Whether a party can seek production of additional documents at a later stage in the commercial suit if he has not produced those documents along with plaint as documents were voluminous?

 Now, so far as the other documents sought to be relied

on/produced as additional documents other than the invoices

are concerned the same stands on different footing. It is not

disputed and in fact it was specifically admitted and so stated

in the application that those additional documents other than

the invoices were in their possession but not produced being

voluminous and that the suit was filed urgently. However, it is

to be noted that when the second suit was filed, it cannot be

said to be urgent filing of the suit for injunction, as the first suit

was filed in the month of October, 2018 and there was an exparte

ad interim injunction vide order dated 29.10.2018 and

thereafter plaintiff withdrew the said first suit on 27.07.2019

with liberty to file a fresh suit as per the Commercial Courts Act

and the second suit came to be filed on 31.08.2019 after period

of one month of the withdrawal of first suit. Therefore the case

on behalf of the plaintiff that when the second suit was filed, it

was urgently filed therefore, the additional documents sought to

be relied upon other than the invoices were not filed as the

same were voluminous cannot be accepted. And therefore as

such Order XI Rule 1 (4) shall not be applicable, though the

application was filed within thirty days of filing of the second

suit. While seeking leave of the court to rely on documents,

which were in his power, possession, control or custody and not

disclosed along with plaint or within the extended period set

out in Order XI Rule 1 (4), the plaintiff has to establish the

reasonable cause for non disclosure along with plaint.

8.5 In view of the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove

and in view of the filing of the first suit in the month of October,

2018; the exparte ad interim injunction order in favour of the

plaintiff dated 29.10.2018; withdrawal of the first suit on

27.07.2019 and subsequently the filing of the second suit on

31.08.2019, non filing of the additional documents other than

the invoices on the ground of they being voluminous cannot be

said to be a reasonable cause for non disclosure/filing along

with plaint. There was sufficient time gap between the filing of

the first suit and filing of the second suit i.e. approximately 10

months and therefore when the second suit was filed the

plaintiff was having sufficient time after filing of the first suit, to

file the additional documents other than the invoices at the

time when the second suit was filed. Therefore as such, both

the courts below have rightly not permitted the plaintiff to rely

upon the documents, other than the invoices as additional

documents in exercise of the powers under Order XI Rule 1 (4)

read with Order XI Rule 1 (5).

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

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Whether court can refuse to permit a party to produce a document on the ground that said document is suspicious?

 Even the reason given by the learned Commercial Court that

the invoices being suspicious and therefore not granting leave

to produce the said invoices cannot be accepted. At the stage of

granting leave to place on record additional documents the

court is not required to consider the genuineness of the

documents/additional documents, the stage at which

genuineness of the documents to be considered during the trial

and/or even at the stage of deciding the application under

Order XXXIX Rule 1 that too while considering prima facie case.

Therefore, the learned Commercial Court ought to have granted

leave to the plaintiff to rely on/produce the invoices as

mentioned in the application as additional documents.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

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Should the plaintiff give reasonable cause for the production of additional documents in the commercial suit if the plaintiff has found those documents subsequently?

Therefore a further thirty days time is provided to the plaintiff

to place on record or file such additional documents in court

and a declaration on oath is required to be filed by the plaintiff

as was required as per Order XI Rule 1 (3) if for any reasonable

cause for non disclosure along with the plaint, the documents,

which were in the plaintiff’s power, possession, control or

custody and not disclosed along with plaint. Therefore plaintiff

has to satisfy and establish a reasonable cause for non

disclosure along with plaint. However, at the same time, the

requirement of establishing the reasonable cause for non

disclosure of the documents along with the plaint shall not be

applicable if it is averred and it is the case of the plaintiff that

those documents have been found subsequently and in fact

were not in the plaintiff’s power, possession, control or custody

at the time when the plaint was filed. Therefore Order XI Rule 1

(4) and Order XI Rule 1 (5) applicable to the commercial suit

shall be applicable only with respect to the documents which

were in plaintiff’s power, possession, control or custody and not

disclosed along with plaint. Therefore, the rigour of

establishing the reasonable cause in non disclosure along with

plaint may not arise in the case where the additional

documents sought to be produced/relied upon are discovered

subsequent to the filing of the plaint.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

Dated: September 15, 2021

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What is reasonable cause for non user of tenanted premises?

