Showing posts with label execution of arbitration award. Show all posts
Showing posts with label execution of arbitration award. Show all posts

Sunday, 2 March 2025

Delhi HC: Whether the court should direct deposit of Arbitration award amount U/S 9 of Arbitration Act?

Arbitration -Amount awarded -Deposit of -Sections 9 and36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -Present petition filed under Section 9 of Arbitration Act seeking deposit of amount awarded to NHAI and restraining respondent from alienating assets -Whether respondent must secure and deposit awarded amount and disclose assets to safeguard enforcement of arbitral award -Held, Section 9 of Arbitration Act permits reliefs before, during, or post-arbitration -Post-award, execution under Section 36 of Arbitration Act is standard for enforcing awards -Courts rarely order deposits under Section 9of Arbitration Act, except in exceptional cases where it's vital to protect award holder -Merely winning award doesn't justify deposit orders -Courts require evidence of risks rendering award unenforceable -Grounds like financial instability or asset movement must be substantiated -NHAI's plea cites stakes involved and respondent's financial condition -It only speculates risks without proof of asset dissipation or unrealisable claims -Concession agreement remains active, and IRB pledged no fund appropriation from escrow until dues clear -Courts apply strict standards to post-award Section 9 of Arbitration Act relief -There must be realisable award and proof of risk making it illusory -Precarious financial conditions alone are insufficient -IRB's substantial investments and commitments negate grounds for immediate deposit -Courts must balance fairness while ensuring awards aren't rendered illusory -Current facts don't justify granting NHAI's requested deposit -Petition dismissed. Deposit under Section 9 of Arbitration Act needs proven risk of award becoming unenforceable, not mere existence of award.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

OMP (I) (Comm.) 172/2024

Decided On: 18.10.2024

National Highways Authority of India Vs. IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Tollways Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/7333/2024, 2024:DHC:8034.
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Sunday, 22 December 2024

Bombay HC: Arbitral Award can be executed by the court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution

Conclusion:

26. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we find that after an award attains finality and the stage as contemplated by provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has been crossed, the final arbitral award under Part-I of the Act of 1996 has to be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The legal fiction under Section 36 is only for the limited purpose of enforcement of an award as a decree. At that stage, the provisions of Sections 38 and 39 of the Code would come into operation. These provisions permit a decree to be executed either by the Court which passed it [the Court as defined by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act of 1996] or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court which passed the decree can also transfer it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction. Proceedings for execution of an arbitral award are beyond the purview of Section 42 of the Act of 1996, inasmuch as such proceedings are not in the nature of any application under Part-I of the Act of 1996. The view as taken by the Division Bench in Akola Janta Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. [supra] that a decree holder must apply for execution of an award to the Court of District Judge who may thereafter execute the award as a decree himself or send it for execution to another Court including a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction commends itself and we respectfully concur with the same. The modality prescribed therein that all applications for execution of awards be first placed before the District Judge who may then execute the same himself or send it to subordinate Courts under Section 38 read with Section 39(2) of the Code is found appropriate in these circumstances.

27. We are, therefore, in respectful disagreement with the views expressed in the order of Reference in Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. [supra] that a Court subordinate to the Court of District Judge [here the Court of Principal District Judge] cannot be recognized as a Court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcement of awards under the Act of 1996. The view taken by learned Single Judge in Arunkumar Deedwania [supra] stands affirmed and the view taken in Sanjay Suryakant Mhaske & others [supra] with respect stands overruled.

30. The Reference accordingly stands answered as follows:-

An Award made under Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be executed not only by the Court as defined by Section 2(1)(e)(i) but also by the Court to which it is sent for execution under Sections 38 and 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition Nos. 6066 and 4682 of 2012

Decided On: 16.02.2018

Gemini Bay Transcription Private Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Deshpande, A.S. Chandurkar and M.G. Giratkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0265/2018, AIR 2018 BOMBAY 89, (2018) 2 MAH LJ 329.

