Bar to Sue vs Suit Barred by Law: Supreme Court Clarifies Why Order II Rule 2 Cannot Be Used to Reject a Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)

S. Valliammai and Ors. Vs. S. Ramanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 372, MANU/SC/0362/2026

Decided On: 16.04.2026

Factual background in brief

The litigation arises from a Chettiar family dispute where the aged parents alleged that their advocate son exerted pressure and coercion to grab properties and bank deposits. The father and mother first filed O.S. No. 4722/2012 (the “first suit”) at Chennai seeking permanent injunction to protect (i) the residential Harrington Road property and (ii) the Standard Chartered Bank account, alleging intimidation, assault and coercion leading to execution of a settlement deed dated 04.11.2011.

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Supreme Court: Plaint Can't Be Rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC as Barred Under Order II Rule 2 CPC

5.21. We think that in a case where Order II Rule 2 of the Code applies, there is no legal bar to filing a suit but the reliefs sought for or the claims made therein cannot be granted if the conditions mentioned therein apply. For arriving at such a conclusion, there has to be evidence let in in order to determine whether the provision of Order II Rule 2 would apply to the suit or not. On the other hand, in the case of Order VII Rule 11(d), if there is express or implied bar for filing of a suit under any law then on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it has to be rejected. The suit need not proceed to record evidence on merits but only to the extent where evidence is necessary to be recorded for the purpose of rejection of the plaint such as on the ground of the suit being bit by law of limitation or on the principle of res judicata. Thus, the bar created by any law to the filing of a suit is different from a Plaintiff suing for certain claims or reliefs which he could not have claimed or sued having regard to Order II Rule 2 of the Code. Therefore, in our view, the application of Order II Rule 2 cannot be construed to be a ground for rejection of the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3624 of 2024

Decided On: 16.04.2026

S. Valliammai and Ors. Vs. S. Ramanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 372, MANU/SC/0362/2026

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Supreme Court: Order II Rule 2 CPC Doesn't Mean Different Causes Of Action From Same Transaction Must Be Included In Single Suit

 In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and Ors. reported in   MANU/SC/7017/2007 : 2007:INSC:34 : (2007) 11 SCC 75, this Court categorically held that if the Defendant wishes to show that the causes of action were identical in both suits, it is necessary for him to have marked the earlier plaint in evidence and then make out that there was a relinquishment of a relief by the Plaintiff, without the leave of the Court. It was also stated that Order II Rule 2 is directed towards securing an exhaustion of the relief in respect of a cause of action and not to the inclusion in one and the same action of different causes of action, even though they may arise from the same transaction. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the "whole of the claim" arising out of "one and the same cause of action". {Para 46}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Defendant must file pleadings of previous suit to prove the identity of the cause of action in the two suits so as to bar second suit as per O 2 R 2 of CPC

In order that a plea of a Bar Under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure should succeed the Defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the Plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the Plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the Defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be established only if the Defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the Appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Trial Judge, however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what the cause of action should have been from the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the Appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of a bar Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable.

 {Para 6}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether plaintiff will be barred to file second suit on the cause of action if he was not entitled to said relief at the time of filing of first suit?

V. The "entitlement to" along with the "availability of" the relief as a requisite in determining the applicability of Order II Rule 2.

72. The Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan (supra) elaborated on the true import of Order II Rule 2 as follows:

Shortly stated Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, enacts that if a Plaintiff fails to sue for the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action in the first suit, then he is precluded from suing in a second suit in respect of the portion so omitted. To apply the Rule to the facts of the case their Lordships will have to consider what was the cause of action in Suit No. 8, on which the Plaintiffs founded their claims, and whether they included all the claims which they were entitled to make in respect of that cause of action in that suit. For, if they failed to include all the claims, then by force of Order 2, Rule 2, they are precluded from including the claim omitted in the present Suit No. 2.

73. Order II Rule 2(1) reads that - "every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the Plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action...". Similarly, Order II Rule 2(3) reads that - "A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs...". It is necessary that the same intention also be read into Order II Rule 2(2) which reads that - "where a Plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished". The phrase "any portion of his claim" must essentially be understood to mean any portion of his claim which he is entitled to make for the simple reason that there cannot be a deliberate or intentional relinquishment of any portion of a claim, if the Plaintiff was not entitled to it. Therefore, the true import of the bar Under Order II Rule 2 must be that it operates to preclude a Plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on the same cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim, or reliefs, which the Plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of filing of the first suit.

