Supreme Court : Impleading distant relatives and strangers in domestic violence proceeding is impermissible

 In the petition filed by Respondent No. 2, apart from arraying her husband and her parents-in-law as parties to the proceedings, has included all and sundry, as Respondents. To say the least, she has even alleged certain actions said to have been done by the tenant whose name is not even known to her. {Para 3}

4. In a matter of this nature, we are of the opinion that the High Court at least should have directed that the petition filed by Respondent No. 2 be confined to her husband as also her parents-in-law and should not have allowed the impleadment of Respondent Nos. 4 to 12.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2013 (SLP (Crl.) No. 8522 of 2010)

Decided On: 07.01.2013

Ashish Dixit and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.L. Dattu and C.K. Prasad, JJ.

Citation: (2013) AIR SC 1077,MANU/SC/0156/2013.

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Supreme Court Lays Down Principles : When Can Stranger To Suit Seek Leave To Appeal Against Decree?

43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be summarised as under:

i. Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively;

ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal;

iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person;

iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court;

v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned;

vi. The expression "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury;

vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and

viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1180-1181 of 2025.

Decided On: 29.01.2025

H. Anjanappa and Ors. Vs. A. Prabhakar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0118/2025.

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Can a claim against persons who hold title to the suit property but are strangers to the partition suit be decided in the same suit?

Take for instance a suit filed for partition by a member of the Hindu Undivided Family. If one of the coparceners or an alienee from such coparcener, claims independent title to one of the properties bought in his individual name, it may be open to the Court while trying the suit for partition to decide whether such a property belongs exclusively to the defendant. To this limited extent, examining the title of a party to the suit schedule property is permissible even in a suit for partition. 

{Para 114}

115. But in a simple suit for partition, the parties cannot assert title against strangers, even by impleading them as proforma respondents. The strangers who are impleaded in a partition suit, may have nothing to say about the claim to partition. But they may have a claim to title to the property and such a claim cannot be decided in a partition suit.

 120. Therefore, we are of the view that the preliminary decree dated 28.06.1963 could not have determined the claim to title made by the legal heirs seeking partition, as against third parties. Any finding rendered in the preliminary decree, that the properties were Mathruka properties liable to be partitioned, was only incidental to the claim of the legal heirs and such a finding will not be determinative of their title to property as against third parties.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.)

Civil Appeal Nos. of 2023

Trinity Infraventures Ltd. and Others Vs M.S. Murthy and Others.

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Can a defendant who is a stranger to the sale deed challenge it?

  In Lal Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Hussain Khan (1905) 32 IA 113, the Privy Council laid down the principle that a stranger to a sale deed cannot dispute payment of consideration or its adequacy. This decision has since been considered by various High Courts and a distinction has been drawn between a deed which was intended to be real or operative between the parties and a deed which is fictitious in character and was never designed as a genuine document to effect transfer of title. In such a situation, it would be open even to a stranger to impeach the deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds. This was also laid down in Kamini Kumar Deb v. Durga Charan Nag and Ors. AIR (1923) Cal. 521 and again in Saradindu Mukherjee v. S.M. Kunja Katnini Roy and Ors. MANU/WB/0159/1942 : AIR1942Cal514 . The Patna High Court in Jugal Kishore Tiwari and Anr. v. Umesh Chandra Tiwari and Ors. MANU/BH/0116/1973 : AIR1973Pat352 and the Orissa High Court in Sanatan Mohapatra and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Kazim Mohammad and Ors. MANU/OR/0061/1977 : AIR1977Ori194 have also taken the same view. {Para 19}

20. The above decisions appear to be based on the principle that a person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which title to the property was intended to be conveyed to plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole question would depend upon the pleadings of the parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit and other attending circumstances. For example, in a landlord-tenant matter where the landlord is possessed of many properties and cannot possibly seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide need from one of the properties, the landlord may ostensibly transfer that property to a person who is not possessed of any other property so that that person, namely, the transferee, may institute eviction proceedings on the ground of his genuine need and thus evict the tenant who could not have been otherwise evicted. In this situation, the deed by which the property was intended to be transferred, would be a collusive deed representing a sham transaction which was never intended to be acted upon. It would be open to the tenant in his capacity as defendant to assert, plead and prove that the deed was fictitious and collusive in nature. We, therefore, cannot subscribe to the view expressed by the Privy Council in the case of Lal Achal Ram (supra) in the broad terms in which it is expressed but do approve the law laid down by the Calcutta, Patna and Orissa High Courts as pointed out above.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1534 of 1999

Decided On: 17.03.1999

Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.

