Showing posts with label special court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label special court. Show all posts

Tuesday, 26 May 2026

Supreme Court: BNSS S.223(1) Proviso Mandatory; Cognizance Without Hearing Accused is Void Ab Initio

As already discussed, though the complaint under the PMLA was filed earlier, the cognizance was only taken subsequently, on 02.07.2024, by which time the BNSS had come into force. Admittedly, the Appellant has not been heard at the time of taking cognizance. The mandate of a legislation which ensures the right of an Accused to a fair trial, whose liberty is at stake, cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the contention of the learned ASG that prejudice caused due to non-hearing at the stage of cognizance will have to be shown by the Accused cannot be accepted, as it is not a mere irregularity that would attract either Section 506 or 511 of the BNSS, but is an illegality that would vitiate the very proceedings. {Para 37}


38. Based on the above discussion, the views expressed by the High Court are, therefore, liable to be set aside. We do find that the allegations against the Appellant are quite serious. However, non-compliance with the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS vitiates the very order taking cognizance, and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of the law. In fact, the Appellant has, at the earliest point in time, filed the application for recall of the order taking cognizance by placing reliance upon the said proviso. Had the Special Court allowed it, the trial would have proceeded further. Suffice it to state that the Appellant cannot be faulted for any delay that has occasioned.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2678 of 2026 

Decided On: 19.05.2026

Parvinder Singh Vs. Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: M.M. Sundresh, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 519,MANU/SC/0504/2026.

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Wednesday, 22 April 2026

What are presumptions under s 29 and 30 of Pocso Act?

 Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, 2012, create a mandatory "reverse burden of proof," requiring special courts to presume the accused is guilty of sexual offences (Section 29) and possessed a culpable mental state (Section 30). The accused must prove their innocence, rather than the prosecution proving guilt, departing from traditional criminal jurisprudence.

Key Aspects of Section 29 (Presumption of Guilt):
  • Application: Applies to offences under Sections 3, 5, 7, and 9 (sexual assault, aggravated assault).
  • Requirement: The Special Court shall presume the accused committed, abetted, or attempted the offence.
  • Rebuttal: The accused must prove the contrary to overcome this presumption.
  • Limitation: Courts have held that this presumption is not absolute; the prosecution must first establish foundational facts (i.e., that the act actually occurred).
Key Aspects of Section 30 (Presumption of Culpable Mental State):
  • Requirement: The court will presume a "culpable mental state" (intention, motive, knowledge) on the part of the accused.
  • Burden: The burden lies on the accused to prove they had no such mental state.
  • For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.
Judicial Interpretation & Scope
  • Not a Replacement for Prosecution Evidence: While these sections shift the onus, the prosecution must still prove "foundational facts" to trigger the presumption.
  • Purpose: These provisions aim to protect vulnerable children from the trauma of prolonged trials and rigorous cross-examination, reflecting the need for swift justice in child abuse cases.
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Saturday, 4 April 2026

Bombay HC: Special Court or High Court have jurisdiction to grant ad-interim relief to protect liberty of applicant in offences under Atrocities Act in appropriate cases

Therefore, this court is of the view that the provision of issuance of notice is to be observed at every proceeding as is contemplated by Section 15A(3) of the Act, cannot be construed that it should be at all stages of the same proceedings, and the same would preclude the court to pass any order including grant of ad-interim protection. Any such interpretation would lead to an absurd situation such as without hearing the victim even notice cannot be issued. In absence of any provision creating an embargo on the court to grant such relief, which has been done specifically in provision of Section 18, where the case prima facie case is made out of commission of offence under Atrocities Act, court ceases to have jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail, it cannot be so interpreted as sought to be asked by Counsel for Appellant.

{Para 14}


15. There could be variety of situations and eventualities in which for the grant of relief it would become imperative for the court to pass an order without waiting for the service of notice to the informant/ victim. For example, prima facie case is not made out under the act and liberty of such individual is at stake. At various stages different orders are to be passed not affecting rights of the parties, etc.


