Supreme Court: CCS Pension Rules | Gratuity Can Be Withheld During Pendency Of Criminal Or Disciplinary Proceedings Against Employee

The Appellant contends that the expression "departmental or judicial proceedings" in Rule 69(1)(c) must be construed to mean that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of either set of proceedings.

12. Such a submission totally misapprehends the nature of the Rule. As the learned Single Judge had rightly noted at the first instance, Rule 69(1)(c) operates as an 'embargo' or a statutory bar, not as an enabling provision. The use of the ordinary disjunctive "or" expands the scope of this bar, indicating that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending. 

13. Rule 69(1)(c) of the 1972 Rules has a wide import and operates in respect of any proceeding that may be pending against an employee at the time of retirement; indeed, the breadth of the provision reflects its protective character. If the Appellant's interpretation were accepted, an employee could contend that once any one set of proceedings against him/her stands concluded, the embargo stands lifted and gratuity must be released. This would altogether defeat the purpose of the provision, which is to safeguard the financial interests of the State.

14. Even in the instant case, where both the proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standard of proof remain fundamentally different. By way of illustration, let us consider if the converse were true i.e., the criminal case against the Appellant had concluded in an acquittal due to failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It would nevertheless be possible that the Appellant was eventually found liable in the pending departmental proceedings on a preponderance of probabilities. An acquittal in that case could not be determinative. If such an approach is impermissible in one direction, it cannot be countenanced in the other either. Moreover, this distinction assumes increased significance in the instant case, as the Inquiry Officer had expressly noted that the matter was sub judice and any definitive conclusion would rest on the outcome of the criminal trial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 14669 of 2025

Decided On: 07.04.2026

Bikram Chand Rana Vs. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prashant Kumar Mishra and V.M. Pancholi, JJ.

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 326,MANU/SC/0322/2026

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Whether the accused must obtain the trial court's permission to renew the passport if a higher court stays the criminal proceeding?

Arguably, case of the petitioner falls into this category. Be that as it may. (c) The impugned Endorsement is structured on the ground that a criminal case is pending inter alia against the petitioner in C.C.No.11606/2020, in the Court of learned

XVII ACMM, Bengaluru City. The same having been challenged in W.P.No.14431/2020, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has stayed all further proceedings before the Trial judge vide interim order dated 10.12.2020, is not in dispute. That being the position, the respondent- RPO is not justified in asking the petitioner to go the Trial the learned Trial

Judge to seek permission to travel aboard in the ‘stayed proceedings’. The Notification dated 25.08.1993 purportedly issued under Section 22 of the Act, normally expects an

order of the kind and this norm is applicable in ordinary circumstances, in the sense that the criminal proceedings are not stayed and hands of the Trial Judge are free to work, and not in the circumstances that have tied his hands. A contention to the

contrary amounts to asking the citizen to do an impossible act. Ordinarily, an act impossible of performance is treated as either having been accomplished or waived vide lex non cogit ad impossibilia which Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th

Edition, Butterworths Wadhwa at pages 326 to 328 extensively discusses. Thus, the insistence on production of an order as mentioned in the impugned Endorsement is not justified.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU

WRIT PETITION NO.19203 OF 2021(GM-PASS); 

KASTURI RAJUPETA v. UNION OF INDIA

BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT

Dated:17 MARCH, 2022

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Whether government servant or judicial officer can be denied pension if judicial proceeding is pending against him?

The petitioner retired on 31.12.2007 as District Judge. At the time of retirement no disciplinary action was pending against him On 5.2.2008, subsequent to his retirement a First Information Report was lodged at Police Station Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 120-B IPC and Section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which was registered at Case Crime No. 152 of 2008. In view of the aforesaid criminal case only 90% of his gratuity amounting to Rs. 3.15 lacs out of total Rs. 3.5 lacs was released in his favour on 6.1.2012 on completion of necessary formalities.

2. The Government Order dated 4th November, 2010, issued on the basis of the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee report dated 17.7.2009 which was accepted by the Supreme Court vide its orders dated 19.7.2010, 29.7.2010 and 2.8.2010 the State Government provided that all judicial officers retiring on 1.1.2006 or thereafter would be entitle to gratuity/death cum retirement gratuity of Rs. 10 lacs.

3. The petitioner had retired on 31.12.2007 and, as such, became entitled to gratuity of Rs. 10 lacs as per the aforesaid Government Order in place of Rs. 3.50 lacs.