 The above circumstances make it clear that the respondent could not operate the Atta Chakki earlier for want of an electric power connection. This was undoubtedly a reasonable cause for not carrying on business in the shop in dispute. In spite of the fact that there is no averments in the application that the respondent ceased to occupy the shop without reasonable cause, the respondent has fully established on the record that he could not operate the Atta Chakki because of a reasonable cause i.e. non-provision of electric power connection to him. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Civil Revision No. 2617 of 1979

Decided On: 25.08.1987

 Jagdish Parshad  Vs.  Madan Lal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dharam Vir Sehgal, J.

Citation: 1988(1) RCR 583

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When tenant can not be evicted from tenanted premises on ground of non user of premises?

Thus it becomes clear from the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above, that the liability of the tenant to pay rent is linked to his enjoyment of the demised premises. In the present case the tenant-petitioner has been deprived of the enjoyment of the entire premises only due to the conduct and attitude of the landlord and therefore, in my opinion, the tenant's liability to pay the entire rent would stand suspended from the date from which he became unable to use and enjoy the tenanted premises. Bare perusal of Section 13(1)(k) of the Act makes it clear that if there is reasonable cause for not using the tenanted premises then a decree of eviction cannot be passed. In the present case there was definitely a reasonable cause for the tenant not to use the tenanted premises in the circumstances referred to above. So far as a decree under Clause (1) of Section 13(1) is concerned it contemplates the tenant to secure suitable residence. Section 13(1)(1) contemplates a voluntary act on the part of the tenant. When the tenant is forced to shift his residence and especially when the conduct of the landlord himself is responsible for forcing the tenant to shift his residence in my opinion, the landlord would not be entitled to seek decree of eviction against the tenant under Clause 13(1)(1) of the Act. In my opinion, the Courts below have neither appreciated the evidence on record properly nor they have applied law properly. So far as the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jatindra Kumar Dass relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents is concerned, in my opinion, the judgement does not consider the Judgement of the Supreme Court in Surendra Nath Bibra 's case referred to above. In any case the perusal of paragraph IS of that Judgement shows that ultimately the Court in that case found that there is no liability on the landlord to repair the tenanted premises and therefore, the tenant was not justified in suspending the payment of rent.

6. The learned Counsel for the respondents by relying on the provisions of Section 10(D) of the Act, contended that the tenant had a remedy of getting the premises repaired. But in my opinion, it is not the question of tenant's having a remedy to get the premises repaired. The question is. the landlord entitled to a decree of eviction against the tenant. The tenant is deprived of the enjoyment of the property by a conduct which is attributable directly to the landlord and therefore there occurs suspension of the liability of the tenant to pay the rent. In my opinion, the tenant had done all within his powers, namely, issuing notice to the landlord to carry out repairs, offering to carry out repairs himself and moving the authorities of the Pune Municipal Corporation. But it is only because of the adamant attitude adopted by the landlord, that repairs could not be carried out. At this stage, now the landlord cannot turn around and say that despite his refusal and his attitude, the tenant could have on his own done the repairs. In my opinions the Courts below were not justified in passing the decree of eviction against the petitioner-tenant. It is to be seen that Section 23(1) casts a duty on the landlord to keep the premises in good and tenantable repair. The landlord committed breach of this statutory duty imposed on him. Sub-section 2 of Section 23. enables the tenant to carry out the repairs, after giving notice to the landlord, The tenant in this case, issued necessary notice to the landlord and then wanted to carry out the repairs, but the landlord did not permit him to do so. This attitude was adopted by the landlord, obviously, to force the tenant to leave the suit premises. Now, in my opinion, to pass a decree in favour of the landlord, on the ground that the tenant has not paid rent for the period during which he could not have occupied the suit premises and also on the ground that he did not continue In occupy the premises and sought shelter elsewhere, would amount to allowing the landlord to take advantage of his own wrong.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 67 of 1983

Decided On: 27.02.1997

 Gopal Dattaraya Chapahlkar  Vs. Govind Yeshwant Borkar and Ors.

