Showing posts with label money lender act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label money lender act. Show all posts

Sunday, 28 July 2024

What precautions the court should take while granting leave to defend in a summary suit based dishonoured cheque?

 A Summary Suit based on dishonoured cheques stands on a higher pedestal. In addition to the proof of underlying consideration, evidenced by the documents and material on record, in a given case, the plaintiff can bank upon the presumptions contained in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 114 illustration (c) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

32. A slightly distinct position of a Summary Suit based on a dishonoured cheque has been expounded by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Laxmichand Udeshi @ Bhatia v. Pravin Hiralal Shah8 wherein the Court adverted to the effect of the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, while considering the prayer for leave to defend the suit based on a negotiable instrument.

33. The observations of the Division Bench in paragraph 14 and 15 of the said judgment are material and, hence, extracted below.-

14] When a summary suit instituted is based on a cheque which is dishonoured, effect of Sections 138 and 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act raising statutory presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of a liability, is a relevant consideration to be kept in mind. The said Sections cast a burden upon the defendant to rebut the presumption. Summary suits instituted on cheques which are dishonoured will, therefore, stand on a higher footing than summary suits instituted on the basis of other documents. In such cases, the Court will have to take into consideration the statutory presumption which is raised when the cheques are dishonoured. The object behind providing a statutory presumption under the N egotiable Instruments Act has to be kept in mind while judging the credibility of a defence raised by the defendant in summary suit. Thus, the test of more than “shadowy” and less than “probable” as adverted to by the Apex Court cannot apply in cases where the law requires a person to explain certain state of affairs. The judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel do not consider the effect of the statutory presumptions raised under the Negotiable Instruments Act when a cheque is dishonoured. In our opinion, when a cheque is dishonoured, the Court is enjoined with the duty to scrutinize the defence put up by the defendant with a much higher degree of care and circumspection. Such summary suits cannot be treated as on par with the cases instituted on contracts or invoices etc. where such statutory presumptions do not operate.

15] The legislative intent behind enactment of Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to prevent abuse of the banking system. Thus, one who issues a cheque extends a solemn promise to pay. Based on this promise and action, the recipients arrange their affairs and quite often enter into further transactions. Unless extra ordinary circumstances are made out, one who issues cheque is deemed to have undertaken to pay. Negotiable Instruments Act enforces the promise strictly by raising statutory presumption and treating it as an offence. This provision elevates a cheque to a higher status than the other instruments, such as written contract etc. to which no such statutory presumption is attached. What needs to be emphasized is that presumption in respect of a dishonoured cheque places a higher burden on the defendant to elucidate the defence than the burden which is cast on a defendant where the suit is filed on the basis of ordinary instruments. In the cases based on dishonour of cheques, the defendant must satisfy the conscience of the Court and cannot take shelter behind the rules formulated primarily in respect of suits based on ordinary instruments. The Court while exercising the discretion to grant leave or otherwise to the defendant in such cases cannot be oblivious of the legislative intent to place the promise made through a cheque on a higher pedestal than the promise made through an ordinary instrument. This is not to state that moment a Summary Suit is lodged based on a dishonoured cheque, it must be decreed without anything more. What needs to be emphasised is that the fact that there is a statutory presumption attached to the dishonoured cheque will constitute an important ingredient while considering the question whether leave to defend should be granted in cases of dishonoured cheques and the Court must scrutinise the defence strictly. The object of the summary procedure is ultimately to see that the defendant does not needlessly prolong the litigation by creating untenable, frivolous and casual defences so as to deprive the plaintiff of the monies due to him.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Under which circumstances defendant is not entitled to get leave to defend the Summary suit qua the interest component?

