Whether court can convict father-in-law for offence U/S 202 of IPC if he fails to inform the authorities about the suicide of daughter-in-law?

The learned Counsel for the respondent State of Rajasthan, however, submitted that the accused would atleast be liable of having committed other offences. It may be noted that the question whether they would be liable under Section 498-A or 304-B does not arise for consideration inasmuch as these provisions were not on the statute on the day of occurrence. However, A 1 was atleast under an obligation to give information about the death of the deceased since the same was unnatural. Assuming that the prosecution has not positively proved that the death was homicidal yet from the medical evidence it is clear that it was not a natural death and consequently the death should atleast be noted as one of suicide. Even in the case of suicide an offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 is inherent. There- fore, even in the case of a suicide there is an obligation on the person, who knows or has reason to believe that such a suicidal death has occurred , to give information. In Kalidas Achamma v. The State of A.P., S.H.O. Karimnagar. I Town P.S. [1987] 2 ALT 937 it was observed as under:

In the case of every suicide abetment is inherent. Whether ultimately it is proved or not, it is a different aspect. Abetment of suicide is an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and therefore whenever a case of suicide is there, the body cannot be disposed of without informing the Police and further as provided under Section 174 Cr. PC the Police have to hold an inquest since it is an unnatural death.

In the instant case A 1, who reached his house on 18.3.82 knowing fully well that the deceased had already died, informed P.W. 8 that the deceased was in a serious condition. Likewise he informed P.W. 12 on telephone without disclosing that the deceased was already dead. However, when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house where the dead body was lying, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated. To the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 13. P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, on his own went and gave a report to the police. It can thus be seen that A 1 intentionally omitted to give the information in respect of the death of the deceased which he was legally bound to give. Section 202 1. P. C. is in the following terms:

202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform-Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

This Section punishes the illegal omission of those who under law are bound to give information in respect of an offence which he is legally bound to give particularly being the head of the family. Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed (2) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that offence and (3) that the accused was legally bound to give that information. Shri R.K. Jain, however, relied on a judgment of this Court in Harishchandrasing Sajjansingh Rathod and Another v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0114/1979 : 1979CriLJ1025 and contended that the word "Whoever" occurring in the opening part of the Section refers to a person other then the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. In that case the accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 331 and 304 read with Section 34 IPC in respect of the death of the deceased and were acquitted.-On appeal by the State the High Court, however, convicted them under Section 202 IPC A Bench of this Court while reversing the order of High Court observed thus:

We have gone through the entire evidence bearing on the aforesaid offence under Section 202 but have not been able to discern anything therein which may go to establish the aforesaid ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The offence in respect of which the appellants were indicted viz. having intentionally omitted to give information respecting an offence which he is legally bound to give not having been established, the appellants could not have been convicted under Section 202 of the Penal Code. It is well settled that in a prosecution under Section 202 of the Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable under this section. The offence under Section 304 (Part II) and the one under Section 331 of the Penal Code not having been established on account of several infirmities it is difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The High Court has also missed to notice that the word 'whoever' occurring at the opening part of Section 202 of the Penal Code refers to a person other than the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. This is so because there is no law which casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself That apart the aforementioned ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code do not appear to have been made out against the prosecution. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that the aforesaid main offences had been committed.

(emphasis supplied)

19. From these observations it is clear that there was no evidence to show that the accused therein knew or had reason to believe that the said offences have been committed and on the other hand they were made principal offenders. In such a situation the ingredients of Section 202 can not be said to have been made out. It is in this context that the meaning of the word "whoever" has been considered. But in the instant case A 1 returned to his house where the dead body was lying on 18.3.82 and the circumstances clearly go to show that he had knowledge that the deceased died of an unnatural death. Therefore he had knowledge or atleast had reason to believe that an offence had been committed even if, at that stage, he thought that it was only a suicide. Therefore it was his bounden duty particularly as head of the family to inform the authorities. He omitted to do so. On the other hand, he went about telling that the deceased was still alive and her condition was serious. But when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house and enquired, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities. Therefore all the ingredients of Section 202 are made out against him and he clearly committed the offence punishable under this Section at that stage. The fact that he himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not absolve him of his complicity in respect of the offence punishable under Section 202 IPC So far A 2 is concerned, he came to the house only after the investigation commenced. Therefore his case stands on a different footing. In the result the convictions and sentences awarded against A 1 and A 2 l are set aside. A 1, however, is convicted under Section 202 IPC and sentenced to undergo six months' R.I. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 1984

Decided On: 28.08.1991

Bhagwan Swarup  Vs. State of Rajasthan

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Whether it is mandatory to report all unnatural deaths whether it amounts to offence or not?