Author: Saiyed Saghir Ahmad, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0172/1999

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Whether stranger to a deed can impeach the deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds?

  Learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 contended that since the plaintiff had filed the suit on the basis of sale deed, executed by defendant No. 2 in his favour and had sought possession over that property from defendant No. 1, it was open to the latter to show that plaintiff had no title to the property in suit and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. It was contended that in his capacity as a defendant in the suit, it was open to defendant No. 1 to raise all the pleas on the basis of which the suit could be defeated. {Para 18}

19. In Lal Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Hussain Khan (1905) 32 IA 113, the Privy Council laid down the principle that a stranger to a sale deed cannot dispute payment of consideration or its adequacy. This decision has since been considered by various High Courts and a distinction has been drawn between a deed which was intended to be real or operative between the parties and a deed which is fictitious in character and was never designed as a genuine document to effect transfer of title. In such a situation, it would be open even to a stranger to impeach the deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds. This was also laid down in Kamini Kumar Deb v. Durga Charan Nag and Ors. AIR (1923) Cal. 521 and again in Saradindu Mukherjee v. S.M. Kunja Katnini Roy and Ors. MANU/WB/0159/1942 : AIR1942Cal514 . The Patna High Court in Jugal Kishore Tiwari and Anr. v. Umesh Chandra Tiwari and Ors. MANU/BH/0116/1973 : AIR1973Pat352 and the Orissa High Court in Sanatan Mohapatra and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Kazim Mohammad and Ors. MANU/OR/0061/1977 : AIR1977Ori194 have also taken the same view.

20. The above decisions appear to be based on the principle that a person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which title to the property was intended to be conveyed to plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole question would depend upon the pleadings of the parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit and other attending circumstances. For example, in a landlord-tenant matter where the landlord is possessed of many properties and cannot possibly seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide need from one of the properties, the landlord may ostensibly transfer that property to a person who is not possessed of any other property so that that person, namely, the transferee, may institute eviction proceedings on the ground of his genuine need and thus evict the tenant who could not have been otherwise evicted. In this situation, the deed by which the property was intended to be transferred, would be a collusive deed representing a sham transaction which was never intended to be acted upon. It would be open to the tenant in his capacity as defendant to assert, plead and prove that the deed was fictitious and collusive in nature. We, therefore, cannot subscribe to the view expressed by the Privy Council in the case of Lal Achal Ram (supra) in the broad terms in which it is expressed but do approve the law laid down by the Calcutta, Patna and Orissa High Courts as pointed out above.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1534 of 1999

Decided On: 17.03.1999

Vidhyadhar  Vs.  Manikrao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.

Author: Saiyed Saghir Ahmad, J.

Citation: AIR 1999 SC 1441,MANU/SC/0172/1999

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Whether strangers to the criminal case can interfere in its investigation?

 Locus standi of a person to prefer a complaint with

regard to the commission of an offence under the Act cannot be

equated with the right to challenge an order issued by the

government directing to conduct further investigation of a case.

It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner is a person who

is relentlessly fighting against corruption and the nefarious

activities of government servants. Even if the petitioner is a

crusader against corruption, it does not confer him any special

right to interfere with the investigation of a case. In Sanjai

Tiwari (supra), the third party had claimed that he was a social

activist and an Advocate. But, the Apex Court did not approve

his locus standi to expedite the trial of the corruption case which

was pending in the competent court.

19. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith and

prevent law from crafty invasions. Easy access to justice should

not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous

petitions (See M/s Holicow Pictures Private Limited v. Prem

Chandra Misra : AIR 2008 SC 913).

20. The petitioner is a total stranger to the case against

the second respondent which is pending in the Special Court. He

is not the informant or the complainant in that case. He is not a

witness in that case. He is not a direct victim of the offence

allegedly committed by the second respondent. He is not a

person in any manner affected by Ext.P1 order. Following the

decisions in Janata Dal (supra) and Sanjay Tiwari (supra), the

conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner has no locus standi to

challenge Ext.P1 order issued by the Government directing to

conduct further investigation of the case against the second

respondent.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 7692 OF 2021

BOBBY KURUVILA Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

Dated this the 15th day of September, 2021

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Whether a Stranger to compromise decree can file separate suit to challenge compromise decree?

