Important provisions of BNSS regarding information to police, investigation U/S 175 of BNSS, and cognizance of offence by Magistrate

 173. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given—

(i) orally, it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it;

(ii) by electronic communication, it shall be taken on record by him on being signed within three days by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may by rules prescribe in this behalf:

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Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant

had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of

the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the

Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said

application and could have refused to direct for the

registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an

application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural

irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given

circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an

order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or

without jurisdiction. {Para 32}

33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain

an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless

the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies

provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate

is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct

the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the

application/complaint discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so

passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction

and would not stand vitiated on this count.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.18084 OF 2024

ANURAG BHATNAGAR & ANR. Vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. 

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 895.

Dated: JULY 25, 2025

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Can police refuse to lodge FIR on email complaint from abroad? Kerala High Court answers

 The Kerala High Court, in the case YYYY v State of Kerala & Ors, delivered a significant judgment clarifying the obligations of the police under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) regarding the registration of FIRs, especially in the context of complaints sent via email from abroad and unsigned complaints.

Case Details:

• Case Number: Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 4778 of 2020

• Date of Judgment: 1 July 2025

• Bench: Justice Kauser Edappagath

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Kerala HC: U/S 173 of BNSS, Zero FIR's can be registered even if a complaint is sent via email from abroad and police cannot reject it for lack of signature or territorial jurisdiction

The implementation of Section 173 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'the BNSS'), marks

a significant shift in how the police handles information relating

to the commission of a cognizable offence. Now, Zero FIR has

been given statutory recognition by incorporating it in Section

173 of BNSS, which deals with the registration of FIR in

cognizable cases. Zero FIR has been introduced with the

primary purpose of ensuring that victims can file complaints

regardless of jurisdiction. Therefore, the police cannot refuse to

register an FIR if a cognizable offence is made out in the

complaint, even if the complaint is forwarded from a foreign

country. In these circumstances, the rejection of Annexure A7

complaint made by the petitioner on the ground that it was

unsigned and sent through e-mail from Australia cannot be

justified. {Para 3}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.MC NO. 4778 OF 2020

SOYA  Vs   STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH

Citation: 2025:KER:44462

Dated: 20TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 

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Supreme Court: What precautions the Magistrate should take before ordering investigation U/S 156(3) of CRPC{S 175 of BNSS}?

 Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure {S 175 of BNSS} which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed Under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored. {Para 24}

25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure{S 175 of BNSS}. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

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Supreme Court: It is not necessary to conduct preliminary inquiry as per Lalita kumari's Judgment if cognizable offence is made out against accused

 The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. {Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: 'Lalita Kumari' Judgment Doesn't Create Absolute Rule That Preliminary Enquiry Is Necessary In Every Case Before FIR

Conclusion/Directions

120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory Under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

[Emphasis supplied]

12. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence.

13. In the present case, the allegations against the Appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The Appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The Appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum.

14. Further, this Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the Appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

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Bombay HC: FIR Won't Stand Quashed If Revision Court Sets Aside Magistrate's Order For Police Investigation Into Cognizable Offence

To equip the revisional court to exercise the discretion in a correct manner, it may be advantageous for the revisional court to ascertain whether, pursuant to the direction of the Magistrate, FIR has, in fact, been registered. Two situations are conceivable : pre and post-registration of FIR pursuant to the order by the Magistrate. {Para 125}

126. (a) If the FIR is yet not registered, an interim order passed by the revisional court, staying effect and operation of the impugned order Under Section 156(3), will have full play and the investigating agency cannot proceed to register the FIR and enter into investigation lest the order passed by the revisional court would be denuded of the meaning and content.

(b) Such an interim order before the registration of the FIR will operate with full force and vigor, irrespective of the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order which weighed with the revisional court to stay such an order.

(c) On the other hand, if the FIR has already been registered, before the revisional court passes an interim order, then the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order may become relevant.

(d) If the revisional court finds that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, (of the nature referred to in Para Nos. 119, 120 and 122 above), in our considered view, the revisional court must be construed to have the power to stay further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR if the matter is still at the stage of investigation.

(e) We hasten to add that while passing such an order of stay of the proceedings at the stage of investigation, the revisional Court ought to record reasons which weighed with the court to hold that there appears a jurisdictional error in passing an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and thereupon, in terms, direct that the further proceedings be stayed.

