Showing posts with label S 438 of BNSS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 438 of BNSS. Show all posts

Friday, 15 August 2025

Supreme Court: Order of discharge of accused should be stayed in exceptional cases

 An order staying the order of discharge is a very drastic order which has the effect of curtailing or taking away the liberty granted to the Accused by the discharge order. As a result of the order staying the order of discharge, the order of discharge ceases to operate, and the Sessions Court can proceed to frame charges against the Accused and try him further. Thus, the stay of the discharge order has a grave consequence of depriving an Accused of the liberty granted under the discharge order. The grant of stay to the order of discharge amounts to the grant of final relief, as the trial can proceed against him. An interim order can be granted pending disposal of the main case only if the interim order is in the aid of final relief sought in the main case. If the discharge order is ultimately set aside by grant of final relief in the revision, the Accused has to face the trial. Therefore, the order staying the order of discharge by way of interim relief cannot be said to be in the aid of final relief. {Para 13}


14. It is only in rare and exceptional cases where the order of discharge is ex-facie perverse that the revisional Court can take the extreme step of staying that order. However, such an order should be passed only after giving an opportunity of being heard to the Accused. Moreover, while granting the stay, the Court must mould the relief so that the trial does not proceed against the discharged Accused. If the trial against a discharged Accused proceeds, even before the revision application against an order of discharge is decided, the final outcome of the revision will become fait accompli.

Ratio Decidendi:

It is only in rare and exceptional cases where the order of discharge is ex-facie perverse that the revisional Court can take the extreme step of staying that order.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 536-537 of 2025

Decided On: 28.02.2025

Sudershan Singh Wazir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 281,MANU/SC/0293/2025

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Saturday, 28 September 2024

Kerala HC: Accused prosecuted before Sessions or Special court can file discharge application within sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents.

 But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents. {Para 10}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here. 

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Kerala HC: The Sessions or Special Court Has Discretion U/ S. 250 of BNSS to Consider Discharge application of accused Even After Prescribed Limit Of 60 Days

It is discernible that in Section 250 of BNSS, Sub-section (1) provides that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.

Sub-section (1) of Section 250 of BNSS is a new provision

which prescribes a period of sixty days to prefer an application

by the accused for discharge from the date of committal of the

case. In fact, no such time limit fixed in Section 227 of Cr.P.C.

But it is noticed that there is lack of clarity or legislative

vacuum in the matter of starting point of sixty days in Section

250(1) of BNSS. It is true that in cases where the procedure of

committal is necessary, the statutory wordings in Section

250(1) of BNSS regarding the starting point of sixty days, is so

clear. But, now a days many Special Courts, viz., Special Court

under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, Special Court under the Protection of Children

from Sexual Offences Act, etc., proceedings are going before

the Special Court during the crime stage itself where committal

doesn't arise. In relation to such cases, the starting point to

count sixty days period to file discharge petition as provided in

Section 250(1) of BNSS lacks clarity or the same is a legislative

vacuum. In this context, it is relevant to refer Section 330 of

BNSS, a pari materia provision to Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Section

330(1) provides that where any document is filed before any

Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of

every such document shall be included in a list and the

prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution

or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the

genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such

documents and in no case later than thirty days after such

supply. First proviso to Section 330(1) stipulates that the Court

may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be

recorded in writing. The notable distinction is that in Section

330(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the word 'shall'

and in Section 250(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the

word 'may'. Thus, it is perceivable that when the legislature

uses the word 'shall', the same is mandatory and when the

word 'may' is used, the same is discretionary. The First proviso

to Section 330(1) of BNSS has been engrafted by the legislature

and the time limit of thirty days is preceded by the word 'shall'

makes the provision mandatory. Thus proviso to relax time

also was incorporated. In Section 250(1) of BNSS, the

legislature used the word 'may' which gives discretion to the

court to relax the time limit and therefore, no proviso to relax

the time limit was engrafted by the legislature. Therefore, even

after expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be

considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory

and is only directory. If so, the intent of the legislature to avoid

filing of discharge petition even at a belated stage in the strict

sense could not be achieved. {Para 9}

10. But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024

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