1. No Fundamental Right To Marry.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that there was not fundamental, unequivocal right to marry in India.
2. On Striking Down The Special Marriage Act & Allied Laws
Another point on which the entire bench agreed was to not strike or read the Special Marriage Act (SMA) and its allied laws down.
3. On Rights Of Transgender Persons To Marry
Print PageQ :- Conditions under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 for registration of marriages celebrated in forms other than the said Act and effect of registration of marriages under the said Act.
Ans:- Chapter III
REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES CELEBRATED IN OTHER FORMS
15. Registration of marriages celebrated in other forms.—Any marriage celebrated, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, other than a marriage solemnized under the16 Special Marriage Act, 1872 (3 of 1872) or under this Act, may be registered under this Chapter by a Marriage Officer in the territories to which this Act extends if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely—
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We, thus, are of the opinion that the
interpretation of definition of shared household as put
by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is
not correct interpretation and the said judgment does
not lay down the correct law.{Para 64}
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs SNEHA AHUJA
Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Dated: 15-10-2020
Findings of the court
g. The Constitution does not expressly recognize a fundamental right to marry. An institution cannot be elevated to the realm of a fundamental right based on the content accorded to it by law. However, several facets of the marital relationship are reflections of constitutional values including the right to human dignity and the right to life and personal liberty;
h. This Court cannot either strike down the constitutional validity of Special Marriage Act(SMA) or read words into the SMA because of its institutional limitations. This Court cannot read words into the provisions of the SMA and provisions of other allied laws such as the Indian Succession Act and the Hindu Succession Act because that would amount to judicial legislation. The Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review must steer clear of matters, particularly those. impinging on policy, which fall in the legislative domain;
In the Supreme Court of India
(Before Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J. and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S. Ravindra Bhat, Hima Kohli and P.S. Narasimha, JJ.)
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1011 of 2022
Supriyo alias Supriya Chakraborty and Another Vs Union of India
Decided on: October 17, 2023
Citation:2023 SCC OnLine SC 1348,
A reading of the Act will indicate that it codifies and regulates the obligations due to a Muslim woman divorcee by putting them outside the scope of Section 125 CrPC as the 'divorced woman' has been defined as "Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with the Muslim law". But the Act does not apply to a Muslim woman whose marriage is solemnized either under the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954 or a Muslim woman whose marriage was dissolved either under Indian Divorce Act, 1969 or the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Act does not apply to the deserted and separated Muslim wives. {Para 27}
Registrar of Marriages (Common), 2018 (1) ILR (Kerala) 377, while examining a case of registration of marriage under the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008, held that personal appearance of the parties to the marriage can be dispensed with by the Local Registrar. It was further observed that the Local Registrar is empowered to obtain their
personal appearance through video conferencing. In para 9 of the judgment, it was observed as under:-
9. True, inconvenience caused by a rule can never be a ground for
annulling the same or reading down the Rule in a different fashion.
But, if the purpose of the rule could be ensured otherwise, should the
parties be put to inconvenience? My conclusion is that if the purpose of the rule can be ensured otherwise, the provision of law can be
interpreted by courts in a fashion not causing any inconvenience to the parties. I am fortified in this view by the principle quod est
inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege (that
which is inconvenient, or against reason, is not permitted in law). I am
also fortified in this view by the following observation in the
commentaries on 'Statutory Interpretation' by Francis Bennion:
"The court seeks to avoid a construction that causes unjustifiable
inconvenience to persons who are subject to the enactment, since
this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes
however there are overriding reasons for applying such a
construction, for example where it appears that Parliament really
intended it or the literal meaning is too strong."
I do not find any overriding reason in this matter for the court to
interpret the provision contained in Rule 11 in such a fashion
compelling the parties to the marriage to be physically present before
the local Marriage Officer, for the purpose of registering their
marriage.”
The ratio of judgment passed in Dr. Praful B. Desai's case
(supra) is that statement of a witness or accused can be recorded by way of
video conference in the presence of his pleader/counsel under Section 273
Cr.P.C. This view was taken keeping in view that under Sections 284 and
285 of the Cr.P.C., attendance of the witness can be exempted by appointing a Commission, who can go to the place where the witness or accused is present and record his statement to meet the ends of justice. Hence, for all
intents and purposes, under the criminal law, presence of the witness is not
necessary before the Court for recording of his evidence. In the same
manner, for the purpose of issuing the marriage registration certificate, as
held by the High Court of Jharkhand in Upasana Bali's case (supra), parties
to the marriage can appear before the Registering Officer through video conference.
Appellant No.1-husband, in the present case, is not seeking
complete exemption of appearance of his wife-appellant No.2 (who is
working in USA) before the Registrar of Marriage. He is seeking that his
wife should be allowed to appear through video conferencing, so that the
marriage can be registered. Appellant No.2-Misha Verma, wife of appellant
No.1, was employed in Virginia University School of Medicine as Resident
Doctor. Now, she is working in J.W. Ruby Memorial Hospital at 1 Medical
Center Drive, Morgantown, West Virginia 26505, United States. The
appellants solemnized marriage on 07.12.2019 according to Hindu rites and
ceremonies in the presence of their respective families at Gurugram
(Haryana). In this case, presence of Misha Verma can be secured through
video conferencing and presence of husband-Ami Ranjan and three
witnesses can be marked by their appearance in the office of Registrar of
Marriages. Then, the certificate of marriage can be issued on doing
verification of facts as contemplated under Sections 15 and 16 of the
Special Marriage Act. Once, the marriage certificate is issued, it can be
made part of the public record under Section 47 of the Act by entering it
into the Marriage Certificate Book. There shall be no violation of Section
47 of the Act. The entire process can be done after seeking presence of Misha Verma wife of appellant No.1-Ami Ranjan through video
conferencing. For all intents and purposes, this would be a valid marriage
certificate.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
LPA No.125 of 2021 (O&M)
(in CWP No.20480 of 2020)
Date of decision: 09.03.2021
Ami Ranjan Vs. State of Haryana
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RITU BAHRI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ARCHANA PURI
Author: Ritu Bahri, J. (oral)
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