Landmark Supreme Court Judgments of the year 2024 On Bail (Part 1)

 1) Supreme Court: Can't Deny Benefit Of First Proviso To S.45 PMLA Merely Because A Woman Is Well-Educated Or An MP/MLA

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

[Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 10778 of 2024]

KALVAKUNTLA KAVITHA Vs  DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 632.

Dated: AUGUST 27, 2024.

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/09/supreme-court-cant-deny-benefit-of.html

2) Supreme Court directs all courts to append a coversheet to judgment informing the convict about availability of free legal aid facilities for pursuing higher remedies while furnishing copy of judgment of conviction/dismissal/reversal of acquittal/dismissal of bail applications

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Should the court send the accused to police custody remand in the same crime after completion of fifteen days if subsequently a serious offence is made out against him?

  A question may then arise whether a person arrested in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him during an occurrence can be detained again in police custody in respect of another offence committed by him in the same case and which fact comes to light after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days of his arrest. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that as a result of the investigation carried on and the evidence collected by the police the arrested accused may be found to be involved in more serious offences than the one for which he was originally arrested and that in such a case there is no reason as to why the accused who is in magisterial custody should not be turned over to police custody at a subsequent stage of investigation when the information discloses his complicity in more serious offences. We are unable to agree. In one occurrence it may so happen that the accused might have committed several offences and the police may arrest him in connection with one or two offences on the basis of the available information and obtain police custody. If during the investigation his complicity in more sessions offences during the same occurrence is disclosed that does not authorise the police to ask for police custody for a further period after the expiry of the first fifteen days. If that is permitted than the police can go on adding some offence or the other of a serious nature at various stages and seek further detention in police custody repeatedly, this would defeat the very object underlying Section 167. However, we must clarify that this limitation shall not apply to a different occurrence in which complicity of the arrested accused in disclosed. That would be a different transaction and if an accused is in judicial custody in connection with one case and to enable the police to complete their investigation of the other case they can require his detention in police custody for the purpose of associating him with the investigation of the other case. In such a situation he must be for formally arrested in connection with other case and then obtain the order of the magistrate for detention in police custody. The learned Additional Solicitor General however strongly relied on some of the observations made by Hardy, J. in Mehar Chand's case extracted above in support of his contention namely that an arrested accused who is in judicial custody can be turned over to police custody even after the expiry of first fifteen days at a subsequent stage of the investigation in the same case if the information discloses his complicity in more serious offences. We are unable to agree that the mere fact that some more offences alleged to have been committed by the arrested accused in the same case are discovered in the same case would by itself render it to be a different case. All these offences including the so-called serious offences discovered at a later stage arise out of the same-transaction in connection with which the accused was arrested. Therefore there is a marked difference between the two situations. The occurrences constituting two different transactions give rise to two different cases and the exercise of power under Sections 167(1) and (2) should be in consonance with the object underlying the said provision in respect of each of those occurrences which constitute two different cases. 

 After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days the further remand during the period of investigation - can only be in judicial custody. There can not be any detention in the police custody after the expiry of first fifteen days even in a case where some more offences either serious or otherwise committed by him in the same transaction come to light at a later stage. But this bar does not apply if the same arrested accused is involved in a different case arising out of a different transaction. Even if he is in judicial custody in connection with the investigation of the earlier - case he can formally be arrested regarding his involvement in the different case and associate him with the investigation of that other case and the Magistrate can act as provided under Section 167(2) and the proviso and can remand him to such custody as mentioned therein during the first period of fifteen days and thereafter in accordance with the proviso as discussed above.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 310-311 of 1992

Decided On: 08.05.1992

Central Bureau of Investigation,  Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni

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Delhi HC: First 15 days of PCR has to be counted from the date of first remand and not from the date of arrest.

The point is really quite simple. Sub-section (1) of S. 167 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 requires that a person arrested must be produced before Magistrate within twenty four hours. Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to authorise, from time to time the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days 'in the whole'. It is plain that those fifteen days begin to run immediately after the accused is produced before the Magistrate in accordance with sub-section (1). Therefore they are, and have to be the 'first' fifteen days after day of arrest.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Criminal Revn. No. 74 of 1982 

Decided On: 16.03.1982

State (Delhi Administration) Vs.  Ravinder Kumar Bhatnagar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.P.S. Chawla, J.

 Citations: 21 (1982) DLT 442, 1982 (3) DRJ 205

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Leading Judgment of Supreme court on arrest of accused

 We, therefore, consider it appropriate to

issue the following requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures:

(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.

(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by atleast one witness, who may be either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be counter signed by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.

(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation center or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.

(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.

(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.

(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.

(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection Memo" must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.

