Showing posts with label international arbitration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international arbitration. Show all posts

Sunday, 22 December 2024

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Landmark Judgment in Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd.

  In a significant ruling on August 10, 2021, the Supreme Court of India addressed the complex issues surrounding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards against non-signatories in the case of Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. This judgment clarifies the legal framework for recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards in India, particularly under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

 Background of the Case
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Sunday, 13 February 2022

Whether court can direct interim relief of deposit of money while granting relief U/S 9 of arbitration Act?

 The second argument canvassed by Mr. Andhyarujina was that before any order of deposit is made, the principles underlying the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 & 5 must be complied with by the Petitioner. He submitted that in the facts of the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner has complied with the aforesaid provisions and therefore the Petitioner is not entitled to an order of deposit. I do not think that this argument holds any substance. It is true that the broad principles of Order 38 ought to be kept in mind whilst passing an order under Section 9 for securing the amount in dispute in the proposed arbitration. As far as Section 9 of Indian Arbitration Act is concerned, whilst considering a relief thereunder, it cannot be said that the Court is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 and/or 5. The scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad and the Court has the discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. Of course, the discretion to be exercised by the Court under Section 9 has to be judicious and not arbitrary. Though, for considering interim measures, the Court would be guided by the principles which the Civil Courts ordinarily employ for considering grant or refusal of interim relief, particularly Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 and Order 38 Rule 5, the Court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts. Whilst exercising its power under Section 9, the Court must have due regard to the underlying purpose of the conferment of the power in the Court which is to promote the efficacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. In an appropriate case, where the Court is of the view that there is practically no defense to the payability of the amount and where it is in the interest of justice to secure the amount, which forms part of the subject matter of the proposed arbitration reference, even if no case strictly within the letter of Order 38 Rules 1 or 2 is made out, though there are serious allegations concerning such a case, it is certainly within the power of the Court to order a suitable interim measure of protection. There is no requirement that for a relief of deposit, an ironclad case under Order 38 Rule 5 must be made out. The provisions of Order 38 are guides to a Section 9 Court and not fetters upon its discretion. To my mind, the position in law, is that, when there is a clear and unequivocal admission of liability or there is no real dispute with reference to the amounts payable, then in such a case an order of deposit may not only be made, but in the interest of justice, ought to be made. Where the defense raised is prima facie untenable and the Petitioner has a good chance of success, an order of deposit to secure the claim can and indeed should be made under Section 9. {Para 21}

22. In the view that I take, I am supported by several decisions of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Jagdish Ahuja v. Cupino Limited [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 849] held as under:—

“6. As far as Section 9 of the Act is concerned, it cannot be said that this court, while considering a relief thereunder, is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5. As held by our Courts, the scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad; the court has a discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection “as may appear to the court to be just and convenient”, though such discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The court is, no doubt, guided by the principles which civil courts ordinarily employ for considering interim relief, particularly, Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 38 Rule 5; the court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

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Whether Indian courts should grant interim relief U/ S 9 of arbitration Act in foreign seated arbitration governed by foreign law?

 For Section 9 to be excluded, there must be a specific agreement between the parties, ousting the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9. Simply put, there must be something more than an Arbitration Agreement being governed by foreign law and with a foreign seat. The Agreement must indicate in clear and express terms that the parties intended to exclude the operation of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act. Merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law or the seat of the arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot be construed to mean that the parties agreed to exclude the application of Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and thereby close the gates to a party to approach this court thereunder. If I was to accept the submission of Mr. Andhyarujina, namely, that because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, the same would amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, it would effectively mean that in all foreign seated arbitrations, Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act would stand excluded. This would effectively mean that the proviso to Section 2(2) would be a dead letter. In fact, the interpretation of Mr. Andhyarujina would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was brought on the statute book i.e. to permit parties to an arbitration to be held outside India to approach the Courts in India inter alia under Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and seek interim relief, pending the said foreign seated arbitration. In fact, the reason why the aforesaid provision was brought on the statute book can be discerned from the discussion on this subject by the Law Commission in its 246th Report. The relevant portion of this Report reads as under:—

“While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. It is for this very reason that I have opined that merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22272 of 2021

Decided on December 13, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5481

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Monday, 30 November 2020

Whether application U/S 34 of Arbitration Act is maintainable to challenge foreign arbitration award?




