Showing posts with label O 22 R 10 of CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label O 22 R 10 of CPC. Show all posts

Wednesday, 26 October 2022

Under which circumstances the court can refuse to implead purchaser of immovable property to continue suit for specific performance of contract?

 The High Court was not right in holding that mere alleged transfer/assignment of the agreement would be sufficient to grant leave to Respondent 3 to continue the suit. From the filing of the suit in 1986, over the years, valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant; such valuable right of defence cannot be defeated by granting leave to the third respondent to continue the suit in the application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC after 27 years of filing of the suit. The learned Single Judge was not right in saying that impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and that the issues can be raised at the time of trial.

{Para 12}

13. In a suit for specific performance, application for impleadment must be filed within a reasonable time. Considering the question of impleadment of party in a suit for specific performance after referring to various judgments, in Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd. [Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] the Court summarised the principles as under : (SCC p. 413, para 41)

“41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are:

41.1. The court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.

41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court.

41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.

41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.

41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation.

41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment.”

In light of the above principles, considering the case in hand, in our view, the application filed for impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 was not filed within reasonable time. No explanation is offered for such an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view by the High Court.

14. Be it noted that an application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC seeking leave of the court to continue the suit by the assignee/third respondent was not actually filed. Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 was straightaway filed praying to amend the suit which would have been the consequential amendment, had the leave to continue the suit been granted by the court.

15. As pointed out earlier, the application was filed after 27 years of filing of the suit. Of course, the power to allow the amendment of suit is wide and the court should not adopt hypertechnical approach. In considering amendment applications, court should adopt liberal approach and amendments are to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of litigations. We are conscious that mere delay is not a ground for rejecting the amendment. But in the case in hand, the parties are not rustic litigants; all the respondents are companies and the dispute between the parties is a commercial litigation. In such facts and circumstances, the amendment prayed in the chamber summons filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC ought not to have been allowed, as the same would cause serious prejudice to the appellant. In our view, the impugned order, allowing Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 filed after 27 years of the suit would take away the substantial rights of defence accrued to the appellant and the same cannot be sustained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5909 OF 2022 

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

Coram: ANIRUDDHA BOSE; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J.

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

Dated: September 1, 2022

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Sunday, 6 October 2019

Whether court can allow application if it is made under wrong provision of law?

According to us, the application was wrongly filed under
Order I Rule 10 CPC and it should have been filed Order XXII
Rule 10 CPC which reads thus:
“ORDER XXII : DEATH, MARRIAGE AND INSOLVENCY
OF PARTIES
xxx xxx xxx
10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in
suit.(
1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or
devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit,
the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or
against the person to or upon whom such interest has
come or devolved.
(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal
therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the
person who procured such attachment to the benefit of
subrule
(1).”
8. It is well settled law that mere mentioning of an
incorrect provision is not fatal to the application if the power to
pass such an order is available with the court.

NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10521 OF 2013

PRUTHVIRAJSINH NODHUBHA JADEJA  Vs  JAYESHKUMAR CHHAKADDAS
SHAH 
Deepak Gupta, J.

Dated:October 04, 2019
Citation: (2019) 9 SCC 533
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Sunday, 18 August 2019

How to ascertain limitation for bringing legal representative on record in case of devolution of property?

O 22 R 10. of CPC:- Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.- (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a Suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.

(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal there from shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1)."

10. Order 22 Rule 3 sub Rule 2 provides "where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) ................ ". Similarly, Order 22 Rule 4 sub Rule 3 provides "where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) ................ ". In Rule 10 it does not state anywhere about the application being made within the time limited by law. There is no time limited by law for an application to be made. Mr. Sancheti also in fairness agreed that the Limitation Act does not also prescribe any time for devolution of interest under Order 22 Rule 10.

11. This is not a case where a person has died and the legal heirs are being brought on record to pursue the claim against the estate of the deceased. Here the suit is against the Trustees and the Trustees may come and Trustees may go. They do not have personal liability. The interest is only purged by devolution. The interest, which is the subject matter of the suit, devolved upon respondents, upon respondents being made Trustees of the two Trusts. Rule 10 under Order 22 is based on the principle that trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit has devolved upon another during the pendency of the suit but that suit may be continued against the person acquiring the interest with the leave of the Court.

12. In Shri Rikhu Dev, Chela Bawa Harjug Dass v. Som Dass (Deceased) Through His Chela Shiam Dass MANU/SC/0422/1975 : 1976 (1) SCC 103, the Apex Court has held that when a suit is brought by or against a person in a representative capacity and there is a devolution of the interest of the representative, the rule that has to be applied is Order 22, Rule 10 and not Order 22, Rule 3 or Rule 4, whether the devolution takes place as a consequence of death or for any other reason. The Apex Court also held that Order 22, Rule 10, is not confined to devolution of interest of a party by death, it also applies if the head of the mutt or manager of the temple resigns his office or is removed from office. In such a case, the successor to the head of the mutt or to the manager of the temple may be substituted as a party under this rule. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Chamber Summons No. 6 of 2015, 

Decided On: 19.09.2017

 Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. Vs.  Annamma Philip and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.R. Shriram, J.