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When liability of tenant to pay rent gets suspended?

Thus it becomes clear from the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above, that the liability of the tenant to pay rent is linked to his enjoyment of the demised premises. In the present case the tenant-petitioner has been deprived of the enjoyment of the entire premises only due to the conduct and attitude of the landlord and therefore, in my opinion, the tenant's liability to pay the entire rent would stand suspended from the date from which he became unable to use and enjoy the tenanted premises. Bare perusal of Section 13(1)(k) of the Act makes it clear that if there is reasonable cause for not using the tenanted premises then a decree of eviction cannot be passed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 67 of 1983

Decided On: 27.02.1997

 Gopal Dattaraya Chapahlkar  Vs. Govind Yeshwant Borkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.K. Deshmukh, J.

Citation: 1997 BomLR 52

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Whether burden of proof is on landlord to prove that non user of tenanted premises was without reasonable cause?

The initial burden to show that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building continuously for 6 months is always on the landlord. He has to adduce tangible evidence to prove the fact that as on the date of filing the petition, the tenant was not occupying the building continuously for 6 months. Once such evidence is adduced, the burden shifts on the tenant to prove that there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy the tenanted premises for a continuous period of 6 months.

23. No straitjacket formula can be evolved for determining as to what is the reasonable cause and each case is required to be decided keeping in view the nature of the lease, the purpose for which the premises are let out and the evidence of the parties. If the building, as defined in Section 2(1), is let out for industrial or commercial/business purpose and the same is not used for the said purpose continuously for a period of six months, the tenant cannot plead financial crunch as a ground to justify non-occupation of the building unless cogent evidence is produced by him to prove that he could not carry on the industrial or commercial/business activity due to fiscal reasons which were beyond his control. If the tenant does not use the building for the purpose for which it is let out, he cannot be said to be occupying the building merely because he has put some furniture or articles or machinery under his lock and key.

19. As observed above by the Supreme Court it shows that reasonable cause depends on facts of each case. The reasonable cause must be for the relevant period of non-user. In this case, the Respondent- Defendant neither pleaded with sufficient particulars as to why he was not using the suit premises during the relevant period from May, 2004 to November, 2004 nor he led any oral or documentary evidence in support of that period. In my opinion, therefore, this was a case where Respondent-Defendant has failed to discharge burden cast on him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 753 of 2009

Decided On: 27.04.2012

 Gopaldas Khushaldas Parmar Vs. Sanmukhlal P. Shah

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Godbole

Citation: 2012(1) RCJ 305 Bom

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Whether burden of proof is on tenant to prove that non user of tenanted premises was due to reasonable cause?

Recently, again, the same view has been reiterated by this Court in Smt. Aleamma v. Seth Meghraj MANU/MP/0041/1993 : 1993 (1) MPJR 378. Therefore, the absence of pleading "without reasonable cause" by the plaintiff for seeking eviction under Section 12(1)(d) of the Act, is misconceived as the law is settled that a landlord seeking eviction under Clause (d) of Section 12(1) of the Act, has only to satisfy the Court that he has pleaded and proved the non-user of the accommodation for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of filing of the suit. If the plaintiff establishes his claim, the onus shifts to the tenant to establish that his default which rendered him liable to eviction was condonable by the Court because of a "reasonable cause".

