Showing posts with label criminal prosecution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal prosecution. Show all posts

Sunday, 30 August 2026

Bombay HC: Prosecution must examine the witnesses, who have no concern with the C.A. report and muddemal property if C.A. report and muddemal property is not received

  It is really surprising that since 2020, the prosecution could not secure the muddemal and C.A. report and seeking the time to open the trial. It also appears wrong practice to discharge the lawyer defending the accused at eleventh hour. The lawyer should intimate the Court well in advance about withdrawing the powers. The accused appears to have been unnecessarily languishing in jail. The Trial Court is directed to call for the Chemical Analysis report within a given time. The prosecution has to examine the witnesses, who have no concern with the C.A. report and muddemal property. So, at least there shall be some progress. Learned Principal District Judge, Aurangabad to take care of and examine such witnesses, having no concern with C.A. report and muddemal. {Para 2}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH

AT AURANGABAD

908 BAIL APPLICATION NO.1671 OF 2022

VEDPRAKASH RAMNATH THAKUR Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

CORAM : S. G. MEHARE, J.

DATE : 28.06.2023

Print Page

Sunday, 14 June 2026

Fraud at the Courthouse Door: When Can Civil Courts Use Section 151 CPC to Set the Criminal Law in Motion?


 
Why this question matters

Civil judges increasingly encounter forged documents, fabricated seals, and engineered “fraud on the court” designed to siphon public money or manipulate rights. The immediate civil response is clear: refuse or recall relief obtained by fraud. But a connected and difficult question is: can the civil court itself trigger criminal prosecution, and if so, when and how, under Section 151 CPC?

Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence now fairly clearly recognises that inherent powers under Section 151 can be used to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings—including by undoing orders obtained by fraud and, in appropriate cases, by directing that serious independent forgeries be reported to the police. This operates alongside, and not in derogation of, the special mechanism for “offences against public justice” under Section 195/340 CrPC, now Section 215/379 BNSS.

Print Page

Sunday, 14 September 2025

Non-Examination Of Magistrate Who Conducted Test Identification Parade Strikes Severe Blow On Prosecution And Cause Of Justice; Orissa HC Sets Aside Conviction

Above all, the prosecution has not offered any explanation as to why the Magistrate, who conducted T.I. parade was not examined to prove the report, inasmuch as many things the defence could have brought out by way of cross-examination of the Magistrate regarding the irregularities or procedural infirmities, if any, made during conduct of the T.I. parade. Recently, in the case of Umesh Chandra and others -Vrs.-State of Uttarakhand reported in MANU/SC/1412/2021 : (2021) 17 Supreme Court Cases 616, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed concern about non-examination of Magistrates to prove the sanctity of T.I. parade and observed as follows:


"10. But more important than that, the test identification parade being a part of the investigation, has to be proved by the prosecution as having been held in accordance with law. The onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the T.I parade was held in accordance with law. It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid T.I parade having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises. If the prosecution has failed to establish that a T.I parade was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove. In the present case, a Magistrate is stated to have conducted the T.I parade. The Magistrate has not been examined. No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined."


Thus, it is undisputed that the Public Prosecutor has a duty to examine the Magistrate who conducts the T.I. parade so that the legal sanctity of the T.I. parade report can be ascertained during the trial. Non-examination of the Magistrate strikes a severe blow not only to the prosecution case but also to the cause of justice as irregularities, if any, committed in such T.I. parade cannot be canvassed and discussed by the trial Court in his absence from the witness box. In the present case, no plausible explanation has been offered as to why the Magistrate was not examined in the Court to prove the T.I. parade report. In the case in hand, the prosecution has proved the T.I. parade report through P.W.4, the informant who has stated that he had signed the T.I. parade report and accordingly, the report was marked as Ext.2 and the signature of P.W.4 was marked as Ext.2/1. Mere marking of the T.I. parade report is not enough inasmuch as the person who conducted the T.I. parade could only highlight what precautions he took, what procedure he followed during such T.I. parade. Lapses, if any, on his part during the proceedings of the T.I. parade which strikes at the root of the identification evidence, can be brought out by the defence counsel in the cross-examination. If the Magistrate is dead or his attendance could not be procured during trial for any reason, the trial Court has to specifically mention the same in the order-sheet and thereafter the prosecution can adduce cogent evidence to prove such T.I. parade report. Identification proceedings are not conducted for the pleasure of the prosecution. It has got a valuable purpose even though the identification test does not constitute substantive evidence.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRLA Nos. 21 of 2012, 504 of 2012 and 719 of 2012

