Showing posts with label privilege. Show all posts
Showing posts with label privilege. Show all posts

Sunday, 5 January 2025

Bombay HC: Advocate Casting Aspersions On Woman's Character Upon Instructions From Client Is Discharging His Duty, Not Insulting Her Modesty

 Reliance is placed upon the decision in the case of Navin Parekh vs. Madhubala Shridhar Sharma & Ors. MANU/MH/0883/1992 : 1992 Mh.L.J. 1409, in the backdrop that the lawyer had forwarded certain letters on behalf of his client where it was alleged that he had acted in highly unprofessional and unethical manner and he was sought to be prosecuted for alleged defamation, since the words used in the letter were per se defamatory. It is in these facts, it was held that where a party on the basis of sufficient material arrives at a conclusion and states its case and the contemplated course of action in the legal correspondence, it would be wholly inappropriate to allege that an offence of defamation is committed. Justice M.F.Saldanha held that, "in the case of an Advocate where express malice is absent, a Court having due regard to public policy would be extremely cautious of depriving him of the protection of Exception 9 to Section 499 Indian Penal Code. The Trial Magistrates would be well advised to be doubly cautious while entertaining complaints against legal practitioners because the law does confer on them certain privileges which are necessary for the conduct of their professional duties. It is, therefore, only in that class of cases where those privileges have been virtually abused alone, the process should be issued. The obligation of making out a case that the accused, who is an advocate had not acted in good faith and that he had acted maliciously is, therefore, a condition precedent and in absence of this necessary ingredient, the prosecution cannot be sustained." {Para 21}

24. In any case, since we find that there was no intention on part of the Petitioner to insult her modesty, as he was only discharging his duty of defending his clients in the remand proceedings and even if he had cast aspersions upon her character, since they were based on the instructions received from his clients, which has reference in the complaint made on-line and its receipt in the police station is not denied, we deem it appropriate to extend the privilege of an Advocate to the present Petitioner and moreso, what we find is, the statement is not unconnected to the case, as it is the case of his client that by using the pressure tactics, they were being coerced to pay the money.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Ratnadeep Ram Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

 Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:48668-DB, MANU/MH/7471/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Thursday, 13 July 2017

When high court should not direct execution of lease deed?

In the light of aforesaid decision, when we consider the overall conduct of Mesco in the instant case, we are fully satisfied that the High Court has adventured into an avoidable illegality while directing execution of lease deed. It is a settled law that equity follows the rule of common law in respect of such contracts. Renewal of lease is a privilege and if a tenant wishes to claim the privilege, he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose. This Court has further considered the question where there is no time limit, an application may be made within a reasonable time. If delay is on the part of lessee for renewal arising out of mere neglect on his part and which could have been avoided by reasonable diligence, would not entitle him to claim renewal. Applying the same principle to the instant case, it is apparent that the conduct of Mesco was unfair and unpardonable. The conduct disentitled it from indulgence by Court in any manner. We are constrained to observe that a number of times the High Court had unnecessarily directed the matter to be reconsidered and on each and every occasion there was rejection of the representation by the concerned authorities. Thus, no equitable consideration was available with Mesco to invoke the writ jurisdiction for the reliefs sought. Relief granted is not permissible as per law.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Orissa Industrial Infra.Dev. ... vs M/S Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd. & Ors on 14 February, 2017
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Thursday, 14 July 2016

When govt should not deny to victim report of committee inquiring in sexual harassment?

We find it very odd that in a matter of an enquiry in respect of an allegation of sexual harassment, the Union of India should claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. The contents of Reports alleging sexual harassment can hardly relate to affairs of State or anything concerning national security. In
any event, absolutely nothing has been shown to us to warrant withholding the Reports and the documents from the appellant in relation to the enquiry of allegations of sexual harassment made by the appellant against Sunil Uke and Ashok Chaturvedi.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4913 OF 2016

Nisha Priya Bhatia Vs Ajit Seth & Ors.

