Showing posts with label first information report. Show all posts
Showing posts with label first information report. Show all posts

Monday, 9 February 2026

Important articles and judgments on police investigation U/S 156 of CRPC {S 175(3 ) of BNSS }

 

1) Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications


35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/03/supreme-court-how-bnss-modernizes.html

2) Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

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Saturday, 20 December 2025

Jurisdictional Thresholds in Money Laundering Prosecutions: The Requirement of a Prior FIR


 I. Introduction

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) serves as a specialized legislation aimed at combating the laundering of proceeds derived from criminal activity. A foundational principle of the PMLA is that the offence of money laundering (Section 3) is derivative—it relies on the existence of a "scheduled offence" (or predicate offence).

A critical legal question often arises in cases where the scheduled offence is not recorded via a First Information Report (FIR) by the police but is instead pursued through a private complaint filed by an individual before a Magistrate. This analysis examines whether the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) has the jurisdiction to register an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) and file a prosecution complaint under the PMLA based solely on a private complaint regarding a scheduled offence, absent any police FIR or complaint by an authorized investigating agency.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

II. The Legal Issue

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Wednesday, 2 July 2025

Can police refuse to lodge FIR on email complaint from abroad? Kerala High Court answers

 The Kerala High Court, in the case YYYY v State of Kerala & Ors, delivered a significant judgment clarifying the obligations of the police under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) regarding the registration of FIRs, especially in the context of complaints sent via email from abroad and unsigned complaints.

Case Details:

  • Case Number: Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 4778 of 2020

  • Date of Judgment: 1 July 2025

  • Bench: Justice Kauser Edappagath

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Kerala HC: U/S 173 of BNSS, Zero FIR's can be registered even if a complaint is sent via email from abroad and police cannot reject it for lack of signature or territorial jurisdiction

The implementation of Section 173 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'the BNSS'), marks

a significant shift in how the police handles information relating

to the commission of a cognizable offence. Now, Zero FIR has

been given statutory recognition by incorporating it in Section

173 of BNSS, which deals with the registration of FIR in

cognizable cases. Zero FIR has been introduced with the

primary purpose of ensuring that victims can file complaints

regardless of jurisdiction. Therefore, the police cannot refuse to

register an FIR if a cognizable offence is made out in the

complaint, even if the complaint is forwarded from a foreign

country. In these circumstances, the rejection of Annexure A7

complaint made by the petitioner on the ground that it was

unsigned and sent through e-mail from Australia cannot be

justified. {Para 3}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.MC NO. 4778 OF 2020

SOYA  Vs   STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH

Citation: 2025:KER:44462

Dated: 20TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 
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Tuesday, 25 March 2025

From Judicial Interpretation to Statutory Law: Section 156 CrPC and S 175 of BNSS, 2023

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020), has analyzed the procedural changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in relation to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This judgment highlights the legislative codification of judicial safeguards aimed at preventing misuse of the powers vested in Magistrates for ordering investigations.

Key Changes in Section 175 of BNSS

Section 175 of BNSS corresponds to Section 156 CrPC but introduces significant procedural modifications:

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Section 156(3) of CR.P.C vs. Section 175(3) of B.N.S.S : A Comparative Analysis of Procedural Changes

The new interpretation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), specifically Section 175(3), which replaces Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), introduces significant procedural changes that will affect its practical application. These changes aim to enhance judicial scrutiny, reduce misuse, and increase accountability in the process of ordering investigations. Below is an explanation of how these changes will impact the working of Section 156 in practice:

Key Changes and Their Practical Implications

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Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications

 However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS"). {Para 28}


29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with Sub-section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any Magistrate, before ordering investigation Under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:


a. Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4) of the BNSS;


b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and


c. Consider the submissions made by the police officer.


30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:


a. Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to the Accused public servant; and


b. Considering the assertions made by the Accused public servant as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged incident.


31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:


a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application Under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate Under Section 175(3).


b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.


c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions Under Section 175(3).


32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in   MANU/SC/0344/2015 : 2015:INSC:239 : (2015) 6 SCC 287, this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant must necessarily make applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the Accused by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). 

28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees.

29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power Under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.


30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.


31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition Under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application Under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [  MANU/SC/1166/2013 : 2013:INSC:748 : (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.


