Showing posts with label Evidence Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Evidence Act. Show all posts

Monday, 12 February 2024

Important highlights of new IPC new CRPC and new Evidence act as enacted in 2023

 The Indian Parliament passed three significant bills in 2023 to replace the existing criminal laws, namely the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) of 1898, and the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. The new laws are the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha  Sanhita, and the Bharatiya Sakshya  Sanhita, which will replace the old criminal laws. Some of the key highlights and changes introduced by these new laws are as follows:

Bharatiya Nyaya (Second) Sanhita (New IPC)

  • The new law eliminates the sedition law and introduces a new form of sedition as subversive activities.
  • It prescribes penalties for disseminating false information through various means.
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Friday, 15 December 2023

Important Notes on family law (Part 6)

 

1) Notes on Rights of the child born out of void and voidable marriage as per S 16 of Hindu Marriage Act



2) Important provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 regarding adoption of child



3) Supreme Court: Procedure to be followed by family court if husband fails to file Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities even after grant of two chances


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3446 of 2023 

Decided On: 06.11.2023

Aditi Vs. Jitesh Sharma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1220/2023, 2023/INSC/981

https://www.lawweb.in/2023/12/supreme-court-procedure-to-be-followed.html

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Scope of applicability of the Indian Evidence Act to the Family Courts.

 S 14 of Family courts Act:-  Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) is the primary legislation governing the admissibility of evidence in Indian courts. However, in the case of Family Courts, established under the Family Courts Act, 1984 (FCA), the applicability of the IEA is nuanced and varies slightly.

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Saturday, 2 December 2023

Important provisions of Indian evidence Act relating to public documents

74. Public documents.—The following documents are public documents—

(1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts—

(i) of the sovereign authority,

(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and

(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of any part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign country;

(2) public records kept [in any State] of private documents.

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Tuesday, 14 November 2023

What is the distinction between real and demonstrative evidence ?

 Real and demonstrative evidence are two distinct types of evidence used in legal proceedings, each serving a different purpose and having specific characteristics. Here's a distinction between them:

Real Evidence:

  • 1) Definition: Real evidence, also known as physical evidence or tangible evidence, refers to actual objects or physical items that are directly related to the case. It includes items, substances, or tangible materials that can be presented in court.


  • Examples: Real evidence can include weapons, documents, photographs, drugs, clothing, murder weapons, and physical objects involved in the alleged crime, such as a stolen item or a damaged vehicle.

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Monday, 13 April 2020

Question and answer on law Part 7

Question:- Where in Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do you find a provision to admit an object in evidence (note: it is not oral evidence nor a document, but is an object, e.g. a gun used to commit crime).

Answer:- Second proviso to S 60 of Evidence Act.

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Saturday, 16 June 2018

Whether Arbitrator can apply principles of Civil procedure code and Evidence Act to arbitration proceeding?

There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Rules of procedure as contained in Code of Civil Procedure. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, MANU/SC/1330/2009 : (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was stated:

(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice," (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 15036 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16636 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.09.2017

 Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited  Vs. Tuff Drilling Private Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 11 SCC 470
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Monday, 17 July 2017

Whether Whatsapp forward can be treated as document as per Evidence Act?

As noticed above, the petitioners are not privy to any information except an alleged WhatsApp circulated post. They have not stated that they have in any manner tried to even ascertain as to whether any of the allegations contained in the petition are true. Nothing has been pleaded or shown as to how they could have even formed a reasonable belief that the post allegedly circulated on WhatsApp group could have any authenticity.
26. The petition has been filed making very serious allegations on mere hearsay without petitioners being to show that they had any occasion to form any reasonable belief.
27. The petitioners in paragraph 5 of the petition state that "Though the petitioners are none to say that the said suicide note is gospel truth or that the allegations contained therein are so, yet, a vast majority of Indians, including members of the NLC and the petitioners herein believe that the said suicide note carries great amount of credibility........".
28. The petitioners are not able to state as to how they form such a belief. The petitioners have also not shown as to how they are connected or in any manner related to the said allegations made in the petition.
29. Annexure - A does not even qualify as a document in terms of the Evidence Act, 1872, in as much as, neither the original nor the copy of the original has been produced. It is an admitted position that the petitioners have not seen original and have had no occasion to even compare Annexure - A with the original.
Delhi High Court
National Lawyers Campaign For ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 May, 2017
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Sunday, 17 July 2016

Whether privileged communication between husband and wife is admissible in family court proceeding?