The Appellant, which was granted special leave, challenges a judgment of the Bombay High Court1. It urges that the impugned judgment is erroneous because it concludes that proceedings Under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter "the Act") can be maintained to challenge a foreign award, defined as one, under that enactment.

Appearing for the Appellant, NV Engineering, Mr. Joydeep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, urged that the impugned judgment is unsupportable in law because a foreign award cannot be challenged Under Section 34 of the Act. It was urged that the three-judge decision in Bhatia International8 and the subsequent holding in Venture Global9 were both held to be incorrect in the larger, five judges ruling in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc MANU/SC/0722/2012 : 2012 (9) SCC 552 ("BALCO" hereafter). Learned Counsel submitted that even the caveat in BALCO that a class of foreign awards made prior to its pronouncement cannot aid Jindal's essential argument with respect to maintainability of a challenge Under Section 34 and that such challenge under Part I is untenable.

10. Mr. Gupta relied on BALCO extensively in support of his argument that the foreign awards in this case, having been rendered outside India under the aegis of the ICC cannot be challenged merely because a condition in the underlying contract says that the law governing the agreement, would be Indian law.

135. Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that the court may refuse to enforce the foreign award on satisfactory proof of any of the grounds mentioned in Section 48(1), by the party resisting the enforcement of the award. The provision sets out the defences open to the party to resist enforcement of a foreign award. The words "set aside or suspended", in Clause (e) of Section 48(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that, by necessary implication, the foreign award sought to be enforced in India can also be challenged on merits in Indian courts. The provision merely recognises that courts of the two nations which are competent to annul or suspend an award. It does not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on such courts for annulment of an award made outside the country. Such jurisdiction has to be specifically provided in the relevant national legislation of the country in which the court concerned is located. So far as India is concerned, the Arbitration Act, 1996 does not confer any such jurisdiction on the Indian courts to annul an international commercial award made outside India. Such provision exists in Section 34, which is placed in Part I. Therefore, the applicability of that provision is limited to the awards made in India. If the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Appellants are accepted, it would entail incorporating the provision contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which is placed in Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 into Part II of the said Act. This is not permissible as the intention of Parliament was clearly to confine the powers of the Indian courts to set aside an award relating to international commercial arbitrations, which take place in India.


 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8607 of 2010

Decided On: 26.11.2020


 Noy Vallesina Engineering Spa Vs.  Jindal Drugs Limited and Ors.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indira Banerjee and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.

Author: S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0899/2020

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Sunday, 30 August 2020

Under which circumstances application U/S 9 of Arbitration Act is maintainable in foreign seated arbitration before the Indian court?

Analysis

32. In the light of the facts and submissions recorded above, the primary question which requires consideration is whether the appellants ought to be permitted to proceed with their request for interim measures of protection under Section 9 of the Act, after having failed in obtaining similar relief from the emergency arbitrator under the JCAA Rules, and even after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.

33. Although Section 9(3) of the Act is, on its terms, expressly relatable to India-seated arbitrations, as evidenced by the reference to Section 17 of the Act, we are of the view that the principle thereof is equally applicable when interim measures are sought in the Indian courts in connection with a foreign-seated arbitration. Resolution of disputes by a tribunal of the parties' choice, and reduced interference by courts, are amongst the central features of arbitration. Section 9(3) of the Act reflects that understanding, and manifests a legislative preference that the grant of interim measures ought to be considered by the arbitral tribunal, once constituted, rather than by the courts. It is only when the remedy before the tribunal lacks efficacy, that a party can seek interim measures from the court under Section 9. In the LC Report also, the following justification is provided for the insertion of Section 9(3) into the Act:

"[NOTE: This amendment seeks to reduce the role of the Court in relation to grant of interim measures once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted. After all, once the Tribunal is seized of the matter it is most appropriate for the Tribunal to hear all interim applications. This also appears to be the spirit of the UNCITRAL Model Law as amended in 2006.

Accordingly, section 17 has been amended to provide the Arbitral Tribunal the same powers as a Court would have under section 9.]"

(Emphasis supplied.)

34. Mr. Singh submitted on behalf of the appellants that the aforesaid principle is not applicable to foreign-seated arbitrations, as interim measures granted by India-seated tribunals alone are automatically enforceable in India under Section 17(2) of the Act. It is for this reason, according to Mr. Singh, that Section 9(3) refers only to the availability of a remedy under Section 17, and not to remedies that may be available before a foreign-seated arbitral tribunal. Mr. Singh pointed to this very difference as the rationale for the insertion of the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act, as contained in paragraph 41 of the LC Report, wherein the Law Commission referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium and Co. vs. Kaiser Aluminium and Co., MANU/SC/0722/2012 : (2012) 9 SCC 552, and observed as follows:-

"41. While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a "judgment" or "decree " for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it.