(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union Territory. Director, Health Services should prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.

(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the illaqa Magistrate for his record.

(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.

(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and state headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.

37. Failure to comply with the requirements hereinabove mentioned shall apart from rendering the concerned official liable for departmental action, also render him liable to be punished for contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt of court may be instituted in any High Court of the country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.

38. The requirements, referred to above flow from Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and need to be strictly followed. These would apply with equal force to the other governmental agencies also to which a reference has been made earlier.

39. These requirements are in addition to the constitutional and statutory safeguards and do not detract from various other directions given by the courts from time to time in connection with the safeguarding of the rights and dignity of the arrestee.

40. The requirements mentioned above shall be forwarded to the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary of every State/Union Territory and it shall be their obligation to circulate the same to every police station under their charge and get the same notified at every police station at a conspicuous place. It would also be useful and serve larger interest to broadcast the requirements on the All India Radio besides being shown on the National network of Doordarshan and by publishing and distributing pamphlets in the local language containing these requirements for information of the general public. Creating awareness about the rights of the arrestee would in our opinion be a step in the right direction to combat the evil of custodial crime and bring in transparency and accountability. It is hoped that these requirements would help to curb, if not totally eliminate, the use of questionable methods during interrogation and investigation leading to custodial commission of crimes.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition. (Crl) No. 539 of 1986.

Decided On: 18.12.1996

D.K. Basu Vs.  State of West Bengal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kuldip Singh and Dr. A.S. Anand, JJ.

 Citation: (1997) 1 SCC 416 : AIR 1997 SC 610

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Whether validity of trial and conviction of accused will be affected by any irregularity in his arrest?

The contention of the appellant was that his arrest, having been effected in Jind territory by a British Indian officer, was illegal and that the illegality of his arrest vitiated the whole subsequent proceedings. Their Lordships reject this contention. They assume that the arrest was open to objection as an infringement of the sovereignty of Jind, although the Jind authorities, so far from resenting what had been done or regarding their rights as having been flouted, co-operated most readily with the British Indian police in bringing the appellant to justice. There was no suggestion of anything like kidnapping. In their Lordships' view, the validity of the trial and conviction of the appellant was not affected by any irregularity in his arrest.

BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Decided On: 26.01.1944

Parbhu Vs. Emperor

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Macmillan, Wright, Porter, Clauson and George Rankin, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1944 PC 73

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Whether it is permissible for court to grant blanket order of anticipatory bail?

 We have said that there is one proposition formulated by the High Court with which we are inclined to agree. That is preposition No. (2). We agree that a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. This flows from the very language of the section which, as discussed above, requires the applicant to show that he has "reason to believe" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. That is why, normally, a direction should not issue Under Section 438(1) to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever." That is what is meant by a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail, an order which serves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, in fact any eventuality, likely or unlikely regarding which, no concrete information can possibly be had. The rationale of a direction Under Section 438(1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw up his application with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section.; But specific events; and facts must be disclosed by the applicant in order to enable the court to judge of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the section.

46. Apart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels this construction, there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, on the basis of which a direction Under Section 438(1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to them can be avoided.

47. A blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Such an order can then become a charter of lawlessness and a weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. Therefore, the court which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a. vacuum.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 09.04.1980

 Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab

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NOTES ON EXECUTION OF DECREE PART 2

S 55. Arrest and detention:-

1) A judgment debtor shall be arrested and detained in civil prison:

Provided firstly that for the purpose of making an arrest ,no dwelling house shall be entered after sunset and before sunrise:

Provided secondly no outer door of a dwelling house shall be broken open unless judgment debtor refuses or prevent access to such dwelling house:

Provided thirdly if room is in occupancy of pardanashin lady,she should be permitted to leave the room:

Provided fourthly if decree is for payment of money and judgment debtor pays the amount of decree and costs,he shall be released.

3) When judgment debtor is arrested in execution of money decree and is brought before court,the court shall inform him that he may apply to be declared an insolvent,and he may be discharged if he has not committed any act of bad faith regarding subject of the application and if he complies with the provisions of law of insolvency.

4) Where a judgment debtor expresses his intention to apply to be declared an insolvent and furnishes security to the satisfaction of court,that he will within one month so apply,and that he will appear when called upon by court,the court may release him from arrest and he fails so to apply and to appear, the court may either direct security to be realized or commit him to civil prison in execution of decree.

Read important judgments on execution of decree:
Click here

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Whether accused can be remanded to police custody from judicial custody within fifteen days of his arrest?

