Showing posts with label trust. Show all posts
Showing posts with label trust. Show all posts

Friday, 27 August 2021

Whether Revenue is entitled to attach properties of Private Trust to recover dues of trustees?

 The controversy then remaining in the

present Petition is whether the Revenue is

entitled to attach the properties belonging to a

Private Trust to recover dues of the trustees, who

was a director of a company which had allegedly

defaulted in paying its tax dues. The contention

of the Revenue appears to be that the property

being attached does not belong to the Trust but is

a property of one late Mrs. Sushila Laliwala- the

mother of the defaulting trustee. Therefore, the

properties could be attached to the extent it

devolved upon the ex-director of the defaulting

company as her legal heir.


 10. Mr. Suresh Kumar appearing on behalf of the

Revenue also fairly submits that pursuant to issuance of the

Letters of Administration by this court to the trustees of the

trust, the above position is settled in law that the subject

properties stand in the name of the trust and do not belong to

the original petitioner No.1 against whom the Revenue has

initiated recovery proceedings. He however submitted that

the recovery proceedings being civil in nature would however

continue against the original petitioner No.1 and his estate in

the hands of his legal-heirs and representatives. But in so far

subject properties are concerned, he has fairly accepted the

position that continuance of the attachment orders would now

not be sustainable in law in view of the Letters of

Administration issued to the trust.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.1657 OF 1998

Rajesh T. Shah Vs  The Tax Recovery Officer

CORAM : UJJAL BHUYAN, &

MILIND N. JADHAV, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 13th March 2020.

JUDGMENT (PER MILIND N. JADHAV, J.) :-

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Wednesday, 19 August 2020

Supreme Court: Factors to be considered by the court for grant of leave to institute suit U/S 92 of CPC against the public trust

The statement of law so laid down was reiterated:

A) In Bishwanath and Anr. v. Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji and Ors. MANU/SC/0263/1967 : (1967) 2 SCR 618

It is settled law that to invoke Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 3 conditions have to be satisfied, namely, (i) the trust is created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature; (ii) there was a breach of trust or a direction of court is necessary in the administration of such a trust; and (iii) the relief claimed is one or other of the reliefs enumerated therein. If any of the 3 conditions is not satisfied, the suit falls outside the scope of the said section. ... ...

B) In Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia MANU/SC/0239/1968 : (1969) 3 SCR 83

It is evident that this Section has no application unless three conditions are fulfilled: (1) the suit must relate to a public charitable or religious trust, (2) the suit must be founded on an allegation of breach of trust or the direction of the Court is required for administration of the trust, and (3) the reliefs claimed are those which are mentioned in the section.

13. Three conditions are therefore, required to be satisfied in order to invoke Section 92 of the Code and to maintain an action under said Section, namely, that

(i) the Trust in question is created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature;

(ii) there is a breach of trust or a direction of Court is necessary in the administration of such a Trust; and

(iii) the relief claimed is one or other of the reliefs as enumerated in said Section.

Consequently, if any of these three conditions is not satisfied, the matter would be outside the scope of said Section 92.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1917 of 2020 
Decided On: 03.03.2020

 Ashok Kumar Gupta Vs  Sitalaxmi Sahuwala Medical Trust and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0259/2020,(2020) 4 SCC 321
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Wednesday, 18 March 2020

Whether suit filed by the trust is maintainable if co-trustees are not joined as a party to suit?

The law is well settled that all co-trustees must be joined in filing suit unless the instrument of the Trust otherwise provides. No one single co-trustee even if he be as a managing trustee, unanimously chosen by the co-trustees, can maintain such a suit without other trustees being parties to it. If any one or more are unwilling to be joined the suit as plaintiff or for some reason or the other it is not possible to join them as plaintiff, they must be impleaded as defendants so that all the co-trustees could be before the Court.