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Sunday, 13 January 2019

Whether suit filed by trust will abate if legal heirs of trustees are not brought on record?

 However, the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal held that "It would, therefore, appear that it is well settled that Order 22, Rule 3 of the Code applies to cases where the plaintiff leaves behind the estate which could be inherited by his heirs or successors and if they are brought on record, then the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3 will apply. However, the case would be different where the suit is brought by the plaintiff not in his personal capacity but in his representative capacity as a trustee or otherwise. In that case when he dies, his own legal representatives would not automatically become trustees and would not be legal representatives within the meaning of Clause (11) of section 2 of the Code. Only those trustees who are elected or appointed under the scheme of the trust can step in his shoes and continue the suit. Such a new trustee could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be legal representatives of the deceased trustee. In any case, the right of the deceased plaintiff to act as a trustee would not pass on to the new trustee on the death of the deceased trustee. The new trustee would get his right not by virtue of death of the previous trustee but because of his being elected or appointed as a trustee under the scheme of the trust... Now obviously such a case will not be covered by Order 22, Rule 3, which contemplated the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff being brought on record. Since the new trustee would not be a legal representative of the deceased trustee, in that sense there is no question of the new trustee applying for being brought on record under the provisions of Order 22, Rule 3 of the Code. Obviously such a case would be covered by Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code." It was further held that unlike Rule 3 of Order 22, no limitation is prescribed for presentation of application under Rule 10 and no penalty is laid down for failure to substitute the person on whom the interest of the deceased plaintiff or defendant devolves and hence the right to make an application under the latter rule is right which accrues from day to day and can be made at any time during the pendency of the suit and there is no abatement under that rule. Considering the ratio of this judgment, it is clear that in the present case, the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 10 shall be attracted and, therefore, even though application was made for substitution after 9 months (though the learned Judge wrongly observed as one year and 3 months), there can be no abatement. It is not the case where the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 4 are to be brought on record but the trustee who is recognised by the Charity Commissioner is to be brought on record. This would happen not only in the case of death but even in the case of retirement or resignation of the trustee. In all these cases, substitution is required to be made and which can only be made under Order XXII, Rule 10. Hence, in my opinion, the learned Judge was not right in holding that the suit abated. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 535 of 1975

Decided On: 22.02.1993

 Abaji Daulata Yadav  Vs. Dhondiram Jagedevrao Yadav and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.S. Patankar, J.

Citation: 1994(3) Bom CR 60, 1993 MHLJ 588
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Sunday, 7 October 2018

Whether successor trustee should make application for bringing him on record within limitation?

However, even if it is assumed that the present case is governed by Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code, the question still remain, whether the application made by the new trustee would be governed by any period of limitation. Even though, Shri Kherdekar appearing for the respondents before the learned single Judge had submitted that such an application would be governed by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, he has very fairly conceded before us that such an application would not be governed by any period of limitation, It is not, therefore, necessary to decide this point in this appeal. However, in Baijnath Ram v. Mt. Tunkowati MANU/BH/0076/1962 : AIR1962Pat285 Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that unlike Rules 3 and 4, of O.22, no limitation is prescribed for presentation of an application under Order 22 Rule 10, and no penalty is laid down for failure to substitute the person on whom the interest of the deceased plaintiff or defendant has devolved and hence the right to make an application under the latter rule is a right which accrues from day to day and can be made at any time during the pendency of a suit and there is no abatement under that rule. A similar view has been taken by a Single Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in C. Wright Neville v. E. H. Freser MANU/NA/0101/1943. It would, therefore, appear that once It is held that the application is governed by O. 22 Rule 10 of the Code, then such an application could be made at any time during the pendency of the suit or appeal, but while granting leave to the applicant to proceed with the suit or appeal, the Court would consider the question on merits. However, the application cannot be thrown out simply because it is not made within a particular period,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1971

Decided On: 24.04.1978

 Sitabai Ramchandra Jaltare  Vs.  Masjid Nurun Mohalla Jingerwadi

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Whether legal heirs of trustees are to be brought on record on death of trustee if suit was brought on behalf of trust?

 The first question which falls for consideration is whether the application which was made by Adbul Majid before the learned District Judge was governed by Rule 3 of Order 22 as held by the learned District Judge or by Rule 10 of Order 22, as held by the learned Single Judge. Relying on certain decisions referred to by him in his judgment, the learned District Judge was of the view that Order 22 Rule 10 is a residuary rule governing only those cases which are not provided for by the preceding rules and where devolution takes place by reason of death, the matter falls under Rule 4 where the death is of the defendant and Rule 10 will have no application to such a case. The learned District Judge was of the view that Rule 10 is an enabling one but not a device intended to get over the laches of the parties bound to move under Rule 3 or Rule 4. It appears that the learned District Judge was of the view that Order 22 Rule 10 will not apply to a case where the plaintiff or defendant dies and the suit has to be continued by other persons. The learned District Judge was of the view that in case of death of the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be. the proper provision to be applied would be Rule 3 or R. 4 of O. 22 and not Rule 10. It was in this view of the matter that the learned District Judge held that the present case was governed by Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code and not by Order 22 Rule 10. Having held so, the learned District Judge further found that the legal representative of Awaliyabi should have been brought within 90 days from her death and since this has not been done, the appeal had abated.

