Showing posts with label coercion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label coercion. Show all posts

Sunday, 6 August 2023

Whether the court can grant temporary injunction in suit for specific performance of contract if vendor pleads that agreement of sale was executed under coercion?

 In the instant case, the defendant has not

denied the execution of the agreement to sell dated

07.05.2022 but has contended that the agreement to sell

was entered into under coercion. However, the defendant

had kept the money received under the agreement of Rs.10

lakh in her account for more than 5 months. Thus, prima

facie agreement cannot be said to be under coercion as

there is no steps taken by the defendant to return the

amount, rather the defendant has kept money in her

account and effect thereto is to be examined before the trial

court and thus no interference is called for at this stage, in

the order passed by the trial Court. {Para 31}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 25 OF 2023

Smt. Manisha w/o. Balkrushna Kode, Vs Shri. Madanlal s/o. Uttamchand Desarda,

CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.

Pronounced on : 02.08.2023

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Sunday, 12 January 2020

Whether accused can be convicted under NDPS Act even if seized contraband was not produced before court?

 Turning to the facts in the present matter, the evidence of PW15 Surender Singh shows that from and out of 7 bags of poppy husk, samples weighing about 500 grams were taken out of each bag. Out of these 3500 grams thus taken out, two samples of 500 grams were independently sealed while rest 2500 grams were also sealed in a separate pouch. These samples were marked A, B and C respectively. The bags were also independently sealed and taken in custody and Exbt-5 seizure memo which recorded all these facts was also signed by the Accused. We have gone through the cross-examination of the witness. At no stage even a suggestion was put to the witness that either the signatures of the Accused were taken by fraud, coercion or mis-representation or that the signatures were not of the Accused or that they did not understand the purport of the seizure memo. It would therefore be difficult to even suggest that the seizure of contraband weighing 223 kgs was not proved by the prosecution. In our view this fact stood conclusively proven.

17. If the seizure of the material is otherwise proved on record and is not even doubted or disputed the entire contraband material need not be placed before this Court. If the seizure is otherwise not in doubt, there is no requirement that the entire material ought to be produced before the Court. At times the material could be so bulky, for instance as in the present material when those 7 bags weighed 223 kgs that it may not be possible and feasible to produce the entire bulk before the Court. If the seizure is otherwise proved, what is required to be proved is the fact that the samples taken from and out of the contraband material were kept intact, that when the samples were submitted for forensic examination the seals were intact, that the report of the forensic experts shows the potency, nature and quality of the contraband material and that based on such material, the essential ingredients constituting an offence are made out.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1497 of 2019 

Decided On: 27.09.2019

State of Rajasthan  Vs.  Sahi Ram

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4723
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Sunday, 13 January 2019

Whether plea of wife that compromise deed was obtained by coercion is tenable if she has obtained divorce on basis of said compromise deed?

From the above narrated facts, it is clear that in the compromise petition filed before the Family Court, the appellant admitted that she has received Stridhan and maintenance in lump sum and that she will not be entitled to maintenance of any kind in future. She also undertook to withdraw all proceedings civil and criminal filed and initiated by her against the respondents within one month of the compromise deed which included the complaint under Sections 498A, 323 and 506 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act from which complaint this appeal arises. In the said compromise, the respondent- husband agreed to withdraw his petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act pending before the Senior Judge, Civil Division, Rampur and also agreed to give a consent divorce as sought for by the appellant.

7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1274 of 2004 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3769 of 2003)

Decided On: 05.11.2004

Ruchi Agarwal  Vs.  Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation: JT 2004(10)SC 475
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Saturday, 10 September 2016

When there will be no arbitrable dispute to exercise power U/S 11 of Arbitration Act?