(f) However, where the investigation culminates into lodging of the chargesheet and/or cognizance has been taken by the jurisdictional court, the interim order or final order passed by the revisional court setting aside the order passed by the Magistrate Under Section 156(3), will not have the effect of quashing the resultant prosecution.

127. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Desai that the view that after FIR is registered revision is not an efficacious remedy, would render the statutory remedy of revision redundant. The order passed by the revisional Court setting aside a direction for investigation, even after registration of the FIR, cannot be said to be bereft of any utility. If such an order is passed before the completion of investigation, the investigating agency may take the same into account in determining the course the investigation shall culminate into. If such an order is passed, post lodging of the chargesheet, the jurisdictional Magistrate may have the benefit of the said order at the stage of taking cognizance or during the course of the inquiry, as envisaged by the Code. The High Court may also have due regard to the order of the revisional Court while considering the prayer for quashing the FIR and/or prosecution in exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction.

128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order Under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law.

[O] ANSWERS

129. We are, therefore, inclined to answer question (i) in the negative. As regards question (ii), in our view, the revisional Court can interfere with an order Under Section 156(3) at the stage and to the extent indicated in paragraph 126 above. The Reference is answered accordingly.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 2517 of 2022, 

Decided On: 10.04.2024

Arun P. Gidh and Ors. Vs. Chandraprakash Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Revati Mohite Dere, N.J. Jamadar and Sharmila U. Deshmukh, JJ.

Author: N.J. Jamadar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2292/2024.

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Whether Magistrate can direct police to register an offence against Organizer Of Public Meeting if A Participant of said meeting has delivered a Hate Speech?

 (i) The respondent no. 1 had not levelled any allegation against the petitioner in the complaint which he had lodged with the concerned police officials.

(ii) The single line averred by respondent no. 1 against the petitioner in his complaint and application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed before the learned Magistrate, on the face of it, does not constitute any offence or make out any case against the petitioner. (iii) Even if the entire allegations made in the complaint lodged with the police or before the learned Magistrate as well as the inquiry conducted by the police in that regard are accepted in their entirety, the same do not disclose commission of any offence by the present petitioner. (iv) The records of the case reveal that the present case is not a case of lack of sufficient evidence against the petitioner, but rather a case with no incriminating material whatsoever against him. (v) Given that the allegations levelled by respondent no. 1 primarily pertain to an alleged hate speech delivered by proposed accused no. 2, and considering that there is no concept of vicarious liability in criminal law regarding such alleged offences, initiating criminal proceedings against the present petitioner would undoubtedly constitute an abuse of the legal process. (vi) The learned Magistrate overlooked the crucial distinction between the duty imposed on the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register an FIR when a complaint reveals a cognizable offence, and the powers vested in Magistrates under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which necessitates the application of judicial mind and scrutiny of the material on record.

(vii) The impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate reflects lack of application of judicial mind, for the reasons that (a) it fails to record any reasons whatsoever for directing registration of FIR; (b) it does not record as to commission of which cognizable offences was disclosed from the perusal of complaint and application filed before it, against the proposed accused persons; and (c) it fails to acknowledge or refer to the contents of preliminary inquiry conducted by the police and submitted before the concerned Magistrate by way of Action Taken Report, even for the purposes of disagreeing with the same and ordering registration of FIR, even though the learned Magistrate had himself called for the same.

122. The recognized purpose of criminal adjudicatory process is that an accused or a proposed accused, if essentially connected to incriminating evidence in a complaint, should be brought within the ambit of law. However, an unmeritorious complaint containing no incriminating material against an accused should not result in orders of registration of FIRs as such proceedings will certainly amount to abuse of process of criminal law.

123. The duty that a Court of law owes to its citizens who approach them as litigants is protected when the material placed on record which reveals commission of a cognizable offence is acted upon. While doing so, the Courts have to be cautious in identifying cases where such material is absent and protecting an accused or proposed accused by way of a reasoned order to avoid abuse of process of law. Absence of reasons brings into question the propriety of an order being not based on judicial precedents, material on record or reasons for its conclusion. The Courts should embrace the method of passing a reasoned order based on judicial precedents and law as well as the material placed before it, which is reflected in its order or judgments. Through such reasoned orders, the Courts can order for registration of FIR against persons who cross criminal boundaries without lawful justification, or conversely, reject such applications where it seems that the accused or proposed accused can be a possible victim of abuse of process of law by initiation of criminal proceedings.

