Whether departmental enquiry will be vitiated if President Of Disciplinary Enquiry Committee Was Replaced Due To Ill Health?

 In any case, the High Court, in the impugned order, failed to take the note of doctrine of necessity. Once it is admitted, (i) that the disciplinary proceedings commenced with an Inquiry Committee of which the President was a member; and (ii) that subsequently he was replaced by someone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity would come into play. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court and the School Tribunal are liable to be reversed.  {Para 23}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7937 of 2011

Jai Bhavani Shikshan Prasarak Mandal Vs.  Ramesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/0376/2022

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Whether Education officer can review his own order?

 We

find that the petitions deserve to be allowed on short

ground that by the impugned order, Respondent

Education Officer has set aside the order passed by the

earlier Education Officer. As such, the impugned order

revokes the approval granted by the earlier order passed

by the predecessor in the office of the Respondent

Education Officer. By now, it is settled principle of law

that unless the power of review is specifically or by

necessary implication provided, the authority cannot

review its own order. No doubt, if an order is obtained by

exercising fraud, it would stand vitiated. However, it is

not the case of the Respondent- Education Officer that

Petitioners have obtained their initial orders by

fraudulent means. If the earlier Education Officer had

granted approval to the Petitioners' appointment, may be

erroneously, the same cannot be made a ground to recall

the same and pass contrary order, unless a case of fraud,

misrepresentation or suppression is made out.

Particularly when most of the Petitioners have already

put in their services for 11 years, the impugned orders

would amount to penalising them for no fault on their

part.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.12234 OF 2016

Vikrant Prataprao Gaikwad  Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : S. S. SHINDE,

V. G. BISHT, JJ

DATE : 28th February 2020

JUDGMENT :- (S. S. SHINDE, J.)

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 316

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Whether the employer can hold an employee guilty for sexual harassment in departmental enquiry despite the pendency of criminal prosecution?

What emerges from the record is:

(a) There were two FIRs filed pursuant to reporting that Respondent No.1

was guilty of objectionable behavior with adolescent girl students in the

school. In both these FIRs the investigation was undertaken and chargesheets

stand filed. Thus, prima facie, the allegations made in the FIR were

found sustainable in police investigation and Respondent No.1 is presently

accused of having committed said offences.

(b) Pursuant to FIR bearing CR No.24 of 2014 Respondent No.1 was

arrested and remained in custody for about seven days.

(c) During the present inquiry 12 witnesses were examined out of whom five witnesses were girls studying in the school.

It was thus not just two girl students, pursuant to whose complaint the

crime was registered against Respondent No.1, but there were other students

as well. Some parents had also gone to the extent of levelling allegations

against Respondent No.1. The conclusion by the Convener in the report that

the charges were sensitive and that the case called for strict action, was

absolutely correct. On the other hand, the reports of the Nominee of

Respondent No.1 and the State Awardee Teacher not only show complete lack

of sensitivity but they also got bogged down unnecessarily by a question

whether any action on their part would amount to contempt of court or not. It

is well settled that a departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal

court are completely different. The purpose is different, the standard of proof

is different and the approach is also different. The initiation of the process in

a departmental proceeding, specially on charges with which we are concerned

in the present matter can never be said to be amounting to contempt of court

even if the criminal proceedings were pending. The allegations made against

Respondent No.1 were of such level and dimension that an immediate action

on the departmental front was required to be undertaken and such action by its

very nature had to be completely independent. Whether any criminal trial

was pending or not would not be having any bearing on the pending issue

before the Inquiry Committee. We have, therefore, no hesitation in observing

that the approach of the Nominee of Respondent No.1 and of the State Awardee Teacher was completely wrong and unsustainable.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3456 OF 2019

THE SECRETARY, LUCY SEQUEIRA TRUST Vs  KAILASH RAMESH TANDEL AND ORS.

Author: Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

Dated: April 08, 2019.

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Whether employees of private schools are entitled to get salary as per 5th and 6th pay commission reports?

