Whether Parents Can Give Consent On Behalf Of Minor Victim To Compromise Sexual Offence?

 It is also settled that offences which involve moral turpitude and grave offences like rape, murder etc. even if compromised cannot be quashed in exercise of High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. inasmuch as such offences are against the State and cannot be restricted to two individuals or groups.

11. In the case in hand, the offences are grave in nature involving minor victim. The allegations are under Section 354A (2)/307 read with Section 18 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, when the offences are grave in nature and allegation is of an attempt of rape of a minor, such allegation and criminal proceeding cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the

families of the victim and accused inasmuch when it is a sexual offence involving a minor, the parents, in the considered opinion of this court, cannot give consent on behalf of the minor to compromise such serious offences.

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

KOHIMA BENCH

Case No. : CRL.REVN 5/2021

MR. LIMHATHUNG Vs THE STATE OF NAGALAND

BEFORE

 MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

Date of Judgment/ Order :24.03.2022

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Supreme court: Power Of Compounding Must Be Expressly Conferred By Statute Which Creates Offence

 However, Section 320 provides for the compounding of offences only under the IPC. Hence, in respect of offences which lie outside the IPC, compounding may be permitted only if the statute which creates the offence contains an express provision for compounding before such an offence can be made compoundable. The power of compounding must, in other words, be expressly conferred by the statute which creates the offence. {Para 60}

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Prakash Gupta vs Securities And Exchange Board Of ... on 23 July, 2021

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Whether the court should set aside conviction if there is a compromise between convict and victim after conviction in a non-compoundable offence?

 While answering Question (A) we may observe in the light of the settled legal position as under :

At the conclusion of the criminal trial the Court on finding the  evidence on record led by the prosecution to be sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused would proceed to convict the accused. The remedy of challenging the order of conviction is available to the accused by way of an appeal. Any compromise entered into post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence cannot by itself result in acquittal of the accused. Similarly, the Court has no power to compound any offence that is non-compoundable and not permitted to be compounded under Section 320 of the Code. The compromise entered into therefore is just a mitigating factor that can be taken into account while hearing the appeal/revision challenging the conviction and which factor has to be taken into consideration while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. It is not permissible to set aside the judgment of conviction at the appellate/revisional stage only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. In a given case the appellate Court/revisional Court also has the option of not accepting the compromise. Thus if the judgment of conviction cannot be set aside in an appeal/revision only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise similar result cannot be obtained in a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code.

Hence, we hold that ordinarily the contention that the convict and the informant/complainant have entered into a compromise after the judgment of conviction can be raised only before the appellate/revisional Court in proceedings challenging such conviction. It would be a sound exercise of discretion under Section 482 of the Code and in accordance with the law of the land to refuse to quash criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non- compoundable offence only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. Instead the Court can permit the convicted party to bring to the notice of the appellate/revisional Court the aspect of compromise. Having said so, it is only in rarest of rare cases that the Court may quash the criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence on settlement between the convict and the informant/complainant. To illustrate, where a jurisdictional issue going to the root of the matter is raised for challenging the conviction or in matrimonial disputes where the parties have agreed to settle their differences, jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised. Such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the rarest of rare cases when found necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. Thus while holding that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised for quashing criminal proceedings even at the appellate/revisional stage as held in Kiran T. Ingale (supra) such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the extent stated hereinabove. The ratio of the decision in Kiran T. Ingale (supra) has to be applied subject to aforesaid limitations. Further, the expression "criminal proceedings" would cover the entire journey of the proceedings commencing from its initiation till the proceedings culminate giving it seal of finality. Question (A) is answered accordingly.{Para 33}

Bombay High Court

Maya Sanjay Khandare And Another vs State Of Maharashtra, Thr Police ... on 5 January, 2021

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Whether court can reject application for compounding of offence in offence of cheating?

Even in this appeal, it is argued by learned Counsel for the Appellant that in view of the provision Under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence Under Section 420 Indian Penal Code is compoundable with the permission of the court. It is further argued by learned Counsel, that while dismissing the application for compounding, High Court has dismissed the Criminal Revision also without considering the various grounds raised in the Revision Petition. It is further submitted that the alleged incident was of the year 1991-92, but the complaint was lodged belatedly on 05th of November 2004. Further it is submitted that Appellant is a senior citizen and the High Court has committed error in dismissing the Criminal Revision without considering the same on merits.

On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the State has submitted that, merely because an offence is compoundable Under Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure, if the offence for which the Appellant is convicted has its adverse social impact on the society, it need not be compounded. It is further submitted that as much as Criminal Revision is also dismissed by the High Court, no case is made out in this appeal to interfere with the conviction recorded and sentence imposed on the Appellant.

10. Having heard the learned Counsel on both sides we have perused the impugned judgment and also other material placed on record. It was the case of the prosecution that in the beneficial scheme introduced for poor persons under residential scheme an amount of Rs. 9800/- was sanctioned during the year 1991-92 to the complainant. It is the specific case of the complainant that though she was to be paid entire Rs. 9800/-, but Appellant misled her and procured her signature and made payment of only Rs. 4000/- and he has utilised rest of the amount for himself for his personal benefit and gain. Merely because an offence is compoundable Under Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure still discretion can be exercised by the court having regard to nature of offence, as such it is rightly held in the impugned judgment that as the offence for which Appellant was convicted and sentenced, it will have its own effect on the society at large. In view of the reasons recorded in the impugned order rejecting the application for compounding, it cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error in not accepting the application filed for compounding the offence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 465 of 2019

Decided On: 11.03.2019

 Bhagyan Das Vs.  The State of Uttarakhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 2032: 2019 (2) Crimes 27 : 2019 (2) KLJ 190 : 2019 (2) RCR (Criminal) 551 : (2019) 4 SCC 354

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Whether court has discretion to refuse compounding of compoundable offence?