7. As already seen the learned Single Judge differed from the learned District Judge with regard to the application of Order 22 Rule 3 to the present case. The learned Single Judge observed that Order 22 Rule 3 would apply only if on the death of the plaintiff the suit is to be continued by the legal representatives of the plaintiff but not to the case where the plaintiff was a trustee. According to him, on the death of the plaintiff, who filed the suit in his capacity as a trustee, or his resignation or otherwise ceasing to be trustee, the person, who could continue the suit would not be his personal legal representative but another trustee of the said trust. The learned single Judge observed that Awaliyabi had not filed the suit in her personal capacity and hence there could not be any question of her personal legal representatives continuing it and it could be continued by another representative of the trust, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned single Judge, with respect, appears to be laying down the law correctly in this respect. In Thirumalai v. Arunachella MANU/TN/0398/1925 : AIR1926Mad540 , the appeal was filed by nine trustees. But during the pendency of the appeal two of them died and one retired. It appears that an application was made for bringing on record the trustees who had been appointed in place of one of them who had expired and the other who had retired. This application had been filed beyond the period of 90 days from the death of one of trustees and from the date of retirement of the other. It was contended that the new trustees, who had been appointed in place of the above said two trustees were their legal representatives within the meaning of clause (11) of S. 2 of the Code and hence the application not being filed within the prescribed time, could not be entertained. On these facts it was held that the new trustees were not legal representatives of those who had died or retired and it was held that the application for bringing the new trustees on record would fall under Order 22 Rule 10, because the interest of the deceased trustees devolved on these persons by the act of the electors done in pursuance of the scheme framed by the Court and it was a case of devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit. In Keshab Rai v. Jyoti Prosad MANU/WB/0345/1932 : AIR1932Cal783 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that Rules 2, 3 and 4 of Order 22 of the Code relate to cases of devolution in interest on the death of a plaintiff or defendant when such plaintiff or defendant was suing or was being sued respectively in his personal capacity, that these rules do not apply when a suit is brought by or against a person in his representative character and to such a suit the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code will be applicable. Again in Kishori Lal v. The Collector ILR (1955) All 128 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code is applicable to those cases where a person who is brought on the record as legal representative inherits the property from the deceased party, but where a person is brought on the record as legal representative in order to represent an estate which was formerly represented in a suit by another person, Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code will apply. Lastly in Roshan Lal v. Kapur Chand MANU/PH/0085/1960 a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court has held that where a suit is brought by trustees and some of them die during the pendency of the suit, the new trustees can be added as parties under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code and newly appointed trustees are not representatives of the deceased trustees within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 3. It would, therefore, appear that it is well settled that Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code applies to cases where the plaintiff leaves behind the estate which could be inherited by his heirs or successors and if they are brought on record, then the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 will apply. However, the case would be different where the suit is brought by the plaintiff not in his personal capacity but in his representative capacity as a trustee or otherwise, in that case when he dies, his own legal representative would not automatically become trustees and would not be legal representatives within the meaning of Clause (11) of S. 2 of the Code. Only those trustees who are elected or appointed under the scheme of the trust can step in his shoes and continue the suit. Such a new trustee could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be legal representative of the deceased trustee. In any case, the right of the deceased plaintiff to act as a trustee would not pass on to the new trustee on the death of the deceased trustee. The new trustee would get his right not by virtue of death of the previous trustee but because of his being elected or appointed as a trustee under the scheme of the trust. Obviously, therefore, when a suit is filed by a person in his capacity as a trustee or representing a trust or any interest and if he dies, the suit can- not be continued by his own legal representatives but will have to be continued by another trustee or a person who is appointed or elected to manage the trust. In short, therefore, interest as a trustee will not devolve on a new trustee because of the death of the previous trustee but because of his being elected or appointed as such, Now obviously such a case will not be covered by Order 22 Rule 3, which contemplates the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff being brought on record. Since the new trustee would not be a legal representative of the deceased trustee, in that sense there is no question of the new trustee applying for being brought on record under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code. Obviously such a case would be covered by Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code, In this view of the matter, therefore, it is not possible to say that the conclusion to which the learned single Judge has arrived is not correct.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1971

Decided On: 24.04.1978

 Sitabai Ramchandra Jaltare  Vs.  Masjid Nurun Mohalla Jingerwadi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.D. Kambli and A.A. Ginwala, JJ.

Citation: 1978 MHLJ 789 bom
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