  Even the endeavor of Mr. Momaya to seek leave to defend by canvassing a submission that plaintiff has charged interest at an exorbitant and unconscionable rate does not advance the cause of the defendant. The plaintiff is seeking pre-suit, pendent lite, and future interest at the agreed rate of 12% per annum. In a business transaction in a commercial city like Mumbai, interest at the rate of 12% per annum can not be said to be exorbitant and unreasonable. Moreover, in the case at hand, there is an unequivocal undertaking to pay interest. In any event the award of interest on the amount covered by dishonoured cheques would be governed by the provisions contained in Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which stipulates rate of 18 % per annum. Therefore, I am not persuaded to accede to the submission on behalf of the defendant to grant leave to defend the suit qua the interest component. {Para 35}

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Loan against bill of exchange for business purpose is a Commercial dispute

The second challenge based on the dispute not falling within the ambit of ‘commercial dispute’ under Section 2(c) of the Act, 2015, also does not carry much substance. Mr. Momaya made an endeavor to demonstrate that the dispute in question does not fall within the meaning of “commercial dispute” as envisaged by Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act, 2015. According to Mr. Momaya, the transaction in question is essentially of a loan simplicitor and does not partake the character of ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders. {Para 17}

18. To bolster up of this submission, Mr. Momaya placed reliance on an order passed by Calcutta High Court in the case of Ladymoon Towers Private Limited v. Mahendra Investment Advisors Private Limited in IA No. GA/4/2021 in CS/99/2020, decided on 13th August, 2021, and another order passed by this Court in Summons for Judgment No. 9 of 2021, in Commercial Summary Suit No. 6 of 2021, Bharat Huddanna Shetty v. Ahuja Properties & Developers, dated 13th July, 2021.

19. “Commercial dispute” is defined under Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Act, 2015 as under:—

“(i) ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders such as those relating to mercantile documents, including enforcement and interpretation of such documents;”

20. Evidently, whether a dispute falls within the ambit of Section 2(1)(c)(i) is, by its very nature, rooted in facts. The decisions relied upon by Mr. Momaya essentially turned on the facts of those cases with which the Court was confronted. It is true that in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited v. K.S. Infraspace LLP3, the Supreme Court has not approved a wide construction of the definition of “commercial dispute”. However, the issue as to whether the dispute in a given case constitutes a “commercial dispute” must necessarily be decided in the backdrop of the facts of the said case.

21. In the case at hand, in my view, the following factors assumes significance. First, the deceased plaintiff claimed that the loan was advanced to the defendant, who was dealing in a real estate business, to discharge his statutory dues. Second, the Bill of Exchange against which the loan was advanced, over the drawal of which there is no dispute, clearly records that the loan was advanced for a business purpose. Third, the letter dated 20th December, 2016, suggests that the defendant availed loan from the plaintiff and his companies regularly. Fourth, the plaintiff seems to have advanced the amount to the defendant in the regular course of business as is evident from the ledger account maintained by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, I find it rather difficult to accede to the submission that the transaction in question is one of a loan advanced by an individual to another without there being any element of commercial interest therein.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

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Wednesday, 4 May 2016

Whether provisions of money lending Act are applicable to casual money lender?

I shall first take up the point whether the suit itself is barred under Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (Bihar Act VII of 1939). The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:--
"4. Suit for recovery of loan only maintainable by registered money-lenders --No Court shall entertain a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such moneylender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1938 (Bihar Act 3 of 1938) at the tune when such loan was advanced ........."
Two important things are to be considered for the application of this section. The first thing is whether it is a suit for a money-lender; and secondly, whether it is for recovery of a loan. In the present case, no money was actually advanced by the plaintiff. He had to take a salami of Rs. 18,000.00 from the defendants, and the defendants had no ready money to pay the same. They, therefore, executed the mortgage bond in respect of this salami money. It is not argued on behalf of the appellant that the plain-tiff is a professional money-lender. It has been held in several cases that where money-lending is casual, then the provisions regarding registration as a moneylender do not apply, vide MANU/BH/0144/1947 : AIR 1949 Pat 400, Bhutnath Kumar v. Nilkantha, Narain Singh.
The business of money-lending imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity, and that is a test of determining whether the plaintiff is a professional money-lender. Occasional loans to relatives, friends or acquaintances do not make the lender a professional moneylender. There must be more than occasional and disconnected loans to justify a finding that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender so as to apply the bar of Section 4 of Bihar Act VII of 1939: Vide Dwarkadas Marwari v. Kalipada Dey. 1959 BLJR 145 and Lakhi Narayan Sao v. Sm. Bhagwati Kuer. MANU/BH/0103/1963 : AIR 1963 Pat. 350.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1970Pat167, 1969(17)BLJR950
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA
A.F.O.D. No. 459 of 1963
Decided On: 19.05.1969
Sanwarmal Agarwalla
Vs.
Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anwar Ahmad and M.P. Varma , JJ.