The general principle of law is that the office of a trustee, irrespective of the number of trustees, is a joint one and co-trustees form, as it were, one trustee and must therefore execute the duties of their office jointly. Hence no suit in regard to trust properties would be maintainable by one or some of the trustees only, if the remaining trustees are not before the Court either as plaintiffs or even as defendants."
45. As held above, the trust properties vest on all trustees. Body of the Trust comprises of all the trustees of the Trust. It is, therefore, apparent that first of all, all the trustees have to decide whether or not suit is to be filed on behalf of the Trust. It has to be a joint or at least decision by majority. It cannot be disputed that the decision of the Trust must be reflected in the resolution passed in a meeting of the Managing Committee of the Trust. It is only through such resolution the Trust can speak or disclose its mind that it has decided to file suit and authorised one of its trustees to sign and verify the plaint to appoint or engage leader to represent the interest of the trust. In the instant case, it is nowhere mentioned in body of the plaint that the suit is being filed in pursuance of any such resolution passed by the Managing Committee of the appellant-Trust. Nowhere it is mentioned that Mr. V.K. Korani was authorised by all the trustees to represent interest of the Trust and that he is entitled to sign and verify the plaint on behalf of the trust. Thus, prima facie; suit has been filed without there being any authority in favour of Mr. Korani from the appellant-Pathshala Trust. The suit, thus, suffers from this additional substantial defect.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal from Order No. 641 of 2004

Decided On: 13.08.2004

Decided On: 14.09.2004

Shri Cutchi Visa Oswal Derawasi Jain Pathshala Vs. Cutchi Visha Oswal Derawasi Jain Mahajan 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.C. Daga, J.


Citation: 2005(1) ALLMR484
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Whether the appellate court should interfere with the decision of the trial court on the question of balance of hardship under rent law?

It is well settled that an Appeal Court will be ordinarily slow to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge on questions like the balance of hardship, for this is primarily a question of fact. To succeed, the appellant must how that the trial Judge misdirected himself on a question of law or that he based his judgment on some finding of fact on which there was no evidence. If in drawing up the statutory balance sheet of hardship under Section 13(2), there is some evidence of hardship on each side the decision of the trial Judge must be normally final. The appellate Court can interfere in certain circumstance, for instance, if there is no evidence of hardship on one side or if the trial Judge has held to be relevant some matter which in law is not relevant such as the absence of a view of a neighbouring hill, river, tree or something pleasant of that kind.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Special Civil Appln. Nos. 2185, 2187 and 2194 of 1969

Decided On: 14.03.1972

 Kishinchand Murjimal Vs. Bal Kalavati 
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Whether construction of marriage hall or charitable hospital would amount to putting premises to non-residential use?

Mr.Chitale, the learned counsel for the respondents sought to support the decree passed by the Appellate Court by arguing firstly that the requirement of the trustees for constructing marriage hall, clinic and hospital etc. is not requirement for residential purposes and hence, any decree that would be passed on that ground evicting the tenant would be contrary to Section 25(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 which prohibits conversion of residential purpose to non-residential purpose. The trial Court has rightly negatived this contention on the ground that the requirement, cannot be considered to be for non-residential purpose because a large portion of the construction will be used by the doctors, nurses and patients who would be residing therein although for different times and sometime temporarily and the present use of the building itself if not wholly for residential purposes.

19. Moreover, the word "residence" must be understood in the context of the Act as used in Section 6. The words "residential use" as opposed to "non-residential use" must, therefore, be used not for education, business trade or storage within the meaning of S. 5 (1). It cannot be said that the construction of a marriage hall or a charitable hospital by a charitable trust would be putting the premises to use for education business, trade or storage within the meaning of Section 6.

20. "Residence" has no doubt, a variety of meanings according to the Statute or document in which it is used. It is an "ambiguous word" and may receive a different meaning according to the position in which it is found. The word may receive a larger or more restricted meaning according to what the Court believes the intention of the Legislature to have been, in framing the particular provision in which the word occurs. Having regard to these various meanings of the word 'residence' and the scheme of the Rent Act as indicated in the Section 6, it must be held that the legislature in used the words "non-residential purpose" in Section 25 did not intend to prohibit use of a building like the suit building containing a residential flat like the suit flat and the land on which such a building stands for purposes of construction of Marriage Halls. Charitable Hospital and quarters and garages for Doctors and Nurses as in the present case. The said Marriage Halls, Hospitals etc. are like to be used for sleeping, eating, drinking etc. temporarily if not permanently from day-day particularly in a crowded city like Bombay. The use of the same cannot be described, the facts and circumstances established in the case, as "non-residential" use within the meaning of even Section 25.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Special Civil Appln. Nos. 2185, 2187 and 2194 of 1969

Decided On: 14.03.1972

 Kishinchand Murjimal Vs. Bal Kalavati and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Vaidya, J.