16. In considered view of this court, appropriate interpretation to Section 15A(3) and (5) would be that right of parties involved in the proceedings cannot be decided finally without notice/hearing to the victim. This however would not take away power of the court to protect the liberty of person in appropriate cases keeping in mind the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.


17. Moreover, it is well settled principle that the prima facie observations made by the Court at interim stage are not binding on the same court while deciding the application finally. Hence, the Special Court is within is power to grant ad-interim bail and issue notice at the same instance.

Ratio: While victims have a statutory right to notice and hearing under Section 15A(3) & (5), this does not curtail the court’s power to grant urgent ad‑interim relief to protect liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The balance lies in hearing the victim before final disposal, but not necessarily before interim protection. Thus, the Special Court/High Court can grant ad‑interim bail and simultaneously issue notice to the victim.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 951 of 2025

Decided On: 27.02.2026

Sahil Ramesh Sonavane Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Joshi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1970/2026,2026:BHC-AS:10270.

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Sunday, 29 March 2026

RPwD Act, 2016: A Notification May Designate the Special Court, But Cannot by Itself Confer Direct Cognizance

 Author’s Note: The question is not whether offences under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 deserve prompt and effective prosecution; they certainly do. The real issue is narrower and jurisdictional: when a Court of Session is notified as a Special Court under Section 84, does that notification alone authorize the court to take direct cognizance or entertain remand at the threshold stage? The safer answer is in the negative unless the parent statute or otherwise applicable criminal procedure expressly permits it.

1. Statutory Background

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Saturday, 21 March 2026

MCOCA Charges Added After Bail? A Practical Roadmap for Sessions Judges

 When MCOCA is invoked mid‑stream in a case where the accused is already on bail, three issues arise together: jurisdiction, the fate of existing bail, and the correct form of the Sessions Court’s order. This article consolidates the law from Supreme Court and High Court decisions into a single, practitioner‑oriented guide.

Jurisdiction: Sessions Court Is Immediately Divested

Section 6 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 provides that “every offence punishable under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed…” This “only by the Special Court” language, read with Section 5, creates exclusive jurisdiction in the notified MCOCA Special Court; no other criminal court can assume such jurisdiction.

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Sunday, 26 October 2025

Criminal Offences and Trials under The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: Role of JMFC and Session Judge

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 stands as a monumental piece of legislation that not only grants comprehensive rights to persons with disabilities but also creates a robust criminal justice framework to protect them from atrocities and discrimination. While much attention is given to the rights and entitlements under this Act, the penal provisions and trial procedures remain lesser explored territories that demand judicial scrutiny and understanding.

The Criminal Justice Architecture Under RPWD Act 2016

The RPWD Act 2016 represents a paradigm shift from the erstwhile Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Chapter XVI of the Act (Sections 89-95) creates a comprehensive penal framework that criminalizes various forms of discrimination, atrocities, and violations against persons with disabilities, transforming what were once civil wrongs into cognizable criminal offences.

Section 92: The Crown Jewel of Criminal Protection

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Saturday, 19 July 2025

Talengana HC: Whether Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence punishable under Pocso Act?

 As the statutory positions in the Cr.P.C. and the POCSO Act are not mutually exclusive, it shall be construed that the Special Court in the stand of Court of Sessions may receive a case on committal from the Magistrate. Meaning thereby the jurisdictional Magistrate is empowered to receive police report or complaint as set down under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. even in regard to the offences under POCSO Act and after taking cognizance, the same may be committed to the Special Court.{Para 13}

14. Concomitantly, the Special Court is also empowered under Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act to take cognizance of the offence. In that way, the Special Court without any committal procedure can directly receive complaint and while doing so the Special Court sets in the position of Magistrate and would process the complaint by applying relevant procedure.

15. For the aforesaid, it shall be understood that the legislature at its wisdom had provided direct reach to the special Court in addition to the indirect committal procedure to extend the needed relief employing either of the forums. Thus, the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Special Court are correspondingly empowered to take cognizance of an offence under POCSO Act upon the complaint. Consequently, it shall be held that, returning of the private complaint by the Special Court and the Magistrate is improper and against the provisions of law.