Q.1. Whether the learned District Judge was justified in granting leave to appeal to the respondents, who are admittedly not party to the compromise decree:

17. Mr. Walvekar submitted that perusal of the order dated 17.7.2013 granting leave to appeal shows that the learned District Judge did not consider the reply filed by the petitioners opposing stay application as also condonation of delay application. Even the impugned order does not show that after hearing the petitioners, the impugned order is passed. In other words, the impugned order is passed in gross violations of principles of natural justice. Mr. Rajure was not in a position to controvert this submission. I, therefore, find merit in this submission.

18. Mr. Walvekar relied upon the decision of this Court in Khalil Haji (supra). In that case, the learned Single Judge of this Court considered the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A as also Order XLIII Rule 1-A. The learned Single Judge also referred to the decisions of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Sooraj Kumari v. District Judge, Mirzapur, AIR 1991 Allahabad 75 and Karnataka High Court in Siddalingeshwar v. Virupaxgouda, AIR 2003 Karnataka 407. After considering the judgments, in paragraph-17 it was observed thus:

“17. Order 23 of CPC deals with adjustment/compromise of a suit. An appeal is a continuation of the suit. Section 107(2) CPC provides that subject to sub-section 1, the appellate Court shall have same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Therefore, the provisions of Order 23 apply in full force to appeal proceedings. By amendment of CPC, Rule 3A has been inserted in Order 23 to bar a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based is not lawful. Therefore, if a party to a suit who enters into a compromise in terms of which a consent decree is made, wants to challenge it on the ground that it is not lawful, the remedy available to him, is either to file an application in the very suit to recall the consent decree on the ground that compromise is not lawful, or is vitiated by fraud, or to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1A CPC, contending that the compromise was not lawful and that it ought not to have been recorded. A compromise decree is based on the agreement arrived at between the parties, which gets a seal of approval from the Court. A stranger to the suit is obviously a stranger to the agreement of compromise. He cannot file an application either in the suit or in the appeal proceedings to challenge a compromise decree as he is not a party to the suit. Therefore, the bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 cannot be extended to him. The provision must confine only to the parties to the suit, who are parties to the agreement to compromise. Hence, I am in respectful agreement with the decisions of the Allahabad High Court and Karnataka High Court, holding that a stranger to a compromise decree cannot file an application in a suit or an appeal to challenge a compromise, as not being lawful, but must file a separate suit for the purpose. The application filed by the applicants, therefore, is required to be dismissed as not maintainable. Since the application is not at all maintainable, there is no need to enter into discussion on the rival contentions as regards the merits of the application. The Civil Application is dismissed.”

19. The learned Single Judge of this Court has held that if a party to a suit who enters into a compromise in terms of which a consent decree is made, wants to challenge it on the ground that it is not lawful, the remedy available to him, is either to file an application in the very suit to recall the consent decree on the ground that compromise is not lawful, or is vitiated by fraud, or to file an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1A CPC. A stranger to the suit is obviously a stranger to the agreement of compromise. He cannot file an application either in the suit or in the appeal proceedings to challenge a compromise decree as he is not a party to the suit. Therefore, the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of C.P.C. cannot be extended to him.

20. In the light of the above discussion, it has to be held that the learned District Judge was not justified in granting leave to appeal to the respondents who are admittedly not party in R.C.S. No. 110/2013. Question No. 1 is answered accordingly.

 In the High Court of Bombay

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

(Before R.G. Ketkar, J.)

Smt. Anubai Bhiva Turuke And Ors Vs Bhagwan Shiva Turuke And Anr. 

Writ Petition No. 10390 of 2013

Decided on March 2, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 3564

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Whether the gift of a immovable property to a stranger to the exclusion of the other heirs of Class-I can be regarded as a transfer ?

There is no ambiguity that the gift is a transfer without consideration. The legislature never conceptualised the gift for consideration or adequate consideration but it is a gratuitous transfer out of love and affection and sometimes for the spiritual benefit of the donor. It is incongruous to say that the gift is not a transfer. It has all the incident of transfer and the right, title and interest of the donor passes to the donee upon execution, registration and acceptances thereof.

