Whether major sons of deceased who are gainfully employed or earning can claim compensation under Motor vehicles Act?

The legal representatives of the deceased could move application for compensation by virtue of Clause (c) of Section 166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression "legal representative" of the deceased. This Court in Manjuri Bera (supra) had expounded that liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the concerned legal representative. Notably, the expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. In Manjuri Bera (supra), the Court observed thus: {Para 14}

9. In terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Act in case of death, all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased become entitled to compensation and any such legal representative can file a claim petition. The proviso to said Sub-section makes the position clear that where all the legal representatives had not joined, then application can be made on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased by impleading those legal representatives as Respondents. Therefore, the High Court was justified in its view that the Appellant could maintain a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Act.

11. According to Section 2(11) Code of Civil Procedure, "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar terms is the definition of legal representative under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 i.e. Under Section 2(1)(g).

12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [MANU/SC/0149/1989 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) Code of Civil Procedure is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit the property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression "legal representative". As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [MANU/SC/0469/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.

In paragraph 15 of the said decision, while adverting to the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation. In the concurring judgment of Justice S.H. Kapadia, as His Lordship then was, it is observed that there is distinction between "right to apply for compensation" and "entitlement to compensation". The compensation constitutes part of the estate of the deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the deceased would inherit the estate. Indeed, in that case, the Court was dealing with the case of a married daughter of the deceased and the efficacy of Section 140 of the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also earning.

15. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the concerned legal representative was fully dependant on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional heads only. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 242-243 of 2020 

Decided On: 13.01.2020

National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Birender and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

Author:A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: Citation: 2020 INSC 34, MANU/SC/0028/2020,AIR 2020 SC 434.

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Important provisions of Civil minor Acts(Part 1)

 

1) Important provisions of motor vehicle Act

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/09/important-provisions-of-motor-vehicle.html

2) Important provisions of The family courts Act 1984

https://www.lawweb.in/2023/09/important-provisions-of-family-courts.html

3) Important provisions of Maharashtra Regional and town planning Act 1966

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/08/important-provisions-of-maharashtra.html

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Supreme Court judgment on cross-objection in appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act

 A conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure would reveal, that there is no restriction on the right to appeal of any of the parties. It is clear, that any party aggrieved by any part of the Award would be entitled to prefer an appeal. It is also clear, that any Respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, apart from supporting the finding in his favour, is also entitled to take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal.

25. When in an appeal the Appellant could have raised any of the grounds against which he is aggrieved, we fail to understand, as to how a Respondent can be denied to file cross-objection in an appeal filed by the other side challenging that part of the Award with which he was aggrieved. We find, that the said distinction as sought to be drawn by the High Court is not in tune with conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

26. As a matter of fact, it could be seen from the prayer Clause in the appeal preferred by the Respondents herein (Insurance Company) before the High Court that the entire award was challenged by the Respondents-Insurance Company. Not only that, but the Appellants herein (the claimants) were also impleaded as party Respondents to the said appeal. In such circumstances, the High Court has erred in declining to consider the cross-objection of the Appellants herein (the claimants) on merits.

27. There is another angle to it. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides, that even if the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the cross-objection would nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. We are, therefore, of the considered view, that even if the appeal of the Insurance Company was dismissed in default and the Insurance Company had submitted that they were not interested to revive the appeal, still the High Court was required to decide the cross-objection of the Appellants herein on merits and in accordance with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 838 of 2020 
Decided On: 30.01.2020

 Urmila Devi  Vs.  Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/0103/2020

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Whether a person licensed to drive L.M.V. is entitled to drive a transport vehicle in that category ?