74. There may arise a situation where the Plaintiff may be entitled to a relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in time. In other words, that obtaining such a relief was impossible due to the circumstances which existed during the institution of the first suit. It is our opinion that, in such scenarios, Courts must give such an interpretation to the principles Under Order II Rule 2 that is not bogged down by mere technicalities.

75. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan reported in   MANU/RH/0033/1964 : AIR 1964 Raj 114 wherein the High Court had opined that Order II Rule 2 does not require that a person must seek all the remedies to which he may be entitled to even though it would be impossible for him to obtain the remedy from the opposite party. Herein, it was not possible for the Plaintiff to obtain the relief of possession from the Respondent No. 2 in his initial suit since the Respondent No. 2 himself was put in actual possession of the property much after the institution of the first suit. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the Plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any portion of his claim or that he omitted to ask for a relief which he could otherwise obtain. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

8. Now, in the present case, when the Petitioner filed the first suit on 14th August, 1946, his claim was only for a declaration to the effect that the adoption of Respondent No. 2 by Pusharam was invalid in law and for the relief that the adoption-deed should be cancelled. According to the admission of Respondent No. 2 himself he was not in possession of the property in respect of which the second suit was filed on 1st July, 1954. It cannot therefore, be said that the Plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any portion of his claim or that he omitted to ask for a relief which he could get from Respondent No. 2. Even if he had sued for possession against Respondent No. 2, he could not obtain a decree for possession against a person who was admittedly not in occupation of the same. It would, therefore, have been futile on the part of the Petitioner to sue for possession against Respondent No. 2 at that time. Order 2, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure does not require that a person must seek all the remedies to which he may be entitled even though it be impossible for him to obtain them from the opposite party. It is true that Respondent No. 2 had obtained a decree for possession against the landlords on 18th February, 1946, i.e., about six months prior to the institution of the Petitioner's suit, but the Petitioner was not a party to that suit. It had nowhere been mentioned in the judgment of the learned Members of the Board of Revenue if the Petitioner was even aware of the decree which Respondent No. 2 had obtained against the landlords Moreover, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the said decree was in the knowledge of the Petitioner, then too, he could not sue for possession, because Respondent No. 2 was not put in actual possession of the property in execution of the decree. It was about three years after, i.e., on 11th March, 1949 that Respondent No. 2 got possession of the property. In our opinion, the learned Members committed an error, which is patent on the face of the record, in holding that the Petitioner ought to have sued for possession at the time when he filed the first suit on 14th August, 1946.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

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Under which circumstances the court can refuse to implead purchaser of immovable property to continue suit for specific performance of contract?

 The High Court was not right in holding that mere alleged transfer/assignment of the agreement would be sufficient to grant leave to Respondent 3 to continue the suit. From the filing of the suit in 1986, over the years, valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant; such valuable right of defence cannot be defeated by granting leave to the third respondent to continue the suit in the application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC after 27 years of filing of the suit. The learned Single Judge was not right in saying that impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and that the issues can be raised at the time of trial.

{Para 12}

13. In a suit for specific performance, application for impleadment must be filed within a reasonable time. Considering the question of impleadment of party in a suit for specific performance after referring to various judgments, in Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd. [Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] the Court summarised the principles as under : (SCC p. 413, para 41)

“41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are:

41.1. The court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.

41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court.

41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.

41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.

41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation.

41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment.”

In light of the above principles, considering the case in hand, in our view, the application filed for impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 was not filed within reasonable time. No explanation is offered for such an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view by the High Court.

14. Be it noted that an application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC seeking leave of the court to continue the suit by the assignee/third respondent was not actually filed. Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 was straightaway filed praying to amend the suit which would have been the consequential amendment, had the leave to continue the suit been granted by the court.

15. As pointed out earlier, the application was filed after 27 years of filing of the suit. Of course, the power to allow the amendment of suit is wide and the court should not adopt hypertechnical approach. In considering amendment applications, court should adopt liberal approach and amendments are to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of litigations. We are conscious that mere delay is not a ground for rejecting the amendment. But in the case in hand, the parties are not rustic litigants; all the respondents are companies and the dispute between the parties is a commercial litigation. In such facts and circumstances, the amendment prayed in the chamber summons filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC ought not to have been allowed, as the same would cause serious prejudice to the appellant. In our view, the impugned order, allowing Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 filed after 27 years of the suit would take away the substantial rights of defence accrued to the appellant and the same cannot be sustained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5909 OF 2022 

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

Coram: ANIRUDDHA BOSE; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J.