127. However, it is also to be kept in mind that a person against whom FIR is being ordered to be registered for no reason will have his reputation at stake. In cases as the present one, against this backdrop, this Court finds merit in the present petition since the complaint filed before the learned Magistrate did not fulfil the criteria of presence of incriminating material disclosing any connection of the petitioner with the alleged act of organising the speech delivered by one Swami ji, whose identity also remains unknown.

130. It is to be noted at the cost of repetition that the complaint qua the present petitioner was not a case of insufficient material but of no material at all. The Court also takes note of the fact that though the Magistrate mentions that from perusal of the complaint, commission of cognizable offence is revealed there is no allegation in the entire complaint itself or in the Action Taken Report about any act of commission or omission on part of the present petitioner.

131. This Court is, therefore, constrained to observe that the Magisterial power may be unlimited but it is not unfettered and should be used not only with utmost caution and vigilance, but also with circumspection after carefully going through the contents of the complaint and the Action Taken Report, if any, filed by the police.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

CRL.M.C. 1463/2020 & CRL.M.A. 5732/2020

 ALOK KUMAR Vs HARSH MANDER & ANR.

 CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA J

 Pronounced on: 21.07.2023 

Index to the Judgment

FACTUAL BACKDROP ...................................................................................... 3

ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER ........................................................... 10

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS ....................................................... 13

WHEN CAN A MAGISTRATE DIRECT REGISTRATION OF FIR .......... 15

I. Law of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. ....................................................................... 15

II. Essential Pre-conditions While Directing Registration of FIR under Section 156(3) ..................................................................................................................... 21

(i) Disclosure of Cognizable Offence .......................................................... 21

(ii) Application of Judicial Mind ................................................................... 23

(iii) Necessity to pass Speaking Order ........................................................... 28

EXAMINING THE PRESENT CASE ON THE TOUCHSTONE OF ABOVE INGREDIENTS .................................................................................................... 29

I. Preliminary Inquiry in Present Case: Examining Action Taken Report ........ 30

II. Whether commission of cognizable offences are disclosed against the petitioner? .............................................................................................................. 33

(i) Function of Pleadings .......................................................................... 39

III. Whether impugned order reflects application of judicial mind? ................... 40

(i) Importance of Reasoned Order ............................................................ 45

LAW ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES ........................ 50

UNLIMITED MAGISTERIAL POWER DOES NOT MEAN UNFETTERED POWER .................................................................................... 56

POWERS OF THE HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C. ........... 57

I. Judicial Precedents in a Nutshell ..................................................................... 58

II. What is Abuse of Process of Law ................................................................... 63

III. Sufficiency or Insufficiency of Incriminating material viz. Abuse of Process of Law… ................................................................................................................ 64

IV. Striking balance between interest of the complainant and reputational injury to the unheard proposed accused ........................................................................... 65

THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT ............................................................ 66

BEFORE PARTING WITH THIS CASE… ..................................................... 69

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Supreme Court Guidelines for recording evidence of victim woman of sexual offences

  The legislature has, at places, moulded criminal procedure to enable victims of sexual crimes to seek justice. This has been done in recognition of the gravity of sexual crimes and the need to handle such cases in an appropriately sensitive manner. For instance, Section 327 CrPC provides for in camera trials to be conducted with respect to offences punishable under Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal Code 1860. {Para 33}

34. This Court, too, has had its role to play in ensuring that justice does not remain inaccessible. In State of Maharashtra v. Bandu @ Daulat,10 this Court directed that special centres be set up in each state in order to facilitate depositions by vulnerable witnesses, including victims of sexual offences. In Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra,11 a two-judge bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. was a part) supplemented the directions issued in Bandu @ Daulat (supra) with respect to setting up such special centres.