19. In this position, it has to be concluded that even for the offence under the POCSO Act the Magistrate is not barred to take cognizance and by the enabling provision, the Special Court is also empowered to take cognizance of the offence under the POCSO Act either upon the police report or on complaint within its territorial jurisdiction. 

Talengana High Court

 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.290 OF 2023

Dated: Date: 18.08.2023.

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Friday, 20 June 2025

Bombay HC: Right to seek default bail in MCOCA case will arise next day after sanction to prosecute is refused by competent authority

 The issue can be examined from a different angle. If we assume for the sake of argument that the effect of the order refusing sanction to prosecute the accused as amounting to not disclosing of any offence under the MCOC Act, the further consequence thereof would, at the most, be that the custody extension order will cease to have any effect at the end of the day on which sanction is refused and till that day, the extension order would have to be held as valid. Even from this view point, the petitioners are not entitled to be released on default bail as the essential condition required for accrual of indefeasible right under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. to the petitioners is not fulfilled. This can be seen from the facts available on record, which show that charge-sheet has been filed on 22/08/2022 and on the same day, the application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was moved by the petitioners. Of course, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the application of the petitioners was filed about 30 minutes before the charge-sheet was filed and, therefore, their application was first in point of time and as such there was an accrual of right of default bail to the petitioners. The argument, in our view, is really not relevant for deciding the controversy involved in the petition. The reason being that, the day on which sanction was refused by the authority, would have to be considered to be the day on which the extended period of custody expired and, therefore, the right to seek default bail would arise on the immediate next day. It also means that when sanction is refused, as for example on Monday, this day of Monday would be the last day on which extended period of custody would come to an end, though in normal circumstances it would have expired later, and therefore, the Investigating Officer would have to take care that he files the final report on that day or otherwise he risks the grant of default bail to the accused. This is because of the fact that the provisions made under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. speak not in terms of hours, minutes and seconds, but only in terms of number of days completed. For the purpose of ascertaining as to when the period of authorized custody comes to an end, it is only the number of completed days, which is relevant and not the time at which the event having the effect of rendering the custody as unauthorized took place. {Para 21}


22. If we examine the issue from the above alternative, which we have proposed only by way of assumption and for the sake of argument, still the petitioners cannot be said to be fulfilling the essential requirement of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. in order to avail of right of default bail. The application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was filed by them on 22/08/2022 and that was the day when the sanction to prosecute the petitioners was refused. It was thus the day which became the last day of their authorized custody, which was otherwise extended up to 23/08/2022. Therefore, the right to avail of default bail in terms of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. really arose in their favour only from 23/08/2022.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Refusal Of Sanction To Prosecute under MCOCA Does Not Invalidate Extension Of Judicial Custody Given By Special Court

A question remains, whether or not refusal of sanction by the A.D.G.P. under the provisions of the MCOC Act by itself will invalidate the grant of extension of period up to 180 days and would automatically reduce the judicial custody remand to it's original period of 90 days, especially when the extension had been granted under a judicial order, not challenged by the petitioners. It is to be noted the investigation for an offence and cognizance of the offence under the provisions of MOCC Act are governed by Section 23 of the MCOC Act, which are reproduced here. {Para 6}


"23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence-


(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-Section 167


(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organised crime under this Act, shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police;


(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be carried out by a police officer below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.


(2) No. Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police."


17. It is worthy to note here that the power to extend the period to complete the investigation up to 180 days is exercised under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. by invocation of provisions made under Section 21 of the MCOC Act and whereas power to grant or refuse sanction to prosecute has it's source in Section 23 of the MCOC Act. Former power is exercised by the Court and latter power by a Police Officer. Objects of both kinds of powers are different. Custody extension is done for, inter alia, ensuring effective and speedy investigation, without any hindrance, while sanction is necessary to enable the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence under the MCOC Act, which is disclosed by the charge-sheet. In other words, former power exists for facilitating the investigation, while the latter power is to facilitate trial of the accused. Thus, both these powers operate in different fields. After considering the magnitude of the investigation required in a particular case, the Special Judge enables in depth investigation by extending custody period, and whereas, there is an embargo created by Section 23(2) of the MCOC Act on the cognizance taking by the Special Court without previous sanction of the A.D.G.P. The purpose of incorporating such embargo is to provide double filter before roping in anybody under the stringent provisions of law.