 The element of “transfer” divest the executant of the deed of all his right which came to be vested upon the recipient thereof may be by way of a gift which does not contain the consideration. Such right of the recipient cannot be taken without the payment of the consideration and precisely for such reason sub-Section(2) has been incorporated. The vested right can only be divested by well recognised mode of transfer. The hypothetical example can be made in this regard when ‘A’ gifted his immovable property to ‘B’ out of love and affection. B in turn wanted to sale the said property to any stranger as such deed of gift is not conditional one. He is entitled to receive the consideration although he acquired the right, title and interest by way of a gift which admittedly does not contain consideration.

In the light of the above, Section 2 should be interpreted when the court deprives a stranger to the property acquiring an interest by way of a gift and such right is being vested upon the heir specified in Class-I of the Schedule. It is anomalous when a co-sharer who gifted the property and the donee who received the property shall not be entitled to any consideration if the property by the operation of the law is directed to be given to the co-sharer or the heir is specified in Class-I of the Schedule. The proper meaning which can be assigned to sub- Section(2) of Section 22 is the moment the Court finds that an heir is entitled to a preferential right under sub-Section(1), in absence of any agreement, the consideration so determined shall pass to the stranger purchaser. Any other interpretation would render the provision otiose and redundant. The word ‘transfer’ has to be given a pragmatic meaning and not in conjunction with the consideration appearing in sub- Section(2) of Section 22 of the Act. If any restrictive meaning of the word transfer is given, it would be a premium to the heir divesting his right by way of a gift to wriggle out of mischief of the provision contained in sub-Section(1) of Section 22 of the Act.

We, thus, held that even a gift being the transfer comes within the ambit of Section 22 of the Act and the heir coming within Class-I of the Schedule is entitled to preferential right.

So far as the concluded transfer is concerned, we do not find any restriction having put under Section 22 to have its restricted applicability in case of proposed transfer if the transfer has been affected without his knowledge, still the heir can maintain the proceeding invoking the preferential right enshrined under Section 22 of the Act. We thus modifying the decree of the Trial Court to the extent that plaintiff has a preferential right in respect of Ka(1) Schedule Property.

 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

HARISH TANDON & KAUSIK CHANDA, JJ.

C.A.N 11623 OF 2017 IN F.A.T 661 OF 2017 

 Judgment On: 08.04.2021

Pabitra Kumar Maity Vs. Smt. Shyamali Manna & Ors

Harish Tandon, J.:

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Supreme Court: Stranger to suit can not file appeal unless he is aggrieved person

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an

appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid

provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an

appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category

of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects 

person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of

the Appellate Court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Smt. Jatan

Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd.1:-

“It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer

an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should

be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment.”

19. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a

psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily

be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized (vide

Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York5 and State of

Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.6).

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2701-2704 OF 2020

SRI V.N.KRISHNA MURTHY  Vs  SRI RAVIKUMAR 

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Dated:21ST AUGUST, 2020

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Whether the court can permit a stranger to the transaction to give a bank guarantee?

It is clear that the object of directing the petitioner to furnish the bank guarantee vide order dated 25.11.2019 was to secure the payment which the respondent was directed to deposit in the escrow account. The bank guarantee now furnished by the petitioner with the assistance of Arcelor Mittal, in my opinion, satisfies the said purpose and secures the respondent for its dues. Mere technical arguments are being raised to try and wriggle out of the directions passed by the court on 25.11.2019 by the respondent.

17. The second argument strongly urged was that the respondent does not wish to deal with a stranger Arcelor Mittal. It was strongly claimed that at the time of encashment of the bank guarantee if such a situation arises, the said Arcelor Mittal may turn around and start proceedings against the respondent. It is pleaded that the respondent is not interested in the Arcelor Mittal and this court cannot force the respondent to deal with the said company.

18. The plea is misplaced. A bank guarantee is a contract between the bankers and the beneficiaries. The respondent for the purpose of the bank guarantee has to deal with the guarantor, namely, the bankers and not the party at the instance the bank guarantee has been given.

19. In my opinion, there is no merit in the plea raised by the respondent. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

OMP (I) (COMM.) 218/2019

Decided On: 03.06.2020

 Bhubaneshwar Expressways Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  National Highways Authority of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jayant Nath, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1145/2020

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Whether executing court can decide the issue that decree was obtained by fraud in obstructionist notice at the instance of third party?