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Friday, 7 April 2023

Whether ๐“๐ก๐ข๐ซ๐ ๐๐š๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ ๐…๐ฎ๐ง๐๐ข๐ง๐  ๐ญ๐ก๐ž ๐‹๐ข๐ญ๐ข๐ ๐š๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐Ÿ๐จ๐ซ ๐†๐š๐ข๐ง ๐‚๐š๐ง ๐„๐ฌ๐œ๐š๐ฉ๐ž its ๐‹๐ข๐š๐›๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐ข๐Ÿ ๐ญ๐ก๐ž ๐‘๐ž๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฅ๐ญ of litigation ๐ข๐ฌ ๐”๐ง๐Ÿ๐š๐ฏ๐จ๐ฎ๐ซ๐š๐›๐ฅ๐ž?


 Prima facie, I am in agreement with the above observations. A party having funded the litigation for a gain in the result thereof, cannot escape its liability in case the result is contrary to its expectation. A balance would have to be struck between a need to ensure the access to justice through this funding arrangement and the cost that the defendant would bear in case such litigation fails and is found to be completely meritless, as in the present case. The defendant cannot be left high and dry and be made to bear its own cost for the purposes of defending a litigation, which was found without any merit and which may not have been initiated against such party but for the funding by the third party. In fact, prima facie, the costs which have been levied by the Arbitral Award would become the cost which will

be covered by the Bespoke Agreement itself, as these are costs of

litigation of respondent nos.1 to 4 herein. {Para 17}

18. The fact that the Bespoke Agreement states that it shall stand

terminated in case the claim is not successful, can also, prima facie,

not affect the right of the petitioner inasmuch as the said agreement

would continue till the passing of the Arbitral Award and the costs arepart of the Arbitral Award. Thereafter, the petitioner is only seeking to enforce the Arbitral Award in terms of the Bespoke Agreement.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 71/2023

SBS HOLDING INC Vs ANANT KUMAR CHOUDHARY & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

Dated:  07.03.2023
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Saturday, 9 April 2022

Whether the court can execute a void arbitral award if parties had participated in the arbitration proceeding?

 Prima facie, if the award is void ab initio on the ground of ineligibility of an arbitrator, the participation of any party in the arbitral proceedings may not be sufficient to infuse life to the arbitral proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

 O.M.P. (COMM) 16/2020 & I.A. 438/2020 & I.A. 440/2020; 

RUIA EXPORTS & ANR. Vs MONEYWISE FINANCIAL SERVICES PVT.LTD & ORS.

Dated: 23.03.2022 

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Monday, 7 February 2022

Delhi HC: Arbitral Award Is To Be Executed At A Place Where Judgment Debtor Resides, Carries Business Or Has Assets

 There is no justification for filing an execution petition before the court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral award was passed, and then seek a transfer to the Court which has jurisdiction over the Judgment Debtor or their properties. Irrespective of the place where the award was passed, it is to be executed by a Court within whose jurisdiction the Judgment Debtor resides, carries on business or his property is situated. Since the Judgment Debtor is admittedly residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Chennai, such courts would certainly have territorial jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award. Thus, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. {Para 12}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 38/2021, EX.APPL.(OS) 981/2021,

EX.APPL.(OS) 1034/2021 and EX.APPL.(OS) 1367/2021

CONTINENTAL ENGINEERING CORPORATION Vs

SUGESAN TRANSPORT PVT. LTD.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

Dated:10.01.2022

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Sunday, 19 January 2020

Whether execution application can be dismissed on ground that Arbitration award is not registered?

 Dismissal of the execution proceedings seeking to execute an award passed by an Arbitrator on the ground that said award was unregistered is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition.
As per the provisions of Section 17(1)(b) of the said Act, it is clear that in any testamentary document purporting to create or declare any right, title or interest in any immovable property exceeding value of Rs. 100/- is compulsory registrable. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 support the aforesaid proposition. On reading of the entire award, it becomes clear that ownership rights in favour of the parties has been created with regard to some of the properties and they have been called upon to relinquish their rights with regard to other properties. It is therefore evident that since the right, title and interest was being created in immovable property exceeding the value of Rs. 100/-, the award was required to be duly registered. In absence of such registration, the award cannot be executed. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision in Sita Ram Bhama Vs. Ramvatar Bhama, MANU/SC/0284/2018 : (2018)15 Supreme Court Cases 130.

