Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether District Judge in Miscellaneous civil appeal can entertain application for amendment of plaint?

The appeal before the learned District Judge was one under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. and not a regular appeal. Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding appeal of such a character extends only to examine the validity of an order enumerated in Clause (r) of Order 43, Rule 1, C. P. C., which runs as under :

"An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely :--

(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, (Rule 2-A), Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX."

Accordingly, the scope of such appeal is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. As such, the learned District Judge has no seisin over the suit as such. He was seized of proceedings for issuance of a temporary injunction in the suit and not of the suit itself. This aspect of the law appears to have been overlooked by the learned District Judge.

As a logical corollary flowing from the aforesaid position of law, it has to be concluded that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for amendment of the plaint submitted before him by the plaintiff-applicant herein. If the applicant herein (plaintiff) chose to submit the application in the appeal preferred by the defendants before the learned District Judge, only courses which would have been adopted by the learned District Judge were (a) to direct the plaintiff to submit the amendment application before the trial Court; and (b) to forward it to the trial Court for decision in accordance with law after deciding the appeal on merits. However, he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for amendment of the plaint on its merits.

 In spite of this, the scope of the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) is restricted as discussed above to examine the propriety and/or legality of order passed under the various rules of Order 39 referred therein. A distinction has to be made between the scope of regular appeal and a miscellaneous appeal under the aforesaid provision. While deciding the appeal of former character the appellate Court has, on the theory that appeal is continuation of suit, power to allow amendment in the pleadings, but in an appeal of the later type the appellate Court has jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of order refusing or granting an interim injunction. The position of trial Court in such a situation appears to be different, as the trial Court is in seisin of the suit as well as of application for issuance of a temporary injunction made in the suit. The powers exercisable by an appellate Court while hearing appeals preferred under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) cannot be regarded to extend to allowing amendment of the plaint, as he is not in seisin of the suit as such. 

In the present situation, the word 'proceeding' connotes merely an application for issuance of a temporary injunction and/or its reply. Accordingly, where the plaintiff-applicant moves an application for amendment of the application for issuance of temporary injunction, the appellate Court may be regarded to have jurisdiction to decide it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Civil Revn. No. 272 of 1979

Decided On: 25.02.1981

Dhundasingh Vs. Leeladhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.G. Mishra, J.

Citation: 1982 AIR MP 14,1981 SCC ONLINE MP, MANU/MP/0005/1982

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District Judge interview Prep: Judicial Oversight in Adoption of Child : What Every District Judge Should Know about HAMA and JJ Act?

 Question 1

Explain the current status of the Bombay High Court’s stay order on transferring adoption cases from courts to District Magistrates. How does it impact the jurisdiction of District Judges?

Answer:

The Bombay High Court issued an interim stay in January 2023 on the transfer of adoption cases from courts to District Magistrates under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2021. This stay remains effective as of 2025, preserving the jurisdiction of District Judges. Adoption proceedings continue before District Courts and High Courts, ensuring that the court-centric approach and judicial oversight remain intact.

Question 2

What is the scope of jurisdiction of the District Judge under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) for adoption within Hindu families?

Answer:

District Judges have jurisdiction primarily in adoption cases under HAMA where court approval is mandated by Section 9(4), which includes scenarios such as death or abandonment of the child’s parents. In typical family adoptions between Hindus, no court permission is needed, and the adoption can be effected by execution of a registered adoption deed complying with statutory requirements.

Question 3

Under HAMA, when is court permission mandatory for adoption? Cite relevant sections.

Answer:

Court permission is mandatory under Section 9(4) of HAMA if:

·       Both parents are dead, or

·       Both parents have renounced the world, or

·       Both parents have abandoned the child, or

·       Both parents have been declared of unsound mind by a competent court, or

·       The parentage of the child is unknown.

These exceptions require judicial sanction to ensure child protection.

Question 4

What role does the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) play in adoption proceedings, and when is its permission required?

Answer:

CARA regulates institutional adoption under the Juvenile Justice Act. CARA’s permission is compulsory for adoptions involving orphaned, abandoned, or surrendered children placed through registered adoption agencies. However, CARA does not regulate interse family adoptions under HAMA, where parties need not seek CARA permission.

Question 5

Compare the procedural and jurisdictional differences between adoption under HAMA and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

Answer:

·       HAMA: Minimal court intervention limited to specified cases, no CARA involvement for family adoptions, focuses on Hindu families and traditional adoptions, registered adoption deed often sufficient.