 On plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, as amended after 1976, it is not open to contend, that the question relating to decree obtained by fraud cannot be gone Into by the Executing Court at the instance of the third party who is neither a judgment debtor nor claiming through the judgment debtor. Rule 101, as it presently stands, clearly bars a separate suit; and. Instead, postulates that all questions arising between the parties shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application filed under Rule 97 or Rule 99. There is no dispute that the present proceedings are arising out of the obstructionist notice taken out by the petitioner under Rule 97 to remove obstruction. Therefore, in such proceedings the issue regarding the decree having been obtained by fraud can surely be adjudicated by the Executing Court at the instance of a stranger to the decree.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3838 of 1989

Decided On: 05.03.2001

 Ahmed Abdul Aziz Bengali  Vs.  Mohammed Hanif M. Mulla and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2001 ( 3 ) ALLMR 720

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Whether stranger to agreement can challenge that agreement?

 The learned senior counsel for appellant has vehemently argued that agreement on behalf of Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) and execution of sale deed thereof by Kumari Mohani without getting permission of Guardian Judge are illegal and cannot be acted upon.

26. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has argued that only Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) could challenge said agreement and sale deed. Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi did not challenge same and did not claim before any authority that agreement and sale deed is not binding upon her. The agreement and sale deed were executed in the year 1983. Now, 35 years have elapsed. Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) has become major and she has not challenged agreement and sale deed against defendant Nos. 9 and 10. Therefore, third party cannot challenge same.

27. I am of the view that it was for Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) to challenge agreement and sale deed. Plaintiff being stranger to agreement cannot challenge that agreement and sale deed on behalf of Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) on the ground that it was executed without completing legal formalities.

28. In this case, Jyoti Nirmal Singh Bedi (minor) is not party. She is one of the co-owners of suit land. Therefore, decree could not be passed against her. Defendant Nos. 9 and 10 are stated to be in possession of suit land. In such circumstances, only right of plaintiff is for refund of earnest money alongwith interest. Since, agreement of defendant Nos. 9 and 10 is not ante-dated, therefore, it will take precedent over the agreement set up by plaintiff.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

RSA No. 4261 of 1999 (O/M)

Decided On: 19.11.2018

Tript Rajinder Singh Bajwa  Vs. Chander Bhushan Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kuldip Singh, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 P & H 24

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Whether court can permit third party to be added as party in the suit?

Much water has been flown under the bridge after the decision is rendered. After this judgment, in 1977, amendment was brought to the Code of Civil Procedure and added a provision Order 1, Rule 8-A which reads as under :

"8-A. Power of Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in the proceedings.---While trying a suit, the Court may, if satisfied that a person or body of persons is interested in any question of law which is directly and substantially in issue in the suit and that it is necessary in the public interest to allow that person or body of persons to present his or its opinion on that question of law, permit that person or body of persons to present such opinion and to take such part in the proceedings of the suit as the Court may specify."

5. By the above amendment, the Parliament has widened the scope of locus in tune with changing times. Courts were also relaxing the rigid rule of locus in the interest of justice.

6. Impleadment of a third party in a suit is an attribute of principle of natural justice. 

 Without much difficulty one can see that concept of locus standi and principle of natural justice are closely intertwined that one cannot be separated from another as the opportunity of being heard is the main attribute of locus standi. When a third party approaches Court with contention that he is interested in the subject matter of the suit or in the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant, the Court shall ordinarily give an opportunity to such a party to put his case. It may be remembered that a third party is coming to the Court on his own risk, whereas a party sought to be impleaded at the instance of the defendant is dragged on to the litigation without his will. These two incidents are therefore entirely different and require different treatment at the hands of the Court. Therefore, observation made by the Single Judge that for all impleadment the plaintiff is dominus litus cannot be applied in all cases. Of course, it can be applied where the defendant insisted in the written statement or in his reply that the particular person is necessary party and the plaintiff can resist the impleadment because he is dominus litus and he can decide who is to be the necessary party. In such an event, he is taking the risk of suit being thrown out in the absence of the necessary party. But in the case of impleadment of third party who approaches the Court and says that he is vitally interested in the dispute that is going on between the plaintiff and defendant, and therefore, he may be given an opportunity of being heard, naturally consistent with the principle of natural justice and fair play, the Court will not refuse his impleadment, unless the Court feels that he is totally a stranger and unless the Court feels that it is employing a delaying tactics.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 1306 of 1999

Decided On: 09.08.2000

 Gulab Babusaheb Bargiri Vs.  Executive Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.K. Chandra Shekhara Das, J.