(Emphasis supplied)


33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka reported in   MANU/SC/0214/2022 : 2022:INSC:209 : (2022) 5 SCC 639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:


24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.


25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that, applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons.


26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, there have to be applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law.


(Emphasis supplied)


34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.


35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: It is not necessary to conduct preliminary inquiry as per Lalita kumari's Judgment if cognizable offence is made out against accused

 The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. {Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: 'Lalita Kumari' Judgment Doesn't Create Absolute Rule That Preliminary Enquiry Is Necessary In Every Case Before FIR

Conclusion/Directions


120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:


120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory Under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.


120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.


120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.


[Emphasis supplied]


12. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence.


13. In the present case, the allegations against the Appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The Appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The Appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum.


14. Further, this Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the Appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

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Monday, 12 August 2024

Supreme court: Statement Of Accused is Inadmissible U/S 27 of Evidence Act If No New Fact Is Discovered Pursuant To Disclosure

 On a threadbare analysis of the entire record, we do not find that the prosecution examined any witness who had deposed about the link evidence/safe custody of the mudammal articles right from the time they were received at the police station and seized till the time the same reached the FSL. Hence, otherwise also, the FSL report(Exhibits 111-115) pales into insignificance. Investigating Officer(PW-18) deposed that he arrested the Accused persons. A detailed enquiry was made from all three Accused-Appellants, and they were examined for the injuries found on their bodies. Thereafter, all the Accused-Appellants conveyed their willingness to show the place of the offence and thereafter, panchnama as per Section 27 of the Evidence Act was prepared. Since the place of incident was also known to police, this disclosure is irrelevant. {Para 45}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2828-2829 of 2023 and 112 of 2024

Decided On: 08.08.2024

Allarakha Habib Memon and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0856/2024.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: The court should not rely on FSL report if prosecution has failed to prove chain of custody

 The trial Court as well as the High Court heavily relied upon the FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) to hold that blood group found on the weapons of offence incriminated the Accused for the crime as the same matched with the blood group of the deceased. In this regard, it is suffice to say that the two weapons which were picked up by Demistalkumar(PW-12) from the place of occurrence were formally seized at the Anand Town Police Station around 2:30 am on 5th May, 2011. Only one of the panchas Mohammad Hussain(PW-5) was examined at the trial. The seizure panchnama(Exhibit -38) records that the three Accused who had inflicted deadly blows to the deceased with dagger, gupti and knife, threw away their weapons near the garden and fled away from the crime scene and that police personnel brought all the weapons to the police station. However, the panchnama(Exhibit P-38) does not bear the signatures of the police constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) who admittedly collected the weapons from the crime scene and presented them to the police station. Thus, no credence can be given to seizure panchnama(Exhibit P-38) because it suffers from the lacuna of not being attested by the witness who had actually presented the weapons at the police station. In addition, thereto, we may further note that Demistalkumar(PW-12), the police constable who deposited the weapons at the police station, did not state in his evidence as to whom he had given the knife and the gupti which he picked up from the crime scene. These weapons were seized vide seizure panchnama(Exhibit-38) which was admittedly prepared at 2:30 am. However, the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) stated that he reached the police station at about 9:15 pm and stayed there for only 20 minutes. These infirmities create a doubt on the very process of seizure of the weapons. {Para 42}


43. The trial Court as well as the High Court heavily relied upon the FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) for finding corroboration to the evidence of the eyewitnesses and in drawing a conclusion regarding culpability of the Appellants for the crime. We may reiterate that the testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses has already been discarded above by holding the same to be doubtful. Thus, even presuming that the FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) conclude that the blood group found on the weapons recovered at the instance of the Accused matched with the blood group of the deceased, this circumstance in isolation, cannot be considered sufficient so as to link the Accused with the crime. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan   MANU/SC/0795/2011 : 2011:INSC:487 : (2011) 11 SCC 724, wherein this Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the Accused. The relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow:


19. The AB blood group which was found on the clothes of the deceased does not by itself establish the guilt of the Appellant unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the Appellants. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could establish that fact. The blood found on the sword recovered at the instance of Mustkeem was not sufficient for test as the same had already disintegrated. At any rate, due to the reasons elaborated in the following paragraphs, the fact that the traces of blood found on the deceased matched those found on the recovered weapons cannot ipso facto enable us to arrive at the conclusion that the latter were used for the murder.


