Supreme Court: Testimony For Sexual Offence Within Home Does Not Require Same Corroboration As Crimes Committed In Open

The third principle concerns the appreciation of

evidence in cases of sexual offences and of crimes

committed within the privacy of the home. Offences

of this nature are seldom committed in the presence

of witnesses. The sexual abuse of a child within the

household, in particular, is perpetrated in secrecy

and in stealth, and the persons ordinarily present are

the perpetrator, the child and, if at all, a member of

the household who is powerless to prevent it. To

insist, in such cases, upon the kind of corroboration

that might be available in a crime committed in the

open would be to insist upon a standard that the very

nature of the offence renders impossible of

attainment, and would be to grant to those who prey

upon children within the home an immunity founded

upon the secrecy in which they cloak their crime. {Para 31}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 429-430/2020

WARIS Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1050.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 24, 2026

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Bombay HC: Whether the court can convict accused based on S 164 CRPC statements of prosecution witnesses?

 Trial Court was wrong in convicting the Appellant by taking recourse to statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the basis of the evidence of the learned Magistrate and the medical evidence, statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code can be treated as previous statement only. There are certain differences recognized by the legislatures in the statement under Section 161 on one hand and statement under Section 164 of the Code on the other hand. They can be summarized as follows :--

SECTION 161: statement before the Police need not be signed

SECTION 164: the statement before the Magistrate is signed.However this is not so in statement before the Police. Prior to recording the statement, learned Magistrate can administer the oath to the maker. This is not the case herein. the statement under Section 164 stands on higher pedestal {Para 70}

71. So if we look at the weightage and value of evidence of judicial officer from all the angles, we may find that his evidence cannot be said direct on the point of happening of the incident. Because he is not giving the evidence on the basis of facts seen by him. His evidence is on the point of what he has heard through the mouth of the victim.

72. So for what purpose this provision is included in the Code. The mechanism created by the Code is investigation carried out by the police including recording the statement of the witnesses. Recording statement through the Magistrate is also a part of investigation. Such statement stands on higher pedestal than the police statement. Still we can not attach more value than recognized by the law. Such statement falls within the category of 'previous statement' only. Its use is permissible in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act only.

73. Does it mean to say that this statement can be the basis for conviction just because it is recorded by judicial official and oath is administered? Answer is 'No'. The reason is this statement is not recorded in the presence of the accused and there is no opportunity of the cross-examination to the maker of the statement when such statement is recorded by the Magistrate. So ultimately, when Magistrate gives evidence, his evidence is not the evidence about the witnessing the incident but it is evidence of facts stated before him by the victim.

• Use of such statement

74. If the victim reiterates what she has stated earlier, such statement can be used for corroboration under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. If there is variance in between the particulars stated in such statement and the oral evidence, that statement can be used for the purpose of the contradiction by the defence. So also if the victim has resiled from the statement, it can be used for cross-examination by prosecution. In this case, prosecution has availed of this opportunity. The victim has disowned the contents.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 990 of 2019

Decided On: 09.05.2024

Deelip Tatoba Raje Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.M. Modak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3173/2024.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Mere recovery of currency notes from accused cannot constitute incriminating evidence in absence of corroborative evidence

 I. RECOVERY OF CURRENCY NOTES

29. At the outset, we may take note of the fact that there is a grave discrepancy regarding the exact amount of currency notes recovered by the Investigating Officer (PW.22) purportedly in furtherance of the disclosure statement made by the Appellant-Pooranmal.

30. Whilst in the examination-in-chief, the Investigating Officer (PW.22) deposed that the Appellant-Pooranmal furnished an information Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act [Proviso to Section 23 of the BSA] regarding receipt of the amount of Rs. 46,000/- (Ex. P-44) from Ladu Lal pursuant to a plan to commit the murder of Smt. Aruna.

31. The Investigating Officer (PW.22) further stated that in consequence of the said disclosure, as also another disclosure pertaining to the shirt allegedly worn at the time of the incident, the Appellant-Pooranmal led the police party to his residence and got recovered a shirt (suspected to be blood-stained) kept in an iron box. The said recovery was reduced into writing vide memo (Ex. P-9), and the shirt was sealed at the spot. Further as per the information given by the Appellant-Pooranmal, a sum of Rs. 46,000/- was recovered from his house and was seized vide memo (Ex. P-13). The said amount was also sealed at the spot.