·       Juvenile Justice Act: Mandatory court adoption orders for all institutional adoptions, CARA regulation compulsory, applies to all religions, strong institutional oversight.

Question 6

Discuss the difference between adoption orders under the Juvenile Justice Act and adoption deeds under HAMA.

Answer:

Under the Juvenile Justice Act, adoption requires a mandatory court order that legally validates the adoption. Under HAMA, for most family adoptions, a registered adoption deed suffices unless Section 9(4) conditions apply, when court approval becomes necessary.

Question 7

Distinguish institutional adoption and interse family adoption with reference to legal framework and procedure.

Answer:

·       Institutional adoption: Involves orphaned or abandoned children, processed through CARA-regulated agencies and requires court orders under the Juvenile Justice Act.

·       Interse family adoption: Adoption between relatives under HAMA without mandatory CARA involvement or court orders in normal cases, emphasizing family autonomy.

Question 8

Which statute governs the adoption of a brother’s child in a Hindu family and why?

Answer:

The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 governs such adoption since it falls under interse family adoption within Hindu personal law. CARA and Juvenile Justice Act provisions do not apply in this family-specific context.

Question 9

Explain the principle of harmonious construction regarding HAMA and the Juvenile Justice Act adopted by courts.

Answer:

Courts hold that HAMA and the Juvenile Justice Act must be read harmoniously without conflict. Each statute governs distinct adoption scenarios—HAMA for family adoptions and JJ Act for institutional adoptions—ensuring complementary child welfare systems without jurisdictional conflicts.

Question 10

What procedural challenges arise from the Juvenile Justice Act amendments and Bombay High Court’s judicial intervention?

Answer:

Challenges include jurisdictional confusion between courts and District Magistrates, inconsistent procedural practices, and concerns regarding judicial oversight and constitutional separation of powers. The Bombay High Court’s stay safeguards court jurisdiction, ensuring procedural clarity.

Question 11

As a District Judge, how would you adjudicate an adoption petition of a relative’s child under HAMA? What documentation is required?

Answer:

Check whether Section 9(4) applies requiring court approval. Verify statutory compliance, family relationship proof, consents, and ensure execution and registration of the adoption deed if no court order is needed.

Question 12

How does the Juvenile Justice Act extend adoption rights beyond religious boundaries compared to HAMA?

Answer:

The JJ Act applies universally to all religions and runs a secular adoption framework. HAMA applies solely to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains and does not extend adoption rights beyond these communities.

Question 13

Define the age limits for adoptable children under HAMA and the Juvenile Justice Act and explain the differences.

Answer:

HAMA generally limits adoption to children under 15 years (with some customary exceptions). The Juvenile Justice Act extends eligibility to children under 18, providing a broader protective framework.

Question 14

How would you maintain procedural consistency and child welfare standards when handling adoption cases under both HAMA and the Juvenile Justice Act?

Answer:

Ensure statutory compliance per each Act. For HAMA, verify family-based procedural correctness and deed registration. For JJ Act, confirm CARA involvement and court adoption orders. Always prioritize the child's welfare and legal safeguards.

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Checklist for District judges of necessary pre- requisite for passing order of sale of immovable property of minor as per provisions of Guardian and wards Act

The district judge must follow a structured procedure and exercise due diligence when considering a petition for the sale of a minor's property under Indian law. This ensures the minor's interests are protected, as mandated by the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (HMGA), 1956, and the Guardians and Wards Act (GWA), 1890. Below is the detailed process and precautions:

1. The guardian must file a petition under Section 8(2) of HMGA and Section 29 of GWA, including:

   • Detailed description and valuation of the property.

   • Reasons for the sale (e.g., necessity, financial hardship, or evident advantage to the minor).

   • Plan for utilizing sale proceeds (e.g., education, healthcare, or reinvestment).