Section 10 of the Act requires a driver to hold a licence with respect to the class of vehicles and not with respect to the type of vehicles. In one class of vehicles, there may be different kinds of vehicles. If they fall in the same class of vehicles, no separate endorsement is required to drive such vehicles. As light motor vehicle includes transport vehicle also, a holder of light motor vehicle licence can drive all the vehicles of the class including transport vehicles. It was pre-amended position as well the post-amended position of Form 4 as amended on 28.3.2001. Any other interpretation would be repugnant to the definition of "light motor vehicle" in Section 2(21) and the provisions of Section 10(2)(d), Rule 8 of the Rules of 1989, other provisions and also the forms which are in tune with the provisions. Even otherwise the forms never intended to exclude transport vehicles from the category of 'light motor vehicles' and for light motor vehicle, the validity period of such licence hold good and apply for the transport vehicle of such class also and the expression in Section 10(2)(e) of the Act Transport Vehicle' would include medium goods vehicle, medium passenger motor vehicle, heavy goods vehicle, heavy passenger motor vehicle which earlier found place in Section 10(2)(e) to (h) and our conclusion is fortified by the syllabus and Rules which we have discussed. Thus we answer the questions which are referred to us thus:

(i) 'Light motor vehicle' as defined in Section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Section 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act No. 54/1994.

(ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, 'unladen weight' of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class of "light motor vehicle" as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the "unladen weight" of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued Under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form.

(iii) The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act No. 54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting Clauses (e) to (h) of Section 10(2) which contained "medium goods vehicle" in Section 10(2)(e), medium passenger motor vehicle in Section 10(2)(f), heavy goods vehicle in Section 10(2)(g) and "heavy passenger motor vehicle" in Section 10(2)(h) with expression 'transport vehicle' as substituted in Section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid substituted classes only. It does not exclude transport vehicle, from the purview of Section 10(2)(d) and Section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle.

(iv) The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of "transport vehicle" is related only to the categories which were substituted in the year 1994 and the procedure to obtain driving licence for transport vehicle of class of "light motor vehicle" continues to be the same as it was and has not been changed and there is no requirement to obtain separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such class without any endorsement to that effect.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5826 of 2011, 

Decided On: 03.07.2017

Mukund Dewangan  Vs.  Oriental Insurance Company Limited

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Important provisions of Motor vehicles Act regarding grant of compensation on account of motor accidents

161. Special provisions as to compensation in case of hit and run motor accident.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having the force of law, the Central Government shall provide for paying in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the scheme made under sub-section (3), compensation in respect of the death of, or grievous hurt to, persons resulting from hit and run motor accidents.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the scheme made under sub-section (3), there shall be paid as compensation,—

(a) in respect of the death of any person resulting from a hit and run motor accident, a fixed sum of two lakh rupees or such higher amount as may be prescribed by the Central Government;

(b) in respect of grievous hurt to any person resulting from a hit and run motor accident, a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees or such higher amount as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

(Came into force from 1-4-2022)

163. Refund in certain cases of compensation paid under Section 161.—(1) The payment of compensation in respect of the death of, or grievous hurt to, any person under Section 161 shall be subject to the condition that if any compensation (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the other compensation) or other amount in lieu of or by way of satisfaction of a claim for compensation is awarded or paid in respect of such death or grievous hurt under any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise, so much of the other compensation or other amount aforesaid as is equal to the compensation paid under Section 161, shall be refunded to the insurer.

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Whether transferee of vehicle is entitled to get benefit of insurance policy if there is theft of vehicle?

The relevant observations made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 10 of its judgment in Mallamma's case
(supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-
“Before us, learned counsel for the appellants
relying upon Section 157 of the M.V. Act, contended that
there is an admitted transfer of ownership of the vehicle as
proved before the Commissioner. Once the ownership of
the vehicle is admittedly proved to have been transferred to
Jeeva Rathna Setty, the existing insurance policy in respect
of the same vehicle will also be deemed to have been
transferred to the new owner and the policy will not lapse
even if the intimation as required under Section 103 of the
M.V. Act is not given to the insurer, hence the impugned
order passed by the High Court is contrary to law. In
support of this contention, learned counsel for the
appellant has relied upon a judgment of this Court in G.
Govindan Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd . (1999) 3
SCC 754.”
When the abovesaid ratio of the law laid down in Mallamma's
case (supra), is considered in the factual context of the present case, same
squarely applies in favour of respondent No.1 and against the petitioner-

Insurance Company. In this view of the matter, it can be safely concluded
that learned Permanent Lok Adalat was well justified, while placing reliance
on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallamma's case (supra)
and the impugned order deserves to the upheld for this reason also.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
 AT CHANDIGARH
Civil Writ Petition No. 14086 of 2016
Date of Decision: 11.8.2016
The Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others

Vs.
Abhishek Kumar and another

CORAM :  MR. JUSTICE RAMESHWAR SINGH MALIK
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR(JOURNAL)23

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Whether non-dependant heir of deceased who died in motor accident is entitled to claim compensation under MV Act?