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Leading judgment on money lending law

I shall first take up the point whether the suit itself is barred under Section 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (Bihar Act VII of 1939). The relevant portion of that section reads as follows:--
"4. Suit for recovery of loan only maintainable by registered money-lenders --No Court shall entertain a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him after the commencement of this Act unless such moneylender was registered under the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1938 (Bihar Act 3 of 1938) at the tune when such loan was advanced ........."
Two important things are to be considered for the application of this section. The first thing is whether it is a suit for a money-lender; and secondly, whether it is for recovery of a loan. In the present case, no money was actually advanced by the plaintiff. He had to take a salami of Rs. 18,000.00 from the defendants, and the defendants had no ready money to pay the same. They, therefore, executed the mortgage bond in respect of this salami money. It is not argued on behalf of the appellant that the plain-tiff is a professional money-lender. It has been held in several cases that where money-lending is casual, then the provisions regarding registration as a moneylender do not apply, vide MANU/BH/0144/1947 : AIR 1949 Pat 400, Bhutnath Kumar v. Nilkantha, Narain Singh.
The business of money-lending imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity, and that is a test of determining whether the plaintiff is a professional money-lender. Occasional loans to relatives, friends or acquaintances do not make the lender a professional moneylender. There must be more than occasional and disconnected loans to justify a finding that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender so as to apply the bar of Section 4 of Bihar Act VII of 1939: Vide Dwarkadas Marwari v. Kalipada Dey. 1959 BLJR 145 and Lakhi Narayan Sao v. Sm. Bhagwati Kuer. MANU/BH/0103/1963 : AIR 1963 Pat. 350.
Equivalent Citation: AIR1970Pat167, 1969(17)BLJR950
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA
A.F.O.D. No. 459 of 1963
Decided On: 19.05.1969
Sanwarmal Agarwalla Vs. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anwar Ahmad and M.P. Varma , JJ.


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When debt will not be loan for purposes of money lenders Act?

The matter seems to be concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Kissen vs. Keshardeo (MANU/SC/0135/1957 : A.I.R. 1957 SC 743) where the approach to the question such as the one arising in this case has been indicated The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Radha Kissen vs. Keshar Deo (MANU/WB/0041/1954 : A.I.R. 1954 Cal 105). In that case when the purchasers failed to complete the agreement for sale of certain property, the vendor instituted a suit against them for specific performance of the agreement. The suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties under which the vendor was to accept payment of a portion of the money payable under the agreement for sale immediately and the balance in certain instalments with interest. The compromise decree vested the property agreed to be sold in one of the purchasers and created a charge on it for the purchase-money unpaid for the time being. Later on the purchasers contended that they were borrowers within the meaning of S. 3 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act and that, therefore, they could not be made to pay an amount in excess of the amount prescribed by S. 30 of the Act in respect of a loan. The Supreme Court negatived this contention pointing out that the fact that under the compromise decree the moneys were payable in a number of instalments instead of at once did not show that the price due had become a loan and that the compromise decree did not alter the intrinsic nature of the money due to the vendor. It was also emphasized that in such cases there must be evidence to show that subsequent to the sale and purchase transaction there was an agreement between the parties to treat the unpaid price as a loan, an agreement to convert the outstanding purchase-money into a loan by the vendor to the purchaser, The Supreme Court referred to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Nirode Barani vs. (sic) Kumar (MANU/WB/0187/1942 : A.I.R. 1942 Cal 616) and Fatch Chand vs. Akimuddin (MANU/WB/0048/1942 : A.I.R. 1943 Cal 108) and after discussing the facts of those cases pointed out that in both those cases the parties had agreed to treat the purchase-money as paid off in entirety and the amount equivalent to the unpaid purchase money as being due by the purchaser to the vendor by way of loan. In the instant case, there is no evidence of such an agreement.
Property - Suit for recovery of amount - Suit decreed by lower Court - Hence, present petition - Held, a loan contracted no doubt created a debt - But there might be a debt contracted without contracting a loan - A dividend declared by a company was after its due date a debt of company to shareholder; moneys due from an insurance company under a policy were debts; arrears of rent were debts but none of them was a loan - Petition dismissed.
Equivalent Citation: 1959JLJ742
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)
C. Rev. No. 81 of 1959
Decided On: 17.03.1959
 Mangilal
Vs.
 R.R. Contractor & Company
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.V. Dixit, J.


