Can S 4 and 5 of CRPC be applied to prosecution under IPC?

 Sections 4 and 5 Cr.P.C. read as follows:-

"4 Cr.P.C. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.-

(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ) shall be

investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according tothe provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

"5 Cr.P.C. Saving.- Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the  time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force."

Recently the Apex Court in Noorulla Khan Vs. Karnataka

State Pollution Control Board, AIR 2021 SC 3438, has held

that Section 5 of Cr.P.C. applies to the proceedings under the

Special Act. The Act specifies certain procedural justice and

protection. Proceedings under the Indian Penal Code would be

governed by the Criminal Procedure Code only and therefore,

the provisions of Section 5 of Cr.P.C. and 468 Cr.P.C. read with

contours for invoking Article 226 of the Constitution will not

permit us to interfere in the investigation as prima facie, facts

go to show that the ingredients of Section 406, 420 and 120-B

IPC are made out against the accused. The actus reus is also

prima facie proved to dupe the informant.

Accordingly, the petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed

with the costs of Rs.5,000/- as Sections 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C.

cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case as we have

elaborately discussed that the complainant/informant has not

invoked the provisions of the special Act (N.I. Act) but the

alleged commission of offences punishable under the Indian

Penal Code triable as per procedural law i.e. Criminal

Procedure Code, the investigation cannot be quashed.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 7685 of

2022

Petitioner :- Mohar Pal And Another

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 2 Others

Coram: Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J. Hon'ble Gautam Chowdhary,J.

Order Date :- 21.6.2022

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Whether on the same facts, the accused can be prosecuted twice, once under IPC and subsequently under the food safety Act?

In Hat Singh's3 case this Court discussed the doctrine of double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act to observe that prosecution under two different Acts is permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the prosecution of the Respondent therein for offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 and Indian Penal Code, this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay MANU/SC/0761/2014 : (2014) 9 SCC 772 held that there is no bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and cognizable offences. A perusal of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear that there is no bar for prosecution under the Indian Penal Code merely because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the first point.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1195 of 2018 

Decided On: 20.09.2018

 The State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs.  Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/1021/2018,(2019) 18 SCC 145,

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Whether police can file chargesheet against accused under Penal Code if he is found in possession of Guthkha?

 There is no force in both the aforesaid submissions made for the applicant. This point was considered by the Apex Court in Criminal Application No. 1195 of 2018, ( The State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Sayyed Hasan and others) decided on 20.09.2018. The Apex Court has considered various provision of aforesaid special enactment and the  Apex Court has laid down that when offence punishable under Indian Penal Code is committed and it is cognizable in nature, crime can be registered. The provision of Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code was considered, and it is laid down by the Apex Court that when there is prohibitory order and there is breach of the provision, Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code can be used. The relevant provisions like Section 27 of the General Clauses Act are considered by the Apex Court and it is observed that there is no specific bar for registration of the crime in the scheme of the aforesaid special enactment. This point was considered by this Court also in Writ Petition No. 3398 of 2011 ( Sanket Food Products Private Limited Vs. Union of Indian and others) with connected matters. In that matter also Goa Gutkha was involved and this Court had considered the same challenges raised in the said matter. In that case manufacturer was also involved. In the present matter the vendor the person who was in found in possession of prohibited food articles is involved. Thus, the provision of Section 273 of the Indian Penal Code involving the Food substances which is dangerous to the life can be used in the present matter. The sample can be tested and ordinarily there is Magnesium Carbonate and there are also heavy metals in such substance. This Court has considered the provision of the previous Act, The Food Adulteration Act and Rules framed there under and there is not much different in between those provisions and the provisions of new enactment. It is laid down by this Court that Guthkha is food and if it is sold ( as eatable) and the provisions of the Indian Penal Code like section 272 and 328 of the Indian Penal Code are applicable, the crime can be registered. In the present matter also this Court hold that these provisions are squarely applicable and so the FIR cannot be quashed.  {Para 5}

Bombay High Court

Manik Dhondiba More vs The State Of Maharashtra And ... on 3 October, 2018

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Section 229A of IPC providing punishment for breach of bail condition of appearance before court is removed in BNSS 2023

 Central Government Act

Section 229A in The Indian Penal Code

²³³ [229A. Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in Court.—Whoever, having been charged with an offence and released on bail or on bond without sureties, fails without sufficient cause (the burden of proving which shall lie upon him), to appear in Court in accordance with the terms of the bail or bond, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. Explanation.—The punishment under this section is—

(a) in addition to the punishment to which the offender would be liable on a conviction for the offence with which he has been charged; and

(b) without prejudice to the power of the Court to order forfeiture of the bond.]