 No doubt, the conditions of service and the pay scales applicable to the teachers of secondary schools are prescribed by Schedule 'C' of the Rules of 1981. The State of Maharashtra by issuance of G.R. directed that all schools should implement the 6th Pay Commission Report and pay salary to the staff accordingly. The payment of salary and the arrears in accordance with the recommendations of 5th and 6th Pay Commission Reports are made applicable to the employees of the private schools irrespective of whether they are receiving grant-in-aid or not. In our opinion, merely because necessary amendments are not made in Schedule 'C' of the Rules of 1981 incorporating pay scales in terms prescribed by the Pay Commission reports would not be a ground to deny the benefit of the pay scales to the petitioners as per the 5th and 6th Pay Commission reports.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 242 of 2013

Decided On: 27.06.2019

Manojkumar S. Amare  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.C. Dharmadhikari and M.S. Karnik, JJ.

Citation: 2020(1) MHLJ 742

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When jurisdiction of civil court is not barred to try disputes relating employees of private school?

Section 9 spells out the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal to deal with the disputes between the Management and the employees. Since the Section so spells out the nature of the dispute, any dispute falling outside the scope of Section 9 could certainly be taken cognizance of by a Civil Court. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the following matters alone, as are defined in Section 9 of the Act.

1) Dismissal, 2) Removal, 3) Termination otherwise 4) Reduction in Rank, and 5) Supersession in promotion. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is restricted to above disputes only and as such if it is a dispute outside the above disputes, the civil court can certainly assume jurisdiction.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 235 of 2003

Decided On: 01.03.2007

Sanjay Gandhi Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, 
Vs.
 Nivrutti S/o Tukaram Borkar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.L. Pangarkar, J.

Citation: 2007(3) ALLMR 45

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Whether school tribunal is civil court?

It is,
thus, clear that the dispute that is raised before the tribunal
under the Act is a dispute of a civil nature and therefore it can
be safely said that the tribunal for the purpose of deciding
appeals filed before it can be said to be civil  court for the
purpose of Civil Procedure Code and therefore, an order made
by the Tribunal is an order within the meaning of the CivilProcedure Code.  I have already pointed out above that under
section 36 of the Civil Procedure Code, provisions in the Code
relating to execution of decree are applicable to the execution of
the order.  Therefore, if the order made by the School Tribunal
is an order within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, then
the provisions in the Code relating to execution of a decree are
available   for   enforcing   or   executing   an   order   made   by   the

School Tribunal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

Writ Petition No.32 of 2015

 Shri Brijlal Biyani Vidya Niketan Shikshan Prasarak Mandal,Vs Bharti w/o Khanderao Dabhade,

Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Dated  : 31st March, 2015
Citation;2016(1)ALLMR797

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When disciplinary enquiry against Teacher can be quashed?

I find that the enquiry was conducted in a slip-shod manner.

The enquiry committee was not constituted as required by law.

The evidence was recorded in a weird manner. The petitioner was not given an adequate opportunity of cross-examining the management witnesses. Two additional charges have been surreptitiously introduced / levelled against the petitioner. The suspension allowance was not paid to the petitioner thereby causing inconvenience to the petitioner. It is for all these reasons that the enquiry deserves to be quashed and set aside.

Bombay High Court

Ashok Shahaji Gulbhile vs The Secretary Gramvikas Shikshan ... on 20 March, 2015

Bench: R.V. Ghuge

Citation; 2015(5) MHLJ678

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Basic principles for grant of back wages in case of setting aside of wrongful termination of employee