In the decision rendered in Union of India vs. Master Construction
Co.(2011) 12 SCC 349
 this court observed as under:
“18. In our opinion, there is no rule of the absolute
kind. In a case where the claimant contends that a
discharge voucher or no-claim certificate has been
obtained by fraud, coercion, duress or undue influence

and the other side contests the correctness thereof, the
Chief Justice/his designate must look into this aspect to
find out at least, prima facie, whether or not the dispute
is bona fide and genuine. Where the dispute raised by the
claimant with regard to validity of the discharge voucher
or no-claim certificate or settlement agreement, prima
facie, appears to be lacking in credibility, there may not
be a necessity to refer the dispute for arbitration at all.
19. It cannot be overlooked that the cost of arbitration
is quite huge—most of the time, it runs into six and seven
figures. It may not be proper to burden a party, who
contends that the dispute is not arbitrable on account of
discharge of contract, with huge cost of arbitration
merely because plea of fraud, coercion, duress or undue
influence has been taken by the claimant. A bald plea of
fraud, coercion, duress or undue influence is not enough
and the party who sets up such a plea must prima facie
establish the same by placing material before the Chief
Justice/his designate. If the Chief Justice/his designate
finds some merit in the allegation of fraud, coercion,
duress or undue influence, he may decide the same or
leave it to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. On the
other hand, if such plea is found to be an afterthought,
make-believe or lacking in credibility, the matter must be
set at rest then and there.
In our considered view, the plea raised by the respondent is bereft of
any details and particulars, and cannot be anything but a bald assertion.
Given the fact that there was no protest or demur raised around the time or
soon after the letter of subrogation was signed, that the notice dated
31.03.2011 itself was nearly after three weeks and that the financial
condition of the respondent was not so precarious that it was left with no
alternative but to accept the terms as suggested, we are of the firm view that
the discharge in the present case and signing of letter of subrogation were
not because of exercise of any undue influence. Such discharge and signing
of letter of subrogation was voluntary and free from any coercion or undue
influence. In the circumstances, we hold that upon execution of the letter of
subrogation, there was full and final settlement of the claim. Since our
answer to the question, whether there was really accord and satisfaction, is
in the affirmative, in our view no arbitrable dispute existed so as to exercise
power under section 11 of the Act. The High Court was not therefore
justified in exercising power under Section 11 of the Act.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10784 OF 2014 @
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.24652 OF 2013
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD …. Appellant
Versus
GENUS POWER INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. …. Respondent

Uday U. Lalit, J.
Dated:December 04, 2014
Citation:AIR 2015 SC (SUPP)136
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Sunday, 13 December 2015

Whether insurance companies can withhold admitted claim amount till insured gives receipt of full and final settlement?

The insurance companies cannot deny the payment of the
admitted claim amount to the insured unless a complete discharge is
given by the insured. The insistence of the insurance company to sign
a discharge voucher of full and final settlement before release of
admitted claim amounts to coercion and undue influence as defined in
Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract Act and such contracts are 
voidable under Section 19 and 19A of the Contract Act.
The withholding of the admitted amount by the insurance
companies unless complete discharge is given, amounts to deficiency
in service within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 as the insurance companies are not expected to
withhold the admitted claim amount till the insured gives the receipt
of full and final settlement.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
ARB.P. 459/2015
Date of Decision: 11th December, 2015
WORLDFA EXPORTS PVT.LTD

v
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
Dated;DECEMBER 11, 2015.
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Sunday, 5 July 2015

When defence of force or coercion is not permissible in cheque dishonour case?



After knowing the principles laid down in the various cases
as above, let us proceed to deal with the facts of the present
cases. It is pertinent to note that in the present cases, the
execution of the cheques has not been denied by the accused. On
account of the above, In view of the Section 139 of the N.I. Act,
there was presumption in favour of the complainant that said
cheques were issued in discharge of legally enforceable debt or
liability favouring the complainant and it was for the accused to
rebut the said presumption.
It is seen that though according to
the accused, letter dated 06.07.2005 and the subject cheques
were obtained from him by force or coercion, however, the
accused did not lodge any police complaint against the directors of
the complainant and others nor did he instruct his banker to stop
payment. The complainant had given
statutory notices to the
accused as required under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act, and same
were served upon the accused though they were not accepted by
him and thus were returned “unclaimed” to the complainant. The