Citation: 1972 MHLJ 822, AIR 1973 Bom 46
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Whether the trustees are required to obtain permission of the charity commissioner for filing eviction suit against the tenant?

The first and fore most reason for the same is that Section 50 is an enabling provision. Ordinarily, trustees as legal owners alone are able to file suits for the recovery of possession of trust properties. As for example, a trespasser, if sued by a third, party, would be able to successfully resist the suit by banking on his de facto possession of the property. To put it in legal parlance, possession is a good point, except against the true owner. That is the established dictum of law. Ordinarily, the Charity Commissioner or the persons claiming to be interested as beneficiaries, but having no legal title in them, would fail in their suits, if they file the same -for the recovery of possession of the trust property, even if they allege that the defendant is in adverse possession and the interest of such beneficiaries are likely to be jeopardised in the ultimate analysis. Such a suit, according to general property law and general procedural law, is bound to fail. In the general interest of public trust properties, which are close to the heart of the Legislature, a special provision has, therefore, been made in Section 50 of the Act clothing the Charity Commissioner or the beneficiaries of the public trust to institute suits for various reliefs set out in clauses (a) to (h) of Section 50 of the Act. But for this enabling provision, the Charity Commissioner or the beneficiaries would not be in a position to institute such suits. The Charity Commissioner, however, is given power to file such suits on his own. The beneficiaries at times might be tempted to raise the disputes under the alleged guise of their interest in the trust properties and may at times work counter to the powers of the trustees. That is why, a condition has been imposed on their right to file such suits and the condition is that they must procure the permission of the Charity Commissioner before they embark on such litigation under the assumed colour of safeguarding the interests of the public trust. The substantial portion of Section 50, therefore, is to be confined to the power of Charity Commissioner and the power of the beneficiaries of the trust to institute those suits enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of Section 50 of the Act, where the background is one depicted in clauses (i) or (ii) or (iii) of the initial part of Section 50.

5. Mr. Shah's submission, however, is that the proviso disables all persons to file suits claiming any of the reliefs specified in that section. In his submission, this provision, which is mandatory in character, takes away the right of all other persons. It is difficult to subscribe to this view canvassed by Mr. Shah. All that the proviso forbids is that those who are given powers in the earlier part of Section 50 are to exercise those powers only in compliance with the provisions of that Act and not otherwise. S9 the proviso is a sort of a restriction placed on the powers of the Charity Commissioner, and on the powers of the beneficiaries of the trust, who are designated by Section 50 as "persons having an interest in the trust". The proviso is not to be enlarged in its connotation to cover even trustees.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1139 of 1979

Decided On: 08.01.1980

Nadiad Nagarpalika, Nadiad Vs.  Vithalbhai Zaverbhai Patel

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.H. Bhatt, J.

Citation : AIR 1980 Guj 161
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Tuesday, 4 February 2020

Supreme Court: S 92 of CPC is not applicable to suit filed by trust

Section 92 of the Code
contemplates a suit against a Trust either for removing any trustee;
appointing new trustee; or vesting any property in a trustee etc.
but the present suit itself is by a Trust against a Sevadar, therefore,
the procedure prescribed under Section 92 of the Code would not
be applicable in a suit by a Trust. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 724 OF 2020

GHAT TALAB KAULAN WALA  Vs  BABA GOPAL DASS CHELA SURTI DASS


HEMANT GUPTA, J.
Dated:JANUARY 31, 2020.
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Sunday, 24 November 2019

What are exceptions to rule that all trustees must join to file suit on behalf of trust?