18. Thus, extending further time of 90 days for completing the investigation by the Special Judge is one thing and giving sanction by the A.D.G.P. is a different thing. Once, the Special Court after giving reasons has extended the period of investigation up to 180 days, the refusal of sanction will not take away the extended period of 90 days granted by the Special Court or even curtail the extended period granted by the Special Court. The detention here was authorized by a legal order of the Court under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOC Act, after considering the material then available with police and with reasoned order and it was never challenged and, therefore, it became a final order. The detention of the petitioners after 90 days thus can not be said to be unauthorized detention.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022

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Sunday, 8 June 2025

Kerala HC: Special courts shall not order an investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC against public servant in absence of prior sanction under Section 19 of PC Act.

  Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties. The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The question whether a sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is necessary or not while ordering an investigation against a public servant invoking powers under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C is no more res integra. In Anil Kumar (supra), it was held that in the absence of a prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, the Magistrate/Court cannot order an investigation against a public servant by invoking power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. After referring to various judgments on the issue of purport and meaning of the word "cognizance", it was concluded that "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. In L.Narayana Swamy (supra), the Apex Court held that an order directing investigation under section 156(3) could not be passed in relation to a public servant in the absence of valid sanction. It was observed that even while directing inquiry under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint, and therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. The same issue arose before the Apex Court again in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora and Others (MANU/SC/0296/2018 : 2018 KHC 6224). After considering the various judgments, including Anil Kumar (supra) and L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Division Bench of the Apex Court directed the matter to be placed before the Larger Bench. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed V.A. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (MANU/KE/3653/2018 : 2019 (1) KHC 239) held that until a final decision is taken in the reference in Manju Surana (supra), the dictum laid down in Anil Kumar (supra) will hold the field. Therefore, as the law now stands, the requirement of sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is a prerequisite for presenting a private complaint against a public servant alleging the commission of an offence specified in sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act. No such complaint could be forwarded for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. in the absence of sanction granted by the competent authority under section 19 of the PC Act. The decision of the Apex Court in B.A.Srinivasan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 pertains to sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C and hence the dictum laid down therein does not apply to the facts of the case.

{Para 7}

Considering the above findings, I am of the view that the court below could not have forwarded the complaints under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation without any sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act obtained by the complainants. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and accordingly, it is set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (Crl.) No. 510 of 2022

Decided On: 17.02.2023

C.V. Balan and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kauser Edappagath, J.

Citation: 2023 KER 9580,2023 KLJ 1 9252023 SCC ONLINE KER 9832023 KER 9580, MANU/KE/0324/2023
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Monday, 2 June 2025

Cognizance by Sessions Courts: Navigating the Legal Framework Under CrPC and Special Acts

 Understanding the jurisdictional boundaries and exceptions in criminal proceedings

Introduction

The power of Sessions Courts to take cognizance forms a critical aspect of India's criminal justice system. While the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 establishes clear procedural boundaries through Section 193, various provisions within the Code and special legislations create specific exceptions that empower Sessions Courts to exercise original jurisdiction. This article examines the intricate legal framework governing when and how Sessions Courts can take cognizance of criminal offences.