 Section 176 of Indian Penal Code is on subject of
omission to give notice or information to public servant by
person legally bound to give it. This Section makes such
omission an offence punishable with simple imprisonment for
a term which may extend to one month or with fine of
Rs.500/- or with both. If such information pertained to an
offence, the simple imprisonment may extend to 6 months or
fine may be Rs. 1000/.
60. Section 43 does not stipulate what is legal. It points
out act or omission which is illegal and obligation to report
flowing from “legally bound to do” needs to be construed in
that light. So an incident like accident leading to death of a
minor girl which may also sustain a civil cause, being viewed
as illegal, therefore, must be reported to police or concerned
competent authority. Omission to report it is illegal. 

Machinery mandated under S. 174 Cr.P.C. can not be allowed
to be rendered nugatory. All unnatural deaths are covered
under provisions of IPC. Whether it is an offence or not, is for
the Investigating Officer to decide. Otherwise it will provide an
escape route for the offender and he may clean or destroy all
evidence under a specious plea that the un-natural death was
not an offence but an unfortunate accident for which he is not
liable. Such a loophole is not envisaged by the Legislature. If
the arguments on these lines are accepted, S. 304A IPC will be
rendered nugatory. S.176 IPC therefore employs the word “on
any subject”.

Provisions looked into by us particularly Section 43 of Indian
Penal Code shows that even when the consequences furnish a
ground for civil action, the person in knowledge is legally
bound to give information thereof to the competent authority
which may include the police Section 176 of the Code makes
omission to give information “on any subject” to any public
servant, an offence. In this backdrop, Section 201 of IPC gets

attracted and causing disappearance of evidence of offence
under Section 176 becomes punishable thereunder. Section
43, Section 176 and Section 201 of Indian Penal Code clearly
obliged first accused No. 1 Nazir before us to report the
incident to police and not to wipe it out altogether.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CONFIRMATION CASE NO.01 OF 2016

The State of Maharashtra  Vs  Nazir Javed Khan 

CORAM :B. P. DHARMADHIKARI & PRAKASH D. NAIK, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON :03rd June, 2019
JUDGMENT: (Per B. P. Dharmadhikari, J.)

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When unnatural death of married woman would not amount to dowry death?

 In Pushpender Singh v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 160/2015, (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12748, decided by a division bench (of which I was a member) on 12.10.2015, similar questions were examined. After referring to the provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and various judgments thereupon, it was observed thus:

“102. Broad principles emerging from above noted case law, to the extent germane to the issues raised before us, may be culled out as under:—

(i) The death of a married woman within seven years of the marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances must result in a serious attempt on the part of the investigating agency, and the court, to inquire if it is a case of culpable homicide;

(ii) If the evidence shows the husband or any of his relatives to be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts resulting in the death, the trial must proceed on the charge of culpable homicide;

(iii) If the evidence is forthcoming to show that the unnatural death of the married woman within seven years of her marriage was preceded “soon before” her death by she being subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry by the husband or any of his relatives, the charge of “dowry death” is to be invoked as an “alternative charge”, or even as a single or main charge against others not implicated by reason of abetment, conspiracy etc.

(iv) The offence of “dowry death” is neither a substitute, nor “minor offence”, nor “included” in the offence of “culpable homicide”;

(v) To bring home the charge of “culpable homicide”, the prosecution must prove the accused to have intentionally committed the act causing death or causing bodily injury resulting in death. In contrast, to bring home the charge of “dowry death”, direct nexus on the part of the accused with the act(s) causing death, or resulting in bodily injury causing death, need not be shown. The prosecution needs to prove only the fact of death being otherwise than under normal circumstances (to put it simply, it being an unnatural death), coupled with the fact that the deceased (necessarily a married woman) had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demands for dowry by the husband, or any of his relatives, the death having occurred within seven years of the marriage. Upon such proof, the Court is bound to presume that the husband, or the relative, who is party to the cruelty or harassment of the specified nature is responsible for the “dowry death”;

(vi) For the charge of “dowry death”, the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts leading to the death;

(vii) To bring home a charge of dowry death, there must be “proximity” or a “live link” between the cruelty and harassment based on dowry demands and the consequential death leading to inference that said conduct was indulged in “soon before” the death;

(viii) The past events of cruelty or harassment, they not having become stale, continue to be relevant for raising the presumption, if the evidence shows continuity of the incriminating conduct proximate enough in terms of time to the unnatural death, even if interspersed by tentative efforts at resolution or compromise;

(ix) A case of unnatural death of the married woman would not amount to “dowry death”, if it is shown to have occurred on account of an accident or as a result of acts of commission or omission on the part of a third person, i.e a person other than the husband or any of his relatives, or for reasons not connected with demands for dowry; and,

(x) The accused against whom presumption is raised may dispel its effect by showing that he had no hand at all, in the death, and he may do so either by showing that the death was accidental or brought about by another person unconnected with the cruelty or harassment relating to the demands for dowry.”

