Showing posts with label derivative title. Show all posts
Showing posts with label derivative title. Show all posts

Sunday, 22 December 2019

Supreme Court: Right of tenant to challenge derivative title of landlord will be lost on attornment

It has been held by a two Judge bench of this Court in
the case of Bismillah Be(Dead) by Legal
Representatives Vs. Majeed Shah 2017 2 SCC 274:-

“24. Law relating to derivative title of the landlord (Lessor)
and challenge, if made, to such title by the tenant (Lessee)
during subsistence of tenancy in relation to demised
property is fairly well settled. Though by virtue of Section
116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the tenant is estopped from
challenging the title of his landlord during continuance of
the tenancy, yet the tenant/lessee is entitled to challenge
the derivative title of an Assignee/Vendee of the original
landlord (Lessor) of the demised property in an action
brought by the Assignee/Vendee against the tenant for his
eviction from the demised property under the Rent laws.
This right of a tenant is, however, subject to one caveat that
the tenant/lessee has not attorned to the Assignee/Vendee.
In other words, if the tenant/lessee pays rent to the
Assignee/Vendee of the tenanted property then it results in
creation of an attornment between the parties which, in
turn, deprives the tenant/lessee to challenge the derivative
title of an Assignee/Vendee in the proceedings.”
This authority has been followed in a later case,
Company Limited [(2018) 6 SCC 744]. It has been held
in this case:-
“42... Similarly, the law relating to derivative title to the
landlord and when the tenant challenges it during
subsistence of his tenancy in relation to the demised
property is also fairly well settled. Though by virtue of
Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped
from challenging the title of his landlord, yet the tenant is
entitled to challenge the derivative title of an assignee of
the original landlord of the demised property in an action
brought by the assignee against the tenant for his eviction
under the rent laws. However, this right of a tenant is
subject to one caveat that the tenant has not attorned to
the assignee. If the tenant pays rent to the assignee or
otherwise accepts the assignee’s title over the demised
property, then it results in creation of the attornment which,
in turn, deprives the tenant to challenge the derivative title
of the landlord.”

NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4726 OF 2010

VINAY EKNATH LAD  Vs CHIU MAO CHEN 

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Dated: December 18, 2019
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Sunday, 20 October 2019

How defect in Notice U/S 106 of Transfer of property Act regarding title of landlord in eviction suit is cured?

 A perusal of the above extracted portion clearly shows that the vendors agreed and confirmed that they had on 26.09.1998 duly executed the Deed of Conveyance in favour of the purchaser. The original Deed of Conveyance was annexed and marked Exhibit-A. The vendors further agreed and confirmed that for all practical purposes, the said land and the premises described in the Second Schedule written thereunder shall be deemed to have been conveyed to the purchaser (plaintiff) as from 26.09.1998 and that they have done no act, deed, matter or things whereby they prevented from executing or granting or conveying the said land and the premises. Applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Official Trustees of W.B. (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the vendors admitted and acknowledged the fact of conveying the land and the premises, more particularly described in the Second Schedule, to the plaintiff. It is not in dispute that the suit premises forms part of the Second Schedule. The plaintiff, therefore, for all intent and purport became owner. As mentioned earlier, the Deed of Confirmation was executed and lodged for registration on 03.08.1999 and was duly registered on 03.01.2005. In view of Section 47 of the Registration Act, the Deed of Confirmation is operative from 03.08.1999. As mentioned earlier, plaintiff had issued notice of termination on 27.08.2000 and 28.08.2000. The Suit is instituted in the year 2002. Thus, when the plaintiff had issued termination notice and instituted Suit, he was owner of the suit premises. The defect of non-registration of Deed of Conveyance was cured by execution of Deed of Confirmation. In view thereof, I do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Shah that the finding recorded by the Appellate Court in paragraph 28 is legally incorrect.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 180 of 2010

Decided On: 05.04.2019

Mahendra Valji Rathod  Vs.  National Radio and Electronics Company

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.G. Ketkar, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 795
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Monday, 1 July 2019

Whether every suit relating to public trust should be filed U/S 92 of CPC?

 It is argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that
if the appellants wanted any relief against the respondents complaining
of a breach of trust, their remedy should have been a suit under
Section 92 of the Code. In answer to this contention, learned counsel
replied that the appellants do not seek any of the reliefs enumerated in
Section 92(1) (a) to (h) of the Code. Settled legal position is that any
and every suit relating to a public trust need not be under Section 92 of
the Code, unless the reliefs claimed therein do fall within the matters
enumerated in Section 92(1) of the Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
 MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
MRS. JUSTICE SHIRCY V.

RFA.No. 360 of 2018

P.E. THOMAS EACEY, Vs MR.ABRAHAM JOSE ROCKY,

Dated this the 21st day of June, 2019


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Sunday, 17 March 2019

When it is permissible for tenant to deny title of landlord?

The rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. During the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant cannot acquire by prescription a permanent right of occupancy in derogation of the landlord's title by mere assertion of such a right to the knowledge of the landlord. See: Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh ILR (1915) 37 All. 557 (PC) and Atyam Veerraju and Ors. v. Pechetti Venkanna and Ors. MANU/SC/0349/1965 : [1966]1SCR831 . The general rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions. Thus

a tenant is not precluded from denying the derivative title of the persons claiming through the landlord.
See: Kumar Krishna Prosad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern Limited and Ors. MANU/PR/0072/1937. Similarly, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy. From this, the exception follows, that
it is open to the tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the tenancy, the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title-holder.
In order to constitute eviction by title paramount, it has been established by decisions in England and in India, that it is not necessary that the tenant should be dispossessed or even that there should be a suit in ejectment against him. It will be sufficient if there was threat of eviction and if the tenant as a result of such threat attars to the real owner, he can set up such eviction by way of defence either to an action for rent or to a suit in ejectment. If the tenant, however, gives up possession voluntarily to the title-holder, he cannot claim the benefit of this rule. When the tenancy has been determined by eviction by title paramount, no question of estoppel arises under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. See : Adyanath Ghatak v. Krishna Prasad Singh and Anr. MANU/PR/0056/1948. The principle must equally apply when the tenant has attorned under a threat of eviction by the title paramount and there comes into existence a new jural relationship of landlord and tenant as between them. The law is stated in 27 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn., para 238:
238. Eviction under title paramount. In order to constitute an eviction by a person claiming under title paramount, it is not necessary that the tenant should be put out of possession, or that proceedings should be brought. A threat of eviction is sufficient, and if the tenant, in consequence of that threat, attars to the claimant, he may set this up as an eviction by way of defence to an action for rent, subject to his proving the evictor's title. There is no eviction, however, if the tenant gives up possession voluntarily.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2223 of 1987

Decided On: 15.09.1987

 D. Satyanarayana Vs.  P. Jagadish

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.P. Sen and B.C. Ray, JJ.

Citation : AIR 1987 SC 2192

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Saturday, 10 November 2018

How landlord should prove his title in eviction suit against tenant?

 It is a settled principle of law laid down by this Court that in an eviction suit filed by the landlord against the tenant under the Rent Laws, when the issue of title over the tenanted premises is raised, the landlord is not expected to prove his title like what he is required to prove in a title suit.

46. In other words, the burden of proving the ownership in an eviction suit is not the same like a title suit. (See Sheela and Ors. v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash MANU/SC/0150/2002 : 2002 (3) SCC 375, Para 10 at page 383 and also Boorugu Mahadev & Sons and Anr. v. Sirigiri Narasing Rao and Ors. MANU/SC/0044/2016 : 2016 (3) SCC 343, Para 18 at page 349).

47. Similarly, the law relating to derivative title to the landlord and when the tenant challenges it during subsistence of his tenancy in relation to the demised property is also fairly well settled. Though by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of his landlord, yet the tenant is entitled to challenge the derivative title of an assignee of the original landlord of the demised property in an action brought by the assignee against the tenant for his eviction under the Rent laws. However, this right of a tenant is subject to one caveat that the tenant has not attorned to the assignee. If the tenant pays rent to the assignee or otherwise accepts the assignee's title over the demised property, then it results in creation of the attornment which, in turn, deprives the tenant to challenge the derivative title of the landlord. [See Bismillah De (dead) by Legal Representatives v. Majeed Shah MANU/SC/1557/2016 : 2017 (2) SCC 274 Para 24]

48. It is equally well-settled law with regard to attornment that it does not create any new tenancy but once the factum of attornment is proved then by virtue of such attornment, the old tenancy continues. (See Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju and Anr. v. Josyula Hanumayamma and Anr. MANU/SC/0343/1961 : AIR 1967 SC 174).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4249 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 27775 of 2017)

Decided On: 20.04.2018

Apollo Zipper India Limited Vs. W. Newman and Co. Ltd.
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Wednesday, 15 August 2018

Whether attornment of tenancy can be proved by conduct of tenant?

The singular question to be examined in the present case is whether the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The receipt of notice by the Defendant is admitted in the written statement. The Defendant has not raised any specific objection as to the validity of the notice. An objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice Under Section 106 of the TP Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. It cannot, therefore, be said that the notice in the present case suffered from any infirmity. A copy of the notice was exhibited and proved by the Plaintiff as Ext. P-4.

60. Second, the Respondent by letters dated 13.06.2006, 27.06.2006, 05.07.2006 and 11.07.2006, sent to the Appellant on the question of ownership of the suit premises and payment of rent had expressed their willingness to attorn and continue the tenancy with the Appellant and also offered to pay rent to the Appellant. (See pages 198 & 199 of the SLP Paper Book-order of the Single Judge)

61. Third, the Respondent in their civil suit (No. 1183 of 2012) filed against the Appellant in Paras 15, 17, 18 and relief Clause (e) of the plaint admitted the ownership of the Appellant over the suit premises and went to the extent of seeking the mandatory injunction against the Appellant directing them to accept the monthly rent of the suit premises from the Respondent.