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Bombay HC: Arbitral Award can be executed by the court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution

Conclusion:

26. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we find that after an award attains finality and the stage as contemplated by provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has been crossed, the final arbitral award under Part-I of the Act of 1996 has to be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The legal fiction under Section 36 is only for the limited purpose of enforcement of an award as a decree. At that stage, the provisions of Sections 38 and 39 of the Code would come into operation. These provisions permit a decree to be executed either by the Court which passed it [the Court as defined by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act of 1996] or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. The Court which passed the decree can also transfer it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction. Proceedings for execution of an arbitral award are beyond the purview of Section 42 of the Act of 1996, inasmuch as such proceedings are not in the nature of any application under Part-I of the Act of 1996. The view as taken by the Division Bench in Akola Janta Commercial Co-operative Bank Ltd. [supra] that a decree holder must apply for execution of an award to the Court of District Judge who may thereafter execute the award as a decree himself or send it for execution to another Court including a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction commends itself and we respectfully concur with the same. The modality prescribed therein that all applications for execution of awards be first placed before the District Judge who may then execute the same himself or send it to subordinate Courts under Section 38 read with Section 39(2) of the Code is found appropriate in these circumstances.

27. We are, therefore, in respectful disagreement with the views expressed in the order of Reference in Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt. Ltd. [supra] that a Court subordinate to the Court of District Judge [here the Court of Principal District Judge] cannot be recognized as a Court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcement of awards under the Act of 1996. The view taken by learned Single Judge in Arunkumar Deedwania [supra] stands affirmed and the view taken in Sanjay Suryakant Mhaske & others [supra] with respect stands overruled.

30. The Reference accordingly stands answered as follows:-

An Award made under Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be executed not only by the Court as defined by Section 2(1)(e)(i) but also by the Court to which it is sent for execution under Sections 38 and 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition Nos. 6066 and 4682 of 2012

Decided On: 16.02.2018

Gemini Bay Transcription Private Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Integrated Sales Service Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Deshpande, A.S. Chandurkar and M.G. Giratkar, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0265/2018, AIR 2018 BOMBAY 89, (2018) 2 MAH LJ 329.

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CHHATTISGARH HC (FB) : Additional district Judge can entertain application U/S 34 of arbitration Act

To sum up, as an upshot of the above discussion, M/s. Sarin Construction Company, Raipur (MANU/CG/0051/2005 : AIR 2006 Chh 412) (supra) based on Section 42 of the Act, 1996 and the judgment of Allahabad High Court in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad (MANU/UP/0549/1998 : AIR 1998 All 313) (supra) sailed on the reasoning that the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction i.e. the Court of District Judge alone has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement, however, the judgments rendered by the different High Courts in preceding paragraphs and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited represented by J. Thilak, Senior Manager (Legal) (MANU/SC/0122/2018 : AIR 2018 SC 965) (supra) would categorically pronounce that the word 'Court' defined in 2 (1)(e) not only includes the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction i.e. Court of Principal District Judge or District Judge(s), but also includes the Court of Additional District Judge(s), therefore, any application filed under any provision of the Act, 1996 before the Court after passing of the award, including applications under Section 34 or 36 of the Act, 1996, can be heard and decided not only by the District Judge(s), but also by the Court of Additional District Judge(s), upon being made over by the District Judge by a general or special order. In respect of application with regard to an arbitration agreement where the award is yet to be passed, such application may be moved before the District Judge and can be made over to the Court of Additional District Judge by general or special order but in such eventuality any subsequent application till passing of award is to be decided by the same Court, which has dealt with the earlier application, by virtue of Section 42 of the Act, 1996. {Para 43}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

W.P. Nos. 227 and 299 of 2018

Decided On: 12.10.2018

A Suo Motu Taken Writ Petition Vs. State of Chhattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prashant Kumar Mishra, Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Ram Prasanna Sharma, JJ.

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

Citation: MANU/CG/0529/2018.

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Bombay HC: Mere desire of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for deciding child custody

In view of the above, now it is settled that it is the

interest of the children that needs to be considered. Mere desire

of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for

taking decision in respect of the custody. The child at the tender

age is not fully aware of his welfare. There is always tendency to

be with parent with whom they are residing. They are mostly

influenced by tutoring by the parents. Interaction with child is

thus influenced by such parents. In the present case also, this

court interacted with the children. The children naturally stated

that they are happy with the father. However, it must be

considered that presently children are in custody of the father

and as expected, answer has come in favour of the father. 