This Court, following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of J.P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. and others vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and others, reported in MANU/SC/0927/2004 : (2005) 1 SCC 172 held that, although, as a general rule, trustees must act together and execute duties of their office jointly, there have been certain exceptions to this general rule against delegation. This Court enumerated the exceptions to the general rule thus:

i) where the trust-deed allows the trust to be executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees;

ii) where there is express sanction or approval of the act by the co-trustees;

iii) where the delegation of power is necessary;

iv) where the beneficiaries competent to contract consent to the delegation;

v) where the delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the business;

vi) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to a decision taken by the trustees jointly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 180 of 1995

Decided On: 18.11.2013

 Namdeo  Vs.  Shahi Gupta Masjid Chandrapur

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.B. Shukre, J.


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Sunday, 28 July 2019

How to decide issue of comparative hardship in eviction suit against tenant?

 To say that the Trustees of the petitioners are also members of the Jamaat and that Jamaat had several other properties, is certainly an irrelevant consideration. As long as, there is no material produced on record, this Trust itself owns any suitable property from where it could start the school, the issue of comparative hardship certainly cannot be decided in favour of the respondents. Besides, in the present case, considering the number of business activities which the respondents carry out through various premises located in Mahabaleshwar itself, the issue of comparative hardship will have to be decided against the respondents. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1997 of 1995, Civil Application Nos. 2274 and 1351 of 2017

Decided On: 21.12.2018

Ranjanwadi Shikshan Trust Vs.  Govind N. Naidu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 38,2019(1) RCR 552
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Sunday, 17 March 2019

Whether application for execution of decree which is not signed by trustees of charitable trust is maintainable?

 It is also argued that the execution proceedings ought to have been signed by all the trustees and that the Secretary of the trust cannot represent the trust to file execution proceedings. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.

7. So far as the question as to who should sign the execution proceedings and who should verify the execution proceedings is concerned, the provisions of Order 21, Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are most relevant. The relevant provision reads as under :

"Written application-- (2) Save as otherwise provided by Sub-rule (1), every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall contain in a tabular form the following particulars."
This provision clearly means that it is not necessary that every time only the decree holder must file execution proceedings. It can be filed by any other person who happens to be acquainted with the facts of the case and the Court happens to be satisfied that the person so signing the execution proceedings is acquainted with the facts of the case. Here, the Secretary of the trust has signed the execution proceedings and it is very clear from the order passed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes that he has not raised any doubt about the acquaintance of the Secretary with the facts of the case. So to the satisfaction of the Judge of the Court of Small Causes, the execution proceedings is rightly presented.

8. No doubt, Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 prohibits the trusts from delegating the powers, but the explanation to Section 47 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 reads as follows :

"The appointment of an attorney or proxy to do an act merely ministerial and involving no independent discretion is not a delegation within the meaning of this section."
It means that ministerial acts can be performed by a person who is authorized by the trustees to do the needful. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that no such authorization is filed by the Secretary before the Court to show that he can sign the execution petition on behalf of the trust. However, when the Court was satisfied that the Secretary was acquainted with the facts of the case and could file proceedings, I do not think that there is any substance in this contention. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Writ Petn. No. 2285 of 1997

Decided On: 21.06.2001

 Monalisa Rohinton Irani  Vs. Naval H. Tata and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.K. Barde, J.

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Saturday, 26 January 2019

Whether court has jurisdiction to control discretion to be exercised by trustees?

The learned Judge has also overlooked the well settled law
laid down in the judgments of various Court relied upon by the
Appellant where it has been expressly held that once the
discretionary power is not exercised by the trustee reasonably and
in good faith, such power could be controlled by a Court. These
judgments have been passed in the following cases viz. Klug
(Supra) a judgement of the Chancery Division, M.V.
Ramasubbier (Supra), judgment of the Supreme Court and in
Re. H.E.H., The Nizam's Jewellery Trust (Supra), again a
judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Re.
H.E.H., The Nizam's Jewellery Trust (Supra) at paragraph 52
has held as under:-