62. In other words, reading of the aforementioned paras in the Respondent's plaint including the relief Clause (e) would go to show that the Respondent was all along willing to accept and indeed actually accepted the ownership of the Appellant over the suit premises and, therefore, sought mandatory injunction against the Appellant to accept them as tenant. The conduct of the Respondent, therefore, disentitles them to now raise a new plea questioning the title of the Appellant over the suit premises and a plea of attornment. Both, in our opinion, are wholly misconceived pleas and, therefore, deserve to be rejected.

63. As mentioned above, the title of the landlord over the tenanted premises in a suit for eviction cannot be examined like a title suit. Similarly, the attornment can be proved by several circumstances including taking into consideration the conduct of the tenant qua landlord.

64. The aforesaid three circumstances, in our opinion, are, therefore, more than sufficient to record a finding that the Appellant was prima facie able to prove their title over the suit premises so also was able to prove the factum of "attornment" made by the Respondent in relation to the suit premises in Appellant's favour thereby entitling the Appellant to determine the contractual tenancy which was devolved upon them by operation of law.

65. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench that there was some dispute or confusion as to who is the owner of the suit premises. In our view, there was neither any dispute and nor confusion and nor any ambiguity over the question of title over the suit premises which needed any elaborate inquiry.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4249 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 27775 of 2017)

Decided On: 20.04.2018

Apollo Zipper India Limited Vs. W. Newman and Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 6 SCC 744
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Saturday, 13 January 2018

Whether tenant should file interpleader suit if he has doubt as to who is owner of tenanted premises?

 In the case of Bharat Bhushan Vij vs. Arti Techchandani, 2008 (153) DLT 247 in paras 4 and 5 it was held as under :
"4. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after death of the original owner without demur and without raising an objection against the person, who claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner.

Delhi High Court

Subhash Jain vs Ravi Sehgal on 4 February, 2014
Author: Manmohan Singh
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Whether tenant can challenge ownership of landlord over tenanted premises in eviction suit?

There is a specific reference to the registered document under which the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord in the plaint. Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant. We notice that there are several documents on record relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet, the respondent refused to acknowledge the appellant’s title. He denied it in his evidence. This is not a simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord. Even after going through the relevant documents relating to the appellant’s title the respondent feigned ignorance about it. The High Court has accepted that in his cross-examination the respondent has stated that he was not accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no decree of eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish in what circumstances he denied the title of the appellant. The High Court has further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking the appellant to produce documentary evidence about his title as a landlord. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing such a conclusion. Even denial of a landlord’s title in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a tenant. It is also settled position in law that it is not necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings. This is so stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs.[10].
14. The High Court has expressed that the respondent was justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents. Implicit in this observation is the High Court’s view that the respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in this reasoning. In eviction proceedings the question of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally. Similar question fell for consideration of this Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu. In that case it was argued that the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence could not maintain the application for eviction on the ground of default and sub- letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act. This Court referred to its decision in Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge and Ors.[11] in which it was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the landlady on the general principle of estoppel between landlord and tenant and that this principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. Section 116 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to such a situation. This Court held that even if the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question, she could still maintain the application for eviction and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below in favour of the landlady was not liable to be disturbed. The position on law was stated by this Court as under:
“In this connection, we may also point out that in an eviction petition filed on the ground of sub-letting and default, the court needs to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question, which may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”
 REPORTABLE
 Supreme Court of India
Keshar Bai vs Chhunulal on 7 January, 2014

Bench: Ranjana Prakash Desai, J. Chelameswar
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014
      
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Thursday, 8 May 2014

Whether Tenant denying title of landlord is liable to be evicted?


  17. In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer  of
           tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect  adversely
           and substantially the interest of the landlord and  hence  is  a
           ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of  clause  (c)
           of sub-section (1) of  Section  12  of  the  M.P.  Accommodation
           Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial  or  disclaimer,  as
           would  entail  forfeiture  of  tenancy  rights  and  incur   the
           liability to be evicted, the tenant should  have  renounced  his
           character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal  terms  set  up
           title of the landlord in himself or in a third party.  A  tenant
           bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove  his  ownership  or
           putting the landlord to proof of his  title  so  as  to  protect
           himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available
           to him by  the  rent  control  law  but  without  disowning  his
           character of possession over  the  tenancy  premises  as  tenant
           cannot  be  said  to  have  denied  the  title  of  landlord  or
           disclaimed the tenancy. Such an  act  of  the  tenant  does  not
           attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It  is  the
           intention of the tenant, as culled out from the  nature  of  the
           plea  raised   by   him,   which   is   determinative   of   its
           vulnerability.”

  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5126 of 2011]


KESHAR BAI   Vs   CHHUNULAL                   


    Citation:2014(2) ALLMR 937 SC,AIR 2014 SC 1394


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
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