35. It is the duty and responsibility of trial courts to deal with the aggrieved persons before them in an appropriate manner, by:

a. Allowing proceedings to be conducted in camera, where appropriate, either under Section 327 CrPC or when the case otherwise involves the aggrieved person (or other witness) testifying as to their experience of sexual harassment / violence;

b. Allowing the installation of a screen to ensure that the aggrieved woman does not have to see the accused while testifying or in the alternative, directing the accused to leave the room while the aggrieved woman’s testimony is being recorded;

c. Ensuring that the counsel for the accused conducts the cross-examination of the aggrieved woman in a respectful fashion and without asking inappropriate questions, especially regarding the sexual history of the aggrieved woman. Cross-examination may also be conducted such that the counsel for the accused submits her questions to the court, who then poses them to the aggrieved woman;

d. Completing cross-examination in one sitting, as far as possible.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 1184 of 2022 

XYZ Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Coram: DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Dated: August 05, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Hold In-Camera Trial In All Sexual Harassment Cases, Apart From Rape Cases

  The legislature has, at places, moulded criminal procedure to enable victims of sexual crimes to seek justice. This has been done in recognition of the gravity of sexual crimes and the need to handle such cases in an appropriately sensitive manner. For instance, Section 327 CrPC provides for in camera trials to be conducted with respect to offences punishable under Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

34. This Court, too, has had its role to play in ensuring that justice does not remain inaccessible. In State of Maharashtra v. Bandu @ Daulat,10 this Court directed that special centres be set up in each state in order to facilitate depositions by vulnerable witnesses, including victims of sexual offences. In Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra,11 a two-judge bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. was a part) supplemented the directions issued in Bandu @ Daulat (supra) with respect to setting up such special centres.

35. It is the duty and responsibility of trial courts to deal with the aggrieved persons before them in an appropriate manner, by:

a. Allowing proceedings to be conducted in camera, where appropriate, either under Section 327 CrPC or when the case otherwise involves the aggrieved person (or other witness) testifying as to their experience of sexual harassment / violence;

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 1184 of 2022 

XYZ Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Coram: DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Dated: August 05, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Magistrate Should Order Police Investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC When Cognizable Offence of sexual harassment Is Prima Facie Found

  We cannot help but note that the police’s inaction in this case is most unfortunate. It is every police officer’s bounden duty to carry out his or her functions in a public-spirited manner. The police must be cognizant of the fact that they are usually the first point of contact for a victim of a crime or a complainant. They must abide by the law and enable the smooth registration of an FIR. Needless to say, they must treat all members of the public in a fair and impartial manner. This is all the more essential in cases of sexual harassment or violence, where victims (who are usually women) face great societal stigma when they attempt to file a complaint. It is no secret that women’s families often do not approve of initiating criminal proceedings in cases of sexual harassment. Various quarters of society attempt to persuade the survivor not to register a complaint or initiate other formal proceedings, and they often succeed. Finally, visiting the police station and interacting with police officers can be an intimidating experience for many. This discomfort is often compounded if the reason for visiting the police station is to complain of a sexual offence. {Para 16}

17. This being the case, the police ought not to create yet another obstacle by declining to register an FIR despite receiving a complaint regarding sexual harassment. Rather, they should put the complainant at ease and try to create an atmosphere free from fear. They ought to be sensitive to her mental state and the fact that she may have recently been subjected to a traumatic experience.

18. Whether or not the offence complained of is made out is to be determined at the stage of investigation and / or trial. If, after conducting the investigation, the police find that no offence is made out, they may file a B Report under Section 173 CrPC. However, it is not open to them to decline to register an FIR. The law in this regard is clear - police officers cannot exercise any discretion when they receive a complaint which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 1184 of 2022 

XYZ Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Coram: DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Dated: August 05, 2022

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Supreme Court: Police officer can not register offence, arrest accused and investigate the case under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act

THE CONCLUSIONS/DIRECTIONS

150. Thus, we may cull out our conclusions/directions as follows:

I. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police Officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same.

II. There is no bar to the Police Officer, however, to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated Under Section 32(3) of the Act, i.e., if he has committed any cognizable offence under any other law.

III. Having regard to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his duties, a Police Officer cannot register a FIR Under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1)(d) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. He is, however, bound by the law as laid down in D.K. Basu (supra) and to follow the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure.

V. It would appear that on the understanding that the Police Officer can register a FIR, there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We must record that we are resorting to our power Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in this regard.

VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Therefore, in regard to the power of arrest, we make it clear that our decision that Police Officers do not have power to arrest in respect of cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, will operate with effect from the date of this Judgment.

VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 200 of 2020 

Decided On: 28.08.2020

 Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Ors.

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Supreme Court: Procedure to be followed by the court if there is a bar for cognizance of offence as per S 195 of CRPC in respect of crime investigated by police

The question whether Sections 195 and 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code affect the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence has already been considered by this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Raj SinghMANU/SC/0038/1998 : 1998CriLJ1104 . In this case it has been that as follows:

"2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed to, or in relation to, any proceedings in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is or course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filling a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC.

 Not only are we bound by this judgment but we are also in complete agreement with the same. Sections 195 and 340 do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 Criminal Procedure Code is followed. Thus no right of the Respondents, much less the right to file an appeal under Section 341, is affected.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1197 of 2003

Decided On: 19.09.2003

M. Narayandas  Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.N. Variava and H.K. Sema, JJ.

Citation: (2003) 11 SCC 251

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When prosecution for posting of emoji on whatsapp group can be quashed?

 When no cognizable offence is found on the face of the

complaint, this Court is of the view that the First Information Report is

liable to be quashed.  In the case on hand the petitioners and the second

respondent are the members of a whatsapp group.  Everyone has a right to

express their feelings and share their idea.  The face of crying smiley is to

comment about the idea of second respondent in publishing or uploading a

video of complaints made by BSNL customers regarding deficiencies in BSNL  

coverage.  Every person has got indefeasible right to express what he feels.

The petitioners who are working as executives and staff of BSNL along with

second respondent ought not to have indulged in posting such emoji in the

interest of BSNL since whatsapp group is formed to promote team spirit.  Such

complaints by the second respondent who is working as a Divisional Engineer

(Rural) will pave way for other complications and friction among members

which will be detriment to the interest of BSNL.  This Court wanted the

petitioners to express their regret as the de-facto complainant in her

individual perception felt offended by the posting of such crying smiley.

Accordingly the first petitioner has filed an affidavit on behalf of all the

petitioners, recording their regret for posting such smileys.  The matter

should rest here and it will be neither in the interest of justice to permit

such complaints to stay.  When the complaint does not disclose any offence as

indicated above, the petitioners will be put to serious prejudice and

hardship in case they are forced to face trial.  Hence, this Court is

inclined to quash the First Information Report in Crime No.206 of 2017 on the

file of the first respondent. 

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT 

Pronounced on: 05.06.2018  

CORAM   

 MR.JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR           

CRL.O.P.(MD)No.3110 of 2017   

and 

Crl.M.P.(MD) Nos. 2366 and 6773 of 2017 

I.Linga Bhaskar -Vs- The State through the Inspector of Police,

                                           

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Supreme Court: Registration of FIR is mandatory when a Magistrate orders investigation U/S 156(3) of CrPC

 But
we would like to only indicate in brief the law on

this subject expressly stated by this Court in the
case of Mohd. Yousuf versus Afaq Jahan (Smt.) and
another, (2006) 1 SCC 627. This Court explained that
registration of an F.I.R. involves only the process
of recording the substance of information relating to
commission of any cognizable offence in a book kept
by the officer incharge of the concerned police
station. In paragraph 11 of the aforementioned case,
the law was further elucidated by pointing out that
to enable the police to start investigation, it is
open to the Magistrate to direct the police to
register an F.I.R. and even where a Magistrate does
not do so in explicit words but directs for
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, the
police should register an F.I.R. Because Section 156
falls within chapter XII of the Code which deals with
powers of the police officers to investigate
cognizable offences, the police officer concerned
would always be in a better position to take further
steps contemplated in Chapter XII once F.I.R. is
registered in respect of the concerned cognizable
offence.
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 110 OF 2016

HAMANT YASHWANT DHAGE  Vs  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 

Dated:February 10, 2016
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC 273

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What is basic concept of chargesheet?