52. The power conferred on the Board of
Trustees is no doubt discretionary, but on the
principle embodied in S.49 viz., that when such
discretionary power is not exercised
reasonably and in good faith, such power may
be controlled by a Court. There was no warrant
for the suggestion made by the Board of
Trustees before the High Court that the power
is absolute. The law on the subject is
succinctly stated in Underhill's Law of Trusts
and Trustees,12th Edn.,p.472;
….it would seem that, even where trustees
claim to exercise their discretion as to
investments, the court will, in a proper case,
direct an inquiry whether it is for the interest of
the beneficiaries that a particular investment
should be continued or called in. So, too,
where absolute discretion has been given to
trustees to do a particular act (e.g. to sell the
trust property), the court cannot compel them
to exercise the power, but if they do exercise
it, the court will see that they do not exercise it
improperly or unreasonably.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
APPEAL NO. 551 OF 2004
IN
SUIT NO. 3578 OF 2000
Kamleshsingh Harnamsingh Chowhan Vs Gangasingh Motisingh Chowhan

CORAM: B.R. GAVAI &
RIYAZ I. CHAGLA, JJ.

Dated: 11TH JANUARY, 2019.
Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 833
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Sunday, 7 October 2018

Whether successor trustee should make application for bringing him on record within limitation?

However, even if it is assumed that the present case is governed by Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code, the question still remain, whether the application made by the new trustee would be governed by any period of limitation. Even though, Shri Kherdekar appearing for the respondents before the learned single Judge had submitted that such an application would be governed by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, he has very fairly conceded before us that such an application would not be governed by any period of limitation, It is not, therefore, necessary to decide this point in this appeal. However, in Baijnath Ram v. Mt. Tunkowati MANU/BH/0076/1962 : AIR1962Pat285 Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that unlike Rules 3 and 4, of O.22, no limitation is prescribed for presentation of an application under Order 22 Rule 10, and no penalty is laid down for failure to substitute the person on whom the interest of the deceased plaintiff or defendant has devolved and hence the right to make an application under the latter rule is a right which accrues from day to day and can be made at any time during the pendency of a suit and there is no abatement under that rule. A similar view has been taken by a Single Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in C. Wright Neville v. E. H. Freser MANU/NA/0101/1943. It would, therefore, appear that once It is held that the application is governed by O. 22 Rule 10 of the Code, then such an application could be made at any time during the pendency of the suit or appeal, but while granting leave to the applicant to proceed with the suit or appeal, the Court would consider the question on merits. However, the application cannot be thrown out simply because it is not made within a particular period,

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1971

Decided On: 24.04.1978

 Sitabai Ramchandra Jaltare  Vs.  Masjid Nurun Mohalla Jingerwadi

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Whether legal heirs of trustees are to be brought on record on death of trustee if suit was brought on behalf of trust?

 The first question which falls for consideration is whether the application which was made by Adbul Majid before the learned District Judge was governed by Rule 3 of Order 22 as held by the learned District Judge or by Rule 10 of Order 22, as held by the learned Single Judge. Relying on certain decisions referred to by him in his judgment, the learned District Judge was of the view that Order 22 Rule 10 is a residuary rule governing only those cases which are not provided for by the preceding rules and where devolution takes place by reason of death, the matter falls under Rule 4 where the death is of the defendant and Rule 10 will have no application to such a case. The learned District Judge was of the view that Rule 10 is an enabling one but not a device intended to get over the laches of the parties bound to move under Rule 3 or Rule 4. It appears that the learned District Judge was of the view that Order 22 Rule 10 will not apply to a case where the plaintiff or defendant dies and the suit has to be continued by other persons. The learned District Judge was of the view that in case of death of the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be. the proper provision to be applied would be Rule 3 or R. 4 of O. 22 and not Rule 10. It was in this view of the matter that the learned District Judge held that the present case was governed by Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code and not by Order 22 Rule 10. Having held so, the learned District Judge further found that the legal representative of Awaliyabi should have been brought within 90 days from her death and since this has not been done, the appeal had abated.