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Tuesday, 10 November 2015

Whether defendant can prove without filing written statement that plaintiff is professional money lender?


As regards the plea of the suit being barred by Money
Lenders Act, the learned Court below has categorically observed
that the appellant/defendant had failed to establish the said plea
by proving the fact that the plaintiff was a professional money
lender. Whether or not the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred under
Section 7-D of the Assam Money Lenders Act, 1934 would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, if it is established that
the plaintiff had lent money in course of his business as a money
lender. Since the defendant had not contested the suit by filing
written statement, hence, there was no occasion for the defendant
to prove and establish the said fact by leading evidence. In that
view of the matter, the learned Court below had rightly rejected
the plea taken by the appellant as regards the suit being barred
under the Money Lenders Act.
 From the perusal of the decision of this Court rendered in the
case of Hem Chandra Chaudhury (supra) relied upon by Mr. Das, it
appears that the said judgment goes against the appellant in the
facts and circumstances of the present case as this Court had
categorically observed that the applicability bar of Section 7-D of
the Assam Money Lenders Act, 1934 cannot be considered in the
absence of any assertion in the written statement that the money
lent by the plaintiff was in course of his business as a money lender.
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
SMT RINA BALA DEVI V MD AHMAD ALI
RSA No.84 of 2015
CORAM;
 HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM
DATED;17.06.2015
AIR 2015(NOC)1096 GAU
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Wednesday, 18 March 2015

Whether accused can be acquitted in cheque dishonour case on ground that complainant has no money lending license?