(emphasis supplied)


44. On a perusal of the deposition of the Investigating Officer(PW- 18), we find his evidence on the aspect of disclosure statements made by the Accused-Appellant leading to the recoveries to be totally perfunctory and unacceptable. The witness did not elaborate upon the words spoken by the Accused-Appellant at the time of making the disclosure statements.


45. On a threadbare analysis of the entire record, we do not find that the prosecution examined any witness who had deposed about the link evidence/safe custody of the mudammal articles right from the time they were received at the police station and seized till the time the same reached the FSL. Hence, otherwise also, the FSL report(Exhibits 111-115) pales into insignificance. Investigating Officer(PW-18) deposed that he arrested the Accused persons. A detailed enquiry was made from all three Accused-Appellants, and they were examined for the injuries found on their bodies. Thereafter, all the Accused-Appellants conveyed their willingness to show the place of the offence and thereafter, panchnama as per Section 27 of the Evidence Act was prepared. Since the place of incident was also known to police, this disclosure is irrelevant. Search of the houses of the Accused-Appellant was undertaken in presence of the panch witnesses and a big knife was seized from the house of the Accused Mohmedfaruk @ Palak, vide panchnama(Exhibit-52).


46. Hence, we are of the firm view that neither the disclosure statements made by the Accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2828-2829 of 2023 and 112 of 2024

Decided On: 08.08.2024

Allarakha Habib Memon and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0856/2024.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court: Confession Recorded By Medical Officer When Accused Were Presented By Police Officers Inadmissible As Evidence

The trial Court as well as the High Court, placed extensive reliance on the confessions of the Accused Appellants Mohmedfaruk @ Palak Safibhai Memon and Amin @ Lalo recorded by the Medical Officer, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) while preparing the injury reports of the Accused. {Para 40}


41. We find that these so-called confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the Accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested in the present case. As such, the notings made by the Medical Officer, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) in the injury reports of Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and Amin @ Lalo would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872(hereinafter being referred to as 'Evidence Act'). As a consequence, we are not inclined to accept the said admissions of the Accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant Under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2828-2829 of 2023 and 112 of 2024

Decided On: 08.08.2024

Allarakha Habib Memon and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0856/2024.

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Tuesday, 14 May 2024

Allahabad HC: Complainant of FIR must be heard in revision filed by accused.

 In Babloo Pasi's case (Supra) Babloo Pasi was the appellant of the case and the accused was respondent No. 2. In para 11 of the said judgment the Apex Court has said that in its opinion having regard to the nature of controversy before the High Court and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions whereunder the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction, the 'fairness in action' did demand that the complainant (appellant of the said case) should have been given an opportunity of hearing in the revision preferred by the accused (respondent No. 2 of the said case). It is true that the Apex Court has further said in the following lines that the appellant of the said case was impleaded as party respondent, but this by itself does not mean that if he did not appear before the trial Court he should not be heard by the High Court when the revision was argued before it. From bare perusal of Para 11 of Babloo Pasi's case it is evident that complaint of such type of cases should be heard in revision under Section 53 of the Act. On the basis of the above discussions I am of the view that in such type of cases the complainant of the FIR is definitely an aggrieved person and must be given an opportunity of hearing before passing an order in such type of revisions. 

{Para 8}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal Revision No. 2211 of 2012

Decided On: 16.01.2013

Nihal Vs. State of U.P.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Srivastava, J.

Citation: 2013 (80) ACC 867 (All), MANU/UP/0237/2013.

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Sunday, 21 April 2024

Whether defence counsel can make out contradictions from statement made in FIR without putting its contents to informant at the time of his evidence?