The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not lay down that even if any right, title and interest is created in immovable property exceeding the value of Rs. 100/-, registration of such documents is not necessary. The aspect of pre-existing rights is also not very relevant especially when both the parties are required to relinquish their rights in favour of the other party with regard to some properties.

7. It is thus found that the Executing Court was legally correct in coming to the conclusion that as the award that was sought to be executed was not registered, the execution proceedings were not tenable. I therefore do not find any reason to interfere with the said order. By observing that it is open for the petitioner to have the award registered and thereafter take such steps as are permissible in law to execute the award, 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4571/2016

Decided On: 10.06.2019

Ramchandra Vs. Kiran and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2020(1) MHLJ 84 SC
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Thursday, 31 October 2019

Supreme Court: Government is not entitled to get unconditional stay to execution of arbitration award

 It may be true that the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a differential treatment to the Government in certain cases, but the same may not be so applicable while considering a case against the Government under the Arbitration Act. For instance, Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure provides for a notice of two months to be given before any suit is instituted against the Government. Further, it is also provides that no ex-parte injunction order can be passed against the Government. Whereas on the other hand, under the Arbitration Act no such special provision has been made with regard to arbitration by or against the Government. There is no requirement under the Arbitration Act for a notice of two months to be given to the Government before invoking arbitration proceeding against the Government. Further, Sections 9 and 17 of the Arbitration Act also provide for grant of ex-parte interim orders against the Government.

26. Section 36 of the Arbitration Act also does not provide for any special treatment to the Government while dealing with grant of stay in an application under proceedings of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Keeping the aforesaid in consideration and also the provisions of Section 18 providing for equal treatment of parties, it would, in our view, make it clear that there is no exceptional treatment to be given to the Government while considering the application for stay Under Section 36 filed by the Government in proceedings Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

27. Although we are of the firm view that the archaic Rule 8A of Order XXVII Code of Civil Procedure has no application or reference in the present times, we may only add that even if it is assumed that the provisions of Order XXVII Rule 8A of Code of Civil Procedure are to be applied, the same would only exempt the Government from furnishing security, whereas Under Order XLI Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has the power to direct for full or part deposit and/or to furnish security of the decretal amount. Rule 8A only provides exemption from furnishing security, which would not restrict the Court from directing deposit of the awarded amount and part thereof.

28. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the Calcutta High Court granting unconditional stay of the arbitration award dated 21.01.2010, cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5432 of 2019 

Decided On: 12.07.2019

 Pam Developments Private Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3937,(2019) 8 SCC 112
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Thursday, 21 February 2019

Whether court is required to see issue of maintainability and enforceability of foreign arbitration award simultaneously?

 Be that as it may, the grounds urged by the petitioner in
the earlier round regarding the maintainability of the
execution case could not have been considered in isolation
and de hors the issue of enforceability of the subject foreign
awards. For, the same was intrinsically linked to the question
of enforceability of the subject foreign awards. In any case, all
contentions available to the petitioner in that regard could and
ought to have been raised specifically and, if raised, could
have been examined by the Court at that stage itself. We are of
the considered opinion that the scheme of Section 48 of the
Act does not envisage piecemeal consideration of the issue of
maintainability of the execution case concerning the foreign
awards, in the first place; and then the issue of enforceability
thereof. Whereas, keeping in mind the legislative intent of

speedy disposal of arbitration proceedings and limited
interference by the courts, the Court is expected to consider
both these aspects simultaneously at the threshold. Taking
any other view would result in encouraging successive and
multiple round of proceedings for the execution of foreign
awards. We cannot countenance such a situation keeping in
mind the avowed object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, in particular, while dealing with the enforcement of
foreign awards. For, the scope of interference has been
consciously constricted by the legislature in relation to the
execution of foreign awards. Therefore, the subject application
filed by the petitioner deserves to be rejected, being barred by
constructive res judicata, as has been justly observed by the
High Court in the impugned judgment.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 540 OF 2018

LMJ International Ltd. Vs Sleepwell Industries Co. Ltd. 

Dated:February 20, 2019.

