Whether plea of wife that compromise deed was obtained by coercion is tenable if she has obtained divorce on basis of said compromise deed?

From the above narrated facts, it is clear that in the compromise petition filed before the Family Court, the appellant admitted that she has received Stridhan and maintenance in lump sum and that she will not be entitled to maintenance of any kind in future. She also undertook to withdraw all proceedings civil and criminal filed and initiated by her against the respondents within one month of the compromise deed which included the complaint under Sections 498A, 323 and 506 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act from which complaint this appeal arises. In the said compromise, the respondent- husband agreed to withdraw his petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act pending before the Senior Judge, Civil Division, Rampur and also agreed to give a consent divorce as sought for by the appellant.

7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1274 of 2004 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3769 of 2003)

Decided On: 05.11.2004

Ruchi Agarwal  Vs.  Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation: JT 2004(10)SC 475

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Whether review petition by stranger to compromise decree is tenable?

In   that   view   of   the   matter,   this
Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   review
application deserves no consideration.   This
Court is bound by the ratio laid down in two
judgments delivered at Principal Seat, cited
across   the   bar   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondents in the case of
Khalil Haji Bholumiya Salar (cited supra) and
also in the case of Ramkrishna Shridhar & Ors
(cited supra) wherein the view is taken that
stranger   to   the   suit   is   a   stranger   to   the
agreement of compromise and he cannot file an
application   either   in   the   suit   or   in   the
appeal proceedings to challenge a compromise
decree as he is not a party to the suit, bar
under  Rule   3A  of   Order   23  of  CPC   cannot   be
extended to him, said provision must confine
only   to   the   parties   to   the   suit   who   are
parties to the compromise agreement, stranger
to   a   compromise   decree   cannot   file   an

application   in   a   suit   or   an   appeal   to
challenge   a   compromise   as   not   being   lawful,
but   must   file   a   separate   suit   for   the
purpose.   
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5416 OF 2012
IN 
SECOND APPEAL NO. 356 OF 2001
WITH 
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5417 OF 2012 
Gaurishankar s/o.Rukhmeshchandra Mishra,  

V
 Asaram s/o. Shankar Jagdale,  

      CORAM:  S.S.SHINDE, J.  
      
Dated : 30.08.2016 
Citation:2016 (6) ALLMR 378,2017(1) MHLJ 122

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When certified copy of compromise deed is admissible in evidence?

Now the other question which remains to be decided is whether the compromise Ex. D3 is admissible in evidence or not? The compromise dated 27.11.1972 has become the basis of the decree dated 08.12.1972 passed by the Sub-Judge, Hoshiarpur. The perusal of Ex. D4 i.e., judgment and decree were passed as per the terms and conditions of compromise placed on file. As rightly observed by the courts below, the compromise has merged into a decree and has become part and parcel of it. To put it clear, the compromise had become a part of the decree which was passed by the court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Hoshiarpur. Hence, it is a public document in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short `the Act') and certified copy of the public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act. A certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling  witness. Inasmuch as the decree was passed and drafted in the light of the compromise entered into between the parties, viz., the plaintiff and the defendants, the certified copy of such document which was produced before the Court, there is presumption as to the genuineness of such certified copy under Section 78 of the Act. We have already noted that the appellant-Jaswant Singh has not challenged the genuineness of certified copy in any manner. Although the record of the Court has been proved to be burnt in a fire in Judicial Record Room, Hoshiarpur on 16.06.1998, but the certified copy of the compromise (Ex.D3), which is the part of the decree was obtained from the record room on 24.08.1988 and the Decree Ex.D4 was got issued on 12.09.1984. In those circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of compromise (Ex.D3).

   REPORTABLE

Supreme Court of India

Jaswant Singh vs Gurdev Singh & Ors on 21 October, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, Jasti Chelameswar

Citation:(2012)1 SCC425

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Whether court can pass decree contrary of compromise petition of parties?

In view of the aforesaid facts and submissions on behalf
of the appellants and the plaintiff-respondents, it is manifest that the
terms of the compromise envisaged in the compromise petition dated
12.12.2002 have been accepted by the parties thereto according to
which the plaintiff-respondents are entitled only to 8 katha 10 dhur of
land as mentioned in schedule-II of the compromise petition.
Therefore, the declaration by both the courts below holding the
plaintiffs to be entitled to 1/4th share in the suit properties are clearly
against the terms of the compromise.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Second Appeal No.201 of 2008

 Ganga Sah son of late Beni Sah.
V

Smt. Kalawati Devi, daughter of late Ganesh Sah,
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V. NATH
Citation;AIR 2014 (NOC) 513 Patna
Date: 23-01-2014

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