Some contradictions were sought to be pointed out in the statement as given in the First Information Report and in the evidence of the witness P.W. 11 but we do not think it is open to the learned advocate to comment upon it because none of those contradictions have been put to the witness at the time of his giving evidence. According to the F.I.R. it would appear that Indradeo Singh accompanied by Chait Ahir, Vikrama Singh, Musan Pandey, Billar Ahir and Mongru Ahir resident of the village went there and forbade the accused persons from cutting paddy crops from his field, but the accused persons did not listen to them. Indradeo Singh made many entreats requested them not to commit such high handedness nor did he say Indradeo Singh fell in the field of Sumer Singh. In the first place it may be noticed that F.I.R. is not a substantial piece of evidence. It is an information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if there is any statement made therein it can only be used for the purposes of contradicting and discrediting a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In the second place the statement given by the informant need not necessarily be an eye witness account of what he has actually seen. There were others who had gone along with him who could have furnished him with information as to what transpired in so far as it was in their knowledge. If these aspects had been put to P.W. 11, he would have had an opportunity of explaining the statement made in the F.I.R. but since that opportunity was not given, any comment based on the statement given by P.W. 11 in the F.I.R. would be without effect.

{Para 7}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 279 of 1968

Decided On: 21.04.1972

Nanhku Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Mathew and P. Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.

Author: P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0185/1972.

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Monday, 13 November 2023

What is the Difference between a General Diary Entry and an FIR?



General diary (GD) entry or Daily diary entry is made when any kind of complaint is lodged & police enter the details in their records.Thereafter,if police believe that there is some prima facie evidence of a cognizable offense being committed, it is registered as FIR.

If the complaint made is relating to non-cognizable offense, General diary entry will still be made,but thereafter,it will be entered into a non-cognizable report.General diary entry is, therefore, a stage prior to FIR or non-cognizable report.General diary entry is an internal police record,while in case of FIR or non-cognizable report,a copy of these will be provided to the Complainant.
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Tuesday, 13 June 2023

Whether it is necessary to hear accused before registration of an offence against him?

 The conclusions are summarized below:


i. No opportunity of being heard is required before an FIR is lodged and registered;


ii. Classification of an account as fraud not only results in reporting the crime to investigating agencies, but also has other penal and civil consequences against the borrowers;


iii. Debarring the borrowers from accessing institutional finance Under Clause 8.12.1 of the Master Directions on Frauds results in serious civil consequences for the borrower;


iv. Such a debarment Under Clause 8.12.1 of the Master Directions on Frauds is akin to blacklisting the borrowers for being untrustworthy and unworthy of credit by banks. This Court has consistently held that an opportunity of hearing ought to be provided before a person is blacklisted;


v. The application of audi alteram partem cannot be impliedly excluded under the Master Directions on Frauds. In view of the time frame contemplated under the Master Directions on Frauds as well as the nature of the procedure adopted, it is reasonably practicable for the lender banks to provide an opportunity of a hearing to the borrowers before classifying their account as fraud;


vi. The principles of natural justice demand that the borrowers must be served a notice, given an opportunity to explain the conclusions of the forensic audit report, and be allowed to represent by the banks/JLF before their account is classified as fraud under the Master Directions on Frauds. In addition, the decision classifying the borrower's account as fraudulent must be made by a reasoned order; and


vii. Since the Master Directions on Frauds do not expressly provide an opportunity of hearing to the borrowers before classifying their account as fraud, audi alteram partem has to be read into the provisions of the directions to save them from the vice of arbitrariness.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7300 of 2022, 

Decided On: 27.03.2023

State Bank of India and Ors.  Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I. and Hima Kohli, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0308/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Sunday, 21 May 2023

Whether Special Court Can Order FIR Against Investigating Officer For Failure To File Chargesheet Within 180 Days U/ S 59 of NDPS Act?

 The learned Judge on the basis of the material on record has

recorded his prima facie opinion about the commission of an

offence under Section 59 of N.D.P.S. Act by this applicant.

The learned Judge has not awarded any sentence to him. So

the right of the accused to meet the case which he would be

made to face has not in any way tinkered with or taken away.

18. It is to be noted that the approach of the learned

Judge being Special Judge under the N.D.P.S. Act is consistent

with the object and spirit of the enactment. It is to be noted

that while implementing the provisions of the enactment such

as N.D.P.S. Act all concerned at their respective place are

required to demonstrate equal seriousness. If such seriousness

is not demonstrated then it can frustrate the object and

intention of such enactment. It needs to be stated that in

order to ensure such seriousness by all concerned the stringent

provisions have been made. Section 59 of the N.D.P.S. Act is

one such stringent provision. It provides for penal

consequences in case of an act by anyone, which is not

consistent with the object and intention. It is submitted that

the opportunity was not given to him to explain the reasons

for delay in filing the charge sheet. In my view, this objection

can be taken care of by perusing the questions put to the

applicant and answers given by him. He has categorically

stated that investigation was complete on 13.10.2021. It is not

his case that after these questions by the Court and answers

given by him, he was in any manner prevented by the Court

from placing on record his explanation. The questions put to

him and answers given by him to those questions clearly

indicate that he was granted an opportunity to explain each

and every aspect. In fact the applicant has admitted that in all

respect the investigation was completed on 13.10.2021.