9. This Court, in an unreported decision in the case of Kashibai v. Shardabai 1987 MPRCJ (N) 74 has also considered the effect of the absence of the pleading of "without reasonable cause" by the landlord and has observed that if the plaintiff pleads and proves the non-user of the accommodation for the purpose for which it was let out for a period of six months preceding the filing of the suit, absence of the pleading "without reasonable cause" will not non-suit the plaintiff.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 94 of 1986

Decided On: 26.08.1993

Godharam Vs. Vasudev Prasad Sharma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.K. Dubey, J.

Citation: AIR 1994 MP 20

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Whether eviction decree will be denied to landlord if tenant casually visits tenanted premises?

 Chagla, C.J. Has further observed that - "Now, a mere casual occupation of premises does not constitute residence in those premises. In construing sub-clause (k), one must also bear in mind the object of the Legislature in passing this legislation. The Rent Restriction Act is passed because there was a scarcity of premises and therefore it was necessary to protect bonafide tenants and also to see that premises were not left unoccupied so that people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises of one place and go about residing in some other premises. Therefore, the purpose within the meaning of sub-clause (k) for which premises are let is the purpose of permanent residence; not a mere casual occupation, not a mere spasmodic stay in the premises." So this decision of Chagla, C.J. interprets the words 'use' in a way connecting it with 'residence' importing that word in sub-clause (k) also and quite justifiably. As considered by me earlier, the purpose of the Rent Control Act is that the people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises at one place and go about residing in some other premises. This is what exactly done in the instant case. The petitioner wants to continue her premises in Baroda and she states that her parents stay in the said premises. Her very parents have their own premises in Bombay where the petitioner herself stays. So it is not a case where person is without a shelter. But on the contrary, the person is trying to have shelter at both the places depriving some needy tenant of shelter in Baroda. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

Civil Revision Application No. 713 of 1979

Decided On: 03.04.1984

Mohini Bhiryomal Hingorani Vs. Bhanubhai Manilal Patel

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.V. Bedarkar, J.

Citation: 1985 Bom RC 27

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How to appreciate difficulty of litigant while setting aside exparte order?

The application for setting aside the order on ex parte has been moved on the same day. When the litigant specifies the cause for absence which appears to be reasonable, keeping in view the general experience of human being it should be accepted as satisfactory cause explaining the absence. 'Satisfactory' is a relative term. The difficulty of the litigant has to be understood by keeping oneself in the circumstances in which he lives. The standard of a city dwellers cannot be applied to a villager.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

C.R. No. 1064 of 1994

Decided On: 07.03.1995

 Narayan Singh and Anr. Vs. Rajaram and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.C. Chitre, J.

Citation: AIR 1995 MP 200

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How to ascertain dominant or primary use of tenanted premises in case of composite use?

At this stage the counsel on either side addressed me on the wording of the two relevant sub-clauses of Section 13(1). Section 13(1)(a) provides a ground for eviction when the tenant commits an act contrary to the provisions of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act in so far as is relevant requires the lessee not to use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. Turning toSection 13(1) of the Rent Act, it is evident that the tenant can be evicted when the premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let. It is true that to a certain extent the two clauses over-lap each other. Both speak of change of use. Section 13(1) has a wider connotation and covers not only positive but also negative aspect. When it is a case of mere failure to use or change of use then the tenant cannot be evicted, if he pleads and, establishes that he had a reasonable cause for the failure to use or change of use. There may be cases where even under Section 13(1) the premises are used wholly for a purpose for which they were not let. In such a case the Court will not find any difficulty in passing a decree in ejectment. But in the present case the premises are put to an additional or a different use and they are still used for the purpose for which they were let. In other words, it is a case of composite use. Whether the case falls within the ambit of Section 13(1)(a) or under Section 13(1)the Court will have to consider the dominant or primary use to find out whether there is a change of use so as to attract the provisions of either of the two sub-clauses.