{Para 12}

13. So far as better company and care is concerned, it is

seen that almost every member in the family of the husband is

occupied in the business. There is only grand-mother of the

children who is in the house for whole day. In the house of the

wife, she is always at home. She stays with her parents. There

are other relatives in the family. So far as deprivation of the

company is concerned, it needs to be noted that both the parties

are staying in the same town. Distance between the houses of

husband and wife is not more than 2 km. Thus, visitation by

parent would not be much difficult. Husband can always meet

children at convenient place. Husband and wife are related to

each other even prior to marriage. One more factor needs to be

considered is that there is one female child who is staying with

mother. If all the siblings stay together it would help children in

growing together. Being female child she requires care and

attention of the mother. Under Muslim Law, custody of the

children below 7 years is required to be with the wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1708 OF 2024 WITH CA/7330/2024 IN FA/1708/2024

Mukhtar S/o. Yunus Sayyad, Vs  Habiba W/o. Mukhtar Sayyad,

CORAM : KISHORE C. SANT, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 28th AUGUST, 2024

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Procedure to be followed by high court for promotion of district Judge

 No doubt that the judgments are evaluated and interviews are

conducted by the Hon'ble Judges of this Court. As such, the

assessment of the judgments of the candidate as well as assessment of the performance of the candidate in vivavoce would be presumed to be on objective basis. However, by now, it is a settled principle of law that merely because there is no possibility of discretion being not

exercised properly, that by itself cannot be a ground for granting wider

discretion howsoever high the authority may be. We may also

gainfully refer to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia vs.

Khalid MujibAIR 1981 SC 487. In the said case, selection process included 33.33

percentage marks for oral interview. Their Lordships held that

allocation of a high percentage of marks for the oral interview as

compared to the marks allocated for the written test, cannot be

accepted by the Court as free from the vice of arbitrariness. After

discussing the entire legal position, Their Lordships observed that

allocation of more than 15% of the marks out of the total marks for

the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and was liable

to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. In the Rules that fall for

consideration before us more than twice permissible limit of 15% i.e.

33.33% of the marks are allocated on the basis of oral interview. Not

only that even 33.33 % of the marks which are to be allocated on the

basis of evaluation of the judgment are also on the basis of subjective

evaluation which may differ from a judge to judge.{Para 12}

13] We are therefore of the prima facie view that award of only

33% of marks on the basis of objective assessment and 66.66 % of

marks on the basis of subjective assessment i.e. evaluation of

judgments and oral viva appears to be an issue which needs to be

looked into.

14] We may clarify that we do not propose to encroach upon the rule

making powers of the High Court on the Administrative Side.

However, as already discussed hereinabove, we may also observe that it is high time that the Rules which govern the promotions of high office of District Judge need to be reframed in a proper format. We may also prima facie observe that the selection process for the

promotion should not have more than 50% of the marks to be

determined on the basis of subjective assessment i.e. evaluation of

judgment and granting of marks for vivavoce. We therefore feel that

rule making authority i.e. High Court on the Administrative Side will

address the issue and find out a system of selection which has more

weightage on the objective assessment than the subjective assessment

of the candidate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1440 OF 2017

Surekha Abhay Sinha  V/s State of Maharashtra 

Mr. Ravi Gadagkar a/w Mr. Aniket Ransubhe i/b Mr. Ajay Basutkar for the Petitioner.

Mr. Himanshu Takke, Asstt. Govt. Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 and

Mr. A.A. Kumbhakoni, Advocate General a/w Mr. Rahul Nerlekar for Respondent No.3.

CORAM: B. R. GAVAI &  M.S. KARNIK, JJ.

DATE: 4th September, 2017

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Whether pension of district Judge can be withheld if there is misconduct in recruitment process of class 3 and class 4 employees?

In view of the above, the action of the High Court in recommending
withholding of 50% pension of the petitioner and in exonerating all the
other five officers is nothing but discrimination between equals who fall
under the same class, for no recorded reasons and as such the punishment
imposed upon the petitioner by the Hon'ble Governor is not tenable in law.
This apart, as already discussed, the aforesaid punishment was
inflicted upon the petitioner finding him guilty of misconduct in conducting
the recruitment of class-III and class-IV employees. Thus, the punishment
was on the cumulative effect of the misconduct in respect of both the
recruitments and if one of them is deleted, it would certainly not have the
same impact so as to impose a punishment which had been inflicted upon
the petitioner. In respect of the recruitment of class-IV employees, the
inquiry has been held to be without jurisdiction as it was barred by time and
was without the proper sanction of the Hon'ble Governor. Accordingly, the
gravity of the misconduct stands reduced and in that respect of the matter,
the punishment ex-facie turns out to be excessive and disproportionate to
the charge proved.
In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, our considered
conclusion is that the order of punishment dated 07.11.2012 withholding
50% of the pension of the petitioner is unsustainable and deserves to be
quashed.
It is accordingly quashed and the writ of certiorari to that effect is
directed to be issued.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Delivered on 22.05.2019

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 19813 of 2013

Petitioner :- Shyam Babu Vaish
Respondent :- State Of U.P.And Anr.