 In the case of Deepali (Supra) the appellant was working as a
teacher in a primary school, who was proceeded against departmentally on

charges of insubordination etc. and was placed under suspension and was
subsequently terminated. The School Tribunal found action of the
Management wholly arbitrary and vitiated due to violation of principles of
natural justice. The School Tribunal also took cognizance of the fact that
the appellant was not gainfully employed and this aspect was not
controverted by the Management. The School Tribunal, in such
circumstances, ordered her reinstatement with full back wages. That order
was modified by a learned Single Judge of this Court as regards payment of
the back wages. That was the order which was subject matter of challenge
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It has been inter alia held that, as a
normal rule an employee becomes entitled to reinstatement with back
wages, once the dismissal/termination, is found to be illegal. After taking
survey of the various decisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court has culled out the
following principles on the question of grant of back wages.
“(i) In cases of wrongful termination of
service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages is the normal rule.
(ii) The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider
that while deciding the issue of back wages, the
adjudicating authority or the court may take into
consideration the length of service of the
employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found
proved against the employee/workman, the financial
condition of the employer and similar other factors.
(iii) Ordinarily, an employee or workman
whose services are terminated and who is desirous of

getting back wages is required to either plead or at least
make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the
court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully
employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer
wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to
plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/workman was gainfully employed and was
getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior
to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled
law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular
fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment
about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive
fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the
employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on
the employer to specifically plead and prove that the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same
or substantially similar emoluments.
(iv) The cases in which the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under
Section 11A
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds
that even though the enquiry held against the
employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural
justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds
that the punishment was disproportionate to the
misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion
not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or
workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the
employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be
ample justification for award of full back wages.

(v) The cases in which the competent court
or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross
violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of
natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or
workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully
justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such
cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under
Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution and interfere
with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely
because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion
on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full
back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same.
The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of
wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is
the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and
there is no justification to give a premium to the employer
of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to
the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back
wages.
(vi) In a number of cases, the superior
courts have interfered with the award of the primary
adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of
litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of
cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of
infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for
delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot
be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice
to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages
simply because there is long lapse of time between the
termination of his service and finality given to the order of
reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in most

of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position
visavis
the employee or workman. He can avail the
services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the
sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can illafford
the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain
amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be
prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin
Works (P) Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 80.
(vii) The observation made in J.K. Synthetics
Ltd. case, (2007) 2 SCC 433 that on reinstatement the
employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of
right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of threeJudge
Benches and cannot be treated as good law. This part
of the judgment is also against the very concept of
reinstatement of an employee/workman.”
It can thus be seen that it is the normal rule to grant back
wages/salary once the Court/Tribunal awards reinstatement. However, this
normal rule is subject to wellknown
exceptions and there is a discretion in
the matter of grant of back wages/salary. Albeit such a discretion is judicial
in nature and has to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each
case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down. In the case of Upekshit
Samaj Kalyan Samiti, Ballarpur...Versus...Education Officer (Secondary)
and others, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 194, the Hon'ble Apex Court had
restricted the back wages to 50%, while in the case of South Bengal State
Transport Corporation...Versus...Ashok Kumar Ghosh and others,
reported in (2010) 11 SCC 71 it was held that, where the punishment was

set aside on a technical ground, the back wages could not be granted and

were accordingly denied.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.4732/2003

 Dnyanshwar  Vithuji Ghude Vs  State of Maharashtra,
CORAM
: A.P. BHANGALE AND
C.V. BHADANG, JJ.
Date of pronouncing the judgment : 01.10.2014
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR 647

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Basic principles for condonation of delay

In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of “S.Ganeshraju (Dead)
through Lrs and another vs Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs and ors
reported in (2013) 11 Supreme Court Cases 341” the Supreme Court in
dealing with an issue of condoning delay as falling under section 5 of the
Limitation Act has held that section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to be
given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless
there are malafides in not approaching the Court during the period of
limitation as a normal rule delay ought to be condoned.
The Supreme
Court has observed as follows:-
12. “The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be given a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the
respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the
court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule,
delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing

with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted
more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to
contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such
technicalities have been given a go-by.
13.
The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or
foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