accused therefore is deemed to have
the statutory notices.
However, the accused did not reply the same. Adverse inference is
bound to be drawn as against the accused. Merely because in the
said letter dated 06.07.2005, it is mentioned that the same is in
the handwriting of the accused and that it is written without any
coercion or pressure of any one and that the accused had signed
the cheques on his own as matter of amicable settlement, that
cannot establish that there was coercion on the accused to sign
the letter. Such an observation of the learned J.M.F.C. is without
any basis. In fact, there was no reason for the accused not to lodge
any police complaint or not to instruct the bank to stop payment
and even there was no reason for the accused not to reply the
statutory notices. According to the accused, on 6.7.2005
around 10.00 a.m.,
he
was
called
along
with
the
at
cheque
books and other documents relating to Malax Traders in the office
of the complainant. The accused had not gone to the office of the
managing director on 06.07.2005 with the cheque books of Malax
Traders, but with his private cheque book or cheques. The coercion
or threatening had not started before the accused had gone to the
office. There was no reason at all for the accused to carry with him
his private cheque book or cheques. It should be kept in mind that
the accused had raised industrial dispute. In such circumstances,
it cannot be at all be said that the accused had successfully

discharged the initial reverse burden to show that the said cheques
were not issued towards the discharge of legally enforceable debt
or liability.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA.
CRIMINAL APPEALS NO. 15, 16, 17, and 18 OF 2013.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 15 OF 2013.
M/s. Agency Real Margao Pvt. Ltd.,

v/s
Shri Subhash K. Parab,

CORAM :- U. V. BAKRE, J.

Pronounced on:-12th February, 2015.
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(CRI)2082
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Sunday, 1 September 2013

Whether Court can recall its own judgment when divorce decree was obtained by way of fraud?

Family - Recall of Decree - Revision filed against an appellate decision upsetting an order of the Trial court recalling a decree passed by it under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act dissolving the marriage between the Petitioner and the opposite party by a decree of divorce by mutual consent - Whether a consent decree obtained by exercise of fraud, undue influence or coercion is liable to be recalled or set aside by the court passing the decree in exercise of its inherent power - Held, Court has inherent power to correct its own proceedings when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it was misled by one of the parties. It was urged before us on behalf of the defendants-appellants that the only remedy is by suit and that once the decree has been signed there is no jurisdiction in the Court to set it aside on the ground of fraud - Section 13B(1) requires a petition jointly presented to the court by both the parties to the marriage - It must clearly and categorically indicate (a) that the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or more before the presentation of the petition (b) that they have not been able to live together and (c) that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved - One of the essential pre-conditions, for maintaining an action under Section 13B was wanting in the petition as well as in the evidence, the decree for divorce disclosed an error apparent on the face of the record - As all the three elements of Section 13B(1) are cumulative, no decree under Section 13B can be supported by only two of them - Therefore, the case was a fit one for review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code - Petition allowed
 AIR1987Ori1, 1986(2)OLR751
Court can recall its own judgment in case of fraud.-There are occasions where the parties do not approach the court with clean hands and obtain a decree of divorce by way of fraud or misrepresentation of the facts. Under such circumstances the court granting the decree of divorce has the power to recall its own judgment under its inherent power. In Pushplata Rout v. Damodar Rout, MANU/OR/0001/1987 : AIR 1987 Ori 1: (1987) 1 Hindu LR 213, the High Court of Orissa held that the court has to be satisfied apart from other provisions of Section 23 of the Act in particular and the provisions in Section 23(1), clause (bb) namely that the consent of any party has not been obtained by force or fraud.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Civil Revn. No. 469 of 1984
Decided On: 15.05.1986
Appellants: Smt. Puspalata Rout
Vs.
Respondent: Damodar Rout1

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.C. Patnaik, J.
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