Citation: 2001(1) MHLJ 63

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Whether strangers can be granted tenancy rights considering them to be family members of tenant?

 It is very pertinent to note that in spite of the catena of judgments interpreting and construing the words "member of a family of the tenant and a family", the legislature has not budged from its position and has not moved to amend Section 5(11)(c) of the Act to reflect the precis of the judicial pronouncements In the Act in any manner. The Section 5(11)(c) has remained as it is though the Act has undergone surgery by way of amendments on a number of occasions at the hands of the Legislature to meet off-arising problematic situations. It is far more pertinent to note that even in the present Maharashtra Rents Act which has replaced the earlier Bombay Rents Act the Legislature has not taken cognizance of the interpretation of the words in Section 5(11)(c) and the Legislature has not enlarged the words "family and the member of a family". It would have been very easy for the Legislature to have removed all the doubts and difficulties which have created innumerable disputes giving rise to innumerable judgments by replacing the words "any member of the tenant's family" by "any person..... residing with the tenant at the time of his death." The Legislature has not enlarged the term used in the original Sub-section 5(11)(c) i.e. "any member of the tenant's family". The Legislature could have deleted the aforesaid words and could have put only one word "person" in place of "member of the tenant's family" to resolve all the so called construction and interpretation difficulties. The intention of the Legislature therefore is absolutely clear to retain the present construction in the Sub-section 5(11)(c) in the form in existence i.e. "any member of the tenant's family". It did not and it does not intend to give a wider meaning to the concept of family to include even a stranger as a member of the family. The Legislature did not and does not intend to depart from the ordinary meaning of the word "family" as understood in common parlance. We understand a family as consisting of father, mother, sons, daughters, sisters and all such blood relations and other relations arising from lawful marriages in the family. We don't include in the concept of family any one who is not related by blood and that is the whole purpose and intention of the Legislature not to remove the word "family" from the said provision. If it wanted to enlarge the meaning of the family it would have expressly said so. The Legislature wants to protect only the members of the family, who are bound by the blood relations and never any stranger however near he or she might be and however thick the love and affection bonds might exists. In my opinion the Legislature has not given any importance to such emotional and sentimental ideas In the Rent Control Act, which regulates relationship between the landlord and the tenant. It is enacted to protect the tenants and their families and not to create any rights in favour of strangers who have no blood relations with the tenant or his family. The Legislature never intended to wide open the umbrella of the Rent Act to give protection to every one who would claim to be a member of the tenant's family on one or the other ground of love and affection or close friendship or father like and son-like or such relationship. A tenant cannot be heard to say that the person residing with him is like his father or like his son or like his daughter or brother. There is no place for the words "like" or "as". The Act protects only those who were really blood relations of the tenant. The Legislature has not allowed any provision in respect of the relationship. The present protection is to the tenant and his family members with whom he has blood relations. The Legislature has been reasonable and moderate to grant protection to the tenant and extend the protection to the members of the family in the ordinary parlance as commonly understood in the society. The Legislature is fully conscious of the fact that it cannot fly at tangent to give protection to all such occupants of the tenanted premises at the cost of the landlord and the valuable property rights of the owners of the premises. The landlord rents out his premises to a tenant on certain terms and conditions which the tenant must observe and if such terms and conditions are observed by the tenant the landlord cannot evict him at his sweet will and in contravention of the provisions of the Rent Act. The Act protects the tenants at the same time controls the property rights of the landlords by imposing reasonable restrictions on them within the four corners of the Act. The rights of the landlords are not given a complete go by and are not extinguished altogether. If the Legislature intended that a tenant and all those who claim through him should be granted protection from eviction at any cost that would result in total extinguishment of the rights of the landlords and that would mean that the landlord has to write-off his property forever, as the tenants and all such strangers who would claim to be the members of their families talking love and affection would have grabbed the property forever and the same would be bequeathed for such love and affection at the cost of the landlord.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

F.A. No. 490 of 1996

Decided On: 04.03.2002

 Jaysen Jayant Rele Vs.  Shantaram Ganpat Gujar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges: 

R.J. Kochar, J.

Citation: (2002) 6 Bom Rent cases 415

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Whether stranger can move court for cancellation of bail?