Section 229A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which dealt with the punishment for the failure to comply with a court order, has been completely repealed in the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 

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Whether a consensual affair can be a defence against the charge of kidnapping a minor?

A perusal of Section 361 of IPC shows that it is necessary that

there be an act of enticing or taking, in addition to establishing the child’s minority (being sixteen for boys and eighteen for girls) and care/keep of a lawful guardian. Such ‘enticement’ need not be direct or immediate in time and can also be through subtle actions likewinning over the affection of a minor girl. Thakorlal D Vadgama v. State of Gujarat, (1973) 2 SCC 413, ¶ 10. 

13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the appellant has

unintentionally admitted his culpability. Besides the victim being

recovered from his custody, the appellant admits to having established  sexual intercourse and of having an intention to marry her. Although the victim’s deposition that she was forcefully removed from the custody of her parents might possibly be a belated improvement but the testimonies of numerous witnesses make out a clear case of

enticement. The evidence on record further unequivocally suggests that the appellant induced the prosecutrix to reach at a designated place to accompany him.

14. Behind all the chaff of legalese, the appellant has failed to

propound how the elements of kidnapping have not been made out. His core contention appears to be that in view of consensual affair between them, the prosecutrix joined his company voluntarily. Such a plea, in our opinion, cannot be acceded to given the unambiguous language of the statute as the prosecutrix was admittedly below 18 years of age.

15. A bare perusal of the relevant legal provisions, as extracted

above, show that consent of the minor is immaterial for purposes of

Section 361 of IPC. Indeed, as borne out through various other

provisions in the IPC and other laws like the Indian Contract Act, 1872, minors are deemed incapable of giving lawful consent.Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 7 SCC 359, ¶ 15.Section 361 IPC, particularly, goes beyond this simple presumption. It bestows the ability to make crucial decisions regarding a minor’s physical safety upon his/her guardians. Therefore, a minor girl’s infatuation with her alleged kidnapper cannot by itself be allowed as a defence, for the same would amount to surreptitiously undermining the protective essence of the offence of kidnapping.

17. The ratio of S. Varadarajan (supra), although attractive at first

glance, does little to aid the appellant’s case. On facts, the case is

distinguishable as it was restricted to an instance of “taking” and not “enticement”. Further, this Court in S. Varadarajan (supra) explicitly held that a charge of kidnapping would not be made out only in a case where a minor, with the knowledge and capacity to know the full import of her actions, voluntarily abandons the care of her guardian without any assistance or inducement on part of the accused. The cited judgment, therefore, cannot be of any assistance without establishing: first, knowledge and capacity with the minor of her actions; second, voluntary abandonment on part of the minor; and third, lack of inducement by the accused.

18. Unfortunately, it has not been the appellant’s case that he had

no active role to play in the occurrence. Rather the eyewitnesses

have testified to the contrary which illustrates how the appellant had drawn the prosecutrix out of the custody of her parents. Even more crucially, there is little to suggest that she was aware of the full purport of heractions or that she possessed the mental acuities and maturity to take  care of herself. In addition to being young, the prosecutrix was not much educated. Her support of the prosecution version and blanket denial of any voluntariness on her part, even if presumed to be under the influence of her parents as claimed by the appellant, at the very least indicates that she had not thought her actions through fully.

19. It is apparent that instead of being a valid defence, the

appellant’s vociferous arguments are merely a justification which although evokes our sympathy, but can’t change the law. Since the relevant provisions of the IPC cannot be construed in any other

manner and a plain and literal meaning thereof leaves no escape route for the appellant, the Courts below were seemingly right in observing that the consent of the minor would be no defence to a charge of kidnapping. No fault can thus be found with the conviction of the appellant under Section 366 of IPC.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1919 of 2010

Anversinh @ Kiransinh Fatesinh Zala Vs State of Gujarat 

Dated:  12.01.2021

Author: Surya Kant, J:

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Whether not working country-made pistol is a deadly weapon for S 398 of IPC?