32. In cross-examination, the Investigating Officer (PW.22) admitted that though on the chit of material exhibit (Ex. P-52), the currency notes were mentioned as Rs. 46,000/-, but when the notes were counted in Court, it was noticed that the amount was Rs. 46,145/-. The Investigating Officer (PW.22) admitted that there was no mention of these extra Rs. 145 on the packet marked as (Ex. P-52).

33. Thus, the very factum of recovery of the currency notes comes under a grave cloud of doubt. That apart, mere recovery of currency notes, in the absence of any cogent evidence establishing a clear nexus between the said amount and the crime, would not by itself constitute an incriminating circumstance against the Appellant-Pooranmal. Thus, the said circumstance was wrongly treated to be incriminating by the trial Court as the recovery itself is doubtful and additionally, the mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute incriminating evidence in absence of corroborative evidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1266 of 2026 

Decided On: 10.03.2026

Pooranmal Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 217,MANU/SC/0213/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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From Accused to Approver: How to Weigh Turncoat Testimony after State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Ors.

The Supreme Court’s treatment of PW12 (the approver) in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Ors. dated  May 19, 2026, citation: 2026 INSC 507 substantially refines how trial courts should appreciate approver evidence in a modern conspiracy-cum-murder trial. The judgment both re‑affirms the classic prudential rule of corroboration and corrects some recurring mistakes in how contradictions and “improvements” in an approver’s version are evaluated.

1. The starting point: approver evidence is usable, but with prudence

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What are recent developments in DNA test from perspective of Criminal trial?

 Recent judicial developments show that courts now accept DNA evidence as highly probative, but they insist much more strongly on chain of custody, proper sampling, laboratory integrity, and corroboration before acting on it. From a judge’s point of view, the shift is from treating DNA as merely “scientific and powerful” to asking whether the collection, preservation, documentation, and interpretation are legally reliable and fair.

Main developments

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Bombay HC: Statement recorded U/S 164 of CRPC is not a substantive evidence and it can be used only to corroborate or to contradict the witness

The learned trial Court accepted the statement made by Prashant PW12 under Section 164 of the Code to the effect that the accused had come out of his shop with a broken glass bottle when otherwise Prashant PW12 had not deposed to any such statement in his evidence before the Court. The learned trial Court accepted such a statement by placing reliance on the case of Sachin Shivaji Kadam & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (2) MLR 54. As far as this aspect is concerned the law on the use of statements-recorded under Section 164 of the Code appears to be quite well settled in that the said statements can be used only for the purpose of contradiction under Section 145 or for corroboration under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel on behalf of the accused has placed reliance on the case of Gurjant Singh v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0198/1970 : AIR 1970 SC 1305 wherein the Apex Court has stated that the statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code Could not be considered as evidence but were corroborative of what was stated earlier in the committal Court. Some other decisions on the same point could also be referred to. Generally, statements under Section 164 of the Code are recorded with the avowed hope that the witnesses will not resile from the earliest versions given by them in respect of an incident out of fear of punishment. The Apex Court in Ram Kishan Singh v. Harmit Kaur Anr. MANU/SC/0169/1971 : AIR 1972 SC 468 has reiterated that the statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code is not a substantive evidence and it can be used only to corroborate or to contradict the witness. The same is also the view held by a learned Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Lakhan Sheo Charan & Anr. v. State of U.P. MANU/UP/0302/1991 : 1991 Cri LJ 2790 wherein the learned Division Bench after considering catena of cases (more particularly referred to in para 12 of the judgment) came to the conclusion that the statements under Section 164 of the Code cannot be used as substantive piece of evidence. The learned trial Court therefore was not right on relying on any part of the statement of Prashant PW12 as recorded earlier under Section 164 of the Code when such a statement was not adhered to by him in his evidence before the Court, Moreover, Prashant PW12 had clearly stated that he had given such statement earlier because he was threatened by the police. This is another error committed by the learned trial Court. {P ara 8}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 2007

Decided On: 20.08.2008

Shivaji Gaonkar Vs. State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.A. Britto, J.