20. As stated above, the wording of the two clauses of the sub-section provide no guidelines. But the object of the Rent Act is to protect tenants against indiscriminate eviction by landlords. Whenever the landlord complains that the tenant has changed the use of the premises, then the Courts must find out in the first instance the original purpose for which the premises are let. If the tenant is found to use the premises for an additional purpose or a purpose different from the purpose for which the premises were let, then it must be found as a fact in every case as to what is the dominant or primary use of the premises vis-a-vis the purpose of letting. It will be a question of fact to be decided in each particular case having regard to all the circumstances. It is not possible to give a list of all the relevant factors but Courts must bear in mind that the Rent Act is enacted primarily for protecting tenants against indiscriminate eviction. The tenants have no such protection under the general law which applies to all leases. It may be that a landlord has rushed to the Court on flimsy or superficial grounds. Or it may be that a tenant in a given case is trying to exploit the situation. In all such cases the Courts have to record a finding about the dominant or primary use of the premises vis-a-vis the purpose of letting. Some times the extent or mode of use may be a relevant factor. But it is difficult to lay down any definite objective test in this behalf.

Bombay High Court

Babhutmal Raichand Oswal vs Laxmibai Raghunath Tarte on 19 November, 1971

Equivalent citations: (1972) 74 BOMLR 214,1972 MHLJ 382

Bench: Bhasme

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When court should not order eviction of tenant on ground of non user of tenanted premises?

Mr. Saldhana, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, submitted that was not a sufficient ground for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court had to be satisfied under Section 13(1)(k) that the non-user was without reasonable cause. Mr. Saldhana, submitted that the two Courts failed to apply their minds to this requirement of Section 13(1)(k) and argued that whether the non-user was for want of reasonable cause, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. He submitted that, having regard to the nature of the services of the tenant and the fact that he was paying electricity charges and rent regularly, it was clearly established that he never voluntarily stopped used the premises for the purpose for which they were let. His non-user was involuntary as he was liable to be transferred, having regard to the nature of the services. He had always animus reverend to the premises. he had never really abandoned the premises as was evidenced by the regular payments of rent."

13. The scope and the effect of the said Section 13(1)(k) was considered to some extent by Chagla, C. J., in an unreported decisions dated July 30, 1954, in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1527 of 1953 (Bom). In that case the Petitioner was a tenant and the Opponent was a landlord. The Petitioner had occupied the suit premises situated in Poona in May 1940, but from June 1950 he had ceased to occupy the premises. He stayed with his son at Jalgaon. The landlord, therefore, contended that the premises were not used for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. The trial Judge held against the landlord and the District Judge had recorded a finding against the tenant. Chagla, C. J., refused to interfere in revision with the said finding of the District Judge but made the following observations : -

"Mr. Parulekar is perfectly right when he contends that under sub-clause (k) of Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act it is not necessary that the tenant himself should reside in the premises. He points out - again rightly, that when we look at the other sub-clause of Section 13(1), whenever action against a tenant is contemplated the tenant is mentioned, but in the case of sub-clause (k) the Legislature has not stated that the tenant should use the premises for the purpose for which they were let. But what sub-clause (k) requires is that the premises should be used for the purpose for which they were let. Therefore, it is true that, so long as the premises have been used for the purpose for which they were let, sub-clause (k) is satisfied and the landlord cannot eject the tenant because he himself did not reside in the premises ..............."

14. Proceeding to consider as to whether any other member of the family was residing in the premises, having regard to the fact that the evidence in that case showed that son of the petitioner stayed in the premises from June 9 to June 14 and C J. observed : -

" ................... As a matter of fact, the learned District Judge finds and I am bound by that finding - that there was merely a casual occupation by the petitioner's son for a spasmodic period of a week. Now, a mere casual occupation of premises does not constitute residence in those premises. In construing sub-clause (k), one must also bear in mind the object of the Legislature in passing this legislation. The Rent Restriction Act is passed because there was a scarcity of premises and therefore it was necessary to protect bona fide tenants and also to see that premises were not left unoccupied so that people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises at one place and go about residing in some other premises. Therefore, the purpose within the meaning of sub-clause (k) for which premises are let is the purpose of permanent residence; not a mere casual occupation, not a mere spasmodic stay in the premises ........"