14. We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone delay
would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the
court is always deliberate. In fact, it is always just, fair and
appropriate that matters should be heard on merits rather than
shutting the doors of justice at the threshold. Since sufficient
cause has not been defined thus, the courts are left to exercise a
discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist
establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be
seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and
had not been negligent and callous in the prosecution of the
matter. In the instant case, we find that the appellants have shown
sufficient cause seeking condonation of delay and the same has
been explained satisfactorily.”
In another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
15.
“Basavraj & Anr. vs. SLAO” reported in “(2013) 14 SCC 81” while explaining
what would be meant by the word 'sufficient cause' the Supreme Court has
made the following observations in considering the case of delay of more
than five years.
9. “ Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that
which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices
to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the
view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances
of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted

diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to
be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the
Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building
Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964
SC 1336; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC
1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150; and
Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.) In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra
Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the
difference between a good cause and a sufficient cause and
observed that every sufficient cause is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that
the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser
degree of proof that that of sufficient cause.”
16.
The principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of
“Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. Vs. Mst.Katiji and Ors. (AIR
1987 Supreme Court 1353)” as appearing in paragraph 3 of its judgment are
required to be considered in considering an application for condonation of delay.
The Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“3.
The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to
parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression
“sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the
life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It
is common knowledge that this Court has been making a

justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this
Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated
down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:-
(1)
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late;
(2)
Refusing to condone delay can result in meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
As against this, when delay is
justice being defeated.
condoned the highest that can happen is that cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the parties.
“Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean
(3)
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
hours delay, every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense in pragmatic manner.
(4)
When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a non
deliberate delay.
(5)
There was no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay in fact he runs a serious risk.
(6)
It must be grasp that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.”
17.
In the light of the aforesaid well settled position in law, it is clear

that the expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is required to be a given liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice. Unless a party contesting the condonation of delay application is able to
show malafides on the part of the party approaching the Court in seeking
condonation of delay, it is held that as a normal rule, the delay should be
condoned. The Court is under an obligation to exercise discretion judiciously and
The reliance placed on behalf of the Petitioners on various decision
18.
hence, the test of bonafides of the applicant is required to be applied.
may not assist the Petitioners inasmuch as in each of these decisions the Court in
the peculiar facts of the case before it has adopted the reasoning as given in the
respective decisions. 
WRIT PETITION NO.975 OF 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

M/s.Ware's Educational Trust Vs Subhash Bhagwan Khedkar,
CORAM ;
: G. S. KULKARNI, J.
DATE : 17th SEPTEMBER,2014
Citation;2015(2)ALLMR91

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Importance of Doctrine of relation back in service jurisprudence.

 Doctrine of relation back has been considered to be an

important part of service jurisprudence. The essence of the "doctrine

of relation back" is that though an employee necessarily has to

undergo rigours of litigation, he eventually stands compensated if the

order of punishment is set aside. Entire back wages and benefits

incidental and consequential to reinstatement are then available to

an employee if the subsequent order of punishment in the form of

dismissal or termination is held to be bad in law since it relates back

to the initial date of dismissal. It is, in this situation, that the

"doctrine of relation back" has its operation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO.9310 OF 2013

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2010 of 2014

Manohar Pandit Marathe Vs President, Sharda Vidya Prasarak Mandal,

(CORAM : RAVINDRA V.GHUGE, J.)

DATE : 01/04/2014

Citation;2014(4) MHLJ 556 Bom

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When court can lift the veil to find out to find out real reason of making an appointment on temporary basis