 In totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the considered
opinion as under :
(i)The Investigating Officer is to take decision seeking
cancellation of bail and the grounds thereof on the basis of
material collected during investigation.
(ii)Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. does not envisage any right
upon any stranger to approach the Court for cancellation of
bail, a right which has been conferred only on the Investigating
Officer or under exceptional circumstances to the complainant.
(iii)Application of a stranger cannot be entertained by the Court
without any substantial set of facts and circumstances or
without sound principle of law to call upon the accused for
cancellation of bail who has been protected under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India except the authority empowered under
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: August 11th, 2016
 CRL.M.C. 1094/2016
PRASHANT KUMAR UMRAO 
v
STATE & ANR 
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

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Whether execution application filed by stranger is maintainable?

Learned counsel submits that after the above first mentioned three decisions were rendered Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C was amended in 1976 and now it provides that the court shall pass a compromise decree only so far as it relates to the parties to the suit. The argument is that a compromise decree cannot confer a right on a stranger to the compromise. The term 'so far as it relates to the parties' was considered by the Supreme Court in Hussainbhai Allarakhbhai Dariaya Vs. State of Gujarat and Others(2010) 8 SCC 759). The apex court has said, "Further under Order 23 Rule 3 a decree can be made in terms of the compromise only in so far as it relates to the parties to the suit. Where either the appellant-plaintiff or the respondent- defendants were not parties, it cannot be said that there was a compromise between the parties to the suit or appeal". What can be understood from the decision is that the rule only mandates that only the parties to the suit can be made parties to the compromise. In other words, a stranger cannot be made a party to it. The rule cannot be read to mean that the decree cannot confer a right on a stranger to the decree. I hold that if there is an enforceable decree in favour of a stranger to a decree, he comes under the definition of decree holder and he can execute it. The  executing court was right in holding that the E.P filed by the 1st respondent is maintainable though he is not a party to the decree.

Kerala High Court

K.Sajan @ Sujan Aged 50 Years vs K.V.Karunakaran on 16 December, 2014

         MR. JUSTICE K.ABRAHAM MATHEW

   14TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2015

   OP(C).No. 482 of 2015 (O)
                

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Whether review petition by stranger to compromise decree is tenable?

In   that   view   of   the   matter,   this
Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   review
application deserves no consideration.   This
Court is bound by the ratio laid down in two
judgments delivered at Principal Seat, cited
across   the   bar   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondents in the case of
Khalil Haji Bholumiya Salar (cited supra) and
also in the case of Ramkrishna Shridhar & Ors
(cited supra) wherein the view is taken that
stranger   to   the   suit   is   a   stranger   to   the
agreement of compromise and he cannot file an
application   either   in   the   suit   or   in   the
appeal proceedings to challenge a compromise
decree as he is not a party to the suit, bar
under  Rule   3A  of   Order   23  of  CPC   cannot   be
extended to him, said provision must confine
only   to   the   parties   to   the   suit   who   are
parties to the compromise agreement, stranger
to   a   compromise   decree   cannot   file   an

application   in   a   suit   or   an   appeal   to
challenge   a   compromise   as   not   being   lawful,
but   must   file   a   separate   suit   for   the
purpose.   
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5416 OF 2012
IN 
SECOND APPEAL NO. 356 OF 2001
WITH 
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5417 OF 2012 
Gaurishankar s/o.Rukhmeshchandra Mishra,  

V
 Asaram s/o. Shankar Jagdale,  

      CORAM:  S.S.SHINDE, J.  
      
Dated : 30.08.2016 
Citation:2016 (6) ALLMR 378,2017(1) MHLJ 122

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Whether fraudulent character of decree can be assailed in execution proceeding?

This Court has in 2001 (3) AMR 720 : (2001 AIHC 3500) taken the view that fraudulent character of decree can be assailed even in execution by persons like present respondents, paragraph 6 of this ruling reads as under.