7. As already seen the learned Single Judge differed from the learned District Judge with regard to the application of Order 22 Rule 3 to the present case. The learned Single Judge observed that Order 22 Rule 3 would apply only if on the death of the plaintiff the suit is to be continued by the legal representatives of the plaintiff but not to the case where the plaintiff was a trustee. According to him, on the death of the plaintiff, who filed the suit in his capacity as a trustee, or his resignation or otherwise ceasing to be trustee, the person, who could continue the suit would not be his personal legal representative but another trustee of the said trust. The learned single Judge observed that Awaliyabi had not filed the suit in her personal capacity and hence there could not be any question of her personal legal representatives continuing it and it could be continued by another representative of the trust, in our opinion, the view taken by the learned single Judge, with respect, appears to be laying down the law correctly in this respect. In Thirumalai v. Arunachella MANU/TN/0398/1925 : AIR1926Mad540 , the appeal was filed by nine trustees. But during the pendency of the appeal two of them died and one retired. It appears that an application was made for bringing on record the trustees who had been appointed in place of one of them who had expired and the other who had retired. This application had been filed beyond the period of 90 days from the death of one of trustees and from the date of retirement of the other. It was contended that the new trustees, who had been appointed in place of the above said two trustees were their legal representatives within the meaning of clause (11) of S. 2 of the Code and hence the application not being filed within the prescribed time, could not be entertained. On these facts it was held that the new trustees were not legal representatives of those who had died or retired and it was held that the application for bringing the new trustees on record would fall under Order 22 Rule 10, because the interest of the deceased trustees devolved on these persons by the act of the electors done in pursuance of the scheme framed by the Court and it was a case of devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit. In Keshab Rai v. Jyoti Prosad MANU/WB/0345/1932 : AIR1932Cal783 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that Rules 2, 3 and 4 of Order 22 of the Code relate to cases of devolution in interest on the death of a plaintiff or defendant when such plaintiff or defendant was suing or was being sued respectively in his personal capacity, that these rules do not apply when a suit is brought by or against a person in his representative character and to such a suit the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code will be applicable. Again in Kishori Lal v. The Collector ILR (1955) All 128 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code is applicable to those cases where a person who is brought on the record as legal representative inherits the property from the deceased party, but where a person is brought on the record as legal representative in order to represent an estate which was formerly represented in a suit by another person, Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code will apply. Lastly in Roshan Lal v. Kapur Chand MANU/PH/0085/1960 a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court has held that where a suit is brought by trustees and some of them die during the pendency of the suit, the new trustees can be added as parties under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code and newly appointed trustees are not representatives of the deceased trustees within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 3. It would, therefore, appear that it is well settled that Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code applies to cases where the plaintiff leaves behind the estate which could be inherited by his heirs or successors and if they are brought on record, then the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 will apply. However, the case would be different where the suit is brought by the plaintiff not in his personal capacity but in his representative capacity as a trustee or otherwise, in that case when he dies, his own legal representative would not automatically become trustees and would not be legal representatives within the meaning of Clause (11) of S. 2 of the Code. Only those trustees who are elected or appointed under the scheme of the trust can step in his shoes and continue the suit. Such a new trustee could not by any stretch of imagination be said to be legal representative of the deceased trustee. In any case, the right of the deceased plaintiff to act as a trustee would not pass on to the new trustee on the death of the deceased trustee. The new trustee would get his right not by virtue of death of the previous trustee but because of his being elected or appointed as a trustee under the scheme of the trust. Obviously, therefore, when a suit is filed by a person in his capacity as a trustee or representing a trust or any interest and if he dies, the suit can- not be continued by his own legal representatives but will have to be continued by another trustee or a person who is appointed or elected to manage the trust. In short, therefore, interest as a trustee will not devolve on a new trustee because of the death of the previous trustee but because of his being elected or appointed as such, Now obviously such a case will not be covered by Order 22 Rule 3, which contemplates the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff being brought on record. Since the new trustee would not be a legal representative of the deceased trustee, in that sense there is no question of the new trustee applying for being brought on record under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code. Obviously such a case would be covered by Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code, In this view of the matter, therefore, it is not possible to say that the conclusion to which the learned single Judge has arrived is not correct.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1971

Decided On: 24.04.1978

 Sitabai Ramchandra Jaltare  Vs.  Masjid Nurun Mohalla Jingerwadi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.D. Kambli and A.A. Ginwala, JJ.