Decided On: 04.04.2024

Baikuntha Bhoi and Ors. Vs. State of Odisha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.K. Sahoo, J.

Citation: MANU/OR/0369/2024.

Print Page

Sunday, 27 October 2024

Organization of prosecuting agencies in India for prosecution of Criminals

Who is prosecutor?

The person who presents the case before the court against the accused based on material collected during investigation by the police, is called the prosecutor. It is the function of prosecutor to properly marshal evidence, law and other facets of the case against accused before the court. He also assists the court in considering the validity of the defence put in by the accused and in determining the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the guilty.

A prosecutor is generally an Advocate paid by the government for presenting Government's case against the accused before the court. The advocate mentioned above are collectively called prosecution machinery. The prosecution is important component of criminal justice system.

Organization of prosecuting agencies in India

S.24 of CRPC{S 18 of BNSS}- Public Prosecutors.—(1) For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be.

Print Page

Friday, 26 January 2024

Whether merged entity will be liable for criminal prosecution for pre-merger crimes?

Provided that where a contravention of any of the provision of any statute or of any rule, Regulation, direction or order made thereunder has been committed by or any proceeding for a criminal offence has been instituted against, a director or secretary, manager, officer or other employee of the transferor bank before the appointed date, such director, secretary, manager, officer or other employee shall, without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), be liable to be proceeded against under such law and punished accordingly, as if the transferor bank, being a banking company had not been dissolved.


32. Every scheme of amalgamation is statutory and sanctioned under the Banking Act. Such amalgamation is to ensure that the interests of the depositors, the creditors and others who had invested, or given credit to in the erstwhile bank, before its sickness, and that the general public are protected. It aims at securing larger public interest and health of the banking industry. Late intervention into the affairs of a bank can result in a "run" on it, resulting in serious loss of confidence in the intricately woven banking and financial system. If one sees this and the overall objective of the scheme, it is to ensure recovery of what are the bank's dues and ensuring protection of the creditors. Clause 3 (3) of the scheme, therefore, has to be considered from this backdrop. In this context, the express mention of directors and such other individuals in the proviso means that it is to that extent only that prosecutions or other criminal proceedings can continue; in the ordinary sense, criminal liability can neither be attributed to DBS nor its directors, brought in after the amalgamation, whose appointments were approved by the RBI.

34. It is, therefore, clear that the criminal liability of the individuals now attributed to DBS are actions of (1) Anjani Kumar Verma, (2) S. Venkatesh, (3) Pradeep Kumar and (4) Parthsarathi Mukherjee. They were all officials of LVB. Their individual responsibility and accountability in criminal law, is and remains unaffected by the amalgamation. Therefore, there is in fact, no involvement of DBS Bank, revealed in the charge sheet filed by the Delhi Police. In completely ignoring these aspects and proceeding on a rather superficial basis, the High Court, in our considered opinion fell into error.