Section14 of the Family Court Act, 1984 provides that a family court may receive any evidence, report, statement, documents, information or matter which in its opinion will facilitate the effective adjudication of the disputes before it, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The aforesaid section therefore makes it pellucid that the issues of relevance and admissibility of evidence which regulate a regular trial do not burden proceedings before the family courts. It is the discretion of the family court to receive or not to receive the evidence, report, statement, documents, informations etc. placed before it on the test whether it does or does not facilitate an effective adjudication of the disputes before it. Aside of the aforesaid, I am of the considered view that Section 65B of the Act of 1872 only deals with the secondary evidence qua electronic records. It does not at all deal with the original electronic records, as in the instant case, where the pinhole camera, with a hard disk memory on which the recording was done has been submitted before the Family Court. The Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer [(2014)10 SCC 473] has held that if an electronic record is produced as a primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence without compliance with the conditions of Section 65B of the Act of 1872. That evidence would take the colour of primary evidence, subject no doubt to its credibility based on forensic examination and cross examination. Further, I am of the considered view that the privilege in respect of the husband and the wife's communication under section 122of the Act of 1872 would also not attract, as Section 14 of the Family Court Act eclipses Section 122 of the Evidence Act in proceedings before the Family Court. Section 14 aforesaid is a special law, so to say, as against the general law, which Section 122 of the Act of 1872 encapsulates vis-a-vis privileged communications between husband and wife.
Rajasthan High Court
Preeti Jain vs Kunal Jain &Anr; on 27 May, 2016
AT JAIPUR BENCH
(S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.224/2016)

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Thursday, 14 July 2016

When govt should not deny to victim report of committee inquiring in sexual harassment?

We find it very odd that in a matter of an enquiry in respect of an allegation of sexual harassment, the Union of India should claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. The contents of Reports alleging sexual harassment can hardly relate to affairs of State or anything concerning national security. In
any event, absolutely nothing has been shown to us to warrant withholding the Reports and the documents from the appellant in relation to the enquiry of allegations of sexual harassment made by the appellant against Sunil Uke and Ashok Chaturvedi.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4913 OF 2016

Nisha Priya Bhatia Vs Ajit Seth & Ors.

Madan B. Lokur, J.
Dated:May 6, 2016 
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2319
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Sunday, 5 June 2016

Whether strict rules of evidence Act and CPC are applicable in departmental enquiry?

I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Apex Court and the Karnataka High court. However, the case in hand stands on a completely different footing. It is trite law that strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to domestic enquiries. Such enquiries are to be conducted in accordance with the standing orders applicable and by adhering to the principles of natural justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)
Writ Petition Nos. 9133 and 9140 of 2015
Decided On: 24.02.2016
Appellants: Siddheshwar Urban Co-Op. Bank Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Ganesh and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:R.V. Ghuge, J.
Citation: 2016(2) MHLJ 880
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Wednesday, 20 April 2016

Whether principles of Evidence Act and Civil procedure code are applicable in Arbitration proceeding?

 I am therefore, of the view that even in arbitration proceedings though strict provisions ofEvidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not applicable and though the arbitral tribunal is not bound by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the arbitral tribunal is bound to consider the principles of Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure and has to follow the principles of natural justice.
Bombay High Court
Rashmi Housing Pvt. Ltd vs Pan India Infraprojects Private ... on 17 December, 2014
Bench: R.D. Dhanuka
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 600 OF 2011
Citation; 2015 (7) ALLMR 290
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Tuesday, 24 November 2015

Whether compact disc is a document as per evidence Act?

 In view of the definition of ‘document’ in Evidence Act,
and the law laid down by this Court, as discussed above, we
hold that the compact disc is also a document. It is not
necessary for the court to obtain admission or denial on a
document under sub-section (1) to Section 294 CrPC
personally from the accused or complainant or the witness.
The endorsement of admission or denial made by the counsel
for defence, on the document filed by the prosecution or on the
application/report with which same is filed, is sufficient
compliance of Section 294 CrPC. Similarly on a document
filed by the defence, endorsement of admission or denial by
the public prosecutor is sufficient and defence will have to
prove the document if not admitted by the prosecution. In
case it is admitted, it need not be formally proved, and can be
read in evidence. In a complaint case such an endorsement
can be made by the counsel for the complainant in respect of
document filed by the defence.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1525 OF 2015
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9151 of 2015)
Shamsher Singh Verma 
V
State of Haryana 
Dated;November 24, 2015.
Citation;2015ALLMR(Cri)4923, 2016CriLJ364,2015(4)Crimes353(SC),(2016) 15 SCC 485.
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Tuesday, 4 August 2015

Whether arbitrator is bound to follow practice and principles of CPC and evidence Act?

