, upon perusing the same, especially, the portions which had not been forwarded to the Court earlier, the Trial Court could have formed an independent opinion as to whether ingredients of various Sections including Section 394 of the IPC were made out. This has not happened. In fact, only on the basis of affidavits of witnesses filed along with the petition on behalf of the complainant, the Court has taken cognizance under Section 394 of the IPC. We do not approve of such exercise in the manner it has been done. {Para 8}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6904 of 2025)

DEEPAK YADAV AND ANOTHER Vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER 

Dated: 17th SEPTEMBER, 2025.

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Supreme court: Complaint U/S 138 of NI Act can Be Amended Even After Cognizance Is Taken

 The issue, whether a criminal court has power to order

amendment of a complaint filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.,

is no longer res integra. In S.R. Sukumar v. S.Sunaad Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609, this Court held as under:-

“19. What is discernible from U.P. Pollution Control Board

case is that an easily curable legal infirmity could be cured

by means of a formal application for amendment. If the

amendment sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity

which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by

allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to

the other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no

enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such

amendment, the court may permit such an amendment to be

made. On the contrary, if the amendment sought to be made

in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity

or the same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or

if there is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the

court shall not allow such amendment in the complaint.”

Hence, it is fallacious to contend that in no circumstance can

amendments to complaints be allowed after cognizance is taken.

{Para 8}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.15699 OF 2024)

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre  Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd. & Anr. 

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 899

Dated: 25th July, 2025.

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Talengana HC: Whether Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence punishable under Pocso Act?

 As the statutory positions in the Cr.P.C. and the POCSO Act are not mutually exclusive, it shall be construed that the Special Court in the stand of Court of Sessions may receive a case on committal from the Magistrate. Meaning thereby the jurisdictional Magistrate is empowered to receive police report or complaint as set down under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. even in regard to the offences under POCSO Act and after taking cognizance, the same may be committed to the Special Court.{Para 13}

14. Concomitantly, the Special Court is also empowered under Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act to take cognizance of the offence. In that way, the Special Court without any committal procedure can directly receive complaint and while doing so the Special Court sets in the position of Magistrate and would process the complaint by applying relevant procedure.

15. For the aforesaid, it shall be understood that the legislature at its wisdom had provided direct reach to the special Court in addition to the indirect committal procedure to extend the needed relief employing either of the forums. Thus, the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Special Court are correspondingly empowered to take cognizance of an offence under POCSO Act upon the complaint. Consequently, it shall be held that, returning of the private complaint by the Special Court and the Magistrate is improper and against the provisions of law.

19. In this position, it has to be concluded that even for the offence under the POCSO Act the Magistrate is not barred to take cognizance and by the enabling provision, the Special Court is also empowered to take cognizance of the offence under the POCSO Act either upon the police report or on complaint within its territorial jurisdiction. 

Talengana High Court

 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.290 OF 2023

Dated: Date: 18.08.2023.

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Supreme Court: PMLA Accused Entitled To Hearing Before Cognizance Is Taken Of ED Complaint Filed After BNSS Came Into Effect

This Court has taken a consistent view that a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA will be governed by Sections 200 to 204 of the CrPC. This view has been taken by this Court in the cases of Yash Tuteja v. Union of India1 and Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate2. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter XVI, containing Sections 223 to 226, will also apply to a complaint under Section 44 of the PMLA. As the complaint has been filed after 1st July, 2024, Section 223 of the BNSS will apply to the present complaint. {Para 5}

6. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 223 puts an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance by providing that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.

7. In this case, admittedly, an opportunity of being heard was not given by the learned Special Judge to the appellant before taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint. Only on that ground, the impugned order dated 20th April, 2024, will have to be set aside.

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.)

Kushal Kumar Agarwal  Vs Directorate of Enforcement 

Criminal Appeal No. 2749 of 2025 

Decided on May 9, 2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 760,2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221

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Kerala HC: Special courts shall not order an investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC against public servant in absence of prior sanction under Section 19 of PC Act.

  Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties. The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The question whether a sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is necessary or not while ordering an investigation against a public servant invoking powers under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C is no more res integra. In Anil Kumar (supra), it was held that in the absence of a prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, the Magistrate/Court cannot order an investigation against a public servant by invoking power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. After referring to various judgments on the issue of purport and meaning of the word "cognizance", it was concluded that "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. In L.Narayana Swamy (supra), the Apex Court held that an order directing investigation under section 156(3) could not be passed in relation to a public servant in the absence of valid sanction. It was observed that even while directing inquiry under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint, and therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. The same issue arose before the Apex Court again in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora and Others (MANU/SC/0296/2018 : 2018 KHC 6224). After considering the various judgments, including Anil Kumar (supra) and L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Division Bench of the Apex Court directed the matter to be placed before the Larger Bench. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed V.A. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (MANU/KE/3653/2018 : 2019 (1) KHC 239) held that until a final decision is taken in the reference in Manju Surana (supra), the dictum laid down in Anil Kumar (supra) will hold the field. Therefore, as the law now stands, the requirement of sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is a prerequisite for presenting a private complaint against a public servant alleging the commission of an offence specified in sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act. No such complaint could be forwarded for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. in the absence of sanction granted by the competent authority under section 19 of the PC Act. The decision of the Apex Court in B.A.Srinivasan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 pertains to sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C and hence the dictum laid down therein does not apply to the facts of the case.

{Para 7}

Considering the above findings, I am of the view that the court below could not have forwarded the complaints under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation without any sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act obtained by the complainants. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and accordingly, it is set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (Crl.) No. 510 of 2022

Decided On: 17.02.2023

C.V. Balan and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kauser Edappagath, J.

Citation: 2023 KER 9580,2023 KLJ 1 9252023 SCC ONLINE KER 9832023 KER 9580, MANU/KE/0324/2023

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Important provisions of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

[Act 14 of 2013 as amended up to Act 23 of 2016 and updated as of 30th April 2024]

An Act to provide protection against sexual harassment of women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints of sexual harassment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto

Whereas sexual harassment results in violation of the fundamental rights of a woman to equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and her right to life and to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution and right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business which includes a right to a safe environment free from sexual harassment;

And whereas the protection against sexual harassment and the right to work with dignity are universally recognised human rights by international conventions and instruments such as Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, which has been ratified on the 25th June, 1993 by the Government of India;

And whereas it is expedient to make provisions for giving effect to the said Convention for protection of women against sexual harassment at workplace;

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Supreme Court: Cognizance of offence Against Public Servant under S 4 of SC & ST (Atrocities Act) For Offence Of Neglect Of Duty Cannot Be Taken Without Administrative Enquiry Report

 The argument of the learned Counsel for the complainant is that the word "charges" occurring in proviso to Section 4(2) of the SC/ST Act is to be interpreted that the enquiry report is to be sought before framing of charges and not before the registration of the FIR.

{Para 49}

50. To my mind, the said argument is bereft of merit as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Charansingh (supra) and as per the proviso noted above, the enquiry report is to be sought before the criminal proceedings are initiated and not before the framing of charges.

14.4. The absence of recommendation would bar taking cognizance by the Court. In a given case, if a complaint without recommendation is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate before proceeding further to keep his decision conforming to Section 4(2) read with the proviso, calls for a report/recommendation from the Department against the named public servant. The Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court based on an administrative enquiry report can take cognizance of the alleged offence and thereon direct penal proceedings. By keeping in perspective, the language/scheme of Section 4, and on the literal interpretation of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 4, it would be legally permissible that the jurisdiction for infraction of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 is attracted only on the recommendation of the administrative enquiry and then, the cognizance Under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 is ordered.

15. By adhering to the above procedure, we hold that the Magistrate would have the accusation of a party and view of the Department while deciding to take cognizance of the offence or not. At the cost of repetition stated that, the purpose of an administrative enquiry is to find out the conduct of a public servant against whom allegations of failure of duty or function are made and the omission or commission is bonafide or willful.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2021

Decided On: 17.05.2024

The State of GNCT of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Praveen Kumar*

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0469/2024.