35. There is no gainsaying that the power to quash a criminal investigation or proceedings should not be lightly exercised. Yet, to refuse recourse to that power, in cases that require or may demand it, is being blind to justice, which the courts can scant afford to be. In the present context, the public's confidence in the banking industry was at stake, when RBI stepped in, imposed the moratorium and asked DBS to take over the entire functioning, management assets and liabilities of the erstwhile LVB. To permit prosecution of DBS for the acts of LVB officials (who are in fact, facing criminal charges) would result in travesty of justice. Therefore, the pending criminal proceedings (arising out of FIR - 189/2019 registered at P.S. Economic Affairs Wing, New Delhi), to the extent it involves DBS, which was the subject matter of the impugned judgment and all consequent proceedings arising therefrom (to the extent of involvement of DBS), are hereby quashed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2242 of 2023 and 2243 of 2023

Decided On: 11.09.2023

Religare Finvest Limited Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1004/2023,2023/INSC/819

Print Page

Wednesday, 12 August 2020

Orissa HC: Provisions of CRPC shall have an overriding effect over Pension Rules

The said judgment was challenged by the State of
Maharashtra before the Supreme Court. Rule 27 of the Maharashtra
Civil Services (Pension) Rules 1982 is a pari materia provision with
Rule 7 of the OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992. On interpretation, it is held
by the Supreme Court that, those provisions of the Pension Rules is only meant for the purpose of granting, withholding or withdrawing the pension and it‟s operation would be in the limited field and cannot supersede the period of limitation prescribed under the Cr.P.C.

This Court also by relying the said decision of the
Supreme Court, in the case of Fani Bhusan Das & Anr. Vs. State
of Odisha (CRLMC Nos. 258 &686 of 2004, and 2626 of 2007),
reported in 2018 SCC Online 310, has observed that the provision
of the Cr.P.C. shall have an overriding effect and shall prevail
notwithstanding any provision in the Pension Rules, and therefore,
the provisions of OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992 would not give any relief to the petitioners.
So the contention of these two petitioners to give them
immune from criminal prosecution by virtue of Rule-7 of the OCS
(Pension) Rules is found without substance and accordingly rejected.
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK


In CRLREV No.534 of 2019

Jitendra Nath Patnaik  Vs  State of Odisha (Vigilance) 

PRESENT:
 SHRI JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY

Date of Judgment : 06.08.2020
Print Page

Monday, 20 July 2020

Whether criminal prosecution for forgery is tenable if an issue as to the genuineness of those documents is pending in civil suit?

Be that as it may, in the Summary Suit No. 105/2015, leave to defend was granted to Respondent No. 2-Mahendrakumar on 19.04.2016. On the application filed by Appellant No. 3 in the said Summary Suit No. 105/2015, four receipts filed in the suit were sent to the handwriting expert. The handwriting expert has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of Respondent No. 2-Mahendrakumar. It was only thereafter, complaint was filed by Mahendrakumar, based on which, FIR No. I-194/2016 was registered on 28.12.2016 against the Appellants for the offences punishable Under Sections 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 114 Indian Penal Code. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellants, in the Summary Suit No. 105/2015, issue No. 5 has been framed by the Court "whether the Defendant proved that the Plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts". When the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, in our view, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit.

19. It is also to be pointed out that in terms of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, the opinion of handwriting expert is a relevant piece of evidence; but it is not a conclusive evidence. It is always open to the Plaintiff-Appellant No. 3 to adduce appropriate evidence to disprove the opinion of the handwriting expert. That apart, Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the Court to compare the admitted and disputed writings for the purpose of forming its own opinion. Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered. Continuation of FIR No. I-194/2016, in our view, would amount to abuse of the process of Court and the petition filed by the Appellants Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2735/2017 to quash the FIR I-194/2016 is to be allowed.

Ratio: When issue as to genuineness of documents, forgery of which was the basis of the criminal proceedings, was pending consideration in civil suit, FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue in this case as it would prejudice the interest of parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 251-252 of 2020 
Decided On: 10.02.2020

 Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel  Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R. Banumathi and A.S. Bopanna, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0155/2020,(2020) 3 SCC 794
Print Page

Tuesday, 19 May 2020

Whether accused can seek transfer of investigation?