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

Dated: September 1, 2022

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How to distinguish whether a particular endowment is public or private?

  In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Others,8 a bench of five Judges of this Court has held that:

“the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.

Endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it.”

 {Para 19}

20. Following the above ratio in The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. Sri Ratnavarma Heggade (Deceased) by his L. Rs.,9 this Court has observed that:

“Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country. Such dedications may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication. Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication, yet, they are not indispensable”

Thus, extinction of private character of a property can be inferred from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or public purposes.

Where the beneficiaries of a trust or charity are limited to a finite group of identifiable individuals, the trust or charity is of a private character. However, where the beneficiaries are either the public at large or an amorphous and fluctuating body of persons incapable of being specifically identifiable, the trust or charity is of a public character.”

25. Therefore, in view of the judgments quoted above and the aforesaid statutory provisions, it must be held that the case of the appellant that there was no endowment or specific endowment must fail and has no legs to stand on. The dedication of the suit jewellery does not require an express dedication or document, and can be inferred from the circumstances, especially the uninterrupted and long possession of the suit jewellery by the respondent/Temple. The private character of the jewels had extinguished long back and the appellant has no basis to claim that the suit jewellery was inherited by him from his adoptive parents. The endowment is clearly public in nature and for the purposes of performing religious ceremonies. As confirmed by three courts, with which we are in agreement, the suit jewellery was dedicated for a specific purpose and can only be used during the performance of the religious ceremony during the Adipooram festival.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

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How to prove that a subsequent suit is barred by O 2 R 2 of CPC?

 In this regard, we would like to refer to judgment of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 wherein it has been observed:

“In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous  suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits.

Just as in the case of a plea of res judicata which cannot be established in the absence on the record of the judgment and decree which is pleaded as estoppel, we consider that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. As the plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits the defence which raises the bar has necessarily to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The cause of action would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed.”

The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2 Rules 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

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Is the plea of res judicata, constructive res judicata, and Order II Rule 2 of CPC available if the civil court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the previous suit?

 In fact, this argument would also recoil on the appellant insofar as he has raised the plea of res judicata and constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code, for the said pleas would not be available in case the civil court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

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When rule of res judicata / constructive res judicata is not applicable to any subsequent proceeding?

 Where the former suit is dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of the plaintiff’s appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letter of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation, or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued, or for want of cause of action, or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision, not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) AIR 1966 SC 1332The reason is that the first suit is not decided on merits.

32. In the present case, the suit filed in 1981 for appointment of the receiver for preparing an inventory of the suit jewellery was not decided on merits but was dismissed on the ground that the respondent had prayed for mandatory injunction and had not made a prayer for declaration of title. Thus, the suit was dismissed for technical reasons, which decision is not an adjudication on merits of the dispute that would operate as res judicata on the merits of the matter. Further, to succeed and establish a prayer for res judicata, the party taking the said prayer must place on record a copy of the pleadings and the judgments passed, including the appellate judgment which has attained finality. In the present case, the appellant did not place on record a copy of the appellate judgment and it is accepted that the second appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed, giving liberty to the respondent to file a fresh suit with a prayer of declaration of title/endowment in respect of the suit jewellery. The liberty granted was not challenged by the appellant. The right to file a fresh suit to the Temple, therefore, should not be denied. The bar of constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code is not attracted.

33. The plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code also fails as the cause of action in the first suit filed in 1981 was limited and predicated on account of the failure of the appellant to open the locks of the safe and the main door of the Kudavarai, the keys of which were available with the appellant and required joint operation. Here again, the party claiming and raising the plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code must place on record in evidence the pleadings of the previous suit and establish the identity of the cause of actions, which cannot be established in the absence of record of judgment and decree which is pleaded to operate as estoppel.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated: JULY 11, 2022

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Questions and answers on law (Part 52)

 Q 1:- Whether victim has right to appeal against inadequate sentence to accused?

Ans:- Proviso to Section 372 ofCRPC (vide Act 5 of 2009) does not envisage right of appeal against inadequate sentence.