Coram:
Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal,J.
Hon'ble Prakash Padia,J.

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Whether District Judge exercises appellate jurisdiction over award of arbitral tribunal?

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.G. Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India and Another, MANU/SC/0527/2011 : (2011) 5 SCC 758 has held that the District Judge, exercising powers under Section 34 of the Act, exercises supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, over the award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Appeal Under Arbitration Act No. 8 of 2016

Decided On: 10.04.2018

Titagarh Wagons Limited Vs. Chowgule and Company Private Limited

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Whether new case or new defence can be raised before court if it was not raised before arbitrator?

The Supreme Court in the case of MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. (supra) has held that a new case or a defence not raised before the Arbitrator, cannot be considered by the Court under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act. In that case, a claim was made by a concessionaire, under the toll agreement. It was contended that the concessionaire had suffered loss on account of delay in issuance and implementation of notification by the State, barring the use of the old route. The award of the Arbitrator was set aside by the Courts, on the ground that there was no clause in the agreement for State to issue such a notification. The Supreme Court held that the award could not have been set aside, as such a plea about absence of a clause in the agreement, was not raised before the Arbitrator.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Appeal Under Arbitration Act No. 8 of 2016

Decided On: 10.04.2018

Titagarh Wagons Limited Vs. Chowgule and Company Private Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.V. Bhadang, J.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 638

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Whether appeal will lay to district judge from order passed by civil judge senior division in application for succession certificate?

 In view of this position, the Civil Judge, Senior Division in these two Appeals have exercised the jurisdiction under Sub-section 1 of Section 388 of the said Act of 1925. In view of the proviso to Sub-section 2 of Section 388, the Appeals under Section 384 of the said Act of 1925 against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division will therefore lie to the District Judge and not to this Court. By virtue of the proviso to Sub-section 2 of Section 388 of the said Act of 1925 in case of all appealable orders passed on Application for succession certificate by the courts referred to Sub-section 1 of Section 388, the Appeal will lie to the District Judge irrespective of the value of the subject matter of the Application for grant of succession certificate. The reason being that the forum of Appeal is created by the proviso to Sub-section 2 of Section 388 of the said Act of 1925 and not by the provisions of said Act of 1869."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 226/2018

Decided On: 12.02.2018

Sheela Vs. Panchfulabai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 392

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When appeal will lay before district Judge from order passed by civil judge senior division in probate proceeding?

255. (i) Under Section 265 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 the High Court has appointed all Civil Judges to act for the District Judge as delegates to grant probate and letters of administration in non-continuous cases arising within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction.

(ii) In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 28-A(1) of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), the High Court has invested all Civil Judges (Senior Division), with all the powers of a District Judge to take cognizance of any contested proceeding Indian Succession Act 1925, within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction that may be transferred to them by their respective District Judges."

6. A bare at the aforesaid paragraphs would make it clear that in case of the contested proceedings, arising under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the said matters may be adjudicated by the District Judge or the Civil Judge, Senior Division to whom the such proceedings have been transferred. Once the Civil Judge, Senior Division has exercised the jurisdiction over the application field by the petitioner for grant of probate of the will having valuation of Rs. 10,000/-, in view of the provisions contained in Section 28-A of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, the appeal lay against such order passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division to the Court of the District Judge. Section 28-A of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 reads as under:--

"28-A (1) The High Court may by general or special order invest any Civil Judge within such local limits and subject to such pecuniary limitation as may be prescribed in such order with all or any of the powers of a District Judge or a District Court as the case may be under the Indian Succession Act, 1865, the Probate and Administration Act, 1881 or paragraph 5 of Schedule III to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

(2) Every order made by a Civil Judge by virtue of the powers conferred upon him under sub-section (1) shall be subject to appeal to the High Court or the District Court according to the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds or does not exceed fifty thousand rupees.

(3) Every order of the District Judge passed on appeal under sub-section (2) from the order of a Civil Judge shall be subject to an appeal to the High Court under the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeal form the appellate decrees."

