Showing posts with label Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Show all posts

Saturday, 7 February 2026

A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Verdict in Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin

 


Read full judgment here: Click here

1.0 Introduction: A Landmark Verdict on Matrimonial Property Rights

The Supreme Court of India's decision in Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin, delivered on December 20, 2023, represents a significant milestone in the jurisprudence concerning the property rights of divorced Muslim women. Arising from a decade-long legal battle, the verdict addresses deep-seated questions about the nature of gifts given at the time of marriage and clarifies the judicial approach required for interpreting social welfare legislation. It stands as a crucial reaffirmation of economic justice for women navigating the complexities of divorce.

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Supreme Court: Divorced Muslim Woman Entitled To Recover Gifts Given by her father To her Husband At the time of Marriage

 It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the High Court. The primary basis for not giving the amount and gold in question to the Appellant, as it appears from the perusal of the judgment, was the apparent contradiction between the statement of the Kazi i.e. marriage Registrar and the father of the Appellant. The former stated in evidence that the entry recording the amount and gold being given to the husband was erroneously done so and it should have been that the said amount(s) were only given without specifying, to whom, the father of the Appellant on the other hand stated that he had given the amount(s) in question to the Respondent. The High Court observed that since the father was directly responsible for giving the said amount(s), it would be prudent to accept his version of events. What, apparently, the High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in which the said statement of the father was given. Those proceedings were concerned with Section 498A-Indian Penal Code and Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and despite such a direct statement by the father of the Appellant the learned Trial Court seized of the matter acquitted the Respondent, a conclusion which appears to have attained finality. Then, it cannot be said, in our view, that the evidentiary value of that statement is either equal to or greater than the statement of the marriage registrar. The High Court records that the latter statement regarding writing and overwriting in the entry in the marriage register is proved by him having produced the same before the Court. When that is the case, we are at a loss to understand why his statement in entirety should not be accepted. Mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of overwriting in the marriage register is not sufficient to discard his testimony.

{Para 8}


9. This case presents the possibility of two interpretations and whereas it is a settled rule that this Court under its plenary, Article 136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High Court simply because there are two views possible, this case, in our considered view, does not fall under this exception for the High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil dispute. The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication. To put it in context, the scope and object of 1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5164 of 2025 

Decided On: 02.12.2025

Rousanara Begum Vs. S.K. Salahuddin and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1375, MANU/SC/1611/2025.

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Monday, 20 May 2024

Whether criminal revision is maintainable against the order passed by the Magistrate under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act?

 Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the classes of Criminal Courts and they include Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Metropolitan Magistrate and the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class. Section 12(3)(b), Cr.P.C. shows that a Chief Judicial Magistrate exercises general control over all Magistrates. Section 10(1) Cr.P.C. provides that all Assistant Sessions Judges shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge in whose Court they exercise jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. lays down that the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceedings before any. inferior Criminal Court constituted within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to regularity of proceedings of any such inferior Court. The explanation to this sub-section provides that all Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purpose of this sub-section and of Section 398. In view of Section 6 of Cr.P.C. all Judicial Magistrates (First Class or Second Class), Metropolitan Magistrates and Executive Magistrates are Criminal Courts. By virtue of the explanation of Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C, all Magistrates shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions judge. It, therefore, follows that all Magistrates are inferior Criminal Courts and, consequently, the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by them or the regularity of any proceedings of such Magistrates can be examined by the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 397. The power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. is in very wide terms. There is nothing to indicate that any order passed by a Magistrate under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, would not fall within the purview of Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. As mentioned earlier, the Legislature has not made any such provision in the Act which may indicate that any finality is attached to the orders passed by the Magistrate. Therefore, the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed or proceedings conducted by a Magistrate under the Act can be examined by the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Sub-section (1) of Section 397, Cr.P.C. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken in Salim v. Judicial Magistrate, Haridwr 1996 JIC 30, that a revision does not lie against an order passed by a Magistrate under the Act does not lay down correct law. {Para 9}


10. Our answer to the question referred by the learned Single Judge is, therefore, as follows :


'Against an order passed by a Magistrate under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, a revision is maintainable before the Sessions Judge under Section 397, Cr.P.C.'

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal Revision No. 1430 of 1999

Decided On: 24.05.2002

Saman Ismail Vs. Rafiq Ahmad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.P. Mathur and R.P. Misra, JJ.

Author: G.P. Mathur, J.

Citation: 2002 Cri L J 3648 (All) (DB),MANU/UP/1313/2002.

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Thursday, 28 September 2023

Whether muslim mother can claim maintenance from her children U/S 125 of CRPC?

 Section 4(1) of the Act contains the provision for maintenance to the divorced woman from her children but this does in fact not debar the divorced Muslim woman from invoking the provision of Section 125 of Cr. PC against her children. Even under the Act the application of the provisions of Section 125 of Cr. PC has been contemplated and the Act has not specifically made any ouster of the application of Section 125 Cr.PC Section 5 of the Act has imposed one condition for the application of sections 125 to 128 of Cr. P C against former husband of the divorced Muslim woman but it is conspicuously silent as regards their application against others. The framework of the Act itself and the ratio decided in the case of Danial Latifi (supra) which we have discussed above will show that the Act itself is not a substituted measure of Section 125 of Cr. P C but in addition thereto. This suggests that the proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.PC against children of the respondent mother is quite maintainable despite the pendency of the proceeding under sections 3, 4 of the Act against her husband.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.R.R. No. 516 of 2001

Decided On: 10.12.2001

Makiur Rahaman Kha and Ors. Vs.  Mahila Bibi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.C. Sil, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/0390/2001.

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Whether Muslim children are entitled to claim maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC?