 Whenever any person is arrested under Section 57 Cr. PC he should be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours as mentioned therein. Such Magistrate may or may not have jurisdiction to try the case. If Judicial Magistrate is not available, the police officer may transmit the arrested accused to the nearest Executive Magistrate on whom the judicial powers have been conferred. The Judicial Magistrate can in the first instance authorise the detention of the accused in such custody i.e., either police or judicial from time time but the total period of detention cannot exceed fifteen days in the whole. Within this period of fifteen days there can be more than one order changing the nature of such custody either from police to judicial or vice-versa. If the arrested accused is produced before the Executive Magistrate he is empowered to authorise the detention in such custody either police or judicial only for a week, in the same manner namely by one or more orders but after one week he should transmit him to the nearest Judicial Magistrate alongwith the records. When the arrested accused is so transmitted the Judicial Magistrate, for the remaining period, that is to say excluding one week or the number of days of detention ordered by the Executive Magistrate, may authorise further detention within that period of first fifteen days to such custody either police or judicial. After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days the further remand during the period of investigation - can only be in judicial custody.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 310-311 of 1992

Decided On: 08.05.1992

Central Bureau of Investigation,  Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: 

A.M. Ahmadi and K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.

Citation: 1992 CRLJ 2768,AIR 1992 SC 1768

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Whether court should issue warrant of arrest against husband if he is wilfully avoiding payment of maintenance?

At this juncture, this Court relevantly points out that ordinarily a Court of Law before passing an order for arrest and detention of the person concerned must be satisfied that he, despite having sufficient means has with a malafide intention, evades payment.

14.One cannot brush aside an important fact that before a Court of Law issues a notice or warrant of arrest against a concerned person, it must primordially satisfy subjectively as to whether the concerned person is liable to be arrested or not. Prior to the ordering of arrest of a person, the concerned Court/trial Court is having a discretion to issue notice to the aggrieved/affected by providing an opportunity to him requiring him to appear before the Court within the time fixed. In fact, it is not a prudent exercise of judicial discretion for a Court of Law to issue a warrant and notice simultaneously as per decision Puna Mahton V. Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 315.

As far as the present case is concerned, the Learned II Additional Family Court Judge, Chennai in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 after marking the presence of the 1st Respondent/Wife and the Petitioner/Husband had stated that 'Payment is not made. Wife insisted that arrest may be made' and therefore, ordered arrest of the Revision Petitioner by 31.05.2016, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is per se not correct in the eye of Law. Just because the 1st Respondent/Wife had insisted for the arrest of the Revision Petitioner/Husband, the same cannot be ordered by the Learned II Additional Family Court Judge, Chennai in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 either as a matter of routine or as a matter of course. Unfortunately, on 17.03.2016, straight away an order was passed by the trial Court to the effect that 'Payment was not made. Wife insisted that arrest may be made' and obviously only upon the insistence of the 1st Respondent /Wife seeking the arrest of the Petitioner/Husband, the same was complied with by the trial Court in ordering the arrest of the Petitioner by 31.05.2016. 

26.To put it succinctly, there is no indication in the impugned order that the trial Court was satisfied that the Revision Petitioner/ Husband despite having sufficient means had wilfully evaded the payment of arrears of maintenance amount in question. Also that, it is for the 1st Respondent/Wife to prove the means/resources of the Petitioner/Husband and in this regard, after enquiry, a finding has to be recorded by the trial Court. Unfortunately, in the instant case, in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012, when the impugned order was passed on 17.03.2016 ordering the arrest of the Petitioner/ Husband by 31.05.2016, no such exercise was resorted to. As such, on this score alone, the impugned order of the trial Court dated 17.03.2016 in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 bristles with material irregularities and patent illegalities in the eye of Law. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS 

Pronounced on :  29.04.2016

 

Coram

 Mr. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL

Crl.R.C.No.624 of 2016

and

Crl.M.P.No.4357 of 2016

V.B.Kamalanathan

V.

K.Jayasree

Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL537

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Guidelines of Bombay high court in respect of handcuffing of arrested person

The   law   declared   by   this   Court   in Shukla
case [(1980)  3 SCC  526 : 1980 SCC  (Cri)  815 :
(1980) 3 SCR 855] and Batra case [(1978) 4 SCC
494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155 : (1979) 1 SCR 392] is a
mandate   under   Articles   141   and   144   of   the
Constitution of India and all concerned are bound