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
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Sunday, 25 November 2018

Whether it is mandatory for court to impose conditions while granting stay to execution of arbitration award?

A bare perusal of the provisions of Section 36 shows that the jurisdiction so conferred on the Court is a discretionary jurisdiction. The proviso to Sub-section (3) further makes it implicit that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 1 Sub-Rule 3 and Rule 5 would become relevant. In exercising powers under Order 41 Rule 5 the Court exercises its discretion and may grant a stay to the execution of a decree if "sufficient cause" is made out and the party seeking stay satisfies the Court that it will sustain substantial loss and inter-alia satisfies the condition as stipulated in sub-Rule 3 of Rule 5. Thus, the under scheme of the provisions of Section 36 read with Order 41 Rules 1 and 5 of the C.P.C., the party opposing grant of a stay cannot assert a proposition that it would be mandatory for the Court to impose a condition for a stay to the execution proceedings. It is for the Court to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and exercise its discretion either to grant a stay to the execution of the decree or impose or not impose any other condition, as the Court may deem appropriate. The above position in law has been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court in Malwa Strips Private Limited Versus Jyoti Limited1. The discretion so vested in the Court is required to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily and in the interest of justice. (see Sihor Nagar Palika Bureau Versus Bhabhlubhai Virabhai & Co. (supra). Adverting to these principles of law, the learned Single Judge in the facts of the case, has appropriately exercised discretion as vested with the court under the provisions of Section 36(3) of the Act read with provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 in passing the impugned order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal No. 101 of 2018 in Notice of Motion No. 2059 of 2017

Decided On: 14.03.2018

 Ecopack India Paper Cup Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sphere International

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.H. Patil and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 916 Bom
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Saturday, 24 November 2018

Whether Arbitrator can entertain application U/S 17 of Arbitration Act once arbitral award is put into execution?

 Indisputably, the impugned order has been passed by the arbitral tribunal in an application under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 filed by the respondent herein. A bare reading of Section 17 of the Act of 1996 makes it clear that an arbitral tribunal can pass any order under the said section till the award by it in the arbitral proceeding is not put into execution before the Court. Once the arbitral award is put into execution by any party before a court, the arbitral tribunal ceases to have any jurisdiction to entertain any application under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 or to pass any order in exercise of power under the said section. In the present case, although the learned advocate representing the present appellants before the arbitral tribunal could not produce copy of the execution application being EC No. 281 of 2017 filed before this Court and a copy of the said application was also not served upon the respondent till that date but a positive statement was made on behalf of the petitioner before the arbitral tribunal about the filing of the said application. The records produced before this Court also substantiate the statement made by the present appellants about the filing of the said execution application on November 10, 2017. The arbitral tribunal, however, instead of adjourning the hearing of the application filed by the respondent and without directing the present appellants to produce a copy of the execution application, passed the impugned order on November 11, 2017. After perusal of the case status report obtained by the appellants from the website of this Court, a copy whereof was made over to the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, there is no dispute that, in fact, the execution case being EC No. 281 of 2017 was filed in the Original Side of this Court on November 10, 2017. Even otherwise also, the present respondent is contesting EC No. 281 of 2017 before a learned Single Judge of this Court and it is not his case that the said execution application was not filed before the Court on November 10, 2017. In these facts, I find that the appellants are justified in their contention that the arbitral tribunal committed a patent illegality in entertaining the application filed by the respondent under Section 17 of the Act of 1996 and passed the impugned order without ascertaining that the submission made on behalf of the present appellants about the filing of the execution application to be incorrect. When the execution application, EC No. 281 of 2017 had already been filed by the appellants before this Court, the entirety of the impugned order passed by the arbitral tribunal is nothing but an order without jurisdiction and a nullity. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

GA 4030/2017 and APO 568/2017

Decided On: 04.05.2018

Jagat Singh Chopra  Vs.  Raj Singh Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 855 Cal
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Friday, 30 March 2018

How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in case of execution of arbitral award?

Under Section 36 of the said Act, the award is enforceable as if it were a decree of the court. The manner of enforcement is provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The legal fiction that is created is for treating an arbitral award for all intents and purposes as a decree of the court.