Clause (b) of Section 3(1) (supra) provides for grant of additional maintenance to her for the fosterage period of two years from the date of birth of the child of marriage for maintaining that child during the fosterage. Maintenance for the prescribed period referred to in Clause (b) of Section 3(1) is granted on the claim of the divorced mother on her own behalf for maintaining the infant/infants for a period of two years from the date of the birth of the child concerned who is/are living with her and presumably is aimed at providing some extra amount to the mother for her nourishment for nursing or taking care of the infant/infants upto a period of two years. It has nothing to do with the right of the child/children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. So long as the conditions for the grant of maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. are satisfied, the rights of the minor children, unable to maintain themselves, are not affected by Section 3(I Mb) of the 1986 Act. Under Section 125, Cr. P.C. the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father (irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and the children have no independent means of their own. it remains his absolute obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125. Cr. P.C. which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125, Cr. P.C. to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125, Cr. P.C., cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act to take away the independent rights of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. where they are minor and are unable to maintain themselves. Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125, Cr.P.C. is absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. Indeed a Muslim father can claim custody of the children born through the divorced wife to fulfil his obligation to maintain them and if he succeeds, he need not suffer an order or direction under Section 125, Cr.P.C. but where such custody has not been claimed by him, he cannot refuse and neglect to maintain his minor children on the ground that he has divorced their mother. The right of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. is separate, distinct and independent of the right of their divorcee mother to claim maintenance for herself for maintaining the infant children upto the age of 2 years from the date of birth of the concerned child under Section 3(1) of the Act. There is nothing in the 1986 Act which in any manner affects the application of the provisions of Sections 125-128 of the Cr.P.C, relating to grant of maintenance insofar as minor children of Muslim parents, unable to maintain I themselves, are concerned.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1197 of 1995

Decided On: 29.07.1997

Noor Saba Khatoon  Vs.  Mohd. Quasim

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. A.S. Anand and K. Venkataswami, JJ.

Author: Dr. A.S. Anand, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0827/1997.

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Whether burden of proof is on the muslim husband to prove that he has given divorce to his wife and how he should prove it?

Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and after perusing the entire record, this Court is of the opinion that in pursuance of definition of divorced woman, it is bounden duty of the husband to prove in Court by adducing cogent and reliable evidence that he had divorced his wife in accordance with Muslim law especially when the wife is not accepting the divorce and denies the factum of giving divorce to her by her husband. Section 2(a) of (The) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is defined as under:--

"2, Definition.-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires--


(a) "Divorced woman" means a Muslim woman who married according to Muslim Law, and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law."

In the present case applicant/wife filed an application under Section 125, Cr.PC for grant of maintenance. In reply to this application, non-applicant/husband submitted in Paragraph 2 that in August, 1997, he had given divorce to the applicant/wife according to Muslim Law. Thereafter, he has filed written application on 1-5-1998, in which he has mentioned that he has pronounced oral divorce to his wife and also given divorce in writing before the Trial Court and has no relations with her.  Learned Revisional Court has failed to consider whether the divorce was given in accordance with the Muslim Law. It is pertinent to note that non-applicant/husband neither examined himself in Court as a witness nor given any opportunity to cross-examine to the applicant/wife. He has not examined any other witness in his favour in Court for establishing his case by adducing evidence. As a matter of fact, in the entire case, there is no evidence led by the husband to prove his case. A mere pleading as mentioned in paragraph 2 of his reply or filing an application about pronouncement or declaration of divorce, would not sufficient to establish that non-applicant/husband has given divorce to the applicant/wife in accordance with the Muslim Law as embodied in Section 2(1)(a) of the Muslim Woman Act.


The fact is also very important and noticeable that the wife/applicant served legal notice dated 2-12-1997, Exh. P-1, its acknowledgment is Exh. P-2 by which she demanded maintenance @ Rs. 2,000/- per month. This notice was duly received by the non-applicant/husband and also admitted the receipt of notice in Paragraph 8 of the reply submitted on 2-9-1998. When the non-applicant husband received notice on 2-12-1997, why he had not given intimation of divorce and reply to this notice informing that the applicant/wife was already divorced in the month of August, 97 and as such now she is not entitled for any maintenance except in accordance with the Provisions of Muslim Women Act.

Learned Lower Revisional Court has failed to consider that the non-applicant/husband has failed to establish that applicant/wife has been given divorce by him in accordance with Muslim Law. For this purpose, non-applicant/husband neither examined him in Court nor adduced any evidence. In absence of this, it cannot be said that the applicant/wife acquired status of divorced woman and, therefore, her application under Section 125, Cr.PC was maintainable only from the period of filing the application till the date of giving divorce and for iddat period.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Criminal Revision No. 341/2001

Decided On: 19.07.2002

Khatunbai  Vs. Gani Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.L. Kochar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/0316/2002.

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Whether provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 are applicable to Muslim woman not married according to muslim law?

A reading of the Act will indicate that it codifies and regulates the obligations due to a Muslim woman divorcee by putting them outside the scope of Section 125 CrPC as the 'divorced woman' has been defined as "Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with the Muslim law". But the Act does not apply to a Muslim woman whose marriage is solemnized either under the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954 or a Muslim woman whose marriage was dissolved either under Indian Divorce Act, 1969 or the Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Act does not apply to the deserted and separated Muslim wives. {Para 27}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (civil) 868 of 1986

Decided On: 28.09.2001

 Danial Latifi vs.  Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju and Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.
Author: S. Rajendra Babu, J.

Citation: AIR 2001 SC 3958.
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Important provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

 

[Act 25 of 1986 as amended by Act 34 of 2019]

[19th May, 1986]

An Act to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from, their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
(2) It extends to the whole of India.

2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “divorced woman” means a Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law, and has been divorced by, or has obtained divorce from, her husband in accordance with Muslim law;

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