to obey the same. We are constrained to say that the
guidelines laid down by this Court and the directions
issued repeatedly regarding handcuffing of undertrials
and convicts are not being followed by the police, jail
authorities and even by the subordinate judiciary. We
make it clear that the law laid down by this Court in
the abovesaid two judgments and the directions issued
by us are binding on all concerned and any violation
or  circumvention  shall  attract the  provisions of the
Contempt   of   Courts   Act   apart   from   other   penal
consequences under law. ”
             In the same decision very clear directions have been issued
by the Apex Court in paragraphs 16 onwards which read thus:
“16. We declare, direct and lay down as a rule that
handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced
on a prisoner — convicted or undertrial —
while lodged in a jail anywhere in the country
or while transporting or in transit from one
jail to another or from jail to court and back.
The police and the jail authorities, on their
own,   shall   have   no   authority   to   direct   the
handcuffing   of   any   inmate   of   a   jail   in   the
country or during transport from one jail to
another or from jail to court and back.
17. Where the police or the jail authorities have
well­grounded   basis   for   drawing   a   strong
inference that a particular prisoner is likely to
jump jail or break out of the custody then the
said   prisoner   be   produced   before   the
Magistrate   concerned   and   a   prayer   for
permission to handcuff the prisoner be made
before the said Magistrate. Save in rare cases
of   concrete   proof   regarding   proneness   of   the
prisoner to violence, his tendency to escape, he
being so dangerous/desperate  and the  finding
that no other practical way of forbidding escape
is   available,   the   Magistrate   may   grant
permission to handcuff the prisoner.

18. In all the cases where a person arrested by
police, is produced before the Magistrate and
remand — judicial or non­judicial — is given
by the Magistrate the person concerned shall
not   be  handcuffed   unless   special   orders  in
that respect are obtained from the Magistrate
at   the   time   of   the   grant   of   the   remand.
19. When the police arrests a person in execution of
a warrant of arrest obtained from a Magistrate,
the person so arrested shall not be handcuffed
unless the police has also obtained orders from
the Magistrate for the handcuffing of the person
to be so arrested.
20. Where a person is arrested by the police without
warrant the police officer concerned may if he is
satisfied, on the basis of the guidelines given by
us in para above, that it is necessary to handcuff
such a person, he may do so till the time he is
taken   to   the   police   station   and   thereafter   his
production before the Magistrate. Further use of
fetters thereafter can only be under the orders of
the Magistrate as already indicated by us.
21. We   direct   all   ranks   of   police   and   the   prison
authorities   to   meticulously   obey   the   abovementioned
directions.”
                                         (emphasis added)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1545 OF 2016
Mr. Satish Banwarilal Sharma.
Vs
Union Territory of Diu, Daman and 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli and Others.

­­
CORAM  :  A.S. OKA & A.A. SAYED, JJ 
Dated: 22ND DECEMBER 2016

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Whether police can arrest accused When Magistrate has ordered enquiry under S 202 of CRPC?

In the light of above discussion, we are unable to find
any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High
Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted
in the present case and the police may not be justified in
exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report
under Section 202.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007
RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED
V
STATE OF GUJARAT
Citation;AIR 2015 SC 1742
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

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Whether police can arrest accused when magistrate has directed inquiry under S 202 of CRPC?

In the light of above discussion, we are unable to find
any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High
Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted
in the present case and the police may not be justified in
exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report
under Section 202.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007

RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED  Vs  STATE OF GUJARAT

Dated;MARCH 16, 2015

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Whether court can rely on the recovery of an article by police at the instance of accused even if he was not in arrest?

It is a well settled position in law that for the purpose of arrest of the accused though, normally, arrest panchanama is made at the subsequent time, the moment the accused is in control and custody of the police, he is deemed to be arrested. Section 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under:-

"46. Arrest how made.- (1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action:

[Provided that where a woman is to be

arrested, unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless the police officer is a female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.]

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.

(3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment for life.

[(4) Save in exceptional circumstances, no woman shall be arrested after sunset and before sunrise, and where such exceptional circumstances exist, the woman police officer shall, by making a written report, obtain the prior permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed or the arrest is to be made.]

Keeping in view the aforesaid provision and taking into consideration the statements of the panch witness, it can be seen that the accused were in the custody of the police from 5.30 A.M. in the morning of 3/11/2011 and, therefore, though, formally, the arrest panchanama was made at 11.30 A.M., they were in the custody of the police since morning and the Investigating Officer has given an explanation by stating that the recovery was made at the instance of the accused earliest in order to ensure that the said articles are not removed by any one. The said explanation is a plausible explanation and the Investigating Officer clearly disclosed his presence of mind in immediately taking the accused to the

place where they had hidden the articles belonging to the deceased. The said submission, therefor, is without any merit and cannot be accepted.

Bombay High Court

The State Of Maharashtra vs Purushottam Dashrath Borate  on 25 September, 2012

Bench: V.M. Kanade, P. D. Kode

Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2012 and Criminal Appeal No. 632 of 2012

Read full judgment here: Click here

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