Under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, there is presumption in favour of holder that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole in part of any debt or other liability. The explanation to Section 138 makes it clear that "debt or other liability" means legally enforceable debt or other liability. Under Section 118 of the N.I. Act it can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears.
8. Thus, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the N.I. Act, it must be emphasized that only legally enforceable debt or liability can be enforced in the proceedings under Section 138 of the said Act, because the explanation to the penal provision is abundantly clear that the dishonoured cheque must have been received by the complainant against a legally enforceable debt or liability.
9. The complainant in the present case, is a money lender who had advanced loan to the accused on the basis of the two promissory notes dated 3.2.2006 and 8.4.2006 respectively for loan of Rs. 18,000/- and Rs. 19,000/- respectively, at interest at the rate of 21 per cent per annum. It is thus case of the complainant that the accused had issued cheque No. 767789 drawn upon Canara Bank, Sadar Bazar, Nagpur for Rs. 40,000/- towards repayment of loan amount and interest. Thus, it was incumbent upon the complainant to establish the fact that she held valid money lending license in accordance with the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 for the relevant period of the transaction. The complainant money lender did not produce such a valid money lending license at the time when complaint was instituted nor till it is decided although required. Furthermore, no such valid money lender's license is produced even during pendency of this Appeal. Section 10 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 runs thus:
10(1) No Court shall pass decree in favour of money lender in any suit to which this Act applies including such suit pending in the Court before the commencement of the Bombay Money Lenders (Amendment) Act, 1975 unless the Court is satisfied that at the time when loan or any part thereof to which the suit relates was advanced the money lender held a valid license and if the Court is satisfied, the money lender did not hold a valid license, it shall dismiss the suit. The words "No court" and "in any suit" used in the Section are wider in scope to embrace any suit or proceeding initiated by a money lender who is required to hold and prove valid license for money lending for the relevant period of the loan transaction or transactions. The trial Court was, therefore, entitled to insist upon the complainant for production of valid license for money lending and also to infer in view of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act that the document withheld was unfavourable to the complainant who withheld it. Thus, the legal position cannot be disputed that Courts are bound to dismiss the suit by money lender for recovery of loans when such money lender was found carrying on business of money lending on the date or dates of the transaction without having valid money lending license. The Court, in view of Section 10(1) of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 is bound to dismiss the suit instituted without production of valid money lending license operative at the time of suit loan transactions. In other words, a money lender can not enforce such loan transaction lawfully without production of valid money lending license operative at the time of transaction of loan to be recovered. Thus, no fault can be found with the trial Court as it was duty bound to dismiss the complaint by the complainant a money lender who was engaged in business of money lending without a valid money lending license at the time of transaction in view of clear provisions of Section 10 of the Bombay Lenders Act, 1946 as the learned Court could not have assisted the complainant to facilitate or further the illegal claim or claim prohibited by law in the complaint. Since explanation to Section 138 of the N.I. Act clearly stipulated that the debt or liability means legally enforceable debt or other liability the claim by money lender against her borrower without production of valid and operative money lending license covering period of transaction was unenforceable claim under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was bound to be dismissed. The complainant moneylender despite availing of sufficient opportunity in the trial Court could not produce valid and operative money lending license at the time of transaction of loan, hence dismissal of complaint can not be faulted as the complainant failed to establish legally enforceable debt or liability of the accused. Section 5 of the Bombay Money Lenders Act prohibits business of money lending except in accordance with terms and conditions of money lending license. In the present case, it was claimed that the loans were advanced at interest on the basis of two promissory notes executed in front of a guarantor. Thus, when transaction of money lending without valid license was prohibited by law, no court can help or assist a party money lender to enforce or recover a claim, except in accordance with law i.e. the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 in this case. The complainant withheld important document without any explanation; hence presumption arose against the complainant in view of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act for non-production of license. Learned Advocate for the appellant made a reference to ruling in Rajesh Varma v. Aminexs Holdings and Investments and Ors. 2008 (3) Mah.L.J. 460 to submit that every loan is not covered by the provisions of the Act inasmuch as Section 2(g) expressly excluded advance of any sum exceeding Rs. 3000/- made on the basis of negotiable instrument other than a promissory note. In the case in hand, the money lender had advanced loans at interest on the basis of two promissory notes hence the ruling cited can not be come to the rescue of the complainant in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the complainant could not establish legally enforceable debt or liability from the accused towards complainant. Since the complainant has failed to establish salutary or basic ingredients of offence punishable under Section 138 of the said Act or observed in Kusum Ingots 's case (supra), the complaint was rightly dismissed and the finding as to acquittal was correct and logical by the trial Court. No ground is made out so as to interfere in this Appeal. The acquittal of the accused is justified, as the cheque in question was, in fact, had not been issued for any legally enforceable debt or liability in view of the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO:  467  /2009


Smt.Nanda w/o Dharam Nandanwar

Vs
Nandkishor s/o Talakram  Thaokar

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

CORAM:  A.P.BHANGALE, J.
DATED:12th January, 2010

Citation: 2010(1)Crimes708, 2010(3)MhLj268
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Whether money lender not having valid money lending license can file dishonour of cheque case?