8. It is settled in law that payment of post retirement dues including gratuity are not bounty and that they cannot be withheld unless the rules provide for it. In other words, in the absence of any rules permitting withholding of post retiral dues including gratuity, the Government cannot withhold the same.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is unable to place before us any rule or statutory provision permitting withholding of post retiral dues due to pendency of a criminal case.

10. Civil Services Regulations vide Regulation 919-A(3) provides that no death-cum-retirement gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental proceedings or the enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal and issue of final orders thereon.

12. A simple reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that the bar on payment of death-cum-retirement gratuity is until the conclusion of the departmental proceedings or the enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal. This bar is not applicable where a criminal case is pending as it is not a departmental proceeding or an enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal.

13. In the case at hand, there is no departmental proceedings or any enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal pending against the petitioner. The petitioner is only facing criminal proceedings and there is certainly no provision which puts a rider on the payment of death-cum-gratuity to a Government servant or a judicial officer merely for the reason that criminal proceedings are pending against him.

14. A Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and three others v. Faini Singh (Special Appeal No. 416 of 2014 decided on 25.4.2014) while considering the provisions of Regulation 919-A(3) of Civil Services Regulations observed that the power of withholding or withdrawing pension is to be used in cases where allegations are of serious nature or grave misconduct and of causing pecuniary loss and it cannot be exercised mechanically merely on the pendency of any judicial proceedings without considering the allegations against the retired Government servant. In other words, pendency of even judicial proceedings has not been recognized as a matter of right to withhold the pension.

15. In Bangali Bahu Misra v. State of U.P., MANU/UP/1042/2002 : 2003(3) AWC 1760, a Division Bench of this Court seized of a similar controversy held that in the absence of any provision under law even if the petitioner is subjected to punishment in criminal proceedings that would not be a ground for withholding the post retiral benefits admissible to him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 937 of 2013

Decided On: 23.10.2017

 Radhey Shyam Chaubey  Vs.  High Court of Judicature and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and Irshad Ali, JJ.

Citation: 2018 (3) AWC 2521.

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Supreme Court guidelines for grant of personal exemption to accused from attending court in criminal proceeding

 The position, therefore, boils down to this: it is within the powers of a Magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an Accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the Magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations on him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the Accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the Magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the Accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the Magistrate who grants such benefit to the Accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an Accused makes an application to a Magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the Magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1901 of 2019 

Decided On: 16.12.2019

 Puneet Dalmia Vs.  Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and M.R. Shah, JJ.

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Whether moratorium prohibiting institution of proceeding as provided in S 14 of insolvency Act applies to criminal proceeding?

As can be seen from Clause (a) of Sub Section 1 of Section 14 of the Code, once the adjudicating authority declares moratorium for prohibiting institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceeding against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any Court of law, Arbitration Tribunal or other authority, the whole emphasis of the arguments of the learned advocate for the respondents 2 to 7 is on the words 'proceedings', 'order' and 'in any Court of law'. It has been submitted that these words do not precisely restrict its operation to only civil proceedings. The words are omnibus and even include a criminal proceeding including the one under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and a criminal revision arising therefrom.

13. As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

 Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mangesh S. Patil, J.

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When court should not entertain issue of prejudice to accused due to his inadequate examination U/S 313 of CRPC?

But equally there cannot be a generalised presumption of prejudice to an Accused merely by reason of any omission or inadequate questions put to an Accused thereunder. Ultimately it will be a question to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case including the nature of other evidence available, the kind of questions put to an Accused, considered with anything further that the Accused may state in his defence. In other words, there will have to be a cumulative balancing of several factors. While the rights of an Accused to a fair trial are undoubtedly important, the rights of the victim and the society at large for correction of deviant behaviour cannot be made subservient to the rights of an Accused by placing the latter at a pedestal higher than necessary for a fair trial.

In Sukha v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0026/1956 : 1956 SCR 288, it was observed as follows:

35. .....We have recently decided that we will be slow to entertain question of prejudice when details are not furnished; also the fact that the objection is not taken at an early stage will be taken into account.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 937, 938 and 939 of 2011

Decided On: 04.10.2019

 Fainul Khan Vs.  State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and B.R. Gavai, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4858

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Whether passport can be denied to a person if criminal appeal against acquittal is pending against him?