Madan B. Lokur, J.
Dated:May 6, 2016 
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2319
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Wednesday, 12 August 2015

Whether suspension of employee results in suspension of all privileges and benefits attached to office?

Equivalent Citation:(2014)13 SCC 622
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 5523 of 2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 9338 of 2012)
Decided On: 17.07.2013
Appellants: State of Punjab
Vs.
Respondent: Jaswant Singh Kanwar
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu and Dipak Misra, JJ.
To analyze the above proposition, the dictionary meaning of suspension is required to be set out. The term 'Suspend' would mean 'to debar usually, for a time, from any privilege, the execution of an office or from the enjoyment of an income'. It is temporary deprivation of office or privilege. By reason of suspension, the powers, functions and privileges remain in abeyance but one continues to be subjected to the same discipline and penalties and to the same authorities'. The above definition makes it clear that during the period of suspension, all the privileges and benefits attached to the office is temporarily suspended unless the period of suspension is considered as the period spent on duty.



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Saturday, 25 October 2014

Distinction between “privilege” and “accrued right”.


In Isha Valimohamad and Anr. vs. Haji Gulam Mohamad &
Haji Dada Trust 1975 (1) SCR 720 the Supreme Court made a distinction
between “privilege” and “accrued right”.
“Mr. Patel for respondent contended that even if the
landlord had no accrued right, he at least had a 'privilege'
as visualised in Section 51, proviso (1)(ii) of the Bombay
Act and that the privilege should survive the repeal.
A privilegium, in short, is a special act affecting
special persons with an anomalous advantage, or with an
anomalous burthen. It is derived from privatum, which,
as opposed to publican, signified anything which regards
persons considered individually; publicum being
anything which regards persons considered collectively,
and forming a society
(See Austin's Jurisprudence, Vol. II, 5th ed. (1911) P.
519)
The meaning of that word in jurisprudence has
undergone considerable change after Austin wrote.
According to Hohfeld:
... a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the
correlative of a 'no-right'. For instance, where "X has a
right or claim that Y should stay off the land (of X), he
himself has the 'privilege' of entering on the land; or, in
equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off.
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) pp. 38-39)
Arthur L. Corbin writes:
We say that B had a right that A should not intrude
and that A had a duty to stay out. But if B had invited A
to enter, we know that those results would not occur. In

such case we say that B had no right that A should stay
out and that A had the privilege of entering.
(See "Legal Analysis and Terminology", 29 Yale
Law Journal 163)
According to Kocourek:
Privilege and inability are correlatives. Where there
is a privilege there must be inability. The terms are
correlatives. The dominus of a Privilege may prevent the
servus of the Inability from exacting an act from the
dominus
(See "Jural Relations", 2nd ed., p. 24)
Patton says:
The Restatement of the law of Property defines a
privilege as a legal freedom on the part of one person as
against another to do a given act or a legal freedom not to
do a certain act.
(See Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (1964), p. 256)
We think that the respondent-landlord had the legal
freedom as against the appellants to terminate the
tenancy or not. The appellants had no right or claim that
the respondent should not terminate the tenancy and the
respondent had, therefore, the privilege of terminating it
on the ground that appellants had sub-let the premises.
This privilege would survive the repeal. But the problem
would still remain whether the respondent had an accrued
right or privilege to recover possession of the premises
under Section 13(1) of the Saurashtra Act on the ground
of the sub-letting before the repeal of that Act. The fact
that the privilege to terminate the tenancy on the ground
of sub-letting survived the repeal does not mean that the
landlord had an accrued right or privilege to recover
possession under Section 13(1) of that Act as that right or

privilege could arise only if the tenancy had been validly
terminated before the repeal of the Saurashtra Act.”
(at Pages 725, 726)
It is clear therefore that no accrued right to property was ever vested in the
defaulting member.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4354 of 2003

The Stock Exchange, Bombay Vs V.S. Kandalgaonkar & Ors.

Dated;September 25, 2014

R.F.Nariman, J.
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