Therefore, on the same analogy, once it is proved and the entire facts that the alleged Bahi entries are not negotiable instruments, which can be enforced, not alone sufficient to charge any person with liability, sequelly, the complainant was legally debarred to recover the alleged loan, as envisaged under the indicated provisions of the Money lender's Act and in view of such legal disabilities attached to the complaint, as discussed here-in-above, are put together, then, in that eventuality, to my mind, the conclusion is irresistible and inescapable that he (complainant) cannot adhere to initiate the criminal prosecution against the respondent within the meaning and in the garb of complaint u/s. 138 of the NI Act. Hence, the trial Court has correctly acquitted the respondent, by way of impugned judgment of acquittal dated 4.6.2014, which, in substance, is as under (paras 16 & 17):-
"16. Section 3 of the Act provides that the suit by a money lender for recovery of loan, lent within a valid license, shall be dismissed. Now the court was required to ascertain whether Section 3 of the Act would cover a complaint filed under Negotiable Instruments Act or not. To decide the same, reliance has to be placed upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 and object behind the passing of the Punjab Registration of Money-lenders' Act as applicable to Haryana. Under the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 the suit filed by a money lender for recovery of loan without a valid license has to be dismissed. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in case titled as Smt. Nandc v. Nandkishor, MANU/MH/0069/2010: 2011 (7) R.C.R. (Criminal) 697 : 2010 (2) CCC 288 (Bombay) has held that the word "in any suit" are wider in scope and embrace any suit or proceeding initiated by a money lender who is required to hold and prove valid license for money lending for the relevant period of loan transaction or transactions. The Hon'ble High court held that the complaint filed by a money lender under Negotiable Instruments Act has also to be dismissed as the debt amounts to an unenforceable claim under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. In addition to this, the intent and object of the legislature behind the enactment of the Punjab Registration of Money-lenders' Act as applicable to Haryana appears to bar the rights of a money lender, lending money without a valid license, for recovering the loan amount in any manner. Therefore, any proceeding whereby the money lender would be intending to recover the loan amount, lent without a valid license, would be also barred. Had it not been the case, the legislature would not have debarred the money lender from filing a suit for recovery of loan amount.
Therefore, the claim by money lender (complainant) against borrower (accused) without a valid and operative money lending license covering period of transaction as unenforceable claim under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
C.R.A. No. A-1101-MA of 2014
Decided On: 13.11.2014
Appellants: Narsi Dass
Vs.
Respondent: Surender
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.
 Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)114, 2015(1)RCR(Civil)108
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Whether money advanced by company comes within scope of money lenders Act?


The fourth ground raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioners is with regard to lending loan without having any
licence to do business under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) 
Money Lenders Act, 1349 F.  Placing reliance on a judgment of this
Court reported in Mrs. K.Sudersanam V. S.Venkata Rao  and as  
there was no licence to do money lending business, he submits that
a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. Since
the complainant is a company established for a business other than
money lending, he submits that the second respondent could not 
have lent money without obtaining licence under the provisions of
the Act.  He thus contends that any default in payment of money is
not enforceable under law and the present complaint under
Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable.  As stated above, the
petitioners are strangers to the second respondent and they came
into contact with the complainant only through one T.Sateesh
Kumar, who is the friend of accused No.2.
           Keeping in view the facts in issue, the said argument of the
learned counsel for the petitioners needs to be tested with the
judgment relied upon by him.
                  A reading of the judgment of this Court referred to above
(K.Sudersanam (10 Supra) would disclose that in order to fall
within the definition of money lender it is not enough merely to
show that a man had on several occasions lent money at 
remunerative rates of interest but that there must be a certain
degree of system and continuity about the transactions and that
the definition of money lender in the Act does not include those
who advanced money casually.   In case on hand, there is no
material to show that there was a certain degree of system and
continuity in doing money lending business.  On the other hand,
the complaint refers to only one transaction.
          Apart from that the word money lender is defined in
Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money 
Lenders Act, 1349 F which reads as under. 
 Money lender means a person including a pawn broker, 
who, within the meaning of this Act, only advances loan in
the ordinary course of his business or does so along with
other business, and shall also include the legal
representative of such person, and the person claiming to
be his representative on the ground of succession or
assignment or otherwise.
         The word loan mentioned in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F is defined in 
Section 2 (4)  of the Act which is as under: -
 loan means a loan secured or unsecured, advanced on interest in
cash or in kind, and shall include every transaction which is in
substance a loan, but shall not include the following.
Section 2 (4) (d) of the Act reads as under:
a loan advanced by a bank, a co-operative society or a company
         A conjoint reading  of Section 2 (4) (d) and 2 (7) of the
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F would   
clearly indicate that the money advanced by a company in the
form of loan is excluded from the purview of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F.   Viewed from any 
angle, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners does
not stand to merit.
ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR          

CRIMINAL PETITION No.6355 OF 2013     

dATED:28-01-2014 

M/s. Vasundhara Projects Pvt. Ltd.,
Vs    
                
The State of A.P. 
         