Citation: 2008(4) MHLJ (Crl) 419, 2009 ALLMR (Cri) 359,MANU/MH/1632/2008

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Whether court can convict the accused based on the statement of prosecutrix U/S 164 of CRPC if she has not supported the prosecution case?

In this case the attention of the victim is not drawn to Section 164 statement during her evidence before the Court. She was being cross examined on the basis of contents of FIR. Such statement can be used for the purpose of corroboration always by the party who has called the witness. This has not happened in this case. Rightly so question of corroboration has not arisen as the victim has not supported the prosecution case.

PROVISIONS OF LAW

17. Code of Criminal Procedure can be said to be the parent law wherein there is provision for recording such statement by the Magistrate. In sub-section (1) to sub-section (5) of Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, cross examination is not contempalted. Amendment carried out in the year 2013 by incorporating subsection (5A)(a) mandates the judicial Magistrate to record the statement of a witness under certain prescribed offences. Whereas sub-section (5A)(b) gives status to such statement in lieu of examination in chief as specified under section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, such upgradation is not made universal. It is only when the maker is disable either mentally or physically. This is not a case before us.

18. Whereas section 26 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 says about audio video graphic exercise of recording the statement. There are also safeguards under section 24 and 25 of the said Act. Still we have got no provision wherein the statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. has been given status of examination in chief. 

20. We have perused those situations. On reading them it is clear that the Court has taken a consistent view “that section 164 Statement can be used only for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction and it cannot be treated as substantive evidence” 

21.  We have to understand that the Court gives a verdict on the basis of evidence before the Court. Whatever material is collected during investigation (either in the form of panchanamas or section 164 statement) can be converted into an evidence only when certain witness deposes before the Court.

CORROBORATION

26. So when the trial Court opined that section 164 statement can be utilized by way of corroboration, we fail to understand what the trial Court mean to say corroboration of which fact? If the evidence of principal fact is not there, the evidence adduced of subsequent fact how it can be used for corroboration. Trial Court has failed to consider this difference and infact has considered section 164 statement as a substantive evidence itself. This is not permissible. We are inclined to set aside that observation. 

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Prasanna B. Varale and S.M. Modak, JJ.)

Imran Shabbir Gauri Vs State of Maharashtra 

Criminal Appeal No. 831 of 2015

Decided on March 31, 2021, 

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 511

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Whether test identification parade can be relied on if witnesses fail to give identification marks or special features of accused?

In cases of inordinate delay, it may be that the witnesses may forget the features of the accused put up for identification in the test identification parade. This, however, is not an absolute Rule because it depends upon the facts of each case and the opportunity which the witnesses had to notice the features of the accused and the circumstances in which they had seen the accused committing the offence. Where the witness had only a fleeting glimpse of the accused at the time of occurrence, delay in holding a test identification parade has to be viewed seriously. Where, however, the court is satisfied that the witnesses had ample opportunity of seeing the accused at the time of the commission of the offence and there is no chance of mistaken identity, delay in holding the test identification parade may not be held to be fatal. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

43. It will thus be seen that the evidence of identification has to be considered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Though it is desirable to hold the test identification parade at the earliest-possible opportunity, no hard-and-fast Rule can be laid down in this regard. If the delay is inordinate and there is evidence probabilising the possibility of the accused having been shown to the witnesses, the court may not act on the basis of such evidence. Moreover, cases where the conviction is based not solely on the basis of identification in court, but on the basis of other corroborative evidence, such as recovery of looted articles, stand on a different footing and the court has to consider the evidence in its entirety.

15. In the case in hand, apart from the fact that there was delay in holding the Test Identification Parade, one striking feature is that none of the concerned prosecution witnesses had given any identification marks or disclosed special features or attributes of any of those four persons in general and the accused in particular. Further, no incident or crime had actually taken place in the presence of those prosecution witnesses nor any special circumstances had occurred which would invite their attention so as to register the features or special attributes of the concerned accused. Their chance meeting, as alleged, was in the night and was only for some fleeting moments.

