Showing posts with label judicial notice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judicial notice. Show all posts

Sunday, 3 August 2025

Courts’ Reliance on Google Maps to Determine Geographical Facts: An Indian Law Perspective on its use and precautions


 Key Takeaway: Indian courts may admit Google Maps evidence subject to the same principles governing other maps and charts under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 1980, but must scrutinize accuracy, relevance, and potential privacy implications before relying on it for decisional purposes.

1. Statutory Framework for Admissibility of Maps and Charts

·       Section 30 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) deems “published maps or charts generally offered for public sale, or maps or plans made under authority of the Central or State Government” as relevant facts, admissible without further proof of their contents.

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Monday, 24 June 2024

Important features of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,2023

 1. The new Act on law of evidence has been named as “Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023” which has replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

2. The words like ‘Parliament of the United Kingdom’, ‘Provincial Act’, ‘notification by the Crown Representative’, ‘London Gazette’, ‘any Dominion, colony or possession of his Majesty, ‘Jury’, ‘Lahore’, ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’, ‘Commonwealth,’ ‘Her Majesty or by the Privy Council,’ ‘Her Majesty's Government’, ‘copies or extracts contained in the London Gazette, or purporting to be printed by the Queen’s Printer’, ‘possession of the British Crown’, ‘Court of Justice in England’, ‘Her Majesty’s Dominions’, ‘Barrister’ have thus been deleted as they are no longer relevant.

3. Language of the BSA has been modernized. The words like ‘Vakil’, ‘Pleader’ and ‘Barrister’ have been replaced with the word ‘Advocate’.

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Tuesday, 19 February 2019

Whether it is permissible for court to exhibit religious scriptures (Granthas) ?

 Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiffs has relied upon the judgment in the case of Sardar Dayalsing Charansing v. Tulsidas Tarachand, AIR (32) 1945 Sind 177, wherein in similar matter, while deciding the question relating to the practices and beliefs in Sikh religion, the documents, in the nature of religious scriptures (Granthas) were referred to in argument and in the authorities cited by the learned Advocates and it was held that the Court is entitled to refer to these documents under Section 57 of the Evidence Act, 1872, as these documents were found to be of assistance to the Court; in order to go in to the history and theological beliefs of that religion.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3588 of 2018 and Writ Petition (ST.) No. 7520 of 2018

Decided On: 20.04.2018

Bipin Jaysukhlal Mehta Vs.  Jayantibhai Talakchand Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 690
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Friday, 5 May 2017

Whether court can take judicial notice of subsequent events While deciding appeal?

Having heard the learned Counsel for the
parties at length and on perusal of the record of the
case, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary
for this Court to decide any of the points urged by
the learned counsel on account of certain
subsequent events which took place during the
pendency of this litigation. In our opinion, the
subsequent events brought to our notice have a
direct bearing over the controversy involved in this
case and hence they deserve to be taken note of for
deciding the appeal.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 4375 OF 2017

Dinshaw Rusi Mehta & Anr.
V
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. 
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 1557
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Sunday, 23 April 2017

Leading judgment on interpretation of documents

In Deo v. Rias (1832) 8 Bing, 178, Tindal, C.J. held that "we are to look at the words of the instrument and to the acts of the parties to ascertain what their intention was; if the words of the instrument be ambiguous, we may call in the aid of the acts done under it as a clue to the intention of the parties. In Chapman v. Bluck (1838) 4 Ring, 187, Park J. held that the intention of the parties may be collected from the language of the instrument and may be elucidated by the conduct they have pursued. Odgers in his Construction of Deeds and Statutes, 5th Edn. by Dworkin at p. 53 stated that in the case of an ambiguity, judicial notice will be taken of the way in which the parties themselves have interpreted their rights and duties under the document. 
In that case the question was "who was the real purchaser of the goods in question". Gajendragadar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the court held that the appellant acted on account of the disclosed partner and as such he was not entitled to sue. It was also further held that whether the contract was entered on behalf of the principal recital in the relevant document could provide the necessary clue. The letters and the confirmation slips were held to be read in the light of the bought and sold notes and the conduct of the parties was presumed to be consistent with them. The signature or how the parties described themselves was held to be not relevant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 5432 of 1992
Decided On: 18.12.1992
 American Express Bank Ltd.
Vs.
 Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors.