In view of the clear and unambiguous language under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that application can be made
either by the injured or the legal representatives of the deceased.
Though legal representative is not defined under the provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, from Rule 2(g) of the A.P.Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989, it is clear that the definition of legal
representative is given same meaning as defined under Section 2(11)
of the Code of Civil Procedure.  In view of the judgment of Honble
Supreme Court in Manjuri Beras case (9 supra), it is clear that the
compensation which is payable on account of no fault liability will
form part of the estate of deceased.  In that view of the matter, there is
no basis for contending that the application is to be filed only by the
dependants.  As we have held that dependency is a matter to be taken
into consideration for award of compensation and merely because one
is not dependant, that by itself, is no ground for not entertaining any
claim made for grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
In view of the clear language under Section 166 of the Act and
in view of the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Manjuri
Beras case (9 supra), wherein, it is held that the compensation to be
awarded under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act will form part
of the estate of deceased, and further, as the Act also provides for
compensation on other conventional heads, we are of the view that the
non-dependant also can lay a claim by filing application under Section
166 of the Act.  It is also to be noticed that the situations may arise,
where, one may have suffered injuries initially but ultimately after
filing a claim, may have succumbed to such injuries also.  In such an
event, lot of amount would be spent towards hospitalisation etc., and
as already discussed in the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in
Montford Brothers case (5 supra), it is common in the Indian
society, where, the members of the family who are not even
dependant also can extend their support monetarily and otherwise to
the victims of accidents to meet the immediate expenditure for
hospitalization etc., in such cases, unless the legal representatives are
allowed to continue the proceedings initiated by the person who
succumbs to injuries subsequently, such claims will be defeated and
that will also defeat the very object and intentment of the Act.  Any
such measure would be wholly unequitable and unjust.  Plainly, that
would never be intent of any piece of legislation.  For the aforesaid
reasons and in view of the language under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 r/w. Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1989,    we are of the view that even the legal representatives who are
non-dependants can also lay a claim for payment of compensation by 
making application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
    Accordingly, we answer the reference, holding that a
non-dependant heir of the deceased who died in a motor accident is
entitled to lay a claim for compensation under section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 where there is no other dependant legal heir
for claiming compensation.
HYDERABAD HIGH COURT                      

M.A.C.M.A.Nos.364 of 2010 

DATE: 01.02.2016  

Dr.Gangaraju Sowmini  .Appellant  
Vs
Alavala Sudhakar Reddy & another. Respondents    



HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY         
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH        
And 
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO             

Citation:AIR 2016 hyd 162(FB)

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When private place shall be treated as public place for purpose of grant of compensation under motor vehicle Act?

   As far as the provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

are concerned, we are of the view that the statute is framed with the

anxiety and the purpose to compensate the victims of accidents which

may occur in different circumstances.           According to us, while

considering the meaning of the term public place, a literal interpretation



will lead to anomalous results and will defeat the purpose.             A

purposive interpretation thus will have to be adopted. It is a matter of

common knowledge that in view of the increased spheres of activities

in daily life of people, the necessity to hire goods vehicles either to

transport household articles or the articles for use, merchandise, sand,

cement etc. as well as agricultural crops arise of and on. The purpose

of a goods vehicle will be to transport various items of goods. If the

words "public place" are interpreted in such a manner that the place

where accident occurred should be one where the place itself is

dedicated for the use of the public, it will go against the purpose of the

provision. The definition clause under Section 2(34) does not go to

that extent. In our view the decision of the Division Bench in United

India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Lakshmi (1997(1) KLT 449),

which was relied upon in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pierce

Leslie India Ltd. And others (2000(1) KLT 792) clearly went to the

extent of holding that a place will be a public place though it is a

private property when it is shown that the public are in the habit of


resorting to it and no one is prevented therefrom so resorting to it.