In assessing the contention for the transfer of the investigation to the CBI, we
have factored into the decision-making calculus the averments on the record and
submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner. We are unable to find any reason that
warrants a transfer of the investigation to the CBI. In holding thus, we have applied
the tests spelt out in the consistent line of precedent of this Court. They have not
been fulfilled. An individual under investigation has a legitimate expectation of a fair
process which accords with law. The displeasure of an accused person about the
manner in which the investigation proceeds or an unsubstantiated allegation (as in
the present case) of a conflict of interest against the police conducting the
investigation must not derail the legitimate course of law and warrant the invocation
of the extraordinary power of this Court to transfer an investigation to the CBI.
Courts assume the extraordinary jurisdiction to transfer an investigation in
exceptional situations to ensure that the sanctity of the administration of criminal
justice is preserved. While no inflexible guidelines are laid down, the notion that
such a transfer is an “extraordinary power” to be used “sparingly” and “in exceptional
circumstances” comports with the idea that routine transfers would belie not just
public confidence in the normal course of law but also render meaningless the
extraordinary situations that warrant the exercise of the power to transfer the
investigation. Having balanced and considered the material on record as well as the
averments of and submissions urged by the petitioner, we find that no case of the

nature which falls within the ambit of the tests enunciated in the precedents of this
Court has been established for the transfer of the investigation.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
Writ Petition (Crl) No. 130 of 2020

Arnab Ranjan Goswami  Vs  Union of India

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated:May 19, 2020.
Print Page

Friday, 15 May 2020

How to prove Email sent by accused in Criminal prosecution?


Electronic Mails

62. We will now turn to the electronic mails which the prosecution has relied on. It has sought to prove this evidence by relying on the testimonies of PW 132, the expert from the West Bengal Electronics Ltd. (Webel), PW 118, the wireless operator and the I.O. According to these witnesses, Akib Ali disclosed his e-mail identities and passwords in their presence in the computer room at Bhabani Bhawan (the C.I.D. headquarters). They claim to have downloaded these e-mails from Akib Ali's e-mail account. The e-mails were then printed in their presence. All these printed e-mails have been signed by the aforesaid witnesses. It has been noted on these e-mails that Akib Ali refused to endorse the printed copies of the mails. Under Section 88A of the Evidence Act the Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed in the computer for transmission. However, the Court cannot draw any presumption about the person who sent the message. The term 'originator' has been defined in the Information and Technology Act, 2000 under Section 2(za) as a person who sends, generates, stores or transmits any electronic message; or causes any electronic message to be sent, generated, stored or transmitted to any other person but does not include an intermediary. Thus on analysing Section 88A of the Evidence Act and the relevant provisions of the Information and Technology Act, it is apparent that the Court may presume the veracity of the message fed into the computer for transmission by the originator through his mail server to an addressee, that is, the person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic record and does not include any intermediary. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. Besides, no presumption can be drawn about the person who has sent such a message. Therefore, even if we accept the fact that these e-mails have been downloaded as stated by the Webel expert or sent by using the e-mail address of Akib Ali, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that Akib Ali was in fact the originator of these e-mails. The disclosure, if any, made by Akib Ali of the e-mail address and password would have to be made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. PWs 118 and 132 have both stated that Akib Ali has disclosed his e-mail identities and passwords in their presence. They have signed the seizure list under which the emails accessed from these accounts and printed have been seized. Therefore, in our opinion, these e-mails are admissible in evidence.
Print Page

Wednesday, 8 January 2020

Supreme Court: Accused can not claim discharge from criminal prosecution on the basis of documents produced by him at that stage of proceeding

LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN REGARD TO AN APPLICATION SEEKING DISCHARGE
14. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz., P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and another (2010) 2 SCC 398  and discern the following principles:
i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.
iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court.
iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.
v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.
vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would 
not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.
viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

15. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 of the Cr.PC (See State of J & K v. Sudershan Chakkar and another  AIR 1995 SC 1954 ). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 of the Cr.PC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the Police (See State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi AIR 2005 SC 359).
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 957 OF 2017

M.E. SHIVALINGAMURTHY  Vs  CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BENGALURU 

K.M. JOSEPH, J.