The word 'charge­sheet' is not found in the Code of Criminal

Procedure.   It is found in Police Manual.   However, it has acquired a

particular   meaning   by   usage.   The   term   'charge­sheet',   though   not

defined or spoken about in the Code of Criminal Procedure, has become

popular and the Courts of all levels ­ including the Apex Court – use this

term in their judgments and orders.  Thus, the term 'charge­sheet' has

acquired a meaning by usage and undoubtedly, that meaning is 'a police
report' under section 173 of the Code, which discloses commission of an
offence by a certain person or persons.  Thus, 'charge­sheet' is popularly
and commonly understood to mean a final report submitted by a police
officer   after   investigation,   disclosing   commission   of   a   cognizable
offence/offences   by   a   certain   person/persons,   not   only   in   common
parlance, but also in legal parlance.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.722 of 2012

The State of Maharashtra Vs. Ajay Jagdish Pande and 3 ors 
and 2.

   CORAM :   NARESH H. PATIL &
ABHAY M. THIPSAY, JJ.
   
  PRONOUNCED ON : 25th JUNE 2014

Citation : 2016 ALLMR(CRI)1864

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What are essential requirements for taking cognizance of offence punishable U/S 156 of CRPC?

 Popotbhai Bhutani & ors. vs State of Maharashtra [2010 ALL MR (Cri.) 244] the full bench of this court has held that " A Petition under Section 156(3) cannot be strictly construed as a complaint in terms of Section 2(d) of the Code and absence of a specific or improperly worded prayer or lack of complete and definite details would not prove fatal to a petition under Section 156(3), in so far as it states facts constituting ingredients of a cognizable offence.

Such petition would be maintainable before the Magistrate."

12. It is thus well settled that the law neither prescribes any particular format for application undersection 156 (3) Cr.P.C. nor contemplates verbatim reproduction of the factual allegations or all the ingredients of the alleged offence. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the application undersection 156 (3) Cr.P.C should contain facts disclosing cognizable offence and further that the police has failed to exercise powers under section 154 Cr.P.C despite intimation, whereupon the magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can order investigation of the crime.

Bombay High Court

Pandharinath Narrayan Patil And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 30 March, 2015

CORAM : RANJIT MORE & SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI,JJ

Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2222,2015(2)BomCR(Cri)358

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Whether Magistrate can order police investigation under S 156 of CRPC if complaint does not disclose cognizable offence?

When the allegation made in the complaint does not disclose cognizable offence, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order police investigation under sub-section (3). In the present case, the learned Magistrate without applying his mind had directed an investigation by the police. Such an order which is passed without application of mind is clearly an order without jurisdiction. Therefore, the order passed directing the police to investigate under subsection (3) of Section 156, Cr. P.C., passed without jurisdiction is liable to be quashed by this Court either under Section 482, Cr. P.C., or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 258 of 2013 (APL)

Decided On: 02.07.2013

 State of Maharashtra Vs.  Shashikant

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: B.R. Gavai and P.N. Deshmukh, JJ.

 Citation: 2013(5)ABR86,2013 ALLMR(cri) 3060

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Highlights of SC Judgment of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P

Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 

 Ss. 154, 155, 156 and 157 - FIR in cognizable case - Registration of - Whether is mandatory or police officer has option,

discretion or latitude of conducting preliminary inquiry before registering FIR - Mandatory registration of FIR on receipt of

information disclosing a cognizable offence as the general rule - Situations/cases in which preliminary inquiry is

permissible - Scope of, and safeguards to be followed in cases where such preliminary inquiry (time-bound) is

permissible - Held, the registration of FIR is mandatory under S. 154, if the information discloses commission of a

cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation - This is the general rule and must be

strictly complied with - However, where information received does not disclose a cognizable offence a preliminary inquiry

may be conducted to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not - Also, matrimonial disputes/family

disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases, or cases where there is abnormal

delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution are illustrations and not exhaustive of all cases which may warrant

preliminary inquiry - Emphasised however, that scope of preliminary inquiry even when permissible in such limited

classes of cases, is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the

information reveals any cognizable offence - Proper stage for such verification of the veracity of the information received

is after registration of FIR, and not before registration of FIR - A preliminary inquiry should be time-bound and in any case

it should not exceed 7 days - The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry - If

preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of entry of such closure must be supplied to first informant

forthwith disclosing reasons therefor - If inquiry discloses commission of a cognizable offence, FIR must be registered -

All information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be

mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be

reflected, 

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