Applicant had an opportunity to place his detailed explanation

on record when he was called upon to file the say to the bail

application. The perusal of the say or reply to the bail

application would show that it was conspicuously silent

about the reasons for delay in filing the charge sheet. In fact

the say filed by the prosecutor on 27.01.2022 would reveal

that on phone, he had questioned the applicant about the

delay in filing the charge sheet. However, he did not answer

him. He finally went to meet him on 28.01.2022. It is,

therefore, seen that throughout the proceeding, he has not

placed the reasons for delay in filing the charge sheet on

record. It is, therefore, seen that the failure on his part is

serious wrong. Learned judge has found that this wrong is

fully covered within the dragnet of Section 59 (1) of the

NDPS Act.

25. In my view, therefore, this decision recognizes the

powers of the court to pass such an order. It is true that in this

case, the order of initiation of disciplinary action was passed.

The question whether the case warrants a disciplinary action

or penal action depends upon the facts and circumstances of

each and every case. In this case, the learned Judge found it

appropriate to order initiation of a penal action as provided

under Section 59 of N.D.P.S. Act. It needs to be stated that as

and when it is found by any Court at any stage of proceeding

that the actionable wrong within the meaning of Section 59 of

the N.D.P.S. Act has been committed then in that event it has

to be approached and dealt with firmly by initiating an

appropriate action. In this view of the matter, I do not see any

substance in the revision. The same is accordingly dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.106 OF 2022

Ashish Devidas Morkhade  Vs  State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : G. A. SANAP, J.

DATE:- 21/04/2023

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Wednesday, 29 December 2021

Supreme Court: In Motor Accident Claim, evidence Recorded Before Tribunal To Be Given Weightage Over Contents Of FIR In Case Of Contradiction

 It is clear from the evidence on record of PW–1 as well as PW–3 that the Eicher van which was going in front of the car, has taken a sudden right turn without giving any signal or indicator. The evidence of PW–1 & PW–3 is categorical and in absence of any rebuttal evidence by examining the driver of Eicher van, the High Court has rightly held that the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the driver of Eicher van. It is to be noted that PW–1 herself travelled in the very car and PW–3, who has given statement before the police, was examined as eye–witness. In view of such evidence on record, there is no reason to give weightage to the contents of the First Information Report. If any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. {Para 8}

Supreme Court

JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY

National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Chamundeswari & Ors.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6151 OF 2021

1st October 2021

Author: R.SUBHASH REDDY, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 523

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Sunday, 13 December 2020

Whether a statement made by accused to investigating officer before registration of FIR is hit by S 162 of CRPC?

The appellant is said to have admitted to the sub inspector of police that be was the driver of the autorikshaw. The sub inspector in his deposition has said that the appellant told him like that when he went to the spot for seizing the contraband oil. The lower court relied on that part of the testimony of the sub inspector (P. W. 4) for concluding that the appellant was the driver of the vehicle. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that the said statement made to sub inspector is only an admission and the same could be used as evidence in this case since investigation bad not been commenced during the time when the statement was made by the appellant. If the said statement was made during investigation, is cannot be used for any purpose in view of the embargo contained till Sec. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So the question to be considered is whether the step taken by the sub inspector in proceeding to the spot was part of investigation in the case.