Dated:JANUARY 07, 2020. 
Print Page

Sunday, 13 January 2019

Whether plea of wife that compromise deed was obtained by coercion is tenable if she has obtained divorce on basis of said compromise deed?

From the above narrated facts, it is clear that in the compromise petition filed before the Family Court, the appellant admitted that she has received Stridhan and maintenance in lump sum and that she will not be entitled to maintenance of any kind in future. She also undertook to withdraw all proceedings civil and criminal filed and initiated by her against the respondents within one month of the compromise deed which included the complaint under Sections 498A, 323 and 506 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act from which complaint this appeal arises. In the said compromise, the respondent- husband agreed to withdraw his petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act pending before the Senior Judge, Civil Division, Rampur and also agreed to give a consent divorce as sought for by the appellant.

7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a divorce as desired by her under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in partial compliance of the terms of the compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which this appeal arises. That apart after the order of the High Court quashing the said complaint on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, she has chosen to file this appeal. It is in this background, we will have to appreciate the merits of this appeal.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, contended that though the appellant had signed the compromise deed with the above-mentioned terms in it, the same was obtained by the respondent-husband and his family under threat and coercion and in fact she did not receive lump sum maintenance and her Stridhan properties, we find it extremely difficult to accept this argument in the background of the fact that pursuant to the compromise deed the respondent-husband has given her a consent divorce which she wanted thus had performed his part of the obligation under the compromise deed. Even the appellant partially performed her part of the obligations by withdrawing her criminal complaint filed under Section 125. It is true that she had made a complaint in writing to the Family Court where Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings were pending that the compromise deed was filed under coercion but she withdrew the same and gave a statement before the said court affirming the terms of the compromise which statement was recorded by the Family Court and the proceedings were dropped and a divorce was obtained.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant having received the relief she wanted without contest on the basis of the terms of the compromise, we cannot now accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, the conduct of the appellant indicates that the criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by the wife only to harass the respondents.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1274 of 2004 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3769 of 2003)

Decided On: 05.11.2004

Ruchi Agarwal  Vs.  Amit Kumar Agrawal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Citation: JT 2004(10)SC 475
Print Page

Sunday, 19 August 2018

Whether complainant can approach police in cheque dishonour case?

 The NI Act provides for the procedure for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The object behind such proceedings is to bring relief to the litigants in a summary manner if the complainant is able to establish his case. Furthermore, such prosecution is maintainable only against the persons referred to in Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act. The Act also provides for the period of limitation for the complainant to complete the procedural formalities and to approach the Court. Whereas if the transaction is attended by other serious offences under the IPC, in a given case the investigation is necessary; particularly when many accused are involved and the evidence can be collected only by an investigating agency. In such cases, it would not be proper to relegate the complainant only to the remedy of the prosecution under the NI Act which he can take recourse to by way of filing a private complaint. In such cases, the complainant's right to approach the police and get the offences investigated by them, cannot be scuttled.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 2906 of 2017

Decided On: 03.04.2018

Hasmukh Tarachand Sheth Vs.  State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Savant and Sarang V. Kotwal, JJ.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 270
Print Page

Sunday, 24 December 2017

Whether criminal prosecution for outraging of modesty can be quashed if victim is not cited as witness?

It is also submitted by learned Counsel for Petitioner that the person to whom letters were addressed is not cited as a witness by the prosecution and hence the offences alleged cannot be established. Therefore, it is further submitted that continuance of the proceedings would be of no use for the prosecution and it will only result in hardship to the Petitioner. I am not persuaded to quash the charge on this ground also because there is no bar under law in examining a witness who is not cited as a witness in the witness list The question whether examination of the victim is required or not can be considered at the appropriate stage by the court below but the non-inclusion of the victim in the witness list alone is no ground at all to quash the charge. In any view of the matter, this is not a fit case to quash the charge at the threshold.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA


Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002



Decided On: 16.02.2005



M.M. Haries Vs. State of Kerala



Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Hema, J.