(Underlining mine).

The learned Assistant Judge and the trial Judge in the present case have not recorded a finding that the petitioner had any permanent residence elsewhere like the tenant in the case decided by Chagla, C. J. Nevertheless, the two Courts appear to have been erroneously carried away by the comment purported to be based on this case in Dalal's Commentary on the Rent Act, 1960, Third Edition at p. 257, reproduced at p. 444, 1969 Fourth Edition.

15. The principal question which the two Courts below ignored was as to whether, even assuming that there was no continuous occupation of the suit premises by the tenant and the members of his family within six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, the tenant had any reasonable cause for not using the premises. It is true that the tenant did not produce the orders of transfers before the trial Court or the Appellate Court as he ought to have done. That, however, does not justify the Courts to ignore the requirements of Section 13(1)(k). The question as to whether the tenant had ceased to use the premises without reasonable cause, will depend on the facts and the circumstances of each case.

16. As observed by Chagla, C. J., in the above case, physical possession by a tenant himself was not necessary. Physical possession by other members of the family also is not necessary if there was reasonable cause for their remaining absent from the premises. The question is one of fact and degree. If there is evidence on record to show that the tenant had something more than a vague wish to return and that he had a real hope coupled with the practicable possibility of its fulfillment within a reasonable time, it cannot be said that the had no reasonable cause for not using the premises. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the tenant had no reasonable cause. Absence may be sufficiently prolonged or unintermittent to compel the inference prima facie of a cesser of occupation. The onus is on the tenant in such a case to repel the presumption and to establish that his possession had not ceased or that he had ceased to occupy on account of reasonable cause. In my judgment, this can be established if the tenant proves notwithstanding the intention on his part to return after his absence, his helplessness in remaining absent from the premises.

17. It is true that the tenant should have made proper attempts to discharge the onus in the present case by producing the orders, if not before the trial Court, at least before the Appellate Court. That, however, as stated above, does not permit the Courts to brush aside the requirements of Section 13(1)(k). It is a matter for not awarding the costs. The Court cannot ignore the nature of the tenant's services and his liability to be transferred when deciding the question under Section 13(1)(k). I do not propose to lay down that in every case where a Government servant is transferred and he goes on paying rent in respect of the premises, he had reasonable cause for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let. The question will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The tenant must couple and clothe his inward intention to return, with some formal, outward and visible sign of it, as for instance by installing some caretaker or representative, be it a relative or not with the status of a licensee and with the function of preserving the premises for his own ultimate home-coming. It may also be that the same result can be secured by leaving on the premises, as a deliberate symbol of continued occupation, furniture. As stated by Asquith L. J., in Brown v. Brash and Ambrose, (1948) 2 KB 247, the tenant must prove not only animus possidendi but a corpus possessions.

18. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, I have no doubt that the petitioner established beyond any doubt that he wanted himself and his family to occupy the premises at all stages; but as he was compelled to stay in Sholapur, he appeared to have shifted temporarily to that place. The facts that he went on paying rent regularly, paid electricity charges and further the facts that the petitioner and his wife were trying to be on good terms with the respondent by even inviting the respondent to stay with them in Sholapur, clearly show that the tenant never intended to stop the use of the suit premises for his own residence. As the tenant was compelled not to stay in the suit premises by transfer, he had reasonable cause, having regard to his conduct and the circumstances of the case, for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit as found by the two Courts below. As there was reasonable cause for non-user, it must be held that the two Courts below erred in law in decreeing the landlord's suit for eviction.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Special Civil Appln. No. 2795 of 1969

Decided On: 23.03.1972

Achut Pandurang Kulkarni Vs. Sadashiv Ganesh Phulambrikar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Vaidya, J.

Citation: 1973BCI(0) 1

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