 The next issue to be examined is whether the country made

pistol (katta) can be termed as a “deadly weapon” as contemplated under Section 398 of the IPC. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the language of Section 398 of the IPC. The said Section is set

out below:

“398. Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed

with deadly weapon.—If, at the time of attempting to

commit robbery or dacoity, the offender is armed with any

deadly weapon, the imprisonment with which such

offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven

years.”

30. It is apparent from the plain language of Section 398 of the IPC that if an offender is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of robbery or dacoity, the same would constitute an offence under Section 398 of the IPC.

31. In the present case, the appellant was armed with a country

made pistol while attempting to commit robbery and therefore, he has been convicted under Section 393 read with Section 398 of the IPC on the assumption that the country made pistol is a ‘deadly weapon’.

32. Thus, the key question to be addressed is whether the country

made pistol (katta) can be termed as a “deadly weapon” even if it is in a state of disrepair and therefore, cannot be used as such without carrying out the necessary repairs. The term ‘deadly’ qualifies the term ‘weapon’. Thus, in order for any weapon to be termed as deadly, it should one which is capable of or likely to cause death if used in the manner in which it is intended to be used. In order for any object, instrument or thing to qualify as a weapon, it should be one, which is intended to be used as such. There may be a large number of instruments or objects, which can be used in a lethal manner, however, if they are not intended or meant to be used in that manner, they cannot be understood to be weapons for the purposes of Section 398 of the IPC. The natural import of the word ‘weapon’ is clearly an object,a device, an instrument or any other thing, that is, intended to be used as a weapon and is inherently one. The term ‘deadly’ specifies the lethal quality of the weapon. A deadly weapon is one, which is lethal and is likely to cause death when used in the manner in which it is intended. By its very nature, a deadly weapon is one, which is likely to result in a fatality.

33. It is necessary to bear in mind that the mere possession of a

deadly weapon while committing a robbery constitutes an offence punishable under Section 398 of the IPC. It is not necessary for the offender to have used the weapon or even threatened to use such a deadly weapon.

34. There are large number of instruments or objects, which if used in a particular manner, may result in a fatality. Even an innocuous writing instrument such as a pen, if used in a particular manner, may result in fatality. However, a pen is not a deadly weapon and merely carrying the said writing instrument, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, would not constitute an offence punishable under Section 398 of the IPC. Thus, the necessary ingredients of a ‘deadly weapon’ are: first, that it should be a weapon and capable of being used as such; and second, that it must be inherently lethal and if used in the intended manner is likely to result in death.

35. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, a firearm, that is, incapable of being used as a weapon, cannot be construed to be a deadly weapon for the purposes of Section 398 of the IPC. Thus, even though the country made pistol recovered from the appellant constitutes a firearm, it cannot be considered as a deadly weapon. This is because at the material time, it could not be used to inflict any fatal injury, if used in the manner in which it was meant to be used – that is, for the purpose of firing a bullet –on account of it being in disrepair.

36. The question whether a firearm, which is non-functional can

qualify as a “deadly weapon” as contemplated under Section 398 of the IPC, is also squarely covered by the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Rakesh (supra). The relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: -

“17. The purpose of using a deadly weapon at the time of

committing robbery, dacoity or attempting one, is

obviously to overawe and instill a sense of fear in the

victim. However, when the so called weapon is in a non

working condition, used merely as a camouflage, whether

such weapon could fall within the definition of ‘deadly

weapon’ is a matter of debate. It can be urged that the

victim who is put in fear of life or grave injury, lest he

parts with his belongings, has no way of knowing that the

weapon being pointed at him is not in working condition or

is fake. The victim in such situation will not resist the

offence thinking that his/her life is in danger. The fear for

life/hurt created in the mind of the victim is a direct result

of the act of the accused.