11. Order 21 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the court which passed the decree, or if the decree has been sent to another court, then to such court for execution. In the present case, two of the parties against whom the award was given challenged the award under Section 34 of the said Act in this court. Respondent also participated in those proceedings and never objected to the jurisdiction of this court. As noted earlier, the validity of the award was decided all the way up to the Division Bench of this court. Thereupon the arbitral award become enforceable as if it were a decree of the court under Section 36. The expression "Court" cannot for the purpose of Section 36 be read at variance with the meaning of the expression under Section 34. Section 42 of the said Act provides, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. The effect of Section 42 is that where an application has been made under Part I in a court with respect to an arbitration agreement, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings. The legislature has affirmatively stated that such a court alone would have jurisdiction and has placed the matter beyond doubt by stipulating that no other court would have jurisdiction. I find support from the judgment of this court in the matter of Eskay Engineers vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited MANU/MH/0771/2009 : 2009 (4) Arb. LR 369 (Bombay) relied upon by Mr. Sen.

12. In this case, as stated above, when the arbitration proceedings commenced, respondent was within the jurisdiction of this court. The arbitration proceedings were held within the jurisdiction of this court. The award was published within the jurisdiction of this court. The challenge to the award by some of the parties was made in this court, in which respondents participated and never raised objection of jurisdiction. Therefore, as provided in Section 42 of the said Act, this is the court which alone will have jurisdiction over these proceedings. Just because respondent has shifted office outside the jurisdiction of this court after the arbitral award was given and before lodging of this execution application does not mean this court will not have jurisdiction.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Chamber Summons No. 1132 of 2014 in Execution Application No. 156 of 2015

Decided On: 07.06.2017

Shree Harivansh Securities Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Nikko Stock Broker Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.R. Shriram, J.
Citation: 2018(1) MHLJ374
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Friday, 16 March 2018

Whether amended S 36 of arbitration Act will be applicable to application U/S 34 on date of commencement of amendment Act?

In Narhari Shivram Shet Narvekar v. Pannalal
Umediram (1976) 3 SCC 203 at 207, this Court, following
Lalji Raja (supra), held as follows:
73“8. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellant however submitted that since the
Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to
Goa the decree became inexecutable and this
being a vested right could not be taken away
by the application of the Code of Civil
Procedure to Goa during the pendency of the
appeal before the Additional Judicial
Commissioner. It seems to us that the right of
the judgment debtor to pay up the decree
passed against him cannot be said to be a
vested right, nor can the question of
executability of the decree be regarded as a
substantive vested right of the judgment
debtor. A fortiori the execution proceedings
being purely a matter of procedure it is well
settled that any change in law which is made
during the pendency of the cause would be
deemed to be retroactive in operation and the
appellate court is bound to take notice of the
change in law.”
Since it is clear that execution of a decree pertains to the
realm of procedure, and that there is no substantive
vested right in a judgment debtor to resist execution,
Section 36, as substituted, would apply even to pending
Section 34 applications on the date of commencement of
the Amendment Act.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2879-2880 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.19545-19546 of 2016)
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET
IN INDIA 
V
KOCHI CRICKET PVT. LTD. AND ETC.
Dated: March 15, 2018.

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Whether Appeal Against Execution Of Foreign Arbitration Award is Maintainable Under Commercial Courts Act?

Given the objects of both the statutes, it is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy resolution of disputes between parties. Equally, enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner, commercially speaking, in the international community. In point of fact, the raison d™รƒยชtre for the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes involving high amounts of money should be speedily decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50 does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be turning the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads. Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to be enforced in India were less than Rs. one crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs.one crore or more, if the Appellants are correct, enforcement of such award would be further delayed by providing an appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and would be directly contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Commercial Courts Act, viz., speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a sum of Rs.1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be construed in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is clear that they are best harmonized by giving effect to the special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, vis-รƒ -vis the more general statute, namely the Commercial Courts Act, being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration. 29. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1661-1663 OF 2018 @ SLP CIVIL No. 28582-28584 of

Date of Order: 07.02.2018

Kandla Export Corporation & Anr. Vs. M/s. Oci Corporation & Anr.