16. In Subash v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0308/1987 : 1987 (3) SCC 331, the aspects of delay as well as absence of any special features for identification and the effect thereof were considered by this Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under:

8. Apart from this infirmity we further find that Shiv Shankar was not put up for test identification parade promptly. The identification parade has been held three weeks after his arrest and no explanation has been offered for the delay in holding the test identification parade. There is, therefore, room for doubt as to whether the delay in holding the identification parade was in order to enable the identifying witnesses to see him in the police lock-up or in the jail premises and make a note of his features.

9. Over and above all these things there remains the fact that a sufficiently long interval of time had elapsed between the date of occurrence when the witnesses had seen Shiv Shankar for a few minutes and the date of the test identification parade. It is, no doubt, true that all the three witnesses had correctly identified Shiv Shankar at the identification parade but it has to be borne in mind that nearly 4 months had elapsed during the interval. It is relevant to mention here that neither in Exhibit Kha-1 nor in their statements during investigation, the eyewitnesses have given any descriptive particulars of Shiv Shankar. While deposing before the Sessions Judge they have stated that Shiv Shankar was a tall person and had "sallow" complexion. If it is on account of these features the witnesses were able to identify Shiv Shankar at the identification parade, they would have certainly mentioned about them at the earliest point of time because their memory would have been fresh then. Thus in the absence of any descriptive particulars of Shiv Shankar in Ex. Kha-1 or in the statements of witnesses during investigation, it will not be safe and proper to act upon the identification of Shiv Shankar by the three witnesses at the identification parade and hold that he was one of the assailants of Ram Babu. As pointed out in Muthuswami v. State of Madras MANU/SC/0075/1951 : AIR 1954 SC 4 : 1954 Cri. LJ 236 where an identification parade was held about 2 1/2 months after the occurrence it would not be safe to place reliance on the identification of the accused by the eyewitnesses. In another case Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P. MANU/SC/0091/1982 : AIR 1983 SC 367 : (1983) 1 SCC 143. It was held that where the witnesses had not given any description of the accused in the first information report, their identification of the accused at the sessions trial cannot be safely accepted by the court for awarding conviction to the accused. In the present case there was a long interval of nearly 4 months before the test identification parade was held and it is difficult to accept that in spite of this interval of time the witnesses were able to have a clear image of the accused in their minds and identify him correctly at the identification parade.

17. Similarly the issue of delay weighed with this Court in Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. MANU/SC/0065/2010 : 2010 (2) SCC 748 in discarding the evidence regarding test identification as under:

8. Insofar as the identification of A-5 is concerned that has taken place at a very delayed stage, namely, his identification took place on 24-1-2001 and the incident is of 29-11-2000, even though A-5 was arrested on 22-12-2000. There is no explanation why his identification parade was held on 24-1-2001 which is after a gap of over a month from the date of arrest and after about 3 months from the date of the incident. No reliance ought to have been placed by the courts below or the High Court on such delayed TI parade for which there is no explanation by the prosecution.

18. In the instant case none of the witnesses had disclosed any features for identification which would lend some corroboration. The identification parade itself was held 25 days after the arrest. Their chance meeting was also in the night without there being any special occasion for them to notice the features of any of the accused which would then register in their minds so as to enable them to identify them on a future date. The chance meeting was also for few minutes. In the circumstances, in our considered view such identification simpliciter cannot form the basis or be taken as the fulcrum for the entire case of prosecution. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1953 of 2010

Decided On: 06.01.2017

Md. Sajjad Vs.State of West Bengal

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Whether expert opinion requires corroboration?

An expert’s opinion does not always need corroboration, but
it must be complete, i.e., based on a completeness of factualmaterial, and must reflect sound reasoning. Mr. Narula relies on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Murari Lal s/o Ram Singh v State of
Madhya Pradesh49 for the proposition that corroboration is not
invariably required. This is true. However, the Court in Murari Lal
also held that on the facts of a particular case, a court may require
corroboration; the degree of corroboration might vary from case to
case. A court should be cautious, not suspicious.50 It should