Obviously, therefore, the respondent in an appeal against an order
of acquittal is one who should be available to the jurisdiction of the
appellate Court, which is in seison (sic) of the appeal against the order of
acquittal.  Clause (f) of Section 6(2) of the Act provides an embargo on
issuance of a passport if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to
have been committed by the applicant are pending before a Criminal
Court in India. The distinction between being charged of an offence
and charge being framed in relation to an offence has always been
maintained.  See for support Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and another vs.
State of Rajasthan . The appellate Court, even if it is the High Court, is a
Criminal Court when it sits and decides matters in criminal jurisdiction.
This is a well settled principle of law.

9.       Hence, if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been
committed by the applicant for Passport are pending before the appellate
Court; the High Court in this case; that is ground enough for the Passport
Officer to be compelled by the opening part of Sub-section (2) of Section 6
of the Act to refuse issuance of such Passport.

ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT                     

WRIT APPEAL No.1026 of 2018    

Dated:01.08.2018 

Subhas Chandra Bose Mandava, Vs Union of India,


HONBLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN             
AND  
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN           

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Whether previous bad character is relevant in criminal proceeding?

Violation of the provisions of Section 54 of the Indian Evidence
Act, in taking into consideration the past history of the
appellants to find them guilty of commission of offence :-Considering the evidence on record, we find that the PW 7 made a
statement in course of his examination-in-chief with regard to the
antecedents of the appellants. However, after thorough consideration of the
impugned judgement, we do not find that those antecedents of the appellants
were considered by the learned trial Judge for finding the appellants guilty of
commission of offence. So, alleged violation of the provision of section 54 of
the Indian Evidence Act, is a begging question on the part of the appellants.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Present:
Justice Debasish Kar Gupta
 And
 Justice Md. Mumtaz Khan
CRA No. 800 of 2006
Munkir Sk. & Anr.
V
The State of West Bengal


Judgment on: 05/10/2016
Citation: 2017 CRLJ 1193

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Whether criminal prosecution can be initiated at instance of person who has no title to property?

The further legal contention that the pendency of a civil dispute would not preclude criminal proceedings or that the end result of the two proceedings being different or that both are not dependant on each other, is concerned, in the present case on hand, there is no established civil right of the complainant or his mother-in-law. There is no civil dispute pending which would determine any such right with any degree of finality. The criminal proceedings are instituted in a vacuum and may possibly result in civil rights being conferred by proxy as it were, in view of the assumptions on which the criminal proceedings are instituted by the complainant and entertained by the court below, albeit these infirmities. The facts and circumstances are not such that both civil and criminal liability is attracted as in the case of Vijayendra Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, MANU/SC/0092/2014 : 2014 AIR SCW 1197, which is cited in support of the above propositions which are not relevant for the case on hand.

Further, the allegation of having engineered fraudulent mutation entries as against the petitioners is wholly irrelevant at the instance of the complainant, in the absence of an established claim to ownership by Mallamma. This is the primary error in the approach of the Investigating Officer in submitting the Charge Sheet and in the court below accepting the same and having taken cognizance of the alleged offences and having issued process against the accused.

The contention that at the stage of issuing summons, it is only a minimum scrutiny that is expected of the court, cannot be implied to mean that the court can overlook glaring circumstances that would not make out a case as suggested by the complainant. When the court below has already failed in its duty to examine the bare details, which would indicate that there is no case made out against the accused, the indignation expressed over the seeming fraud on the part of accused No. 1 on analysis of records and documents, to which the complainant or his mother-in-law were not privy and the parties to those documents not seeking to raise any controversy over the same, would result in pure adventurism on the part of the prosecution in alleging a conspiracy against the petitioners, while having thought it fit to drop Accused No. 4 & 5 from the proceedings, when they are in fact holding the portion of land claimed by Mallamma.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition Nos. 979 of 2013 and 5438 of 2012

Decided On: 03.11.2016

 S. Muniraju and Ors.

Vs.

 State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anand Byrareddy, J.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 845

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Whether court should decide suit and application for breach of injunction by common judgment?