Print Page

Sunday, 1 January 2017

How to ascertain territorial jurisdiction of court for filing complaint for making false statements in income tax search proceeding?

As hereinbefore stated, the appellants as
assesses, had residences both at Bhopal and Aurangabad and had been
submitting their income tax returns at Bhopal. The search operations
were conducted simultaneously both at Bhopal and Aurangabad in
course whereof allegedly the appellants, in spite of queries made, did not
disclose that they in fact did hold a locker located at Aurangabad. They
in fact denied to hold any locker, either individually or jointly. The locker,
eventually located, though at Aurangabad, has a perceptible co-relation
or nexus with the subject matter of assessment and thus the returns filed
by the appellants at Bhopal which in turn were within the purview of the
search operations. The search conducted simultaneously at Bhopal and
Aurangabad has to be construed as a single composite expedition with a
common mission. Having regard to the overall facts and the accusation
of false statement made about the existence of the locker in such a joint
drill, it cannot be deduced that in the singular facts and circumstances,
no part of the offence alleged had been committed within the
jurisdictional limits of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal.
72. Chapter XIII of the Code sanctions the jurisdiction of the
criminal courts in inquries and trials. Whereas Section 177 of the Code
stipulates the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, Section 178 enumerates
the places of inquiry or trial. In terms of Section 179, when an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a
consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or
tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done
or such consequence has ensued. For immediate reference, Sections 177
and 178 are extracted hereinbelow.
“177: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial – Every
offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried
by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.
178: Place of inquiry or trial – (a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local areas an
offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one
local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local areas
than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas, it may be inquired into or
tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of
such local areas.
73. As would be evident from hereinabove, ordinarily every
offence ought to be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local
jurisdiction it had been committed as is mandated by Section 177 of the
Code. Section 178, however marks a departure contingent on the
eventualities as listed in clauses (a),(b), (c) and (d) of Section 178 to
identify the court that would have the jurisdiction to try the offences as
contemplated therein. 
74. Though the concept of “cause of action“ identifiable with a
civil action is not routinely relevant for the determination of
territoriality of criminal courts as had been ruled by this Court in
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and
Another, (2014) 9 SCC 129, their Lordships however were cognizant of
the word “ordinarily” used in Section 177 of the Code to acknowledge the
exceptions contained in Section 178 thereof. Section 179 also did not
elude notice .
75. Be that as it may, on a cumulative reading of Sections 177,
178 and 179 of the Code in particular and the inbuilt flexibility
discernible in the latter two provisions, we are of the comprehension that
in the attendant facts and circumstances of the case where to repeat, a
single and combine search operation had been undertaken
simultaneously both at Bhopal and Aurangabad for the same purpose,
the alleged offence can be tried by courts otherwise competent at both
the aforementioned places. To confine the jurisdiction within the
territorial limits to the court at Aurangabad would amount, in our view,
to impermissible and illogical truncation of the ambit of Sections 178
and 179 of the Code. The objection with regard to the competence of the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal is hereby rejected.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.824 OF 2016
[ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL) NO. 1474 OF 2012]
BABITA LILA & ANOTHER 
V
UNION OF INDIA 
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC647
Print Page

Thursday, 29 December 2016

Whether criminal prosecution under prevention of corruption Act can be initiated against Judge?