Dated : 07.02.2018 
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Sunday, 31 December 2017

Whether execution of arbitration award can be challenged as per S 47 of CPC?

 This writ petition filed by the State under Article 227 of the Constitution assailing the order dated 22.9.2012, as passed by the teamed Sub-Judge-I, Patna in Execution Case Nos. 1 of 2010/11 of 2011, whereby the Executing Court rejected the petition of the State of Bihar filed under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short as 'CPC') for dismissal of the execution case filed for enforcement of Arbitral Award, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to decide the matter and pass an award. The primal question to be decided in this writ petition is whether the State having challenged the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal before the Arbitral Tribunal itself at the stage of reference of dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal and the Arbitral Tribunal having ruled against the State and in favour of its jurisdiction, State not having then challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') could, later at the stage of execution proceedings, raise any objection under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC.

In view of the judgments and binding precedent noted above, surely that was impermissible. Having abandoned the remedy under Section 34 of the Act, resort to Section 47 CPC was clearly impermissible, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mallikarjun (supra). Having thus forfeited their rights, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SBP & Co. (supra), they cannot expect this Court to exercise powers of superintendence under Article 227 to come to their rescue. The question that even if the award was a nullity, as understood in common civil law, absence of jurisdiction rendering the order nullity could set up the defence at any stage, such a principle would not govern the present dispute, inasmuch as what was said by the Apex Court recently in the case of MSP Infrastructure Limited (supra) that common civil law principle would not apply to the special law governing arbitration. Thus, on all counts, the objection on behalf of the writ petitioners State must fail. The learned Sub-Judge rightly rejected the objection petition and the impugned order cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

CWJC No. 11026 of 2013

Decided On: 21.02.2017

The State of Bihar and Ors. Vs. Surendra Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Navaniti Prasad Singh and Vikash Jain, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2017(NOC)1073 PAT
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Sunday, 17 September 2017

Whether district judge can entertain application for execution of arbitration award?

In the case of Fountain Head Developers, the Full Bench has held that the District Judge in a district alone is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction and it is not included in other Judge subordinate to him. It is also held that "The Parliament intended to have only one court as the forum for arbitral proceedings, that is, the "principal court of original jurisdiction" in a district". This ratio laid down by the Full Bench in Fountain Head Developers cannot be misread that the District Judge or the District Court means only a Court of Principal District Judge. It appears that the order of the Division Bench of Nagpur Bench in The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. which is very relevant and useful, was not placed before the Hon'ble Single Judge and therefore, he had no opportunity to consider this aspect from the other prospective.

24. In the case of The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of Nagpur has held that

"The word "Court" occurring in Section 36 must be held to be a Court of District Judge also for the purpose of enforcement of the award. It further held that "From a conjoint reading of these provisions, it is clear that an award must be treated as a decree passed by the District Judge and, therefore, it may be executed either by the District Judge himself or by any Court to which it may be sent by such District Judge for execution vide Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transfer of decree by the District Judge would be governed by Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a decree holder must apply for execution of an award to the Court of District Judge, who may either execute the award as a decree himself or send it for execution to another Court including a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction."
Thus, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction has a wider connotation which includes Principal District Judge and so also of the District Judges, who collectively fall under the category of Judges having principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Hence, the challenge given cannot sustain. Writ Petition is dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4157 of 2017

Decided On: 12.04.2017

Union of India Vs. Arun Kumar Deedwania

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mridula Bhatkar, J.


Citation: 2017(4) MHLJ131

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Sunday, 21 May 2017

When arbitration award is executable against sick industry?