 Hence, the power under
subsection
(2) of Section 5 is held to be discretionary.
18. The exercise of discretion under subsection
(2) of
Section 5 has to be by keeping in view the object of
enactment and the exigencies of the administration. If the
exercise of discretion is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable,
capricious or is a colourable exercise of power to defeat the
protection in service granted by the statutory provisions,

then the Court is empowered even to invoke the principles
of “lifting of veil” to find out the real reason of making an
appointment on temporary basis, and if the action is not
found to be bona fide, an appropriate direction can be
issued to provide protection in service by treating the
appointment on probation, even if it is shown to be on
temporary basis or for a fixed period. This is the view
propounded by the Full Bench, which is in conformity with
the object and the provisions of the MEPS Act. The ratio of
the decision of the Full Bench cannot be construed as
creating absolute bar to the jurisdiction of the School
Tribunal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act, to consider and
decide the question as to whether in the given facts and
circumstances of the case, an order of appointment on
temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent
vacancy cannot be treated as one on probation and the
employee is entitled to protection in service, in a challenge

to the order of termination. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 4404/2011

Abdul Rafique Abdul Hamid, Vs  The Yavatmal Islamia Anglo Urdu Education Society, Yavatmal, 

R. K. DESHPANDE, J.
DATE : 13 th FEBRUARY, 2014 .
Citation;2014(3) MHLJ 99 Bom

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Jurisdiction of civil court in case of Maharashtra Employees of Private School

The controversy in each such suit, therefore, has to be gone into on the above touchstone. We have seen from the pleadings in Civil Suit No. 165 of 1996 that the plaintiff seeks declaration that the Inquiry Committee constituted is void and defendant be restrained from holding any inquiry. Now, if this relief is seen, it would be clear that this relief does not relate to either dismissal, removal, termination, reduction in rank or supersession in promotion. This suit is, therefore, certainly out of cognizance of the Tribunal. The Civil Court, therefore, could certainly take cognizance of such a suit. Whether such a declaration and injunction could be granted or not would be a different question and we need not go into that.1

2007(3)ALLMR45, 2007(2)BomCR760, 2007(109)BOMLR717

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 235 of 2003

Decided On: 01.03.2007

Appellants: Sanjay Gandhi Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, A Society registered under Societies Registration Act, through its Secretary Shri Namdeo Nagorao Hajare

Vs.

Respondent: Nivrutti S/o Tukaram Borkar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.L. Pangarkar, J.

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Right to employee of private school to claim unpaid salary or unpaid emoluments from management

An employee of a private school, therefore, cannot claim the unpaid salary or unpaid emoluments from the management of the school by filing an appeal before the School Tribunal solely for that purpose and that no such appeal would lay before the School Tribunal under section 9 of the Act for that purpose. Similarly, if an employee of the private school challenges his order of termination, dismissal or removal or reduction in rank before the School Tribunal under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act, after hearing the parties if the School Tribunal comes to the conclusion that such order of termination, removal or dismissal in rank was illegal and then also in addition to the reinstatement the School Tribunal can only direct the payment of arrears of emoluments or salary for the period subsequent to the order of termination, dismissal or removal or reduction in rank till the period so specified by the School Tribunal and not of any outstanding amount of salary or emoluments of the period to the passing of impugned order. It is this abundantly clear that the respondent No. 1 employee could not have claimed her unpaid salary for the period from 16-12-1982 to 30-4-1983 prior to the order of termination from the School Tribunal in the appeal filed by her challenging the termination and, therefore, the Labour Court did not commit any error of jurisdiction in entertaining the application filed by the employee under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in passing the award on 6-6-1989.

Bombay High Court

Sangam Education Society, Nagpur ... vs Bharti Hansraj Borkar And Anr. on 27 January, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1995 (4) BomCR 621

Bench: R Lodha

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Whether Jurisdiction of civil court is barred in respect of matters where remedy is not provided under Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act?

The Legislature having provided for a remedy before the Tribunal only in respect of the subjects spelt out in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 9, in those cases the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred to the extent to which the Legislature has spoken. In other areas which are not covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 9, the remedy of an appeal before the Tribunal is not available and hence, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred.

Bombay High Court

St. Ulai High School Through Its ... vs Shri Devendraprasad Jagannath ... on 18 December, 2006

Equivalent citations: 2007 (109) Bom L R 60, 2007 (1) MhLj 597

Bench: J Patel, D Chandrachud, R Dalvi

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