Coram:
A.M. Ahmadi, M.M. Punchhi and K. Ramaswamy, JJ.

Citation:(1993) 2 SCC199
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Saturday, 11 March 2017

Whether court should grant interest on damages for breach of contract of professional services?

The extent of damages for the breach of the contract of professional services agreed and failed to be rendered and for the consequent mental agony, distress and anguish would be analogous to the damages which are grantable for similar effects upon a tort.
 Courts have also granted interest upon the damages awarded. Under Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 interest can be allowed as much in proceedings for recovery of damages as in proceedings for recovery of debts. The interest which is allowable is at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the date of the notice till the date of institution of the proceedings. Further interest from the institution of the Suit is payable under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the reasonable rate on the principal sum from the date of Suit until the date of the decree and at the rate not exceeding 6% per annum from the date of decree until payment.
167. Interest has been granted on the amount of damages even under common law. In the case of Perry v. Sidney (supra) it has been observed the compensation for inflation be also accounted for "because damages carry interest". In the case of Hayes v. James (supra) a rough estimate of the true value of the property at the time of the sale which resulted in the action for damages itself came to be granted by way of interest. The rough estimate made by the trial Judge was upheld by the appeal Court as a fair assessment. The relevant portion of the Judgment at page 818 shows how the interest on the property came to be calculated roughly assessing the property's value thus:
The judge awarded the Plaintiffs 80% of the interest because of the true value of the marionette at the time of sale, and the Defendants argue that the proportion should have been much less. The judge was making a rough estimate which should not readily be criticized. However, the Defendants submit that it was wholly wrong. In my opinion the judge's assessment is fair. In considering how to apportion the original price of 65,000, he has deducted the 10,000 paid by the Plaintiffs from the overpayment for the marionette, leaving 55,000. 10,000 of that is the balance of the overpayment, which leaves 45,000 as the amount for which the Defendants are responsible. 45,000 is near enough 80% of 55,000.
168. In the case of Watts v. Morrow (supra) interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the award of damages based on the cost of the repairs was held appropriate.
169. Those interest rates are on the principal amount of damages for breach of contract calculated under all the heads including mental distress from the date of the Suit till the date of Judgment.
170. In the case of Nizam's Institute (supra) a lump sum payment of Rs. 10 lakhs only for pain and suffering came to be made with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the Judgment which is the interest allowable under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
171. The claim of interest of 18% is at the usual commercial rate prevailing at the time of the filing of the Suit. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that that rate prevailed until the end of 2007 after which the rate of commercial interest was lower. A reasonable rate of interest is required to be granted to the Plaintiffs for the 22 years period during which the Plaintiffs' Suit remained on the docket of this Court and the Plaintiffs remained indemnified. In this case interest @ 16% p.a. for the entire period from the date of the surgery of the original Plaintiff No. 2 till the date of this Judgment and thereafter @ 6% p.a. till payment/realization would meet ends of justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Suit No. 1101 of 1989
Decided On: 02.09.2011
 Padam Chandra Singhi and Ors.Vs. Dr. P.B. Desai and Ors.
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Sunday, 7 February 2016

Whether Newspaper report is admissible in evidence unless proved in accordance with law?

The issue is no longer resintegra and came up before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Raj Shetty and another
vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1988 SC 1274 wherein it was
categorically held that the newspaper item being in the nature of
hearsay secondary evidence in itself have no evidentiary value,

unless proved by evidence aliunde. It is apt to reproduce paras 25
and 26 of the judgment and relevant portion whereof reads thus:
“25. ….. We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in
a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary
evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a
newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one
of the documents referred to in Section 78 (2) of the Evidence
Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The
presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the
Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as
proof of the facts reported therein.
26. It is now well settled that a statement of fact contained
in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore
inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the
statement appearing in Court and deposing to have
perceived the fact reported….” 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 3231 of 2014

Date of decision: October 27, 2015.

Private Bus Operator Welfare Society V State of H.P. and others 

Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Citation;AIR2016(NOC)138HP
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