18. However for the purpose of Section 398 IPC, this

argument does not merit acceptance. As noticed above

even carrying a “deadly weapon” at the time of offence

attracts Section 398 IPC and the actual use or brandishing

is not required. Section 398 IPC applies when at the

time of the attempted robbery or dacoity the accused has

caused or threatened the victim of bodily harm and injury

etc. and at that time the accused was in possession of a

deadly weapon. The word ‘deadly’ qualifies and is

descriptive of the term “weapon”. If the accused is not

carrying a “weapon” or carrying a “weapon” which is not

in a working condition and cannot cause any grievous

bodily harm or injury, it would not qualify and cannot be

regarded as a deadly weapon. The effect thereof is that the

legislative mandate of minimum punishment under Section

398 IPC is not applicable in such cases. Punishment,

howsoever, prescribed under Section 393 IPC is applicable

and also stringent enough and can extend upto 7 years.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment delivered on: 15.09.2020

 CRL. A. 807/2017

SONU @ RAJA  Vs STATE 

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Madras HC: Precaution to be taken by the magistrate before committal of accused of unsound mind to session court

While so, the police completed the investigation and filed a final

report in P.R.C.No.15 of 2017 against Kaliyappan for the offence under

Section 302 IPC before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Omalur.

Surprisingly, the Magistrate commenced the proceedings under Sections 207

and 209 Cr.P.C. and committed the case to the Court of Session, by order

dated 03.03.2008 in P.R.C. No.15 of 2007. Even during the committal

proceedings, the Magistrate did not take any steps to satisfy himself as to

whether Kaliyappan was in a sound state of mind to understand the proceedings.

20. A close reading of Section 328 Cr.P.C. shows that it deals with

(a) persons of unsound mind and (b) persons suffering from mental retardation at the stage of an inquiry. The expression “inquiry” is defined in Section 2(g) to mean every inquiry, other than a trial, under the Code. These may include proceedings relating to remand, bail, taking of cognizance, issuance of process, furnishing of copies, committal proceedings and framing

of charges. In this case, though there were sufficient materials to indicate that Kaliyappan was suffering from mental illness even at the stage of committal, no steps were taken by the committal Court under Section 328 Cr.P.C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Crl.O.P.No.4993 of 2018 and Crl.M.P.Nos.2485 & 2486 of 2018

Kaliyappan Muniyappan Aanurpatty Vs State 

CORAM:

 Mr. JUSTICE P.N. PRAKASH

PRONOUNCED ON: 04.09.2020

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Whether court should quash second FIR if it is based same facts with additional sections under IPC?

The Respondent then filed an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008. The allegations are similar that the Appellant put up an imposter in place of the Respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney, which the Respondent had never executed, sold his lands. The FIR itself recites that earlier also the Appellant had sold the lands of the Respondent on the basis of same general power of attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998, and also the institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 for annulment of the same.

11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the Appellant in pursuance of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs are common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds.

12. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made Under Sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted Under Sub-section (2) thereof.

13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the Appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the Respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the Appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 2020 

Decided On: 07.02.2020

Prem Chand Singh  Vs.  The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 54,MANU/SC/0136/2020

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Supreme Court: Prosecution of accused for an offence under IPC can continue even if sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act is not forthcoming

We decline to deviate from the view taken by the High

Court that the charge against the petitioner for offence

punishable under the Indian Penal Code can continue

irrespective of the fact that sanction in respect of

offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 is not forthcoming. To that extent, we find no

infirmity in the conclusion reached by the High Court.

Our understanding of the impugned judgment is that

the High Court has made it clear that if sanction to

prosecute the petitioner for offence punishable under

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not or has not been

granted, the question of proceeding against the

petitioner for that charge does not arise.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2787/2020

SATYABRAT GUPTA Vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 

Dated : 29-07-2020 

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

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Important Notes on Indian Penal Code

1) Notes on S 34 and S149 IPC- Principle of constructive liability

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/08/notes-on-s-34-and-s-149-ipc-principle.html

2) Notes on offence of Forgery

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/08/notes-on-offence-of-forgery.html

3) Notes on offence of Mischief and Criminal Trespass

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/08/notes-on-offence-of-mischief-and.html

4) Notes on offence of receiving of stolen property

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/08/notes-on-offence-of-receiving-of-stolen.html

5)Notes on offence of Mischief and Criminal Trespass

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Whether Investigation In IPC Offences Can Be Quashed For Non Investigation Of SC-ST Offences By Competent Police Officer?

Undisputedly, in the instant case, the respondents were

charged under Sections 302/34, 404/34 IPC apart from Section

3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 and the charges under IPC have been

framed after investigation by a competent police officer under the

Code, in such a situation, in our view, the High Court has

committed an apparent error in quashing the proceedings and

discharging the respondents from the offences committed under the

provisions of IPC where the investigation has been made by a

competent police officer under the provisions of the Code. In such a

situation, the chargesheet

deserves to proceed in an appropriate

competent Court of jurisdiction for the offence punishable under

the IPC, notwithstanding the fact that the chargesheet

could not have proceeded confined to the offence under Section 3 of the Act,

1989.