7. No doubt is left on careful perusal of the said section that the order passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division on application under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act having a valuation of Rs. 10,000/- i.e. less than Rs. 50,000/-, the appeal against the said order lay before the District Court and the appeal filed by the respondents before the Additional District Judge was maintainable and it cannot be said that no appeal lay before him.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Rev. Application No. 925 of 1989

Decided On: 08.03.1995

Manohar son of Bapurao Sapre Vs. Bhaurao son of Tukaramji Shirbhate and another

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Lodha, J.

Citation:1995 (2) Mh.L.J. 336, 

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Whether district judge can entertain application for execution of arbitration award?

In the case of Fountain Head Developers, the Full Bench has held that the District Judge in a district alone is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction and it is not included in other Judge subordinate to him. It is also held that "The Parliament intended to have only one court as the forum for arbitral proceedings, that is, the "principal court of original jurisdiction" in a district". This ratio laid down by the Full Bench in Fountain Head Developers cannot be misread that the District Judge or the District Court means only a Court of Principal District Judge. It appears that the order of the Division Bench of Nagpur Bench in The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. which is very relevant and useful, was not placed before the Hon'ble Single Judge and therefore, he had no opportunity to consider this aspect from the other prospective.

24. In the case of The Akola Janata Commercial Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of Nagpur has held that

"The word "Court" occurring in Section 36 must be held to be a Court of District Judge also for the purpose of enforcement of the award. It further held that "From a conjoint reading of these provisions, it is clear that an award must be treated as a decree passed by the District Judge and, therefore, it may be executed either by the District Judge himself or by any Court to which it may be sent by such District Judge for execution vide Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transfer of decree by the District Judge would be governed by Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a decree holder must apply for execution of an award to the Court of District Judge, who may either execute the award as a decree himself or send it for execution to another Court including a subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction."

Thus, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction has a wider connotation which includes Principal District Judge and so also of the District Judges, who collectively fall under the category of Judges having principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Hence, the challenge given cannot sustain. Writ Petition is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4157 of 2017

Decided On: 12.04.2017

Union of India Vs. Arun Kumar Deedwania

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mridula Bhatkar, J.

Citation: 2017(4) MHLJ131

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Whether it is permissible lay trap in court premises without previous permission of District Judge or High court?

There is one more aspect of the matter, which is of
considerable importance.  In this case, the trap was laid and the
raid was effected in the court premises itself.   It was arranged
during the working hours of court.  No permission appears to have
been obtained from the High court or the Judge in­charge of the
Judicial Administration of the District, before laying such a trap.
If the investigating agencies are permitted to lay traps in the court
premises, on working days and during the working hours, it would
not   be   conducive   to   the   administration   of   justice.     The   staff
attached to a Judge discharges duties under the instructions of the
Presiding Officer. If the Police Officers, whose subordination to the
Judicial Magistrate is evident from the provisions of the Code of
Criminal   Procedure,   and   who   frequently   visit   the   courts   for
obtaining remand or as witnesses, are allowed to raid the court
premises without permission of the Presiding Officer of the court
or the Principal District Judge, or the High court, there is every
possibility of a serious threat to the administration of justice and
the independence of judiciary, being posed.   A similar view was

taken by the Allahabad High Court in Surendra Sahai and Others
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1997 Cri.L.J.1670. In my
opinion, therefore, it was absolutely improper on the part of the
investigating   agency   to   have   laid   a   trap   without   seeking   the
previous   permission   of   the   Judge   in­charge   of   the   Judicial
Administration   of   the   District   or   the   High   court   and   without
seeking permission to lay such a trap. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.162 OF 2000
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
V/s.
ANNASAHEB MAHADEV BHANDARE 

CORAM : ABHAY M. THIPSAY, J.
DATE : 27th JULY 2015.
Citation: 2017 ALLMR(CRI) 1505

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Whether district Judge while entertaining application U/S 34 of arbitration Act functions as civil court or mere tribunal?

Now, turning to the next question as to
whether the present appeal is maintainable and whether the
original petition was under Article 227 or 226 of the
Constitution of India, it may be pointed out that since the
filing of the proceeding under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
before the learned District Judge is against the statute, the 
subsequent order, dated 18.07.2016, cannot cure the initial
illegality. As it has already been held hereinabove that the
Court of the learned District Judge does not exercise
jurisdiction of a regular civil court but is a Court of limited
jurisdiction,
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Letters Patent Appeal No.1841 of 2016
IN
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 746 of 2016

Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, Bihar-Jharkhand, Now
known as Multi-State Co-operative Land Development Bank
Ltd., Bihar & Jharkhand, 
V
 State of Bihar.
CORAM: CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE RAVI RANJAN

Date: 28-10-2016

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Whether person in govt/judicial service should resign to participate in District judge selection process?