 A proceeding under Order XXXIX. Rule 2A, C.P.C., initiated on the ground of disobedience or breach of injunction order, is in the nature of a criminal proceeding as the person against whom such proceeding is initiated is liable to be detained in prison if it is found that he had committed breach of injunction order. Since a punishment is imposed and a person is sent to Jail, the principle on which these proceedings are decided are entirely different. Here the principle of criminal law will apply and the plaintiff will have to establish beyond any shadow of doubt that the defendants had committed disobedience or breach of the injunction order even though he had full knowledge of the same. The burden of proving its case in such cases lies entirely on the plaintiff. The principle on which a civil suit is decided are different as here decision on the issues arising out of pleadings is taken on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Therefore, a common judgment and order deciding the main suit as well as application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P.C. will not be proper. In my opinion, the order passed by learned Munsif on 11.12.1989 holding the defendants guilty in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and directing them to be detained in civil prison is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

Citation : AIR 1998 All 228

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

C.M.W.P. No. 682 of 1990

Decided On: 06.02.1998

 Gyan Chand Jain   Vs.  XIIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Agra 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.P. Mathur, J.

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Whether departmental proceeding can be continued during pendency of criminal proceeding?

 In the peculiar facts of the present case, therefore, we accede
to the contention of the appellants that the pendency of the
criminal case against the respondent cannot be the sole basis to
suspend the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
respondent for an indefinite period; and in larger public interest,
the order as passed in Stanzen’s case be followed even in the fact
situation of the present case, to balance the equities.
13. The next question is: whether Clause 4 of the Settlement
would denude the appellants from continuing with the disciplinary
proceedings pending against the respondent. Clause 4 of the
Settlement reads thus:
“4. If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or
to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial
within a year of the commission of the offence, the
management may then deal with him as if he had committed
an act of “gross misconduct” or of “minor misconduct”, as
defined below; provided that if the authority which was to
start prosecution proceedings refuses to do so or comes to
the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall
be open to the management to proceed against the employee
under the provisions set out below in Clauses 11 and 12
infra relating to discharge, but he shall out below in Clauses
11 and 12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed
to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any,
and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to
all other privileges for such period. In the event of the
management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in
service, he shall be liable only for termination with three
months’ pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in
Clause 3 above. If within the pendency of the proceedings
thus instituted is put on trial such proceedings shall be
stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the
provisions mentioned in Clause 3 above shall apply.”
 (emphasis supplied)
14. Ordinarily, the scope of Clause 4 of the Memorandum of
Settlement pressed into service would be a matter of an Industrial
Dispute, to be adjudicated by the competent Forum, if the
respondent can be termed as a workman. The respondent herein
was appointed in a clerical cadre of the appellant-bank; but when
the alleged misconduct was committed on 29th May 2006, she was
working as Assistant (Clearing). Neither before the learned Single
Judge, the Division Bench nor before us any argument has been
canvassed on the factum of whether the respondent can be treated
as a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. Both sides, however, have relied on the said Clause and
invited us to spell out its purport.
15. On the plain language of Clause 4, in our opinion, it is not a
stipulation to prohibit the institution and continuation of
disciplinary proceedings, much less indefinitely merely because of
the pendency of criminal case against the delinquent employee. On
the other hand, it is an enabling provision permitting the institution
or continuation of disciplinary proceedings, if the employee is not
put on trial by the prosecution within one year from the
commission of the offence or the prosecution fails to proceed
against him for want of any material.
16. As can be culled out from the last sentence of Clause 4, which
applies to a case where the criminal case has in fact proceeded, as
in this case, for trial. The term “completion of the trial” there at,
must be construed as completion of the trial within a reasonable
time frame. This clause cannot come to the aid of the delinquent
employee - who has been named as an accused in a criminal case
and more so is party to prolongation of the trial.
17. Notably, in the present case inspite of a peremptory direction
of the Division Bench given on 28th June 2010 to the concerned
criminal Court to proceed with the trial on day-to-day basis, as
noted above, no effective progress has been made in that trial
(except recording of evidence of three prosecution witnesses out of
eighteen witnesses) so far. In the last six years, evidence of only two
additional prosecution witnesses has been recorded. The
respondent has not pointed out any material on record to even
remotely suggest that she had tried her best to dissuade the
criminal Court from adjourning the trial, in breach of direction
given by the Division Bench of the High Court to proceed on day-today
basis and to conclude the trial within one year from 28th June,
2010. Pendency of criminal trial for around 10 years, by no means,
can be said to be a reasonable time frame to withhold the
disciplinary proceedings. We are fortified in taking this view on the
principle underlying the former part of the same clause, which
envisages that if the Authority which has to start the prosecution
refuses (read fails) to do so within one year from the commission of
the offence, the departmental action can proceed under the
provisions as set out in Clauses 11 and 12 of the Settlement.
18. In the fact situation of the present case, it is possible to take
the view that the first part of Clause is attracted. In that,
respondent has been put on trial in connection with the alleged
offence, by framing of charges on 12th June 2007. That has
happened after one year from the commission of the offence.
19. Be that as it may, the remedy of writ being an equitable
jurisdiction and keeping in mind the larger public interests (atleast
in cases of involvement of the employees of the Public Sector Banks
in offence of breach of trust and embezzlement), the arrangement
predicated in the case of Stanzen (supra) would meet the ends of
justice. For, the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the
respondent cannot brook any further delay which is already
pending for more than 10 years.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4715 of 2011
State Bank of India & Ors.
Vs.
Neelam Nag 
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC491