"6. On plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, as amended after 1976, it is not open to contend that the question relating to decree obtained by fraud cannot be gone into by the executing Court at the instance of the third party who is neither judgment debtor nor claiming through the judgment-debtor. Rule 101, as it presently stands clearly bars a separate suit and instead postulates that all questions arising between the parties shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application filed under Rule 97 or Rule 99. There is no dispute that the present proceedings are arising out of the obstructionist notice taken out by the petitioner under Rule 97 to remove obstruction. Therefore, in such proceedings the issue regarding the decree having been obtained by fraud can surely be adjudicated by the executing Court at the instance of a stranger to the decree. Reliance placed on the decision of this Court in Bank of India's case (supra) would be of no avail in as much as the observations made therein are in context of the issue that was considered by that Court. Moreover the decision of the Apex Court in Hiralal Patni's Case (supra) deals with the pre-amendment situation, which his inapplicable to our case. On the other hand, the respondents have rightly relied on the decision of the Apex Court inBrahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal. In the said decision the Apex Court has held that it cannot be said that the only remedy available to the stranger to the decree for possession who has resisted its execution, to have his claim agitated is the one Under Rule 99 of order XXI after he has lost possession to the decree-holder and that he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The Apex Court after considering the scheme of order XXI has observed that the provisions of Order XXI lay down a complete Code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. In para 5 of this decision the apex Court has observed that the amended provision of Order 21 clearly guards against the pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both in the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing Court and it is that adjudication which is subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties in such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a complete Code and the sole remedy for the concerned parties to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position it is too late in the day for the Petitioner to contend to the contrary."

10. From this judgment also it is clear that respondents could resist the execution on implementation of decree on lines of succession certificate obtained by petitioner from Chandrapur Court before Wardha Court. In fact some amounts have been withdrawn from bank account in Wardha jurisdiction.

Bombay High Court

Manda R. Pande vs Smt. Jankibai S. Dubey on 8 September, 2005

Equivalent citations: AIR 2005 Bom 397, 2006 (2) MhLj 162

Bench: B Dharmadhikari

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Whether person who is stranger to compromise decree can file suit for setting aside compromise decree?

Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party submitted that the opposite party being the adopted daughter she has mutated the property in her name and alienated the same in the year 2007. He further submitted that since the adoptive mother has not disclosed that she has any knowledge about filing of the suit against her in respect of the suit property and same was compromised rightly after her death opposite party No. 1 has filed the application to set aside the compromise. The court below taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case has allowed the application. In support of his contention he has cited the decision reported in MANU/SC/0152/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 1139, Banwari Lal V. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another.

7. The facts discussed in the above paragraphs clearly reveals that the applicant filed the application to recall the compromise entered into in the suit is stranger to the said compromise. She has no personal knowledge regarding the compromise and its terms and conditions. The application to recall the compromise was filed 15 years after the compromise was entered into that too after the death of the defendant, the recorded tenant.

8. The recall petition was filed under the provision of under Order, 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said prescribed procedure was confined the parties to the suit not to the legal heirs. In the case of Smt. Suraj Kumari (supra) the Court has held that Order, 23 Rule 3-A of the C.P.C. is not applicable to a stranger to the compromise decree. A suit by stranger to set aside the compromise decree, which affects his rights is not barred by the aforesaid provision. The provision makes it clear that the party to the suit is debarred from filing the suit for setting aside the compromise decree on the ground of being unlawful. A remedy available to such a party only by moving the appropriate application before the court concerned which has passed the compromise decree to appreciate the contention whether the compromise is lawful or the decree was obtained fraudulently, only remedy available is to file a suit revoking the said compromise.

Equivalent Citation: 2015(I)ILR-CUT518,AIR 2015(NOC)748 Orissa

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

W.P.(C) No. 592 of 2012

Decided On: 28.01.2015

Banita Choudhury Vs.  Subrata Pati

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Sanju Panda, J.

Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)748 Orissa

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Whether stranger to decree who is dispossessed is entitled to make application in execution proceeding?

At this juncture, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Anr.MANU/SC/0191/1997: AIR 1997 SC 856 wherein a two-Judge Bench scanning the anatomy of the rules came to hold that:

...a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order XXI, Rule 99. Order XXI, Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order XXI, Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtor. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing the possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him.

21. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the court has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger who apprehends dispossession or has already been dispossessed from the immovable property. The self-contained Code, as has been emphasised by this Court, enjoins the executing court to adjudicate the lis and the purpose is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is also so because prior to 1976 amendment the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by the executing court. Order XXI, Rule 101 provides for the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon Under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were a decree.

 Supreme Court of India

Sameer Singh & Anr vs Abdul Rab & Ors on 14 October, 2014

Bench: Dipak Misra, V. Gopala Gowda

Citation: AIR2015SC591, 2014(6)ALD100(SC), 2015(1)ALLMR450, 

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