“The challenge in the present writ  application  is  to  the  communication,
dated 16th of February, 2016, whereby representation of the  petitioners  to
appear in interview for the post of District Judge Entry Level (Direct  from
Bar) Examination, 2015, was  rejected  and  a  condition  was  imposed  that
petitioners  will  have  to  tender  their  rejection,   first,   from   the
Subordinate Judicial Service of the State of  Bihar  and  only,  thereafter,

they could appear in the interview.
  For   the   above-mentioned   reasons,   the   Appeal   is   allowed.
Consequently, the Writ Petition  (CWJC  No.  3504  of  2016)  filed  by  the
appellants also stands allowed  directing  the  respondents  to  permit  the
appellants to participate in the selection process  without  insisting  upon
their resigning from their current employment.  If the appellants are  found
suitable, it is open to the appellants to resign  their  current  employment
and opt for the post of District Judge, if they so choose.
REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7358  OF 2016
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17466 of 2016)


Vijay Kumar Mishra and Another                             … Appellants

                                    Versus

High Court of Judicature at Patna and Others              … Respondents

   Dated:August 9, 2016                    
Chelameswar, J.
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC313,2017(2) MHLJ 9 SC

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Whether District Judge can grant stay to show cause notice issued by civil judge under O 39 R 11 of CPC?

 Mr. S.R. Rivankar submitted that in the present case the
conclusion is already reached by the learned Civil Judge and
issuance of show cause notice is mere formality. Though there
may be some substance in the contention of Mr. Rivankar that
the learned Civil Judge has come to a final conclusion but,
there is no final order passed under Order XXXIX Rule 11.
6. The learned District Judge has erred in entertaining the
appeal and granting stay to the proceedings before the Civil
Judge. It is also not clear from the impugned order whether
the learned District Judge has held appeal to be maintainable
or has postponed the decision till the disposal of the appeal.
Either course of action are not correct in law. First the appeal
was not maintainable. Secondly, the learned District Judge
ought to have considered the nature of the proceedings and
what was at stake was allegation of disobedience of the order
of the Court. By grant of stay in an appeal, which is not
maintainable, the proceedings taken out in respect of breach of
judicial order have been scuttled. The appropriate course of
action would be to permit the learned Civil Judge to pass the
final order in the matter and then entertain the appeal from
such final order.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 544 OF 2014
 Shri Gajanan Bala Gawas,

 Versus
Me. Sagun Narayan Morjkar,

Coram:- N. M. JAMDAR, J.
Date:- 18 February 2015
Citation;2016(2) MHLJ 862

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Whether Judge can be denied promotion due to adverse remarks recorded by District Judge?

It needs no emphasis that a judicial officer has to be disciplined and must behave as a responsible officer. Indiscipline in the judiciary cannot be tolerated. However, as noted above, the remarks of the District Judge that the appellant was, `irresponsible and indisciplined officer who has no regard for superiors or truth' have been expunged/substituted by the Inspecting Judge. The effect of such expunction/substitution is that the appellant cannot be considered an irresponsible or indisciplined officer on the basis of remarks recorded by the District Judge. The gravity of what has been recorded in column (3) is, thus, lost. Moreover, the root of the problem between the two senior judicial officers appears to be clash of ego. In the words of Samuel Johnson, every man is of importance to himself. The observation noted in column (3), `He never came to me in the chamber or at the residence to discuss any problem relating to Nazarat' indicates that the District Judge was not happy with the appellant for having not given due importance to him.

In our view, the matter for the appellant's promotion in the substantive vacancy in UPHJS which was considered by the selection committee on May 18, 1998 and by the full court on July 11, 1998 needs to be reconsidered in light of the discussion made above and in accordance with law. Since the appellant is likely to superannuate shortly, we expect the High Court on its administrative side to complete this exercise as early as possible and preferably within one month from the date of the communication of this order.

Supreme Court of India

Pratap Singh vs State Of U.P.& Anr. on 15 November, 2011

Author: R Lodha
Bench: R.M. Lodha, Jagdish Singh Khehar

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