That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO."


35. We are unable to accept Mr. Singh's contention. The primary purpose of Part I of the Act (which inter alia includes Section 2, 9 and 17) is to govern India-seated arbitrations. The reference in Section 9(3) to Section 17 alone, cannot therefore be dispositive of the question as to whether the same principle applies where the arbitration is seated outside India. In our view, the absence of a specific reference to foreign-seated arbitrations in Section 9(3) ought not to be construed as a widening of the Section 9 power, to cover cases where the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, and is capable of granting efficacious relief. Such an interpretation would not just extend the scope of Section 9, but would amount to the provision being available in the Indian courts in connection with foreign-seated arbitrations, but not in connection with India-seated arbitrations. We therefore hold that, although an application under Section 9 is maintainable in connection with a foreign-seated arbitration, an application thereunder would not lie after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, unless the applicant demonstrates that it does not have an efficacious remedy before the tribunal. (We are not required in the facts of the present case to decide whether the availability of a remedy before an emergency arbitrator, or the seat court, would also dissuade the Indian court from granting relief under Section 9.)

36. In considering the aforesaid question, the Court would certainly have regard to the question as to whether the remedy before the arbitral tribunal would be efficacious or not. This caveat is incorporated in Section 9(3) also, and would turn upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including the amplitude of the power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal. In making this assessment, the manner in which the applicant has framed the relief sought cannot be determinative; the more appropriate test is whether the tribunal is sufficiently empowered to grant effective interim measures of protection. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

FAO (OS) (COMM) 65/2020

Decided On: 07.07.2020

 Ashwani Minda   Vs.  U-shin Limited
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Saturday, 11 July 2020

Wednesday, 2 October 2019

Basic concept of habitual residence in International arbitration

V. Factors Considered When Determining "Habitual Residence"

Courts consider a variety of factors when determining a child's habitual residence. The factors can be divided into two broad categories: factors regarding intent and factors regarding acclimatization of the child to the country of residence. A single factor usually is not determinative, and courts often need to weigh conflicting factors. This section will list the factors that have been considered by courts and provide brief commentary about each.

A. Factors Related to Parental Intent

• Parental employment - The employment of one or both parents in a country to which the parents recently moved can be evidence of establishing a new habitual residence. Conversely, leaving one's employment in a country can be evidence of leaving a prior state of habitual residence.

• Purchase of home - Purchase of a home also is evidence of establishing habitual residence. Purchase of a home is more likely to be a basis for such a finding than short-term stays with relatives or in a rental apartment.

• Moving of belongings - The movement of family belonging can establish intent to establish a new habitual residence. However, shipping some belongings while keeping other belongings in the state from which one moved can be evidence of not intending to change habitual residence.

• Location of bank accounts - A parent's decision to maintain bank accounts in a country where the parent had lived, despite spending time in a new country, is evidence of the parent's tie to the original country.

• Obtaining driver's license and professional licenses - Obtaining a driver's license or professional license in a new country (or attempting to obtain such licenses) is evidence of intent establish a new habitual residence.

• Marital instability - If the family is moving at a time of marital instability, that can be viewed as supporting evidence that at least one of the parents did not intend to live at the new location indefinitely, and thus there was not intent to establish a new habitual residence. This is particularly true if the parties agreed the move was for a "trial period."

• Citizenship; immigration status; type of visa - If a parent and child come to a country on a tourist visa and do not seek more permanent residency status, that can lead to a finding that habitual residence in the prior country from which the parent and child came was not abandoned. A court has observed, however, "While an unlawful or precarious immigration status does not preclude one from becoming a habitual resident under the Convention, it prevents one from doing so rapidly."

27. As can be seen from the above decisions, the meaning of the expression 'habitually resident' is similar in meaning to 'ordinary resident'. 

From a reading of all of the above judgments and authorities it is clear that the question of whether a person habitually resides in a country or place may depend on various facts and circumstances. The term 'habitually resides' or similar terms such as 'ordinarily resides' have not been defined and do not have a technical meaning. However, from the above observations there are some factors or tests which are applicable to decide whether a person habitually resides in a particular place or location. Some of the important tests and factors, are as under:

(i) The quality of the residence and not only the duration of the residence.