The Foundational Principle: Section 193 CrPC

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Sunday, 2 March 2025

Madhya Pradesh HC: Electricity Department cannot recover the dues assessed in the name of electricity theft until adjudicated by the Special Court

After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties and going through the provisions of Sections 135 and 154 of the Act, 2003, this Court finds that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, every offence punishable under Section 135 of the Act, 2003 shall be triable by the Special Court. As per Sub Section 5 of Section 154 of the Act, the Special Court is even empowered to determine the civil liability against the consumer or a person in terms of money for theft of energy. Thus, when the

Special Court is very well empowered to determine the civil liability apart from taking any penal action against the person who has committed theft of energy, the authorities could not have usurped such powers and could not had determined the liability and could not have raised a demand of Rs.1,93,561/- vide Annexure P/1 dated 23.07.2022.The aforesaid analogy finds support from the matter of Sangita wd/o Suresh Chandra Gupta and Another Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2009(1) MPLJ 366.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT GWALIOR

WRIT PETITION No. 11729 of 2023

NAVEEN KUMAR JAIN Vs  MADHYA PRADESH.

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE

Dated: 24 th OF FEBRUARY, 2025.

Citation: 2025:MPHC-GWL:3898.
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Wednesday, 25 December 2024

Whether Special court under Electricity Act 2003 can determine civil liability in civil misc application?

 I am in the agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court. In these circumstances, it was permissible for the Special Court to determine the civil liability and it was not necessary for the Court to wait till the conclusion of the trial. As stated hereinabove, the respondents have not filed the charge sheet before the special Court although the FIR was registered on 29th September, 2017. The applicant cannot be left with no remedy as the liability has to be determined in accordance with Section 154(5) of the said Act. The decision referred to by the Counsel for the respondent is in a different context and the same is not applicable in the present case. For all the reasons stated hereinabove, the application is required to be allowed. Hence, I pass the following order. {Para 13}

ORDER

i) Criminal Application No. 749 of 2018 is allowed.

ii) The impugned order dated 13th June, 2018, passed by the special Judge, Barshi below Exhibit-21 in Civil Misc. Application No. 77 of 2017, is set aside and the special Court is directed to adjudicate the application preferred by the applicant in accordance with law;

iii) The interim application preferred by the applicant be decided within a period of four weeks from today.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Prakash D. Naik, J.)


Dhairyashil Arun Doifode Vs Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. and Another 

Criminal Application No. 749 of 2018

Decided on August 7, 2018.

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2770

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Saturday, 28 September 2024

Supreme Court: Clean Acquittal Of Accused After Long Undertrial Custody May Give Rise To Claim For Compensation

  There are cases where clean acquittal is granted by the criminal courts to the Accused after very long incarceration as an under trial. When we say clean acquittal, we are excluding the cases where the witnesses have turned hostile or there is a bona fide defective investigation. In such cases of clean acquittal, crucial years in the life of the Accused are lost. In a given case, it may amount to violation of rights of the Accused Under Article 21 of the Constitution which may give rise to a claim for compensation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024.

Decided On: 26.09.2024

V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1065/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Senthil Balaji judgment- Requirement Of Expeditious Trial Must Be Read Into Special Statutes Imposing Stringent Bail Provisions

 Considering the gravity of the offences in such statutes, expeditious disposal of trials for the crimes under these statutes is contemplated. Moreover, such statutes contain provisions laying down higher threshold for the grant of bail. The expeditious disposal of the trial is also warranted considering the higher threshold set for the grant of bail. Hence, the requirement of expeditious disposal of cases must be read into these statutes. Inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial and the higher threshold for the grant of bail cannot go together. It is a well-settled principle of our criminal jurisprudence that "bail is the rule, and jail is the exception." These stringent provisions regarding the grant of bail, such as Section 45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, cannot become a tool which can be used to incarcerate the Accused without trial for an unreasonably long time.

 {Para 25}

26. There are a series of decisions of this Court starting from the decision in the case of K.A. Najeeb   MANU/SC/0046/2021 : 2021:INSC:50 : (2021) 3 SCC 713, which hold that such stringent provisions for the grant of bail do not take away the power of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India. We have already referred to paragraph 17 of the said decision, which lays down that the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed in a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. One of the reasons is that if, because of such provisions, incarceration of an undertrial Accused is continued for an unreasonably long time, the provisions may be exposed to the vice of being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024.

Decided On: 26.09.2024

V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1065/2024.

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Kerala HC: Accused prosecuted before Sessions or Special court can file discharge application within sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents.

