1) It is submitted that while considering the application
u/s 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court
has to consider an issue that whether there exists any
Arbitration Agreement between the parties. Such right
is certainly vested in Civil Court. The Plaintiff is
challenging the legality of agreement dated 20.05.2006
on the ground that the same is obtained by fraud and
is therefore seeking further declaration that the said
agreement is null and ab initio void. As such, the very
Arbitration clause as contained in the said agreement
is not enforceable. In spite of the fact that Section 16
of the said Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to
decide its own jurisdiction in view of particular
circumstances narrated in the plaint, the present
application deserves to be rejected.”
v. By a judgment dated 19.07.2011, the Additional Judge, Small
Causes Court, Pune, after hearing both sides, held as follows:
“11. After perusing the above mentioned cited cases, it
shows that when there is a clause of arbitration it is
mandated on the Civil Court to refer the dispute and
parties for arbitration as per agreement. In present
case the plaintiffs have materially contention about
playing fraud by Defendant No.3 but there is no any
contents in agreement as alleged by plaintiff in plaint
about keeping faith on Defendant No.3. It shows about
signing by Defendant No.3 for agreement dated
20.05.2006 and he was also party to said agreement.
The plaintiff alleged about playing fraud after resigning
by Defendant No.3 from partnership firm of Defendant
No.1 and signing the confirmation deed dated
13.07.2006 but as per Partnership Act remedy is
provided. Moreover, from the documents, it shows that
the confirmation deed dated 13.07.2007 was executed
by Defendant No.3 as Authorized Partner of M/s
Regency Mahavir Properties and another partner Dilip
Jain. The fraud alleged by the plaintiff is in respect of
the documents for which the remedy is also provided.
After considering the arbitration clause I find that the
application is to be allowed and the disputes have to
be referred for arbitration. Hence, I pass the following
order:
1) Application is allowed.
2) The plaintiff is directed to get the alleged dispute
resolved through the process of arbitration by
referring the plaintiff to invoke the process of
arbitration as per the arbitration clause 14
mentioned in the agreement dated 20.05.2006.”
Finding thus, the learned Judge referred the parties to arbitration.
2) High court dismissed writ petition with the result that the
parties stood referred to arbitration.
3) When sections 34 and 35 are seen, the position becomes even
clearer. Unlike section 31, under section 34, any person entitled to
any legal character may institute a suit for a declaration that he is
so entitled. Considering that it is possible to argue on a reading of
this provision that the legal character so declared may be against
the entire world, section 35 follows, making it clear that such
declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit and persons
claiming through them, respectively. This is for the reason that
under section 4 of the Specific Relief Act, specific relief is granted
only for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights. The principle
contained in section 4 permeates the entire Act, and it would be
most incongruous to say that every other provision of the Specific
Relief Act refers to in personam actions, section 31 alone being out
of step, i.e., referring to in rem actions.
25. The reasoning in the aforesaid judgment would again expose the
incongruous result of section 31 of the Specific Relief Act being
held to be an in rem provision. When it comes to cancellation of a deed by an executant to the document, such person can approach the Court under section 31, but when it comes to cancellation of a deed by a non-executant, the non-executant must approach the
Court under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Cancellation of the very same deed, therefore, by a non-executant would be an action in personam since a suit has to be filed under section 34. However, cancellation of the same deed by an
executant of the deed, being under section 31, would somehow
convert the suit into a suit being in rem. All these anomalies only
highlight the impossibility of holding that an action instituted under
section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an action in rem.
26. Given this finding of law, it is clear that the judgments of the District
Court and the High Court in this case need no interference.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5147 OF 2016
DECCAN PAPER MILLS CO. LTD. Vs REGENCY MAHAVIR PROPERTIES
R.F. Nariman, J.
Dated:August 19, 2020.