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Whether pension of an employee can be withheld during pendency of departmental/criminal proceedings?

In   case   of  State   of   Jharkhand   and   others
(supra),  the   Supreme   Court   formulated   the   following
questions for consideration :­
"2. Crisp and short question which arises for
consideration in these cases is as to whether, in
the absence of any provision in the Pension Rules,
the   State   Government   can   withhold   a   part   of
pension and/or gratuity during the pendency of
departmental/criminal proceedings ?”  
7. After   taking   into   consideration,   the   various
expositions on the subject, the Supreme Court in paras 16
and 17 of the judgment held thus :­ 
“16. The fact remains that there is an imprimatur to the
legal principle that the right to receive pension is recognised
as a right in “property”. Article 300­A of the Constitution of
India reads as under: 
“300­A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by
authority   of   law.   ­   No   person   shall   be   deprived   of   his
property save by authority of law.” 
Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the
question posed by us in the beginning of this judgment
becomes too obvious. A person cannot be deprived of this
pension   without   the   authority   of   law,   which   is   the

constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300­A of the
Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take
away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment
without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of
administrative instruction cannot be countenanced. 
17.  It hardly needs to be emphasised that the executive
instructions   are   not   having   statutory   character   and,
therefore, cannot be termed as “law” within the meaning of
aforesaid Article 300­A. On the basis of such a circular,
which   is   not   having   force   of   law,   the   appellant   cannot
withhold even a part of pension or gratuity. As we noticed
above, so far as statutory Rules are concerned, there is no
provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given
situation. Had there been any such provision in these Rules,
the position would have been different.” 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                             
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 2630 OF 2014
PURUSHOTTAM KASHINATH KULKARNI AND OTHERS
V
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

CORAM : S.S. SHINDE & P.R. BORA, JJ.
Dated: February 16, 2016
Citation: 2016 (5) ALLMR410

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Whether application for breach of injunction should be separately registered as Misc. Judicial case?

The application for breach of injunction should be

separately registered as Misc. Judicial case and should be tried

by framing appropriate points. The proceeding under Order 39,

Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code are absolutely independent

proceedings

A proceeding under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code, initiated on the ground of disobedience or breach of injunction order, is in the nature of a criminal proceeding as the person against whom such proceeding is initiated is liable to be detained in prison if it is found that he had committed breach of injunction order. Since a punishment is imposed and a person is sent to jail, the principle on which these proceedings are decided are entirely different. Here the principle of criminal law will apply and the plaintiff will have to establish beyond any shadow of doubt that the defendants had committed disobedience or breach of the injunction order even though he had full knowledge of the same. The burden of proving its case in such cases lies entirely on the plaintiff. The principle on which a civil suit is decided are different as here decision on the issues arising out of pleadings is taken on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Therefore, a common judgment and order deciding the main suit as well as application under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Civil Procedure Code will not be proper.

Bombay High Court

Rampyaribai Wd/O Sukhdeo Daga And ... vs Niladevi Wd/O Narayandas ... on 30 April, 2007

Equivalent citations: 2007 (4) MhLj 213

Bench: A Chaudhari

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How to prove identity of mobile telephone instrument in criminal case?

Question is, whether the identity of the said mobile telephone
instrument, as the same one, that had been robbed, has been
satisfactorily established.  It may be recalled that the IMEI number
of   the   mobile   telephone   instrument   has   not   been   brought   on
record.  It was easily possible for the investigating agency to have
collected such information, so as to fix the identity of the mobile
telephone instrument, as the same that was being used by the first
informant Ashok.   Even assuming that Ashok did not know the
IMEI number, it was easily possible to ascertain the same from the
connectivity number i.e. the mobile telephone number itself.  The
same, however, has not been done.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1291 of 2012

ARUN MARUTI WAGHCHAURE V/s. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 

CORAM : ABHAY M. THIPSAY, J.
DATE : 19th MARCH 2015.
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(CRI)4339 Bom

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“Whether an arbitration clause in an agreement creates any bar to initiate criminal proceedings?”

