Showing posts with label summary suit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label summary suit. Show all posts

Monday, 27 April 2026

What is Summary suit, grounds of defence and refusal of leave?

 In a summary suit under Order  CPC, the defendant has no right to defend as of course; he must first obtain leave to defend, and leave is refused only when the defence is sham, illusory, frivolous, or vexatious.student.

For a Judicial service interview, remember this formula: substantial defence or triable issue = leave granted; moonshine defence = leave refused.
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Sunday, 28 July 2024

Supreme Court: If the transaction is contained in more than one document between the same parties they must be read and interpreted together and they have the same legal effect for all purposes as if they are one document

 The defence so raised itself being the question of law, as the interpretation of documents itself goes to the root of the transactions/contract and the claim based upon it. In the present case, B.O.I. Finance Ltd. (Supra), as relied is not applicable on facts and the laws. That was a case of ready forward contract. In the case in hand, three documents and the transactions, of which two views of the learned Judges unless decided finally in due trial, it is difficult to accept the case that the view taken by the one learned Judge that transactions are sham and bogus and unseverable and other Judge hold it to be severable, without trial and by overlooking the earlier opinion, this itself is a triable issue. The Appellate Bench also may not decide such issue on such question of law, considering the scope and purpose of law on order XXXVII of the CPC, at this stage of the Summary Suit. It should be after final Judgment. In the present case, the same documents are interlinked and interconnected as observed by the earlier learned Judge, therefore, unless these findings are set aside, the findings in the impugned order that those are severable just cannot be accepted, without the trial. The case of misconstruction or interpretation of all connected documents itself made out a case of good defence. It cannot be treated as sham or bogus defence. The misinterpretation itself affects the rights and the transaction/claim. Therefore, the construction of documents is always question of law so is the position in case in hand. The distinction, therefore, at this stage, in summary proceedings like this, itself will not sufficient to deny the order of unconditional leave as granted by one Judge on the basis of same documents. (Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.11 and Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal12) {Para 56}

Interpretation of documents and the nature of transactions-triable issue-

57. We have to consider the legal position in view of the contentions so raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The Apex Court in Smt. Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar13, while dealing with the aspects of interpretation of any deed or documents, has held as under:-

“27. Secondly, there is ample authority for the proposition that when there is a dispute in regard to the true character of a writing, evidence de hors the document can be led to show that the writing was not the real nature of the transaction, but was only an illusory, fictitious and colourable device which cloaked something else, and that the apparent state of affairs was not the real state of affairs. [See Chandi Prasad Singh v. Piari Bidi C.A. No. 75 of 1964, decided on 16-3-1966, and Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst. Reoti Devi (supra)].

58. While dealing with the effect of various transactions, based upon the various documents, the Court required to deal with and take into consideration every connected transactions and the documents, to give total effect to the transactions by treating them all as one document. The Apex Court in (S. Chattanatha Karayalar v. The Central Bank of India Ltd.)14 has observed as under:-

3. ………. “The principle is well established that if the transaction is contained in more than one document between the same parties they must be read and interpreted together and they have the same legal effect for all purposes as if they are one document. In Manks v. Whiteley 1912-1 Ch. 735 at p. 754, Moulton, L.J. Stated:

“Where several deeds form part of one transaction and are contemporaneously executed they have the same effect for all purposes such as are relevant to this case as if they were one deed. Each is executed on the faith of all the others being executed also and is intended to speak only as part of the one transaction, and if one is seeking to make equities apply to the parties they must be equities arising out of the transaction as a whole.”

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Anoop V. Mohta and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.)

Hubtown Limited Vs IDBI Trusteeship Service Limited, 

Commercial Appeal No. 7 of 2016


Decided on October 24, 2016

     

 Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9019.
Read full Judgment here: Click here.
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Bombay HC: summary suit as originally filed, prior to the commencement of the and as now transferred, being commercial dispute matter, the original procedure as provided under Order XXXVII shall be applicable to such summary suits