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Summons in a criminal case to face trial cannot be issued against positions or posts as a post is not a juridical person

 Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that by now it is a settled principle of law as has been reiterated by this Court in the case of Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. (supra) that summons in a criminal case to face trial cannot be issued against positions or post as a post is not juridical person hence, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa has committed illegality by issuing summons against DGM Sail, M/s. RMD Gua Ore Mines more so when such post undisputedly does not even exist. Thus, taking cognizance by not naming any person who was responsible for the alleged criminal act is certainly not sustainable in law. {Para 6}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Cr.M.P. No. 2956 of 2022

M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited VsThe State of Jharkhand

P R E S E N T

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

Dated the 22nd April, 2024.

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Supreme Court: If Magistrate is taking cognizance of offence based on protest petition filed with additional material, it is to be tried as private complaint case

 Shri Vinod Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the CJM as also the High Court fell in error in taking cognizance Under Section 190(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as the CJM had relied upon not only the Protest Petition which was supported by affidavit of the complainant but also on the affidavits of witnesses which were filed along with the Protest Petition to support the contents of the complaint. The submission was that once the CJM was relying upon additional material in the form of evidence produced by the complainant along with the Protest Petition then the only option for the CJM was to treat it as a complaint Under Section 200 Code of Criminal Procedure and proceed accordingly. The said case could not have been continued as a State case and should have been treated as a private complaint. It was also submitted that it was open for the CJM to have rejected the police report submitted Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure for closure and relying upon the material in the case diary, (in effect, the material collected during investigation) could have taken cognizance but once additional evidence was being relied upon which had been filed along with the Protest Petition then the only option open was to treat it as a private complaint and after following the due procedure in Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure proceeded to take cognizance Under Section 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure. {Para 5}

7. We have carefully examined the order dated 24.08.2021 passed by the CJM taking cognizance and summoning the police and we find that the CJM had actually taken into consideration not only the Protest Petition but also the affidavit filed in support of the Protest Petition as well as the four affidavits of witnesses filed along with the Protest Petition. It was based on consideration of such affidavits that the CJM was of the view that the investigation was not a fair investigation and these affidavits made out a prima facie case for taking cognizance and summoning the Accused.

9. In the case of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, through Secretary Home, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow and Anr.,   MANU/SC/0916/2019 : 2019:INSC:742 : (2019) 8 SCC 27 Justice K.M. Joseph, speaking for the Bench laid down the legal position relying upon previous judgments of this Court. In the said case the facts were quite similar to that of the present case where affidavits were filed along with the Protest Petition. The net result is that the Magistrate in the present case ought to have treated the Protest Petition as a complaint and proceeded according to Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2134 of 2024.

Decided On: 18.04.2024

Mukhtar Zaidi Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0318/2024.

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Whether the appellate or revisional court should reverse any finding on account of any irregularity in sanction for prosecution if accused has not raised objection in that respect in the trial court?

 Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the PC Act is also important in this context inasmuch as the time lapse in challenging an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction resulting in a failure of justice is of considerable significance. Unless the challenge is made at the initial stages of a trial and within a reasonable period of time, the court would not be obliged to consider the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction for prosecution. Therefore, it is not as if the Accused can, after an unreasonable delay, raise an issue about the sanction; but if that Accused does so, the court may not decide that issue both at the appellate stage as well as for the purposes of stay of the proceedings. {Para 66}

67. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal   MANU/SC/0650/1999 : (1999) 8 SCC 501 it was held that for determining whether the absence of or any error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the court has a duty to consider whether the Accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if it had been raised at the trial and early enough, it would not be sufficient to conclude that there was a failure of justice. Whether in fact and in law there was a failure of justice would differ from case to case but it was made clear that if such an objection was not raised in the trial, it certainly cannot be raised in appeal or in revision. It was explained that a trial involves judicial scrutiny of the entire material before the Special Judge. Therefore, if on a judicial scrutiny of the evidence on record the Special Judge comes to a conclusion that there was sufficient reason to convict the Accused person, the absence or error or omission or irregularity would actually become a surplusage. The necessity of a sanction is only as a filter to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution. However, after judicial scrutiny is complete and a conviction is made out through the filtration process, the issue of a sanction really would become inconsequential. It was held in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Report as under:

A court of appeal or revision is debarred from reversing a finding (or even an order of conviction and sentence) on account of any error or irregularity in the sanction for the prosecution, unless failure of justice had been occasioned on account of such error or irregularity. For determining whether want of valid sanction had in fact occasioned failure of justice the aforesaid Sub-section (2) enjoins on the court a duty to consider whether the Accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if he had raised any such objection at the early stage it is hardly sufficient to conclude that there was failure of justice. It has to be determined on the facts of each case. But an Accused who did not raise it at the trial stage cannot possibly sustain such a plea made for the first time in the appellate court......

In a case where the Accused failed to raise the question of valid sanction the trial would normally proceed to its logical end by making a judicial scrutiny of the entire materials. If that case ends in conviction there is no question of failure of justice on the mere premise that no valid sanction was accorded for prosecuting the public servant because the very purpose of providing such a filtering check is to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they have committed offence in the discharge of their official duties. But once the judicial filtering process is over on completion of the trial the purpose of providing for the initial sanction would bog down to a surplusage. This could be the reason for providing a bridle upon the appellate and revisional forums as envisaged in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of 2017

Decided On: 13.07.2017

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. C.B.I.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and A.K. Sikri, JJ.

Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 3620,MANU/SC/0829/2017.

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Whether the Pocso court must record reasons if he could not record evidence of child within thirty days of taking cognizance of offence?

Even otherwise, Section 35 of the POCSO Act allows the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence to record evidence of the  child after a period of thirty days from the date on which cognizance of the offence has been taken. The only rider in this regard imposed by the provision of law is that the Court must record reasons for the delay. In the present case, while allowing recording of evidence after a period of thirty days from the date of taking of cognizance, the Special Court did not record any reasons for the delay. But, the deficiency would have to be considered only as an irregularity in the light of the petitioner not raising any specific objection to the application vide exhibit 24. If the petitioner had raised objection and showed that there was any possibility of prejudice being caused to his defence, the case would have been different and perhaps, the challenge now made to the order dated 2nd March 2016 by the petitioner would have been required to be considered in the perspective of the prejudice factor. This is not the case here and, therefore, I do not think that failure of the learned Special Judge to record reasons for belated recording of the evidence of the victim has resulted in an illegality, causing prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. 

{Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

Criminal Writ Petition No. 68 of 2018

 Shubham Vilas Tayade,  Vs The State of Maharashtra, through Police

Coram : S. B. Shukre, J

Dated : 31st January 2018

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Whether Magistrate should examine approver if special court has directly taken cognizance of an offence under the Special Act?

 But in cases where a Special Court itself is competent to take cognizance and also empowered to grant pardon, the procedure Under Section 306 of the Code gets by-passed, as held by this Court in State through CBI v. V. Arul Kumar MANU/SC/0632/2016 : (2016) 11 SCC 733. An argument was advanced in Arul Kumar (supra) (as seen from paragraph 20 of the Report) that Section 306 of the Code has no application to cases relating to offences under the PC Act. In support of the said argument, the decision in P.C. Mishra v. State (CBI) MANU/SC/0232/2014 : (2014) 14 SCC 629 was also relied upon. While dealing with the said contention, this Court held in Arul Kumar as follows:

21. Sub-section (1) of Section 5, while empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance of offence without the Accused being committed to him for trial, only has the effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory requirement of Section 193 of the Code. Section 193 of the Code stipulates that the Court of Session cannot take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, embargo of Section 193 of the Code has been lifted. It, however, nowhere provides that the cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate at all. There is, thus, an option given to the Special Judge to straightaway take cognizance of the offences and not to have the committal route through a Magistrate. However, normal procedure prescribed Under Section 190 of the Code empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance of such offences, though triable by the Court of Session, is not given a go-by. Both the alternatives are available. In those cases where charge-sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this situation, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision. In contrast, in those cases where Special Judge takes cognizance of offence directly, as he is authorised to do so in view of Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988, Section 306 of the Code would get bypassed and as the Special Judge has taken cognizance, it is Section 307 of the Code which would become applicable. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the PC Act, 1988 makes this position clear by prescribing that it is the Special Judge who would exercise his powers to tender of pardon as can clearly be spelled out by the language employed in that provision. Section 5(2) is to be read in conjunction with Section 5(1) of the PC Act, 1988. The aforesaid legal position would also answer the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent based on the judgment of this Court in A. Devendran [A. Devendran v. State of T.N., MANU/SC/1851/1997 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 220]. In that case, this Court held that once the proceedings are committed to the Court of Session, it is that court only to which commitment is made which can grant pardon to the approver. The view taken by us is, rather, in tune with the said judgment.{Para 74}

75. In other words, this Court recognised in Arul Kumar two types of cases, namely (i) those which come through the committal route; and (ii) those where cognizance is taken directly by the Special Judge Under Section 5(1) of the PC Act. In the second category of cases, the Court held that Section 306 of the Code would get by-passed.

76. Therefore, it is clear that when the Special Court chooses to take cognizance, the question of the approver being examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate as required by Section 306(4)(a) does not arise. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned Counsel for the Respondent is therefore right in relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sardar Iqbal Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) MANU/SC/0131/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 536 and Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0268/2013 : (2013) 13 SCC 1.

77. In Sardar Iqbal Singh (supra) the offence was triable by the Special Judge who also took cognizance. Therefore, there were no committal proceedings. Though Sardar Iqbal Singh arose under the 1898 Code, Sub-section (2) of Section 337 of the 1898 Code was in pari materia with Section 306(4)(a) of the 1973 Code. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Sardar Iqbal Singh was rightly applied in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (supra) for coming to the conclusion that where a Special Judge takes cognizance of the case, the occasion for examining the approver as a witness arises only once.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu  Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0723/2023.

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Whether the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence triable by the Special Court?

 Sub-section (1) of Section 5, while empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance of offence without the Accused being committed to him for trial, only has the effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory requirement of Section 193 of the Code. Section 193 of the Code stipulates that the Court of Session cannot take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, embargo of Section 193 of the Code has been lifted. It, however, nowhere provides that the cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate at all. There is, thus, an option given to the Special Judge to straightaway take cognizance of the offences and not to have the committal route through a Magistrate. However, normal procedure prescribed Under Section 190 of the Code empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance of such offences, though triable by the Court of Session, is not given a go-by. Both the alternatives are available. In those cases where charge-sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this situation, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision. In contrast, in those cases where Special Judge takes cognizance of offence directly, as he is authorised to do so in view of Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988, Section 306 of the Code would get bypassed and as the Special Judge has taken cognizance, it is Section 307 of the Code which would become applicable.{Para 21}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu  Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0723/2023.

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Whether the court can cognizance of an offence for dishonour of cheque even if original power of attorney is not filed alongwith complaint?

  From the aforesaid analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that in a case where the complainant is a company, an authorized employee can represent the said company. Once an averment to this effect is made in the complaint, it is sufficient for the Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process. It also emerges that in case authority of a person filing complaint on behalf of the company is disputed by the accused, the same would be a matter of trial to be decided during the course of trial and it would not be a ground to dismiss the complaint at the threshold itself. The ratio laid down in these judgments has not been taken note of either by Delhi High Court or by Madras High Court in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner. Thus, the ratio laid down in these judgments to the effect that production of original Power of Attorney is necessary at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, is not the correct position of law. {Para 12}

13) In the instant case, the respondent/complainant has specifically pleaded that Shri Basharat Gul is the duly constituted Attorney of the Bank who is authorized to institute the complaint and verify the pleadings. A copy of the Power of Attorney has been annexed to the complaint. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance of the complaint and issuing process against the petitioner on the basis of the impugned complaint.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR

CRM(M) No.88/2020

AB. RASHEED BHAT  Vs. HDFC BANK LTD 

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE

Pronounced on:21.10.2022

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