 But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents. {Para 10}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here. 

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Kerala HC: The Sessions or Special Court Has Discretion U/ S. 250 of BNSS to Consider Discharge application of accused Even After Prescribed Limit Of 60 Days

It is discernible that in Section 250 of BNSS, Sub-section (1) provides that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.

Sub-section (1) of Section 250 of BNSS is a new provision

which prescribes a period of sixty days to prefer an application

by the accused for discharge from the date of committal of the

case. In fact, no such time limit fixed in Section 227 of Cr.P.C.

But it is noticed that there is lack of clarity or legislative

vacuum in the matter of starting point of sixty days in Section

250(1) of BNSS. It is true that in cases where the procedure of

committal is necessary, the statutory wordings in Section

250(1) of BNSS regarding the starting point of sixty days, is so

clear. But, now a days many Special Courts, viz., Special Court

under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, Special Court under the Protection of Children

from Sexual Offences Act, etc., proceedings are going before

the Special Court during the crime stage itself where committal

doesn't arise. In relation to such cases, the starting point to

count sixty days period to file discharge petition as provided in

Section 250(1) of BNSS lacks clarity or the same is a legislative

vacuum. In this context, it is relevant to refer Section 330 of

BNSS, a pari materia provision to Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Section

330(1) provides that where any document is filed before any

Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of

every such document shall be included in a list and the

prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution

or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the

genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such

documents and in no case later than thirty days after such

supply. First proviso to Section 330(1) stipulates that the Court

may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be

recorded in writing. The notable distinction is that in Section

330(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the word 'shall'

and in Section 250(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the

word 'may'. Thus, it is perceivable that when the legislature

uses the word 'shall', the same is mandatory and when the

word 'may' is used, the same is discretionary. The First proviso

to Section 330(1) of BNSS has been engrafted by the legislature

and the time limit of thirty days is preceded by the word 'shall'

makes the provision mandatory. Thus proviso to relax time

also was incorporated. In Section 250(1) of BNSS, the

legislature used the word 'may' which gives discretion to the

court to relax the time limit and therefore, no proviso to relax

the time limit was engrafted by the legislature. Therefore, even

after expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be

considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory

and is only directory. If so, the intent of the legislature to avoid

filing of discharge petition even at a belated stage in the strict

sense could not be achieved. {Para 9}

10. But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024

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Wednesday, 3 July 2024

Short Notes of Judgments under Prevention of money laundering Act(PMLA)

 

1) Supreme Court: PMLA Accused Need Not Fulfill S.45 Conditions When Furnishing Bond After Appearing Before Trial Court As Per Summons

In a notable judgment, the Supreme Court held that when an accused in a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), who appears before the Special Court pursuant to a summons issued to him, it cannot be considered that he is in custody. Therefore, such an accused is not required to apply for bail under Section 45 of the PMLA.

The Special Court can however ask such an accused to furnish bonds to secure presence in terms of Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To accept such a bond, it is not necessary that the stringent twin conditions for bail under Section 45 of the PMLA must be satisfied, clarified the Supreme Court.

Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 121/2024 (and connected matters)

Decided on: 1 March, 2024

2) Supreme court: ED Cannot Arrest Accused After Special Court Has Taken Cognizance Of PMLA Complaint

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Monday, 24 June 2024

Important provisions of Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999

 1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999.

 Received the assent of the Governor on 23rd April, 1999 and published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette Extraordinary, Part-IV, dated 24th April, 1999.

(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Maharashtra.

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(d) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such, syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets have been field before a competent Court within the preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence;

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Important provisions of Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002

An Act to prevent money-laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from, or involved in, money-laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(s) “person” includes—

(i) an individual,

(ii) a Hindu undivided family,

(iii) a company,

(iv) a firm,

(v) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,

(vi) an every artificial judicial person not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses, and

(vii) an any agency, office or branch owned or controlled by any of the above persons mentioned in the preceding sub-clauses;

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 19[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 20[or abroad];

21[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]

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