In my view, the learned arbitrator is bound to follow principles of natural justice and fair play. Though section 19 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides that Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and/or Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the practice and principles of Code of Civil Procedure and evidence are required to be considered by the arbitrator for taking any decision. Learned arbitrator cannot consider disputed documents in evidence without it being proved. Perusal of the record indicates that both parties had not agreed before the Arbitral Tribunal that no oral evidence would be led by both the parties and the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of the documents and other material. On the contrary, the record indicates that the petitioner filed affidavit in lieu of examination in chief and had offered himself for cross examination in support of his deposition on various disputed facts. The petitioner had also asked for permission to cross examine the respondent's witness but was rejected by the arbitrator for the patently illegal and irrelevant reasons. The learned arbitratorkvm ARBP363.11 therefore could not have conducted the matter only on the basis of documents and other material when the petitioner had asked for an opportunity to lead oral evidence and had made himself available for cross examination.
Bombay High Court
Inhabitant vs Kokan Mercantile Cooperative ... on 5 February, 2013
Bench: R.D. Dhanuka
Citation; 2013(2) BOMCR193
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Monday, 27 July 2015

Whether plea of alibi is to be proved strictly?

That apart, the law
clearly stipulates how a plea of alibi is to be established. In
this context, we may profitably reproduce a few passages from
Binay Kumar Singh V. State of Bihar  (1997) 1 SCC 283
“22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an
exception (special or general) envisaged in the
Indian Penal Code or any other law. It is only a rule
of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence
Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact
in issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the
provision is worth reproducing in this context:
“The question is whether A committed a crime
at Calcutta on a certain date; the fact that on
that date, A was at Lahore is relevant.”

23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and
that word is used for convenience when an accused
takes recourse to a defence line that when the
occurrence took place he was so far away from the
place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable
that he would have participated in the crime. It is a
basic law that in a criminal case, in which the
accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury
to another person, the burden is on the prosecution
to prove that the accused was present at the scene
and has participated in the crime. The burden
would not be lessened by the mere fact that the
accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea
of the accused in such cases need be considered
only when the burden has been discharged by the
prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution
succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent
on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to
prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the
possibility of his presence at the place of
occurrence. When the presence of the accused at
the scene of occurrence has been established
satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable
evidence, normally the court would be slow to
believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he
was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But
if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a
quality and of such a standard that the court may
entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his
presence at the scene when the occurrence took
place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to
the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that
purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid
down that, in such circumstances, the burden on
the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore,
that strict proof is required for establishing the plea
of alibi.
[Emphasis supplied]



Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2047 OF 2008
Vutukuru Lakshmaiah 
Versus
State of Andhra Pradesh .
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2052 OF 2008
Citation; 2015(2) crimes 349 SC
Dipak Misra, J.
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Friday, 27 February 2015

When plaintiff has deemed to have waived his right to enforce contract for specific performance?

 In Chotu Mia v. Mt. Sundri, AIR 1945 Pt 260, a Full Bench of the Patna High court held where after the forfeiture of the lease the lessee remits certain amount to the lessor as rent and intends it as payment of rent and the landlord accepts it only as damages for use and occupation, the acceptance of payment by the landlord must be deemed to be as rent and operates as a waiver of the forfeiture."
36. We are of the view that the same principle applies to the case on hand. The second respondent had already stated that he was not intending to execute the draft contract for sale and that the contract was no longer in existence. Assuming that Ex. P. 1 amounted to a concluded contract for sale, the first respondent has accepted the refund amount of Rs. 13,000 knowing full well that the second respondent has cancelled the contract. In the context, therefore, the mere conditional acceptance by the use of the words `without prejudice' to his rights under the contract for sale cannot in any manner derogate from the fact that he had acquiesced in the breach of the contract committed by the second respondent. As was observed in Doe d. Morecraft v. Meux, (1824) 1 Car and P 347, what was of importance was what the first respondent did and not what he said. The first respondent had received the money back and the effect of it cannot be taken away by the words `without prejudice' which he said.
Evidence Act,S115-Waiver-suit for specific performance of contract-vendor(deft)refunding amount received from plaintiff-plaintiff accepting the same though "without prejudice"to his rights-plaintiff acquiesced in breach of contract by vendor -plaintiff waived his right to enforce contract.
Madras High Court
H.G. Krishna Reddy And Co. vs M.M. Thimmaiah And Anr. on 24 January, 1983
Equivalent citations: AIR 1983 Mad 169, (1983) 1 MLJ 467