The fact that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the
Judicial Officer was not challenged and has attained finality is
far too significant a circumstance to be overlooked. If, parties
having oblique motives and their Advocates are allowed to
make wild allegations against judicial dictums which have attained
finality, the very independence of the judiciary will be
severely threatened and no Judge shall be able to work fearlessly
and independently. It is clearly reflected from the record
that the counsel representing the complainants has been taking
undue interest in the entire matter and appears to have made
it his own goal to somehow or the other and at any cost to target
and get the Judicial Officer entangled in a criminal case. Allegations
have been leveled in the complaint on the workings of
the officer at different stations, the knowledge whereof cannot
be imputed to the complainants who are illiterate persons.[25]
Thus evidently, it is the petitioners’ Advocate who appears to
be operating behind the scenes in the matter. A totally false
assertion has been made at para No.5 of the written submissions,
which are signed by the counsel, that the Registrar General
has informed this Court that the petitioners’ complaint has
been forwarded by Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice to the Registrar
(Vigilance) for making inquiry. The fact is totally otherwise
inasmuch as, Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice has directed
that the complaint be filed.
Now coming to the issue whether the Anti Corruption
Bureau officials were justified in sending the petitioners' complaint
to the Registrar General or not. Sections 2 and 3 of the
Judges Protection Act, 1985 have a material bearing on this issue
and are reproduced herein for the sake of convenience:-
“2. Definition.—In this Act, “Judge” means not only every
person who is officially designated as Judge, but also
every person—
(a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal
proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if
not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment
which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be
definitive; or
(b) who is one of a body of persons which body of
persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as
is referred to in Clause (a).
3. Additional protection to Judges.—(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),
no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal
proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for
any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him
when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.[26]
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect
in any manner the power of the Central Government or
the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or
any High Court or any other authority under any law for
the time being in force to take such action (whether by
way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise)
against any person who is or was a Judge.
As per the foregoing provisions, it cannot be denied that
the arraigned Judicial Officer, who was discharging his judicial
duties while passing the judgment of acquittal, is covered by
the definition of Judge set out in Section 2 of the Act. As per
Section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, all courts have been
prohibited from entertaining any criminal or civil proceedings
against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or
word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course
of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or
judicial duty or function. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the
Act, provides an exception and saves the powers of the competent
authority which can be, the Central Government, the State
Government, the Supreme Court of India or the High Court or
any other authority empowered under law to take such action
against any person who is or was a Judge. The clear intent of
the provision is that in case, the High Court feels that action;
civil and criminal is warranted against any subordinate Judicial
Officer, it can so direct without prejudice to the restrictions
contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. That precisely
appears to be the reason that the complaint was for-[27]
warded by the officers of the Anti Corruption Bureau to the
High Court. Only Hon’ble the Chief Justice, upon being persuaded
that action is warranted, could have allowed registration of
a criminal case against the officer overriding the restrictions
contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Judges Protection
Act. As noticed above, Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice has
already decided that no action is warranted upon the complaint
received from the complainants against the arraigned Judicial
Officer and has been filed.
Consequently, this Court is of the opinion
(a) that the complaint submitted by the petitioners’ was
per se malicious and motivated.
(b) that the same does not disclose the necessary ingredients
of any cognizable offence whatsoever.
(c) that the motives of the petitioners’ counsel in filing
the complaint and prosecuting the matter is oblique and
malafide and was aimed at interfering in the administration
of justice and tarnishing the image of the Judiciary
and therefore, deserves to be deprecated.
Reportable
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR

S.B. CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.20/2016

Smt. Makhni  Vs. The State of Rajasthan 

Date of order : 05/07/2016
HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA

Citation:2016 CRLJ 4552
Print Page

Saturday, 14 May 2016

When prosecution for criminal misappropriation of stridhan is not tenable against IN-LAWS?

Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about
the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that
such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion
of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to
attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As
noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of
‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into
consideration the common practice that these articles are sent
along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of
common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in
connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in
her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been
residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the
dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return
the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case
and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do
not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that
appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the
offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding
under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the
criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the
dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view,
continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is
not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
Versus
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC309
Dated;January 19, 2016


Print Page

Friday, 19 February 2016

Whether accused whose name is not mentioned in FIR can be prosecuted?

In Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. , after referring to the authorities Rotash, Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., Sone Lal v. State of U.P., Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh and Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam, the Court opined that: (Ranjit Singh case, SCC p.344, para 14) "14....in case the informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused."
(Emphasis added)
When we apply the above principles to the facts of this case, we are convinced that the implication of all the five accused was perfectly justified and was supported by legal evidence as was spoken to by the relevant witnesses which was duly corroborated by the medical evidence. Therefore, mere non mentioning of two of the names in the F.I.R cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Susanta Das & Ors. Vs. State of Orissa

[Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2009]
Coram:
FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
Dated;January 06, 2016
Print Page

Sunday, 1 November 2015

When prosecution under S 409 of IPC is liable to be quashed

 At this stage we also think it proper to observe that in the
present case, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken to be true, the ingredients of the offence punishable
under Section 409 IPC for which appellants are summoned,
are also not made out. To constitute an offence punishable
under Section 409 IPC, apart from entrustment, it is also
essential requirement that it should be shown that the
accused has acted in the capacity of a public servant, banker,
merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. It is nowhere
shown in the complaint that the appellants have acted in any
of the above capacities.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.953 OF 2015
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 330 of 2015)
Mr. Robert John D’Souza and others … Appellants
Versus
Mr. Stephen V. Gomes and another … Respondents
Citation; 2015 CRLJ 4040 SC
Print Page

Saturday, 26 September 2015

What are rules for grant of permission to issue passport to person against whom criminal prosecution is pending?

 It seems that after the Supreme Court judgment of Maneka Gandhi's case, the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 22 of the said Act, issued a notification dated 16th August, 1979 exempting citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by them are pending before any criminal Court in India and who produce orders from the Court concerned permitting them to depart from India, from the operation of the provisions of the clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act, subject to the following conditions, namely.
(a) the passport to be issued to every such citizen shall be issued.
(i) where the order of the Court referred to above, gives such permission for a period not exceeding three months, for a period of three months and an observation will be made on the passport that the holder may travel abroad for a period not exceeding that specified in such order; or
(ii) if no period is specified in such order, the passport shall be issued for a period for six months and may be renewed for a further period of six months, if the order of the Court is not cancelled or modified; or
(iii) in any other case, for the period for which such permission is given by such order;
(b) the said citizen shall give an undertaking in writing to the passport authority that he shall, if required by the Court concerned, appear before it any time during the continuance in force of the passport so issued.
9. By the notification dated 25th August, 1993, the earlier notification was substituted granting exemption to the citizens against whom proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by them are pending before a Criminal Court in India and who produce order from the Court concerned permitted them to depart from India, from the operation of the provisions of clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 the said Act, subject to following conditions, namely,
(a) the passport to be issued to every such citizen shall be issued;
(i) for the period specified in order of the Court referred to above, if the Court specifies a period for which the passport has to be issued; or
(ii) if no period either for the issue of the passport or for the travel abroad is specified in such order, the passport shall be issued for a period of one year;
(iii) if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period less than one year, but does not specify the period of validity of the passport, the passport shall be issued for one year; or
(iv) if such order gives permission to travel abroad for a period exceeding one year, and does not specify the validity of the passport, then the passport shall be issued for the period of travel abroad specified in the order.
(b) any passport issued in terms of (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) above can be further renewed for one year at a time, provided the applicant has not travelled abroad for the period sanctioned by the Court; and provided further that, in the meantime, the order of the Court is not cancelled or modified;
(c) the passport issued in terms of (a)(i) above can be fresh, order specifying a further period of validity of the passport or specifying a period for travel abroad;
(d) the said citizen shall give an undertaking in writing to the passport authority that he shall, if required by the Court concerned, appear before it at any time during the continuance in force of the passport so issued.

Bombay High Court

Deepak Dwarkasingh Chhabria vs Union Of India And Another on 8 August, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 Bom 181, 1996 (2) MhLj 877
Bench: A Shah
Print Page