      28.   The idea given by the dictum laid down therein will

promote the object of the statute and if we adopt a narrow

interpretation it will defeat the intent and purport of the statute also.

According to us the Division Bench in United India Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Pierce Leslie India Ltd. And others (2000(1) KLT 792 has

expressed in clear terms that the private premises or houses also could

be termed as a public place, where it is shown that public are in the

habit of resorting to it. It could not be taken that the travel of goods

vehicles can only be through the national highways or PWD roads or

such other public roads. Herein also, going by the evidence the vehicle

was actually heavily loaded with bundles of paddy crops . Evidently

after it was loaded from the paddy fields it was being taken through

public way which was situated nearby going by the mahazar, for

unloading in the courtyard, made ready for stocking it. The vehicle had

access to the place as held in Rajan's case ( supra) which is sufficient.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                              PRESENT:

         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
                                 &
          THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH

       FRIDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2015.

                     MACA.No. 1400 of 2008 ( )
                   

            PARUKUTTY, W/O. LATE SASIDHARAN NAIR,
       
                      Vs
           K.P.JOSEPH, S/O. PAILAN,
       KATTILAPPEDIKA HOUSE, MATTATHUR.

        Citation;2016(2)ALLMR(JOURNAL)90

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Good study material on motor vehicle accident compensation

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5vWGtQ14k1BajNYOFUzdU9pak0/view?usp=sharing

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Whether court can determine compensation in case of death by electrocution relying on provisions of Motor vehicle Act?

There is no codified law for arriving at the quantum of compensation in cases of this type. The enactments like Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Workmen Compensation Act, 1948; and Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 may be applied for arriving at the just compensation. In the decision reported in (1969) 3 SCC 64 (C.K.Subramania Iyer v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair) the Supreme Courtheld that there is no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at precisely. In the decision reported in (2001) 8 SCC 151 (M.S.Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood) the Supreme Court held that multiplier method may be adopted to arrive at the just compensation. The age of the deceased can also be taken for arriving at a correct multiplier as per the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2011 (5) LW 408(P.S.Somanathan & Others v. District Insurance Officer & Another).

Madras High Court

Mrs.Saroja vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu on 13 February, 2014

Citation;2014(4)T.A.C 558 Madras

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Whether motor vehicle Act will prevail over consumer protection Act ?

While holding that Consumer Fora have no jurisdiction to entertain complaint arising out of fatal accident while travelling in vehicle, NCDRC allowed a revision petition filed by Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. challenging the order of Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur by which, while dismissing appeal, order of District Forum allowing complaint was upheld. Earlier a complaint before Consumer Forum was filed by complainant whose father while travelling in bus of Rajasthan SRTC met with an accident and on account of injuries, died. Though a complaint claim petition was pending before MACT, Sikar, District Forum granted compensation and its appeal before State Commission was dismissed. In revision Rajasthan SRTC prayed for relief and contended that it has neither charged any amount for insurance from complainant nor Consumer Fora had jurisdiction to decide complaint. NCDRC, in the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in Thiruvalluvar Transport Corpn. v. Consumer Protection Council, (1995) 2 SCC 479 reiterated that Claim Tribunal constituted for the area under Motor Vehicle Act had jurisdiction to entertain any claim for compensation arising out of the fatal accident and as Consumer Protection Act is a general law, it must yield to the special law. 

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

                                                NEW DELHI       

REVISION PETITION NO. 2843 OF 2012

 (From the order dated 11.04.2012 in Appeal No. 96 of 2012 of the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur)

 Manager,

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,

Beawar, Ajmer

 Versus

Mr. Kuldeep Singh S/o Late Sh. Amarjeet Singh

BEFORE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S. CHAUDHARI,  PRESIDING MEMBER      HON’BLE DR. B.C. GUPTA, MEMBER

                             

PRONOUNCED ON   9^th May,  2014

 

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