(ii) The residence must be actual and bona fide and there must be a regular physical presence that must endure for some time. However, the duration of time must be considered in the facts of each case and given the purpose of the residence in a particular place.

(iii) The purpose may be one or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. That is not to say that the propositus intends to stay where he is indefinitely. Indeed his purpose while settled may be for a limited period.

(iv) Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or merely love of the place may be common reasons for a choice of regular abode, and there may be others. All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.

(v) Some of the specific factors that may be considered are: location of bank accounts; location of movables; purchase of a house; obtaining of licenses and residential status or visa type of the person in that place.

(vi) The residence in that place must be something more than casual or a flying visit to a place. It is not a requirement that the person is at a particular place for dwelling always or on permanent uninterrupted basis.

31. It is relevant to note that in the case of Mother v. Father, supra, the parties had taken an apartment for rent in New York for only 3 months and the daughter had started speech therapy and this was sufficient in that case for the Court to hold that the child 'habitually resided' in New York. In Sandip Shankarlal Kedia, supra, this Court held that the wife habitually resided in Dubai, inter alia, because she was a Director of three companies in Dubai and has businesses in Dubai.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Application No. 49, 50 and 51 of 2017

Decided On: 22.02.2019

 Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh Vs. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.J. Kathawalla, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 566 Bom
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Thursday, 21 February 2019

Whether court is required to see issue of maintainability and enforceability of foreign arbitration award simultaneously?

 Be that as it may, the grounds urged by the petitioner in
the earlier round regarding the maintainability of the
execution case could not have been considered in isolation
and de hors the issue of enforceability of the subject foreign
awards. For, the same was intrinsically linked to the question
of enforceability of the subject foreign awards. In any case, all
contentions available to the petitioner in that regard could and
ought to have been raised specifically and, if raised, could
have been examined by the Court at that stage itself. We are of
the considered opinion that the scheme of Section 48 of the
Act does not envisage piecemeal consideration of the issue of
maintainability of the execution case concerning the foreign
awards, in the first place; and then the issue of enforceability
thereof. Whereas, keeping in mind the legislative intent of

speedy disposal of arbitration proceedings and limited
interference by the courts, the Court is expected to consider
both these aspects simultaneously at the threshold. Taking
any other view would result in encouraging successive and
multiple round of proceedings for the execution of foreign
awards. We cannot countenance such a situation keeping in
mind the avowed object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, in particular, while dealing with the enforcement of
foreign awards. For, the scope of interference has been
consciously constricted by the legislature in relation to the
execution of foreign awards. Therefore, the subject application
filed by the petitioner deserves to be rejected, being barred by
constructive res judicata, as has been justly observed by the
High Court in the impugned judgment.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 540 OF 2018

LMJ International Ltd. Vs Sleepwell Industries Co. Ltd. 

Dated:February 20, 2019.

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
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Saturday, 24 November 2018

Whether rate of interest in international commercial Arbitration will be governed by law of seat of arbitration?

 'Interest' is defined as "the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person for a sum of money belonging to or owned by any reason to another"1. In essence, an award of Interest compensates a party for its forgone return on investment, or for money withheld without a justifiable cause.

The current practice of awarding Interest in international commercial arbitrations is riddled with inconsistencies, and is criticized for lack of uniformity In international contracts, there is no consensus on the method or rate of awarding Interest.

4. In an international commercial arbitration, in the absence of an agreement between the parties on Interest, the rate of Interest awarded would be governed by the law of the Seat of arbitration.

The rate of interest awarded must correspond to the currency in which the award is given, and must be in conformity with the laws in force in the lex fori.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10394 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 25819 of 2018)

Decided On: 11.10.2018

Vedanta Ltd. Vs. Shenzen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 4773
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Sunday, 14 October 2018

When consortium of companies cannot initiate international commercial arbitration?