Citation: 1978 MHLJ 789 bom
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Sunday, 4 March 2018

Whether resolution taken by general body of trust will not be effective till it is approved by charity commissioner?

 Learned Advocate Shri Sunil Manohar then placed reliance on reported judgment in Chembur Trombay Education v. D.K. Marathe reported in MANU/MH/0863/2001 : 2002(3)BomCR161 . In paragraph 11 of this judgment the learned Single Judge has observed as under:

... A priori, any amendment or change brought about in accordance with law would come into effect from the date of resolution of the Society to bring about such a change. This proposition is fortified from the plain language of Section 22 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The said section requires that where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17, the trustee shall, within 90 days from the date of occurrence of such change, report such change to the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner, as the case may be. The dictionary meaning of expression "occur" as observed in the Black's Law Dictionary is:

To happy; to meet one's eyes; to be found or met with; to present itself; to appear; hence, to befall in due course; to take place; to arise.
Giving the natural meaning to this word in Section 22 of the Act, coupled with the principle enunciated by the Apex Court that when the Act does not require that registration of any change is a condition precedent to come into effect, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the amendment to the constitution as well as subsequent elections of the President and members of the Governing Council, therefore, came into effect from the date of the respective resolutions of the general body. The enquiry postulated under Section 22 is only to ascertain the factum as to whether the change has occurred or not. In the event, the competent authority is satisfied that the change has not occurred in accordance with law, only then that change will have to be undone and status quo ante will have to be restored. A fortiori, resolution of the general body of the Society is sufficient to ignite the change of amendment in the constitution as well as of electing new general body for administering the affairs of the Society. The fact that the change report is pending consideration before the Charity Commissioner, would be of no avail....

9. Learned Advocate Dr. Anjan De fairly conceded that the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Chembur Trombay Education v. D.K. Marathe reported at MANU/MH/0863/2001: 2002(3)BomCR161 does not support his contentions.

10. We find that any of the provisions contained in Bombay Public Trusts Act or the Rules thereunder do not mandate that amendment to the bye-laws or the rules of constitution of society passed by the society or trust shall not operate unless and until said amendment gets approval of Charity Commissioner/ Assistant Charity Commissioner etc.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2672 of 2007

Decided On: 26.07.2007

 Ganesh S/o. Mahadeorao Thawre Vs. Central Hindu Military Education Society 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.H. Joshi and R.C. Chavan, JJ.


Citation: 2007 (6) MHLJ589

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Sunday, 5 November 2017

Whether it is necessary to file plaint along with application U/S 92 of CPC in suit relating to trust?

Apart from the above discussion, we have also taken notice of the fact that plaint was not annexed with the application filed Under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is pre-requisite for filing the application for leave to file a suit. Based on the averments in the plaint only, it can be inferred that whether an application Under Section 92 is maintainable or not. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3166 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 34719 of 2011)

Decided On: 23.02.2017

 Swami Shivshankargiri Chella Swami and Ors. Vs. Satya Gyan Niketan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Citation: 2017(5) MHLJ527.
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Friday, 3 November 2017

Whether trust can file complaint before consumer forum?

A reading of the definition of the words ‘complaint’, ‘complainant’ and ‘consumer’ makes it clear that a Trust cannot invoke the provisions of the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word ‘person’ has also been defined in the Act and Section 2(m) thereof defines a person as follows :-
(m)    "person" includes, -

 (i)      a firm whether registered or not;

 (ii)    a Hindu undivided family;

(iii)    a co-operative society;

(iv)    every other association of  persons 
 whether  registered  under  the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not
5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a Trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.
  NON-REPORTABLE

Supreme Court of India
Pratibha Pratisthan & Ors vs Manager, Canara Bank & Ors on 7 March, 2017

Bench: Madan B. Lokur, Prafulla C. Pant
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Sunday, 28 May 2017

Whether husband can claim ownership over property purchased in the name of wife?

