Whether eviction decree will be denied to landlord if tenant casually visits tenanted premises?

 Chagla, C.J. Has further observed that - "Now, a mere casual occupation of premises does not constitute residence in those premises. In construing sub-clause (k), one must also bear in mind the object of the Legislature in passing this legislation. The Rent Restriction Act is passed because there was a scarcity of premises and therefore it was necessary to protect bonafide tenants and also to see that premises were not left unoccupied so that people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises of one place and go about residing in some other premises. Therefore, the purpose within the meaning of sub-clause (k) for which premises are let is the purpose of permanent residence; not a mere casual occupation, not a mere spasmodic stay in the premises." So this decision of Chagla, C.J. interprets the words 'use' in a way connecting it with 'residence' importing that word in sub-clause (k) also and quite justifiably. As considered by me earlier, the purpose of the Rent Control Act is that the people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises at one place and go about residing in some other premises. This is what exactly done in the instant case. The petitioner wants to continue her premises in Baroda and she states that her parents stay in the said premises. Her very parents have their own premises in Bombay where the petitioner herself stays. So it is not a case where person is without a shelter. But on the contrary, the person is trying to have shelter at both the places depriving some needy tenant of shelter in Baroda. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

Civil Revision Application No. 713 of 1979

Decided On: 03.04.1984

Mohini Bhiryomal Hingorani Vs. Bhanubhai Manilal Patel

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.V. Bedarkar, J.

Citation: 1985 Bom RC 27

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Whether a statute becomes inoperative by lapse of time?

A statute can be abrogated only by express or implied repeal. It cannot fall into desuetude or become inoperative through obsolescence or by lapse of time. In R. v. London Country Council(1), Scrutton L.J. put the matter thus:

"The doctrine that, because a certain number of people do not like an Act and because a good many people disobey it, the Act is therefore "obsolescent" and no one need pay any attention to, it is a very dangerous proposition to hold in any constitutional country. So long as an Act is on the statutebook, the way to get rid of it is to repeal or alter it in Parliament, not for subordinate bodies, who are bound to obey the law, to take upon themselves to disobey an Act of Parliament."

As to the theory of desuetude, Allen in his 'Law in the Making, 5th edn. p. 454 observes:

"Age cannot wither an Act of Parliament, and at no time, so far as I am aware, has it ever been admitted in our jurisprudence that a statute might become inoperative through obsolescence."

Supreme Court of India

State Of Maharashtra vs Narayan Shamrao Puranik And ... on 25 October, 1982

Equivalent citations: 1983 AIR 46, 1983 SCR (1) 655

BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:
 1983 AIR   46    1983 SCR  (1) 655
 1982 SCC  (3) 519   1982 SCALE  (2)948

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Leading judgment of justice Chagla on jurisdiction of bench of HC and principal seat of HC to decide particular matter

In the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan, reported in AIR 
1983 SC 46 three Judges of the Apex Court in paragraph 26 relied on the ratio 
of the decision rendered by Chagla, C.J. at the Bombay High Court.  It would 
be appropriate to quote paragraph 26 in its entirety, which reads thus :

“26.As to the scope and effect of sub­s. (3) of s. 51 of the Act,  
the question came up for consideration before Chagla, C.J. and  
Badkas, J. in Seth Manji Dana v. Commissioner of Income­tax,  
Bombay, Civil Appeal No.995 of 1957(Bom),  decided on July  
22,   1958.  This  was   an  application  by which  the  validity of  
Rule 254 of the Appellate Side Rules was challenged insofar as  
it provided that all income­tax references presented at Nagpur  
should   be   heard   at   the   principal   seat   of   the   High   Court   at  
Bombay, and the contention was that the result of this rule  
was   that   it   excluded   income­tax   references   from   the  
jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   functioning   at   Nagpur.   In 
repelling the contention, Chagla, C. J. observed : 

"Legally, the position is quite clear. Under section 51 (3) 
of the States Reorganization Act, the Judges sitting at Nagpur  
constitute a part of the High Court of Bombay. They are as  
much a part of the High Court of Bombay, and if we might say 
so distinguished part of the High Court of Bombay, as if they  
were sitting under the same roof under which Judges function 
in Bombay. All that happens is that the Chief Justice, under  
the powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes  
the   work   to   various   Judges   and   various   Divisional   Benches,  
and acting under that power he distributes certain work to the  
Judges sitting at Nagpur."
He then continued:
"All that rule 254 does is to permit as a matter of convenience  
certain   matters   to   be   presented   at   Nagpur   to   the   Deputy 
Registrar. If rule 254 had not been enacted, all matters would  
have   to   be   presented   at   Bombay   and  then   the   Chief  Justice  
would   have   distributed   those   matters   to   different   Judges,  
whether sitting in Bombay or at Nagpur. It is out of regard and  
consideration   for   the   people   of   Vidarbha   and   for   their  
convenience that this rule is enacted, so that litigants should  
not be put to the inconvenience of going to Bombay to present  
certain   matters.   Therefore,   this   particular   rule   has   nothing 
whatever   to   do   either   with   section   51   (3)   of   the   States  
Reorganisation Act or with the Constitution." With regard to  
Rule 254, he went on to say :
"Now, having disposed of the legal aspect of the matter, we turn  
to the practical aspect, and let us consider whether this rule  
inconveniences the people at Nagpur. If it does, it would certain 
call for an amendment of that rule. Now, there is particular  
reason   why   all   Income   Tax   References   should   be   heard   in  
Bombay and that reason is this. The High Court of Bombay for  

He then concluded :
many   years,   rightly   or   wrongly,   has   followed   a   particular  
policy with regard to Income Tax References and that policy is  
that the  same   Bench  should   hear  Income   Tax References,   so  
that there should be a continuity with regard to the decisions  
given on these References. I know that other High Courts have  
referred to this policy with praise because they have realised  
that the result of this policy has been that Income Tax Law has  
been laid down in a manner which has received commendation  
from various sources. The other reason is and we hope we are  
not   mistaken   in   saying   so   that   the   number   of   Income   Tax  
References from Nagpur are very few. If the number was large,  
undoubtedly a very strong case would be made out for these  
cases to be heard at Nagpur."

"After all, Courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and  
not in order to maintain any particular system of law or any  
particular system of administration. Whenever a Court finds  
that   a   particular   rule   does   not   serve   the   convenience   of  
litigants, the Court should be always prepared to change the  
rule."
The ratio to be deduced from the decision of Chagla, C. J. is  
that the   Judges   and   Division   Courts   sitting   at  Nagpur   were  
functioning as if they were the Judges and Division Courts of 
the High Court at Bombay.”



MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO.341 OF 2013.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
       

Mrs. Sayali wife of Swapnil Kuber,

 V

Swapnil S/o. Harischandra Kuber,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM  :   A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED    :   SEPTEMBER 19, 2013.
Citation; 2014(5) ALLMR97

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