12. The order impugned is accordingly restricted to the offence

under Section 3 of the Act, 1989 and not in respect of offences

punishable under the IPC. The Special Case No. 37/11 is restored

on the file of the Special Court, District Anuppur(MP) and the trial

Court may proceed further and conclude the trial expeditiously in

respect of offences punishable under the IPC in accordance with

law.

NONREPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 123 OF 2020

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH  Vs BABBU RATHORE 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Dated:January 17, 2020
Citation: AIR 2020 SC 472

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Calcutta HC: Knowledge of commission of dacoity is necessary to attract penal liability for harbouring dacoits U/S. 216-A IPC

There is no evidence on
record that the appellant was aware that they were planning to commit
dacoity in the convent. Raucous and unbridled behaviour of the accused
persons during marriage or their expensive habits without anything more
would not create an irresistible inference in the mind of a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence that they were planning to commit dacoity in the
convent.
It is apposite to note that in Emperor the Court held penal liability
would not be attracted if a person harbours dacoits in general and it must
be proved that he had harboured such dacoits who intended to commit a
‘particular dacoity’. Knowledge of the appellant with regard to dacoity
conducted at the convent does not appear to be proved beyond doubt as
evidence of P.W. 11 is too vague to be convincing and the other evidence on
record do not inspire confidence to come to such conclusion.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion, that the
prosecution case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and the
appellant is entitled to get an order of acquittal.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Joymalya Bagchi
And
The Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
C.R.A. 693 of 2017
With
CRAN 1241 of 2018

Gopal Sarkar  Vs. State of West Bengal

Judgment on : 20.12.2019
Joymalya Bagchi, J. :

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Basic concept of fraction of life imprisonment

Section 57 in The Indian Penal Code

57. Fractions of terms of punishment.—In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, ⁵⁶ [imprisonment] for life shall be reck­oned as equivalent to ⁵⁶ [imprisonment] for twenty years.

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Whether Section 3 of the Legal Metrology Act bars prosecution of accused for offences under IPC?

In the light of principles laid down, we find that Section 3 of the Act completely overrides the provisions of Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code in respect of the offences and penalties imposable for violations of the provisions of the Act, it being special Act. Therefore, if the offence is disclosed to be made out under the provisions of the Act, an Accused cannot be charged for the same offence under Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code. Reading of Section 51 of the Act makes it clear that the provisions of Indian Penal Code insofar as they relate to offences with regard to weight or measure, shall not apply to any offence which is punishable under the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Indian Penal Code which relate to offences with regard to weight and measure as contained in Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code alone will not apply. No person can be charged for an offence relating to weight or measure falling under Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code in view of the provisions of the Act.

35. The scheme of the Act is for the offences for use of weights and measures which are non-standard and for tampering with or altering any standards, secondary standards or working standards of any weight or measure. The Act does not foresee any offence relating to cheating as defined in Section 415 of Indian Penal Code or the offences Under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code. Similarly, an act performed in furtherance of a common intention disclosing an offence Under Section 34 is not covered by the provisions of the Act. An offence disclosing a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence which is punishable Under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code is also not an offence under the Act. Since such offences are not punishable under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the prosecution for such offences could be maintained since the trial of such offences is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Similar is the provision in respect of the offences Under Sections 467, 468, 471 Indian Penal Code as such offences are not covered by the provisions of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1328-1329 of 2019 

Decided On: 04.09.2019

 The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Aman Mittal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

Hemant Gupta, J.

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Whether person committing theft of electricity can be prosecuted under provisions of IPC?

 Sections 378 and 379 IPC deal with the theft of movable property. Electricity is energy and not property. There is no provision in the IPC to prosecute any person for committing theft of electricity. Therefore the provisions of Electricity Act are enacted to take various offences relating to electricity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 4415 of 2017

Decided On: 09.02.2018

 Syed Yaqoob Syed Masood Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.S. Shinde and A.M. Dhavale, JJ.