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6355 OF 2013   
Citation: 2014(2)ALD(Cri)883, 2015ALLMR(Cri)100, 2014 (3) ALT (Crl.) 193 (A.P.)  
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Monday, 16 March 2015

How to prove that loan transaction was money lending transaction in case of dishonour of cheque?



The fourth ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is with regard to lending loan without having any licence to do business under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Placing reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in Mrs. K.Sudersanam V. S.Venkata Rao and as there was no licence to do money lending business, he submits that a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. Since the complainant is a company established for a business other than money lending, he submits that the second respondent could not have lent money without obtaining licence under the provisions of the Act. He thus contends that any default in payment of money is not enforceable under law and the present complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. As stated above, the petitioners are strangers to the second respondent and they came into contact with the complainant only through one T.Sateesh Kumar, who is the friend of accused No.2.
Keeping in view the facts in issue, the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners needs to be tested with the judgment relied upon by him.
A reading of the judgment of this Court referred to above (K.Sudersanam (10 Supra) would disclose that in order to fall within the definition of money lender it is not enough merely to show that a man had on several occasions lent money at remunerative rates of interest but that there must be a certain degree of system and continuity about the transactions and that the definition of money lender in the Act does not include those who advanced money casually. In case on hand, there is no material to show that there was a certain degree of system and continuity in doing money lending business. On the other hand, the complaint refers to only one transaction.
Apart from that the word money lender is defined in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F which reads as under.
Money lender means a person including a pawn broker, who, within the meaning of this Act, only advances loan in the ordinary course of his business or does so along with other business, and shall also include the legal representative of such person, and the person claiming to be his representative on the ground of succession or assignment or otherwise.
The word loan mentioned in Section 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F is defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act which is as under: -
loan means a loan secured or unsecured, advanced on interest in cash or in kind, and shall include every transaction which is in substance a loan, but shall not include the following. Section 2 (4) (d) of the Act reads as under:
a loan advanced by a bank, a co-operative society or a company A conjoint reading of Section 2 (4) (d) and 2 (7) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F would clearly indicate that the money advanced by a company in the form of loan is excluded from the purview of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Money Lenders Act, 1349 F. Viewed from any angle, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners does not stand to merit.
Andhra High Court

M/S. Vasundhara Projects Pvt.  vs State of andhra pradesh on 28 January, 2014
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(cri)Journal 100
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Sunday, 22 January 2012

NBFC Money lender act

CORAM:

HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA



HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER

Date
:26/04/2011

COMMON
CAV JUDGMENT

(Per
: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA)


In
all these appeals as common question of law is involved, they were heard together and disposed of by this common judgement.


2. The
appellants-Radhe Estate Developers of Letters Patent Appeal No. 113 of 2010 preferred a writ petition - Special Civil Application No.13024 of 2009 for a direction on the respondent-Assistant Registrar (Money Lending), Ahmedabad, to decide the application preferred by it for prosecution of the 1st respondent - Mehta Integrated Finance Limited, for having obtained licence under the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, (hereinafter referred to as `the Money-Lenders Act') and thereby prosecute it u/Sec.35A and 35B of the Money-Lenders Act. Learned Single Judge, having noticed that the representation preferred by the appellant-writ petitioner is pending with the authorities, disposed of the writ petition by the impugned order dated 14th December 2009 with a direction to decide the said representation, giving rise to the appeal.


3. The
other appeals, i.e. Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 1094, 1095 and 1097 of 2010, have been preferred by State of Gujarat or its authorities against the common judgement dated 13th January 2010 passed in four different writ petitions, wherein learned Single Judge held that the Bombay Money-Lenders Act, 1946, would not be applicable to the companies, which are Non-Banking Financial Companies (hereinafter referred to as `N.B.F.Cs.') and governed by Chapter III of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as `the R.B.I. Act'), and thereby set aside the notices issued by the Assistant Registrar (Money-Lending) to four different companies under the Money-Lenders Act.

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