In the given case before this court when the property was purchased in the name of this plaintiff/appellant in the year 1979 there was no cloud in the marital relationship between the parties. I have already said that evidence is galore that the entire consideration money came from either the defendant personally or from his private limited companies. It is immaterial whether the defendant violated the provisions of the companies act or whether such money was reimbursed to the company. It is true that after purchasing the property the parties shifted to the suit flat and the defendant is still residing there. The marriage between the parties was dissolved on 26.09.1984 that is roughly after six years of the execution of those deeds and the suit was filed on 2nd of July, 1987 that is after a gap of 2 year 9 months of the divorce. Thus, when a fat amount (as per money value of 1978-79) was given to the wife for the purchase of the suit flat this court is satisfied that the husband had good faith on his wife and that the relationship at that point of time was 'fiduciary' one. The plaintiff/appellant was like a 'trustee' vis-a-vis her husband, if he is treated as 'trust'. The cumulative effect of the circumstances noted above, when seen in the light of the substantial amount paid by the defendant/husband that puts the plaintiff/appellant in 'fiduciary capacity' vis-a-vis her husband. Such being the case the transaction is completely saved from the mischief of Section 4 of benami prohibition Act by reason of the same falling under Sub-Section 3(b) of Section 4. Thus, I reiterate that the plea of banami as raised by the respondent/defendant was not, therefore, barred by the said Act of 1988.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
S.A. 577 of 2008
Decided On: 02.09.2016
 Debika Chakraborty

Vs.

 Pradip Chakraborty

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indrajit Chatterjee, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 Calcutta 11
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Friday, 14 April 2017

Whether trust can file complaint under consumer protection Act?

 A reading of the definition of the words ‘complaint’, ‘complainant’
and ‘consumer’ makes it clear that a Trust cannot invoke the provisions of
the Act in respect of any allegation on the basis of which a complaint could
be made. To put this beyond any doubt, the word ‘person’ has also been
defined in the Act and Section 2(m) thereof defines a person as follows :-
(m) "person" includes, −
(i) a firm whether registered or not;
(ii) a Hindu undivided family;
(iii) a co-operative society;
(iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not

5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it
is clear that a Trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer.
Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer
dispute under the provisions of the Act.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3560 OF 2008
Pratibha Pratisthan & Ors.
vs.
Manager, Canara Bank & Ors.
Dated:March 7, 2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 1303,(2017) 3 SCC 712

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Tuesday, 11 October 2016

Whether agricultural tenancy is heritable on death of tenant in case of lands belonging to trust or educational institution?

 There is an another angle.   During the pendency of
appeal the original appellant has expired.   The legal heirs are

brought on record.  In view of the clear pronouncement of law by
the Apex Court in the case of Shriram Mandir Sansthan (cited
supra) in case of the lands belonging to a trust or an educational
institution falling within Section 129(b) of the Bombay Tenancy
Act, the tenancy is not heritable on the death of the tenant.  We
have made reference to this fact since the said subsequent event
has taken place during the pendency of present appeal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO.39 OF 2005.
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.516 of 1992 (D).
Digamber s/o Pandhari Bhise,

             V
   Shri Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan,
  CORAM:     B.R.GAVAI AND
          P.N.DESHMUKH, JJ.
          DATE :     23rd NOVEMBER, 2015.
Citation:2016(5) MHLJ163
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Sunday, 16 August 2015

Whether there is limitation for filing suit for recovery of streedhan?

In the decision reported in Scariah Varghese v. Marykutty (1991 (2) KLT 71), it was held :
"Even if there was no previous demand, the plaint itself can be considered as a demand. It is not a correct statement that the dowry would only part take the nature of a trust amount. True under the Trust Act, there are certain obligations which are in the nature of trust and certainly without any other statutory provision the amount given as dowry will legitimately assume the character and nature of trust in the hands of any person other than the person entitled to the amount, viz., the wife. Of course for recovery of a trust amount no period of limitation is prescribed. By virtue of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the statute itself says that the amounts in the hands of the husband or the husband's parents for and on behalf of the wife is a trust amount and so there is no difficulty to say that the obligation is one under trust to return the amount by virtue of the statutory provision and so there is no limitation for such a suit."
Kerala High Court

Mat.Appeal.No. 184 Of 2011 ( ) vs Biju Gopalan on 27 June, 2012
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