Bench: K Singh, Padmanabhan
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Friday, 26 December 2014

Landmark judgment of Supreme court of Tahsildar singh v state of Uttar pradesh


 It is not necessary to multiply cases. The two conflicting views may be briefly stated thus : (i) omissions, unless by necessary implication be deemed to be part of the statement, cannot be used to contradict the statement made in the witness-box; and (ii) they must be in regard to important features of the incident which are expected to be included in the statement made before the police. The first proposition not only carries out the intention of the legislature but is also in accord with the plain meaning of the words used in the section. The second proposition not only stretches the meaning of the word "statement" to a breaking point, but also introduces an uncertain element, namely, ascertainment of what a particular witness would have stated in the circumstances of a particular case and what the police officer should have recorded. When the section says that the statement is to be used to contradict the subsequent version in the witness-box, the proposition brings in, by construction, what he would have stated to the police within the meaning of the word "statement". Such a construction is not permissible.
50. From the foregoing discussion the following propositions emerge : (1) A statement in writing made by a witness before a police officer in the course of investigation can be used only to contradict his statement in the witness-box and for no other purpose; (2) statements not reduced to writing by the police officer can not be used for contradiction; (3) though a particular statement is not expressly recorded, a statement that can be deemed to be part of that expressly recorded can be used for contradiction, not because it is an omission strictly so-called but because it is deemed to form part of the recorded statement; (4) such a fiction is permissible by construction only in the following three cases : (i) when a recital is necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement; illustration : in the recorded statement before the police the witness states that he saw A stabbing B at a particular point of time, but in the witness-box he says that he saw A and C stabbing B at the same pint of time; in the statement before the police the word "only" can implied, i.e., the witness saw A only stabbing B; (ii) a negative aspect of a positive recital in a statement; illustration : in the recorded statement before the police the witness says that a dark man stabbed B, but in the witness-box he says that a fair man stabbed B; the earlier statement must be deemed to contain the recital not only that the culprit was a dark complexioned man but also that he was not of fair complexion; and (iii) when the statement before the police and that before the Court cannot stand together; illustration : the witness says in the recorded statement before the police that A after stabbing B ran away by a northern lane, but in the Court he says that immediately after stabbing he ran away towards the southern lane; as he could not have run away immediately after the stabbing, i.e., at the same point of time, towards the northern lane as well as towards the southern lane, if one statement is true, the other must necessarily be false.
51. The aforesaid examples are not intended to be exhaustive but only illustrative. The same instance may fall under one or more heads. It is for the trial Judge to decide in each case, after comparing the part or parts of the statement recorded by the police with that made in the witness-box, to give a ruling, having regard to the aforesaid principles, whether the recital intended to be used for contradiction satisfies the requirements of law.
Citation: AIR1959SC1012, 1959(2)AnWR201, (1959) 29 AWR 522, 1959CriLJ1231, (1959)IIMLJ201, [1959]Supp(2)SCR875
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decided On: 05.05.1959
Appellants:Tahsildar Singh and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Uttar Pradesh
Read Judgment here;click here
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sarkar, B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah and T.K. Thommen, JJ.
Read Judgment here: click here

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Friday, 23 November 2012

Supreme Court: Carbon copy made by one uniform process is primary evidence as per the Evidence Act.

  The learned Sessions Judge felt that it would not be possible to secure her presence without undue delay, and therefore, permitted the prosecution to prove the certificate through PW-2 Dr. Kapila, who was conversant with her hand-writing and signature, he having worked with her for about two years. He stated that the carbon copy of the certificate Ex P-E was prepared by Dr. Vedwa by one process and bears her signature. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that this certificate was inadmissible in evidence since the prosecution has failed to prove that the original certifi- cate was lost and not available. Section 32 of the Evidence Act provides that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person in the discharge of professional duty whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay, the same is relevant and admissible in evidence. Besides, since one carbon copy was made by one uniform process the same was primary evidence within the meaning of explanation 2 to Section 62 of the Evidence Act. Therefore the medical certificate Ex. P-E was clearly admissible in evidence.

Supreme Court of India
Prithi Chand vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 17 January, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 702, 1989 SCR (1) 123
BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
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