This would bring me to the next objection raised by the
petitioner that the petitioner industry has been declared as a
sick industry under the provisions of the SIC Act. Therefore,
by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 22(3) of the SIC
Act, the award is not executable and the execution proceeding
deserves to be dropped. The award of the Facilitation Council
being an award deemed to have been made under the Act of
1996, is executable under Section 36 of the said Act.
29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jay Engineering Works
Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council and another (2006) 8 SCC 677 has held
that once the awarded amount is included in the scheme

approved by the Board, Section 22 of the SIC Act would apply.
30. Very recently, in the matter of Ghanshyam Sarda v. Shiv
Shankar Trading Company and others (2015) 1 SCC 298, the Supreme Court
has held that the SIC Act is a self-contained code and has
conferred upon BIFR complete supervisory control over a sick
industrial company to adopt such methodology as provided in
Chapter III for detecting, reviving or winding up such sick
company. The authority to determine the existence and extent
of sickness of such company and to adopt methodology for its
revival are, in the exclusive domain of BIFR and by virtue of
Section 26 there is an express exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the civil court in that behalf. The Supreme Court further held
as under in paragraph 30: -
“30. As laid down by this Court the Act is a
complete code in itself. The Act gives complete
supervisory control to BIFR over the affairs of a
sick industrial company from the stage of
registration of reference and questions concerning
status of sickness of such company are in the
exclusive domain of BIFR. Any submission or
assertion by anyone including the company that by
certain developments the company has revived
itself and/or that its net worth since the stage of
registration having become positive no such
scheme for revival needs to be undertaken, must
be and can only be dealt with by BIFR. Any such
assertion or claim has to be made before BIFR
and only upon the satisfaction of BIFR that a sick

company is no longer sick, that such company
could be said to have ceased to be amenable to its
supervisory control under the Act. The aspects of
revival of such company being completely within
its exclusive domain, it is BIFR alone, which can
determine the issue whether such company now
stands revived or not. The jurisdiction of the civil
court in respect of these matters stands
completely excluded.”
31. In light of the principles laid down herein-above, if the facts of
the present case are examined, it is quite vivid that the
petitioner has simply said that the petitioner industry is a sick
industry, it has not been demonstrated that whether the
awarded amount has been included in the scheme approved
by the BIFR. Section 26 of the SIC Act bars the jurisdiction of
the civil court, as held by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyam
Sarda (supra).
32. Therefore, the petitioner's plea in regard to applicability of the
SIC Act is not complete in itself, rather halfhearted, it has
neither been established that the awarded amount has been
included in the scheme approved by the BIFR nor it has been
shown how the civil court has jurisdiction in view of Section 26
of the SIC Act and the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Court in Ghanshyam Sarda (supra).
33. As a fallout and consequence of aforesaid discussion, I hold
that the learned executing court is absolutely justified in
rejecting the objections raised by the petitioner herein in
execution and no error of jurisdiction has been committed while
rejecting those objections raised by way of applications.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (Art. 227) No.699 of 2015

Order delivered on: 25-11-2016
M/s. I.C.S.A. (India Limited), 
V
M/s. Swastik Wires,

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Citation: AIR 2017 Chhatisgarh 70
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Saturday, 26 November 2016

What is distinction between execution of decree of civil court and execution of award of arbitrator?

I also cannot ignore the proposition of law that Section 47 of
the Civil Procedure Code cannot override the procedures provided under
Section 5, 16, 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and
thereby entertain challenge to the award at execution stage.
The issue that an award made in arbitral proceedings is not a
decree within the meaning of CPC having been settled by the
aforesaid pronouncement by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the provisions
of Section 47 CPC cannot be available to obstruct the execution of
the award.
Thus having regard to the provisions of Sections 5, 12, 13, 16, 34,
35 and 36 of the Act, the irresistible conclusion is only grounds
which can be pressed into service for challenge to an award is
within the ambit and scope of Section 34 of the Act. Once the stage
of Section 34 is over and the questions that were raised or could
have been raised at that stage cannot be allowed to be raised again
and again by pressing into service section 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure at the time of execution of award under Section 36 of the
Act.
In view of the aforesaid facts and discussions, the applicant did not
have any right to challenge the enforceability of the award by takingrecourse to Section 47 CPC and the same were liable to be

dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:  Justice Samapti Chatterjee
C.O. 3955 of 2015
Fingertips Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
Vs
Dhanashree Electronics Limited

Judgment on : April 27, 2016.
Samapti Chatterjee, J.
Citation:2016(NOC)690 Cal
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Sunday, 8 May 2016

When arbitration award will become unexecutable?