5. Sec. 2(h) of the Cr. P. C. defines "investigation" as including "all i the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer". S. 137 of the Code says that, if, from information received "or otherwise" an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate; he shall forthwith send a report of 'he same to the Magistrate concerned and proceed in person to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. If he does not send a report to the Magistrate, that does not mean that his proceeding to the spot is not for investigation. In order to bring such proceedings within the ambit of investigation it is not necessary that a formal registration of the case should have been made before proceeding to the spot. It is enough that he has some information to afford him reason even to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. Any step taken by him pursuant to such information, towards, detection etc., of the said offence, would be part of investigation under the Code. In Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) ((1976) 5. C. C. 644) the Supreme Court considered a case in which a police officer arranged a raid after recording a complaint, but before sending it for registration of the case. It was held in that case that "the moment the inspector had recorded the complaint with a view to take action to track the offender, whose name was not even known at that stage, and proceeded to achieve the object, visited the locality, questioned the accused, searched his person, seized the note and other documents, turns the entire process into an investigation under the Code." Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) has observed in State of U. P. v. Bhagwant Kiskore (MANU/SC/0066/1963 : AIR. 1964 S. C. 221): "Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a police officer, the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for investigation". It was held by a single Judge of the Gujarat High Court (Shelat, J.) in Kantilal v. State (MANU/GJ/0065/1970 : AIR 1970 Guj 218) that the police officer in charge of a police station is empowered to investigate any information received from which he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate. It has been observed by the learned Judge that "it makes no difference whether that information was reduced to writing or not at that particular stage"


6. I, therefore, conclude that the statement allegedly made by the appellant to the sub inspector of police was during investigation of the case.


7. The embargo contained in Sec. 162 has a wide sweep that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of investigation shall be used for any purpose except for the limited purpose mentioned therein. The limited purpose envisaged in the section has no application to the facts of this case. Hence the alleged statement of the appellant to the sub inspector is excluded form legal consideration in this case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. A No. 149 of 1985

Decided On: 04.08.1988


C. Chandrababu  Vs.   Sub Inspector of Police


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0410/1988,1988(3)Crimes757(Ker.), 1988(2)KLJ389

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Thursday, 5 November 2020

Chhattisgarh HC: Special Court Under SC-ST (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act Has Power To Direct Registration Of FIR U/s 156(3) CrPC

The Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter

of Anand Swaroop Tiwari v. Ram Ratan Jatav and

others1996 MPLJ 141 relied upon the decision

 of the Supreme Court

in A.R. Antulay (supra) and other decisions and in

the result, clearly held as under: “(

a) Special Courts under the Act are not to

function as Sessions Court, but as Courts ‘

of original jurisdiction’.

(b) Proceedings of Special Court are governed

by Section 190, Chapters XV, XVI (other than

Section 209) as also Chapters XIX and XX as

the case may be and such other provisions of

the Code as are not inconsistent with the

scheme and provisions of the Act, reading

“Special Courts” wherever the expression

“Magistrate” occurs.

(c) Section 193 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure does not apply to proceedings under

the Act and committal orders are not

required.

(d) Special Court can take cognizance on

private complaints after following the

procedure provided in the Code in relation to

private complaints.

(e) Where cognizance has already been taken

on the basis of committal orders in Police

challan cases, it is not necessary for the

Courts to retrace their steps or to take

cognizance afresh.

(f) Where cognizance has already been taken

on the basis of committal orders in private

complaint cases, the Special Courts may deal

with the cases as if they are dealing with

private complaints under Section 200 of the

Code.”  {Para 30}

31.The decision rendered by the Full Bench of the M.P.

High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra) has

further been followed by the M.P. High Court in the

matter of J.N. Fuloria v. Benibai and others 2000(1) MPLJ 459.

32.Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law rendered

by the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay (supra) and the

M.P. High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra), it

is quite vivid that the Special Court constituted

under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 is the criminal

court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by

Section 193 of the Code, and the Special Court can

take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred

to in Section 190 of the Code and is governed by

Chapters XV & XVI of the Code and such other

provisions of the Code which are not inconsistent

with the status and functions as Courts of original

jurisdiction. Therefore, the Special Courts

constituted under the Act of 1989 will also have

power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of

the Code to direct investigation in exercise of power

conferred, to the Station House Officer subject to

fulfillment of making two prior applications under

Section 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of

the Code by the complainant. As such, I do not find

any merit in the submission of learned Senior Counsel

for the petitioners that the Special Judge under SC &

ST Act has no power and jurisdiction to invoke

Section 156(3) of the Code and to direct registration

of FIR and investigation. Such a submission being

meritless and substanceless deserves to be and is

accordingly rejected.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Criminal Misc Petition No.173 of 2018

Order delivered on:27-10-2020

 Jaisingh Agrawal, Vs  State of Chhattisgarh, 

Coram: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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