Since disputes arose between the parties to the agreement,
various interim claims had been made by the Consortium of M/s
Larsen and Toubro, an Indian company, together with Scomi
Engineering Bhd, a Company incorporated in Malaysia, for
which the Consortium has filed this petition under Section 11 of
the Act to this Court, since according to them, one of the parties
to the Arbitration agreement, being a body corporate,
incorporated in Malaysia, would be a body corporate, which is
incorporated in a country other than India, which would attract
Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Act.
 On the other hand, Mr. Shyam Diwan, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of MMRDA, the respondent, has
relied upon both the contract dated 09.01.2009 as well as the
actual Consortium Agreement dated 04.06.2008 between the
Indian company and the Malaysian company, which, when read
together, would show that they are really an un-incorporated
association and would, therefore, fall within Section 2(1)(f)(iii) as
being an association or a body of individuals, provided the
central management and control is exercised in any country
other than India. He has also gone on to rely heavily upon the

fact that in the Consortium, the lead partner is the Indian
company, and the Consortium’s office is at Wadala in Mumbai
making it clear, therefore, that sub-Clause (iii) of Section 2(1)(f)
of the Act would not apply as it is clear that the central
management and control, that is envisaged by the said sub-
Clause, would not be exercised in a country outside India but in
India itself.
This being the case, coupled with the fact, as correctly
argued by Shri Diwan, that the Indian company is the lead
partner, and that the Supervisory Board constituted under the
Consortium Agreement makes it clear that the lead partner
really has the determining voice in that it appoints the Chairman
of the said Board (undoubtedly, with the consent of other
members); and the fact that the Consortium’s office is in
Wadala, Mumbai as also that the lead member shall lead the
arbitration proceedings, would all point to the fact that the

central management and control of this Consortium appears to
be exercised in India and not in any foreign nation.
14) This being the case, we dismiss the petition filed under
Section 11 of the Act, as there is no “international commercial
arbitration” as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act for the
petitioner to come to this Court. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION (C) No. 28 OF 2017

M/S LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED SCOMI
ENGINEERING BHD 
Vs
MUMBAI METROPOLITAN REGION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 

Dated:October 3, 2018.
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Friday, 27 May 2016

When objection U/S 34 of Arbitration Act is not tenable before Indian court?

We are thus of the view that by Clause 28, the parties chose to
exclude the application of Part I to the Arbitration proceedings between
them by choosing London as the venue for Arbitration and by making
English law applicable to Arbitration, as observed earlier. It is too well
settled by now that where the parties choose a juridical seat of
Arbitration outside India and provide that the law which governs
Arbitration will be a law other than Indian law, part I of the Act would not
have any application and, therefore, the award debtor would not be
entitled to challenge the award by raising objections under Section 34

before a Court in India. A Court in India could not have jurisdiction to
entertain such objections under Section 34 in such a case.
 As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the juridical seat of
Arbitration attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words it
would not be necessary to specify which law would apply to the
Arbitration proceedings, since the law of the particular country would
apply ipso jure. The following passage from Redfern and Hunter on
International Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue:-
“It is also sometimes said that parties have
selected the procedural law that will govern
their arbitration, by providing for arbitration in
a particular country. This is too elliptical and,
as an English court itself held more recently in
Breas of Doune Wind Farm it does not always
hold true. What the parties have done is to
choose a place of arbitration in a particular
country. That choice brings with it submission
to the laws of that country, including any
mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration.
To say that the parties have ‘chosen’ that
particular law to govern the arbitration is
rather like saying that an English woman who
takes her car to France has ‘chosen’ French
traffic law, which will oblige her to drive on the
right-hand side of the road, to give priority to
vehicles approaching from the right, and
generally to obey traffic laws to which she may
not be accustomed. But it would be an odd
use of language to say this notional motorist
had opted for ‘French traffic law’. What she
has done is to choose to go to France. The
applicability of French law then follows
automatically. It is not a matter of choice.
Parties may well choose a particular place of
arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri is

one which they find attractive. Nevertheless,
once a place of arbitration has been chosen, it
brings with it its own law. If that law contains
provisions that are mandatory so far as
arbitration are concerned, those provisions
must be obeyed. It is not a matter of choice
any more than the notional motorist is free to
choose which local traffic laws to obey and
which to disregard.”
 In this view of the matter, the judgment of the Gujarat High
Court holding that Ashapura’s objections under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act are tenable before a Court in India that is the Court at
Jam-Khambalia, Gujarat is contrary to law. The proceedings under
Section 34, which occurs in Part I, are liable to be dismissed as
untenable. The Civil Appeals of Eitzen are liable to succeed and are,
therefore, allowed. The judgment of the Bombay High Court dated
03.12.2015 enforcing the Foreign Award under Part II of the Arbitration
Act is correct and liable to be upheld.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5131-5133 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) Nos. 2210-2212/2011)
EITZEN BULK A/S  V ASHAPURA MINECHEM LTD. & ANR.
Dated;MAY 13, 2016

S. A. BOBDE, J.
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