In the case of National Aluminum Co. Ltd. (supra), during the course of hearing before the Supreme Court, a request was made that since the matter had been pending more than sixteen years the respondent should be directed to deposit the amount awarded by the Arbitrator and it is in these circumstances that Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret Section 34 of Arbitration And Conciliation Act and while referring to the mandatory provision, as detailed in Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction as no special grounds had been urged. The Apex Court also noticed the mandatory language of Section 34 of 1996 Act that an award when challenged under Section 34 within the time stipulated therein becomes unexecutable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
EX. P. 93/2010
Decided On: 24.10.2011
Appellants: M/S M.D. Overseas Ltd
Vs.
Respondent: Canara Bank
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sistani
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Sunday, 24 April 2016

What is procedure for execution of arbitration award?

 In view of what has been stated above, when an application under
section 36 is filed before any principal civil court of original jurisdiction, it is duty
bound to find out:-
(i) whether it has territorial jurisdiction to decide questions forming
the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the
subject matter of a suit, and if so
(ii) whether period for filing application for setting aside the arbitral
award under section 34 of the Act has expired, and if so
(iii) whether such an application has at all been filed, and if so
(iv) whether such application on being filed has already been refused;
then and then only, the court can proceed to enforce the award as if it were a
decree of that court. But if it is found that it does not have jurisdiction to decide
questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the
subject matter of a suit, in that event, it cannot go for enforcing the award
taking recourse to the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure
because by describing an arbitral award as ‘decree of the court’, the legislature
had amply mandated that it would only be the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide questions forming the subject matter of
the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit. Otherwise, the
words ‘the court’ occurring at the end of section 36 after the word ‘a decree of’
shall become redundant which is contrary to the principles of interpretation of
statutes.
30. However, if the court to which an application under section 36 has been
filed, finds that it does not have jurisdiction to decide questions forming the
subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a
suit, then it can entertain application only if the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter
of arbitration transfers the same to it. This is because, as discussed above, the
arbitral award at all events is the decree of the court having jurisdiction to decide
questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the 
subject matter of the suit and not otherwise. If an arbitral award is the decree of
the principal civil court having jurisdiction to decide questions forming the subject
matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of the suit by
legal fiction created by section 36 of the 1996 Act all other attributes of a civil
court decree shall be available to it and so it shall also be capable of being
transferred under section 39 as w21ell as Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Order XXI of the
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
31. The above questions are fundamental and also inherent in section 36 of
the Act. Unless an executing court is satisfied on these points, it does not derive
jurisdiction to proceed further for enforcing an arbitral award. As these questions
go to the root of the matter and are intimately related to the inherent jurisdiction
of a court, a court cannot entertain an execution application under section 36 of
the Act read with the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC merely at the asking of
an award holder. As observed above, these aspects have not been gone into by
the learned Executing Courts involved in any of these revision petitions.
Consequently, it is to be held that the impugned orders are vitiated by
jurisdictional error and so, they are liable to be set aside. The impugned orders
are accordingly set aside.
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

Case No: CRP 196/2015
 Alema Khatun V Tata Motors Finance Limited,


Date of delivery ofJudgment and Order : 08.02.2016
Citation;AIR 2016 Gauhati 64
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Monday, 9 November 2015

Whether foreign Award of arbitration can be reviewed at enforcement stage?

The grounds of challenge enumerated in the aforesaid section are meant to be construed narrowly and do not permit review of the foreign award on merits. The Courts are not expected in any enforcement proceedings to re-determine questions of fact. In Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. (supra) in paragraph 45 of the report, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held that Section 48 of the 1996 Act does not give an opportunity to have a "second look" at the foreign award in the award enforcement stage. The scope of inquiry under Section 48 does not permit review of the foreign award on merits. Procedural defects (like taking into consideration inadmissible evidence or ignoring/rejecting the evidence which may be of binding nature) in the course of foreign arbitration do not lead necessarily to excuse an award from enforcement on the ground of public policy.
Calcutta High Court
Cliff Navigation S. A vs Lmj International Limited on 23 July, 2015

Author: Soumen Sen
Read full judgment here; click here
Citation;AIR2015(NOC)1089 Cal
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