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before R.K Gauba, J.)

Shiv Ram & Ors. v. State of Delhi

 Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13127

Crl. A. 496/2002

Decided on December 7, 2018

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Whether registration of FIR can be challenged on ground of prior receipt of information relating to unnatural death?

Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that
the earlier or the first information in regard to the commission
of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirement of Section 154
of the Code and there cannot be second FIR or fresh
investigation of any subsequent information in respect of the
same cognizable offence. Learned senior counsel further
stressed upon that when the police had conducted inquiry on

the information and closed the case there is no point in
re-opening the case by filing FIR that too on the basis of
anonymous letters received by the brother of the deceased
after a lapse of 5 (five) years. In view of the above claim of
learned senior counsel for the appellants, it is imperative to
discuss the scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code in
order to ascertain as to whether the ‘information’ received
under Section 174 of the Code satisfies the requirement of
Section 154 of the Code.
Scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code:
10) The proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited
scope. The object of the proceedings is merely to ascertain
whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or
an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the
death. The question regarding the details as to how the
deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what
circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and
scope of the proceedings under Section 174 of the Code.
Neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to
mention those details in the inquest report. It is, therefore,

not necessary to enter all the details of the overt acts in the
inquest report. The procedure under Section 174 is for the
purpose of discovering the cause of death, and the evidence
taken was very short. When the body cannot be found or has
been buried, there can be no investigation under Section 174.
This section is intended to apply to cases in which an inquest
is necessary. The proceedings under this Section should be
kept more distinct from the proceedings taken on the
complaint. Whereas the starting point of the powers of police
was changed from the power of the officer in charge of a police
station to investigate into a cognizable offence without the
order of a Magistrate, to the reduction of the first information
regarding commission of a cognizable offence, whether
received orally or in writing, into writing. As such, the
objective of such placement of provisions was clear which was
to ensure that the recording of the first information should be
the starting point of any investigation by the police. The
purpose of registering FIR is to set the machinery of criminal
investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the
police report and only after registration of FIR, beginning of
investigation in a case, collection of evidence during
investigation and formation of the final opinion is the
sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173
of the Code. In George and Others vs. State of Kerala and
Another (1998) 4 SCC 605, it has been held that the
investigating officer is not obliged to investigate, at the stage of
inquest, or to ascertain as to who were the assailants. A
similar view has been taken in Suresh Rai and Others vs.
State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 84.
11) In this view of the matter, Sections 174 and 175 of the
Code afford a complete Code in itself for the purpose of
“Inquiries” in cases of accidental or suspicious deaths and are
entirely distinct from the “investigation” under Section 157 of
the Code wherein if an officer in-charge of a police station has
reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered to investigate, he shall proceed in person to the
spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. In
the case on hand, an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code
was convened initially in order to ascertain whether the death
is natural or unnatural. Learned senior counsel for the
appellants claims that the earlier information regarding
unnatural death amounted to FIR under Section 154 of the
Code which was investigated by the police and thereafter the
case was closed. On a careful scrutiny of materials on record,
the inquiry which was conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the death is natural or unnatural cannot
be categorized under information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence within the meaning and import of Section
154 of the Code. On information received by P.S. Mulana, the
police made an inquiry as contemplated under Section 174 of
the Code. After holding an inquiry, the police submitted its
report before the sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ambala stating
therein that it was a case of hanging and no cognizable offence
is found to have been committed. In the report, it was also
mentioned that the father of the deceased-R.P. Sharma (PW-1)
does not want to take any further action in the matter. In view
of the above discussion, it clearly goes to show that what was
undertaken by the police was an inquiry under Section 174 of
the Code which was limited to the extent of natural or
unnatural death and the case was closed. Whereas, the

condition precedent for recording of FIR is that there must be
an information and that information must disclose a
cognizable offence and in the case on hand, it leaves no matter
of doubt that the intimation was an information of the nature
contemplated under Section 174 of the Code and it could not
be categorized as information disclosing a cognizable offence.
Also, there is no material to show that the police after
conducting investigation submitted a report under Section 173
of the Code as contemplated, before the competent authority,
which accepted the said report and closed the case.
12) In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the
investigation on an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code is
distinct from the investigation as contemplated under Section
154 of the Code relating to commission of a cognizable offence
and in the case on hand there was no FIR registered with the
P.S. Mulana neither any investigation nor any report under
Section 173 of the Code was submitted. Therefore, challenge
to impugned FIR under Crime No. 194 of 2005 registered by
P.S. Bhilai Nagar could not be assailed on the ground that it
was second FIR in the garb of which investigation or fresh
investigation of the same incident was initiated.
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 775 OF 2013

Manoj Kumar Sharma V State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 418

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Whether FIR lodged after closing of case on earlier inquiry conducted for unnatural death is maintainable?

 Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that
the earlier or the first information in regard to the commission
of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirement of Section 154
of the Code and there cannot be second FIR or fresh
investigation of any subsequent information in respect of the
same cognizable offence. Learned senior counsel further
stressed upon that when the police had conducted inquiry on
the information and closed the case there is no point in
re-opening the case by filing FIR that too on the basis of
anonymous letters received by the brother of the deceased
after a lapse of 5 (five) years. In view of the above claim of
learned senior counsel for the appellants, it is imperative to
discuss the scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code in
order to ascertain as to whether the ‘information’ received
under Section 174 of the Code satisfies the requirement of
Section 154 of the Code.
Scope of ‘Inquiry’ under Section 174 of the Code:
10) The proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited
scope. The object of the proceedings is merely to ascertain
whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or
an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the
death. The question regarding the details as to how the
deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what
circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and
scope of the proceedings under Section 174 of the Code.
Neither in practice nor in law was it necessary for the police to
mention those details in the inquest report. It is, therefore,
10not necessary to enter all the details of the overt acts in the
inquest report. The procedure under Section 174 is for the
purpose of discovering the cause of death, and the evidence
taken was very short. When the body cannot be found or has
been buried, there can be no investigation under Section 174.
This section is intended to apply to cases in which an inquest
is necessary. The proceedings under this Section should be
kept more distinct from the proceedings taken on the
complaint. Whereas the starting point of the powers of police
was changed from the power of the officer in charge of a police
station to investigate into a cognizable offence without the
order of a Magistrate, to the reduction of the first information
regarding commission of a cognizable offence, whether
received orally or in writing, into writing. As such, the
objective of such placement of provisions was clear which was
to ensure that the recording of the first information should be
the starting point of any investigation by the police. The
purpose of registering FIR is to set the machinery of criminal
investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the
police report and only after registration of FIR, beginning of
11investigation in a case, collection of evidence during
investigation and formation of the final opinion is the
sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173
of the Code. In George and Others vs. State of Kerala and
Another (1998) 4 SCC 605, it has been held that the
investigating officer is not obliged to investigate, at the stage of
inquest, or to ascertain as to who were the assailants. A
similar view has been taken in Suresh Rai and Others vs.
State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 84.
11) In this view of the matter, Sections 174 and 175 of the
Code afford a complete Code in itself for the purpose of
“Inquiries” in cases of accidental or suspicious deaths and are
entirely distinct from the “investigation” under Section 157 of
the Code wherein if an officer in-charge of a police station has
reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered to investigate, he shall proceed in person to the
spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. In
the case on hand, an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code
was convened initially in order to ascertain whether the death
is natural or unnatural. Learned senior counsel for the
12appellants claims that the earlier information regarding
unnatural death amounted to FIR under Section 154 of the
Code which was investigated by the police and thereafter the
case was closed. On a careful scrutiny of materials on record,
the inquiry which was conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the death is natural or unnatural cannot
be categorized under information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence within the meaning and import of Section
154 of the Code. On information received by P.S. Mulana, the
police made an inquiry as contemplated under Section 174 of
the Code. After holding an inquiry, the police submitted its
report before the sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ambala stating
therein that it was a case of hanging and no cognizable offence
is found to have been committed. In the report, it was also
mentioned that the father of the deceased-R.P. Sharma (PW-1)
does not want to take any further action in the matter. In view
of the above discussion, it clearly goes to show that what was
undertaken by the police was an inquiry under Section 174 of
the Code which was limited to the extent of natural or
unnatural death and the case was closed. Whereas, the
condition precedent for recording of FIR is that there must be
an information and that information must disclose a
cognizable offence and in the case on hand, it leaves no matter
of doubt that the intimation was an information of the nature
contemplated under Section 174 of the Code and it could not
be categorized as information disclosing a cognizable offence.
Also, there is no material to show that the police after
conducting investigation submitted a report under Section 173
of the Code as contemplated, before the competent authority,
which accepted the said report and closed the case.
12) In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the
investigation on an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code is
distinct from the investigation as contemplated under Section
154 of the Code relating to commission of a cognizable offence
and in the case on hand there was no FIR registered with the
P.S. Mulana neither any investigation nor any report under
Section 173 of the Code was submitted. Therefore, challenge
to impugned FIR under Crime No. 194 of 2005 registered by
P.S. Bhilai Nagar could not be assailed on the ground that it
was second FIR in the garb of which investigation or fresh
investigation of the same incident was initiated.
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 775 OF 2013
Manoj Kumar Sharma & Ors. .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. .... Respondent(s)

Dated:AUGUST 23, 2016.
R.K. Agrawal, J.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 3930

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