Q 2:- What is meant by Rule of law?

Ans:- Rule of law is the principle  that all people and institutions are subject to and accountable to law that is fairly applied and enforced; the principle of government by law.

Q 3:- What is retracted confession?

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Whether the right of the landlord to get rent accrued during the pendency of the first suit will be barred by res judicata if the landlord fails to claim said rent by amending plaint?

 (g) Rent and Recurring Cause of Action:

48. The Corporation and the Firm maintain that the Owner's claim has been barred by res judicata. I reckon what applies, if ever, here is Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. And the provision reads:

2. Suit to include the whole claim.--(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish and portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.

(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.--Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.--A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.

49. The illustration exemplifies what amounts to relinquishment of part of claim. A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200. The rent for the whole of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for 1906. He shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for 1905 or 1907.

50. That is, the suit was in 1908. A's cause of action got crystalised on the date of his filing the suit. His right was to recover the rent arrears accumulated by then--for 1905, 1906, and 1907. The cause for his action was the B's default. The default was up to the date of his going to the Court, until the end of 1907. In the illustration, by the time A filed the suit, the rent for 1906 and 1907 was also due. Yet A did not seek to recover what he had been entitled to by then. The rent for 1906 and 1907, I may stress, was not the rent accumulated pending the suit.

51. In other words, A's suit in 1908 must have included the whole claim which A was entitled to make by then. But A sued for the rent of only 1906. In that suit, as A did not seek the rent for 1905 and 1907, it amounted to his relinquishing that portion of the claim. Law treats that as an intentional relinquishment. So, he shall not afterwards sue for that relinquished or omitted portion. The reckoning point, I must say, is the date of suit filing.

52. Looked from another angle, in the illustration, we may note that the suit was filed in 1908, but the rent for that year was not included because it was not due by then. That means a future arrear cannot provide cause of action. What should happen to the rent of 1908?

53. We cannot presume that a suit gets decided there and then. It runs its course; in the meanwhile, many years may pass. Let us assume that the case in the illustration took six years to conclude, after running its course through appellate and revisional channels. So it ended in 1914. If we accept the Corporation's argument, then every year or at least intermittently the owner should have amended his pleadings and kept adding the rent for the years passing by until the suit ended. This method adopted, the court fee gets paid whenever there is an amendment and, eventually, the arrears adding up, even the pecuniary jurisdiction may change. So halfway through the trial Court should abandon the case and transmit it to another court. A chimerical concept of procedural law. On the contrary, once the cause of action crystallizes and issues are struck, the parties go to the trial on that basis. Thus, for adjudicatory purposes, the cause of action stands frozen.

54. True, subsequent events may affect the suit outcome. For that, either party to the suit should bring to the court's notice those later developments. For that even the amended Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC provides. Otherwise, the court itself, in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, may take note of those developments. But law does not compel a person to invariably bring on record all the later developments through amendment. If the later developments provide an independent cause of action, the party's right to a fresh legal remedy remains intact. This proposition applies with more rigour if the cause of action is recurring.

55. Indeed, default in rent remittance provides recurring cause of action. Every successive default provides an independent cause of action. Later developments may affect that cause of action if they are duly brought on record; otherwise, they provide further independent cause of action. Even the doctrine of lis pendens does not defeat the suitor's independent right to sue. It is only a matter of prudence and convenience that all the related facts are brought under one umbrella of adjudication. More particularly, if the cause of action is recurring, each instance of recurrence provides an independent cause of action. Here, the first suit--RCS No. 754 of 1977--concerns the rent from 1.4.1973 to 30.4.1977. The second suit--RCS No. 149 of 1998--concerns the later period.

56. I, therefore, conclude that the Owners have not lost their right to sue the Corporation and the Firm merely because the default occurred when another suit was pending. Pithily put, if there is no completed cause of action, there is no right for the party to sue. If the completed cause of action has many aspects or facets, but the party sues only on a few, the rest remain relinquished or abandoned. But on a completed cause of action if a party sues and pending those proceedings, there is, temporally speaking, recurrence of the same cause of action, it provides an independent cause of action. All these rights to sue are subject to one obvious limitation: The Statute of Limitation.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 561 of 2018 and 562 of 2016 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2005 in Regular Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 K.B. Lahoti and Company and Ors. Vs. Champalal Vithuram Jajoo and Ors.

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