On this aspect, in S.W. Palanitkar & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.3, this Court has echoed the following views:

"22. Looking to the complaint and the grievances made by the complainant therein and having regard to the agreement, it is clear that the dispute and grievances arise out of the said agreement. Clause 29 of the agreement provides for reference to arbitration in case of disputes or controversy between the parties and the said 3 (2002) 1 SCC 241  clause is wide enough to cover almost all sorts of disputes arising out of the agreement. As a matter of fact, it is also brought to our notice that the complainant issued a notice dated 3-10-1997 to the appellants invoking this arbitration clause claiming Rs.15 lakhs. It is thereafter the present complaint was filed. For the alleged breach of the agreement in relation to commercial transaction, it is open to the Respondent 2 to proceed against the appellants for his redressal for recovery of money by way of damages for the loss caused, if any. Merely because there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, that cannot prevent criminal prosecution against the accused if an act constituting a criminal offence is made out even prima facie."

Supreme Court of India

State Of Orissa & Ors vs Ujjal Kumar Burdhan on 19 March, 2012

Bench: D.K. Jain, Anil R. Dave

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Whether unsubstantiated criminal proceeding against other spouse which results in acquittal amounts to cruelty?

 The Appellant made

unsubstantiated allegations of unchastity against the respondent for

having extra marital affair. There can be no two opinions that the

allegation was very serious. Such an allegation not only disturbs the

tranquility of a marriage but more importantly is character

assassination of a person which certainly has to be placed on a

higher pedestal than merely other grounds for a failed marriage.

In 1995/96 she filed a criminal prosecution under

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code/3 and 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act.

The respondent was convicted but came to be

acquitted in Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 2001. It cannot be lost sight

of that in view of the institution of a criminal prosecution under

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code/3 & 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act and the inability to substantiate the same leading to

acquittal in Appeal itself amounts to cruelty in the eyes of law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Miscellaneous Appeal No.852 of 2011

 Usha Devi  Vs  Ashok Kumar Mishra 

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA

and

 MR. JUSTICE JITENDRA MOHAN

SHARMA

Order dated;19-06-2014

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Whether High Courts can interdict criminal proceedings against public servants on ground that there was no sanction for prosecution?

 In the instant cases the High Court had interdicted the criminal proceedings on the ground that the Law Department was not the competent authority to accord sanction for the prosecution of the respondents. Even assuming that the Law Department was not competent, it was still necessary for the High Court to reach the conclusion that a failure of justice has been occasioned. Such a finding is conspicuously absent rendering it difficult to sustain the impugned orders of the High Court.

11. The High Court in both the cases had also come to the conclusion that the sanction orders in question were passed mechanically and without consideration of the relevant facts and records. This was treated as an additional ground for interference with the criminal proceedings registered against the respondents. Having perused the relevant part of the orders under challenge we do not think that the High Court was justified in coming to the said findings at the stage when the same were recorded. A more appropriate stage for reaching the said conclusion would have been only after evidence in the cases had been led on the issue in question.

12. We, therefore, hold that the orders dated 23.03.2012 and 03.03.2011 passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in law.

Supreme Court of India

State Of Bihar & Ors. vs Rajmangal Ram on 31 March, 2014

Author: R Gogoi

REPORTABLE
 Citation: AIR2014SC1674, 2014ALLMR(Cri)1882,2014CriLJ2300, 2014(2)Crimes293(SC),

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Simultaneous prosecution of criminal and civil proceedings against same persons pertaining to same cause when permissible

Guru Granth Saheb Sthan Meerghat Vanaras v. Ved Prakash, (2013) 7 SCC 622 (Civil Appeal No. 4166 of 2013, decided on May 1, 2013) - There is no hard-and-fast rule that simultaneous prosecution of criminal and civil proceedings will embarrass or prejudice the accused or that invariably civil proceedings should be stayed until disposal of criminal case. Considering effect of Ss. 40 to 43, Evidence Act, 1872 [regarding relevancy and binding effect of previous judgment in a given case], mere possibility of conflicting decisions in civil and criminal proceedings cannot be a ground to stay civil proceedings as such a possibility is envisaged by the law.

Guru Granth Saheb Sthan Meerghat Vanaras v. Ved Prakash, (2013) 7 SCC 622

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