 Having heard the learned counsel on both sides we have
perused the impugned judgment and also other material placed
on record. It was the case of the prosecution that in the
beneficial scheme introduced for poor persons under
residential scheme an amount of Rs.9800/- was sanctioned
during the year 1991-92 to the complainant. It is the
specific case of the complainant that though she was to be
paid entire Rs.9800/-, but appellant misled her and procured
her signature and made payment of only Rs.4000/- and he has
utilised rest of the amount for himself for his personal
benefit and gain. Merely because an offence is compoundable
under Section 320 Cr.PC, still discretion can be exercised by
the court having regard to nature of offence, as such it is
rightly held in the impugned judgment that as the offence for
which appellant was convicted and sentenced, it will have its
own effect on the society at large. In view of the reasons

recorded in the impugned order rejecting the application for
compounding, it cannot be said that the High Court has
committed any error in not accepting the application filed
for compounding the offence.

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No(s). 465 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s).125 of 2017)

BHAGYAN DAS  Vs THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 

R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.:
Dated:MARCH 11, 2019.

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Whether high court can quash prosecution under S 498A of IPC if there is compromise beween husband and wife?

Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is non-compoundable. Section 4 of the Dowry Act is also non-compoundable. It is not necessary to state that non-compoundable offences cannot be compounded by a Court. While considering the request for compounding of offences the Court has to strictly follow the mandate of Section 320 of the Code. It is, therefore, not possible to permit compounding of offences Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Act. However, if there is a genuine compromise between husband and wife, criminal complaints arising out of matrimonial discord can be quashed, even if the offences alleged therein are non-compoundable, because such offences are personal in nature and do not have repercussions on the society unlike heinous offences like murder, rape etc. (See Gian Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0781/2012 : (2012) 10 SCC 303). If the High Court forms an opinion that it is necessary to quash the proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure ends of justice, the High Court can do so. The inherent power of the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code is not inhibited by Section 320 of the Code. Needless to say that this Court can also follow such a course.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1498 of 2014 

Decided On: 21.07.2014

 Manohar Singh Vs.  State of Madhya Pradesh

Coram:Ranjana Prakash Desai and N.V. Ramana, JJ.

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Whether prosecution of accused for offence of Rape can be quashed on the ground there is compromise between him and victim?

Upon the meticulous and careful reading of the letter
dated 23.08.2014 written by the prosecutrix to the S.H.O. of
Police Station Shahdol and her statement under Section 164
of the Cr.P.C., I have found that the prosecutrix has not
stated overtly or covertly that she has levelled false
allegations against the applicant. On the other hand, she has
simply and guilelessly stated that the parents of the applicant
and the applicant himself are agreed upon her marriage with
the applicant, therefore, she does not want to prosecute him.
Hence, the charges of rape and criminal intimation are
undeniably on record. Resultantly, on the basis of the
aforesaid, the applicant cannot be discharged in terms of
Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. Further, I am of the considered
view that once the complainant/informant has set the criminal
machinery of the State in motion by lodging a report of
cognizable offence(s) then, further proceedings in the case
cannot be stopped at his insistence because he has arrived at
friendly understanding with the accused and he does not want
any penal action against him. Otherwise, there will be a
complete anarchy and the State's criminal machinery will
become a tool of whims and fancies of the complainant. Upon
the aforesaid premises, the complainant cannot stop the
prosecution of the accused of a cognizable case except as per
provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. Hence, in the present
case, the prosecutrix cannot stop the prosecution of the
applicant because she has developed an understanding with
the applicant. Thus, the trial Court is bound to conduct the
trial of the case in accordance with the provisions of the
Cr.P.C. irrespective of the fact whether the prosecutrix would
support the prosecution case or not at trial?
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : JABALPUR
(Single Bench : Rajendra Mahajan J.)
Criminal Revision No. 1988/2015

Shivendra Tripathi Vs State of Madhya Pradesh 

Dated:15-10 -2015
Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)154 M.P

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Whether complaint of dishonour of cheque can be compounded without consent of complainant?

"73.  The present Code, which repealed the 1898 Code, contains Section 320 containing comprehensive provisions for compounding. A perusal of Section 320 makes it clear that the provisions contained in Section 320 and the various sub-Sections is a Code by itself relating to compounding of offence. It provides for the various parameters and procedures and guidelines in the matter of compounding. It this Court upholds the contention of the appellant that as a result of incorporation of Section 147 in the N.I. Act, the entire gamut of procedure of Section 320 of the Code are made inapplicable to compounding of an offence under the N.I. Act, in that case the compounding of offence under N.I. Act will be left totally unguided or controlled. Such an interpretation apart from being a absurd or unreasonable one will also be contrary to the provisions of Section 4(2) of the Code, which has been discussed above. There is no other statutory procedure for compounding of offence under N.I. Act. Therefore, Section 147 of the N.I. Act must be reasonable construed to mean that as a result of the said Section the offences under N.I. Act are made compoundable, but the main principle of such compounding namely, the consent of the person aggrieved or the person injured or the complainant cannot be wished away nor can the same be substituted by virtue of Section 147 of N.I. Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Punjab-Haryana High Court

M/S Mountain Fall India Private ... vs M/S Lahmeyer International ... on 21 May, 2014

Citation;ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL185

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