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SC: Prosecution under IPC can be initiated in case of food safety violation

 The High Court is clearly wrong in holding that
action can be initiated against defaulters only under
Section 55 of FSS Act or proceedings under Section 68 for
adjudication have to be taken. A further error was
committed by the High Court in interpreting the scope of
Section 188 of the IPC. Section 188 of the IPC does not
only cover breach of law and order, the disobedience of
which is punishable. Section 188 is attracted even in cases
where the act complained of causes or tends to cause
danger to human life, health or safety as well. We do not
agree with the High Court that the prohibitory order of the
Commissioner, Food and Safety is not an order

contemplated under Chapter X of the IPC. We are also not
in a position to accept the findings of the High Court that
Section 55 of the FSS Act is the only provision which can be
resorted to for non compliance of orders passed under the
Act as it is a special enactment.
7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender
under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the
punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an
act or an omission constitutes an offence under two
enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished
under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to
be punished twice for the same offence. T.S. Baliah v. T.S.Rengachari – (1969) 3 SCR 65. The same set
of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences
under two different laws. An act or an omission can
amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at
the same time, an offence under any other law.State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan – (1988) 4 SCC 655 The High
Court ought to have taken note of Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows:
“Provisions as to offences punishable under
two or more enactments – Where an act or
omission constitutes an offence under two or more
enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be
prosecuted and punished under either or any of

those enactments, but shall not be liable to be
punished twice for the same offence.”
8. In Hat Singh’s3 case this Court discussed the doctrine
of double jeopardy and Section 26 of the General Clauses
Act to observe that prosecution under two different Acts is
permissible if the ingredients of the provisions are satisfied
on the same facts. While considering a dispute about the
prosecution of the Respondent therein for offences under
the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act
1957 and Indian Penal Code, this Court in State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Sanjay4 held that there is no bar in prosecuting
persons under the Penal Code where the offences
committed by persons are penal and cognizable offences. A
perusal of the provisions of the FSS Act would make it clear
that there is no bar for prosecution under the IPC merely
because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalties.
We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the
first point.
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1195 OF 2018

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs SAYYED HASSAN SAYYED SUBHAN 

Dated:SEPTEMBER 20, 2018.

Citation: 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 5367 (S.C.)

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Notes on offence of Forgery

Forgery(S 463 of IPC){S 336(1) of BNS}

Whoever makes any false document or a false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record with the intent:

a) to cause damage or injury to public or to any person,or to cause any person to part with property or to enter into any contract(express or implied),or

b) to support any claim or title,or

c)to commit fraud,or

d)that fraud may be committed,

commits forgery.

Read important judgments on forgery:
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Making a false document or electronic record(S 464 of IPC) {S 335 of BNS}

A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record-

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Whether complainant can approach police in cheque dishonour case?

 The NI Act provides for the procedure for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The object behind such proceedings is to bring relief to the litigants in a summary manner if the complainant is able to establish his case. Furthermore, such prosecution is maintainable only against the persons referred to in Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act. The Act also provides for the period of limitation for the complainant to complete the procedural formalities and to approach the Court. Whereas if the transaction is attended by other serious offences under the IPC, in a given case the investigation is necessary; particularly when many accused are involved and the evidence can be collected only by an investigating agency. In such cases, it would not be proper to relegate the complainant only to the remedy of the prosecution under the NI Act which he can take recourse to by way of filing a private complaint. In such cases, the complainant's right to approach the police and get the offences investigated by them, cannot be scuttled.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 2906 of 2017

Decided On: 03.04.2018

Hasmukh Tarachand Sheth Vs.  State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Savant and Sarang V. Kotwal, JJ.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 270

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Whether accused can be convicted with aid of S 34 of IPC if it is not possible to convict him U/S 149 of IPC?

There cannot be any quarrel about the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments where subtle distinction is drawn between Section 34 and Section 149, Indian Penal Code which deal with 'common intention' and 'common object' respectively. At the same time, it is also clarified that it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether Section 34 or Section 149 of Indian Penal Code or both the provisions are attracted. It is also held that non-applicability of Section 149 Indian Penal Code is no bar in convicting the Accused persons Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, if the evidence discloses commission of offence in furtherance of common intention of them all.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 701, 702, 703-704, 705-706, 707, 708 of 2012 

Decided On: 06.10.2017

Birbal Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 440

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Maharashtra amendment to CRPC and IPC 2018

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gK3XIEqCpY-GFBIwjPhJUJ5FZkd-auQR/view?usp=sharing

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