48 Dr. Khatri’s report, p. 394.
49 (1980) 1 SCC 704.
50 H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma and Ors., 1959 Supp (1)
SCR 426.
consider all other relevant evidence and then decide whether to
accept or reject it. Handwriting analysis is an imperfect science.
Experts’ opinions are error-prone. They are not to be brushed aside,
but they are also not to be accepted as the unvarnished truth merely
because they say a particular thing. Nothing prevents the court from
comparing the disputed writing with the admitted writing and then
coming to a conclusion of its own. If there is an opinion of an expert,
or of any witness, the court may apply its own observation by
comparing the signatures, or handwriting for providing a decisive
weight or influence to its decision. In Ajay K. Parmar v State of
Rajasthan,51 the Supreme Court held that the evidence of an expert
witness, though inconclusive on its own, was not to be discarded

entirely. The final decision is always that of the Court.52

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY & INTESTATE JURISDICTION
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 20 OF 2005
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 753 OF 2004
SHIRISH POPATLAL SHAH,
v
ARUN POPATLAL SHAH,
CORAM : G.S.Patel, J.
Dated : 8th July 2016
Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 257

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Whether admission of party in pleading or oral requires corroboration?

 Keeping the above undisputed facts in mind, when we examine the legal issue, at the very outset, it will have to be stated that even while holding that Exhibits 68-69 being unregistered documents cannot be accepted in evidence, the relationship of the appellants and the respondent as landlord and tenant was not in controversy. Even according to the respondent himself the rent payable was Rs.800/- per year which was admittedly not paid by him right from day one when the tenancy commenced. It was an admitted case of the respondent that the rent was due from him from October, 1971 till the third suit was filed. We are unable to appreciate as to how the appellants could have been non-suited solely on the ground that Exhibit-69 was not admissible in evidence. It is needless to emphasize that admission of a party in the proceedings either in the pleadings or oral is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration. In our considered opinion, that vital aspect in the case (viz) the admission of the respondent in the written statement about the rate of rent and the further admission about its non- payment for the entire period for which the claim was made in the three suits was sufficient to support the suit claim. The High Court failed to note the said factor while deciding the Second Appeal which led to the dismissal of the appeals. Even while eschewing Exhibit-69 from consideration, the High Court should have noted that the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiffs and the defendants was an established factor and the rate of rent was admitted as Rs. 800/- per year.
Reportale

Supreme Court of India

Ahmedsaheb(D) By Lrs.& Ors vs Sayed Ismail on 19 July, 2012

Bench: T.S. Thakur, Fakkir Mohamed Kalifulla

Citation:2012(6) MHLJ503

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Whether Statement of victim recorded U/S 164 of crpc can be read in evidence as per S 33 of Indian evidence Act?

For the application of Section 33 Indian Evidence Act, it is mandatory that the adversary must have the right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness, but at the time of recording statement u/s 164, Cr.P.C, there vests no right or opportunity with the adversary to cross-examine the witness. Hence, Section 33 of Indian Evidence Act is not applicable in the case at hand meaning thereby that we cannot legally read the statement of victim recorded u/s 164,Cr.P.C on the strength of Section 33 of Indian Evidence Act at least. However, the statement of witness recorded u/s 164, Cr.P.C, itself bears a corroborative value.

Jharkhand High Court

Barju Sah vs State Of Jharkhand on 13 August, 2015

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What is object of recording statement of witness U/S 164 of CRPC?

 So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 164 is concerned, the object is two fold; in the first place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by denying the contents of his previously recorded statement, and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section 164, his evidence in Court should be discarded, is not at all warranted. (Vide: Jogendra Nahak & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2565; and Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 2901).

16. Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements made by witnesses in the Committal Court or even to contradict the same. As the defence had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements are recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., such statements cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

Supreme Court of India

R. Shaji vs State Of Kerala on 4 February, 2013

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Difference between the statement recorded under sec. 162 and sec. 164 of crpc

There is a difference between the statement recorded under sec. 162 and sec. 164. Statement under the provisions of sec. 162 is recorded by the police as a matter of preliminary investigation in to the case before filing charge sheet in the court of law, while statement u/s 164 is recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate as a confession of a person (may or may not be during the course of trial), but like an examination-in-chief to be used in the course of a trial. While statement u/s 162 is not signed, statement u/s 164 is signed by the person making statement. Statement u/ 162 cannot be relied until proved beyond doubt, while a confession made u/s 164 has to be relied as is made before a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate.

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