“Summary Suit” and “Summary Judgment”-

34. The conceptual position of “summary suit” as contemplated under Order XXXVII of CPC and its specific provisions are governed as per the original provisions of CPC. The amended CPC, in view of Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act inserted the provision for a “summary judgment”, through Order XIII-A which is made applicable to the classes of Suits (commercial suits) which required to be decided by the Commercial Division/Court. It prescribes the procedure and stages for application for summary judgment. This also includes and provides the powers of a Commercial Judge to pass conditional order including for evidence for hearing of summary judgment. We are concerned with Order XIII-A, Rule 1(3) of CPC, whereby it is specifically provided “notwithstanding anything to the contrary, “an application” for summary judgment under this Order shall not be made in a Suit in respect of any commercial disputes that is originally filed as a summary suit under Order XXXVII.”. Therefore, once the summary suit as originally filed, prior to the commencement of the and as now transferred, being commercial dispute matter, the original procedure as provided under Order XXXVII shall be applicable to such summary suits. The parties are not entitled to prayer for summary judgment under XIII-A in view of the specific provision so referred above. This also means that the judgments and the issues so decided in summary suit shall for all purposes be governed by the CPC, even after such suits are transferred as commercial suits. The Commercial Division Judge is required to follow the original C.P.C. and is required to keep in mind the position in law revolving around all the facets of summary suits. The provisions of Section 13, therefore, is required to be interpreted and/or considered accordingly, when any decision is given by the Commercial Division/Court in such summary suit. 

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Anoop V. Mohta and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.)

Hubtown Limited Vs IDBI Trusteeship Service Limited, 

Commercial Appeal No. 7 of 2016


Decided on October 24, 2016

     
                                           Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9019.

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Bombay HC: The Commercial court Act is not applicable to the transaction of advancing the amount as a friendly loan

In the wake of the above, the impugned order which take a view that the transaction of advancing the amount as a friendly loan is commercial in nature, is an erroneous finding as a solitary transaction of advancing loan, on friendly terms, unlike a commercial lending with the prevailing market rate, would fall short or ordinary transaction of a financer, banker. Moreso, even the plaintiff is conscious of this position and in her response to the Application filed for return of plaint for presentation of appropriate court, she admit so. {Para 17}

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Bharati Dangre, J.)

Glasswood Realty Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs  Chandravilas Kailashkumar Kothari 

Writ Petition No. 8393 of 2021

Decided on December 6, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5032 : (2022) 1 Bom CR 527.

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Under which circumstances the loan transaction between businessman relating to mercantile documents will not be treated as Commercial dispute?

 The plaintiff is a businessman. The 1st defendant is a partnership firm; the 2nd and 3rd defendants are its partners. And the 2nd defendant is said to be the plaintiffs friend. Therefore, acting beyond the call of his business, the plaintiff has given “a friendly loan” to the defendants. The defendants executed a promissory note and issued cheques as well. But the cheques were dishonoured. So, the plaintiff has sued the defendants for recovery.

16. It is trite to observe that, for the Court to determine the nature of the suit, what matters at this stage is the plaint allegations and nothing else. Both the learned counsel agree of section 2, what applies is clause (c) (i) of sub-section (1), the lexical provision of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The transaction may be ‘ordinary’ but must have occurred between “merchants, bankers, financiers and [or] traders”. And that ordinary transaction may relate to “mercantile documents, including enforcement and interpretation of such documents”. A merchant or a trader need not be as such-always and invariably. That merchant or trader is an individual, at first. And he may transact with another only as an individual. An individual may help another individual and that help may take the shape of lending. Not every instance of lending must reek of business or trade; not every trader must always act as a trader.

17. Here, the plaintiff pleads that he lent a friendly loan to another needy friend. It is not a transaction between them in the course of their ordinary business; much less can it be treated as money lending perse.

18. First, the definition is exhaustive because section 2 (1) (c) (i) employs the expression “means”. Second, though it may be an ordinary transaction, it is not between or among merchants, bankers, financiers, or traders. So, it cannot be treated as a transaction, ordinary or otherwise, between merchants, bankers, financiers, or traders. It is indeed a private transaction sans any commercial or business trappings.

19. At any rate, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has not obliterated Order 37 of CPC. If I indulge in some generalisation, Order 37 is a genus and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 a species.

20. Under these circumstances, I hold that the Suit ought to be treated as a Summary Suit rather than a Commercial Summary Suit. After re-numbering the suit thus, the Registry will place it before the Court the next week.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.)

Bharat Huddanna Shetty  Vs  Ahuja Properties & Developers and Others 

Summons for Judgment No. 9 of 2021, 

Decided on July 13, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 13984.

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What precautions the court should take while granting leave to defend in a summary suit based dishonoured cheque?

 A Summary Suit based on dishonoured cheques stands on a higher pedestal. In addition to the proof of underlying consideration, evidenced by the documents and material on record, in a given case, the plaintiff can bank upon the presumptions contained in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 114 illustration (c) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

32. A slightly distinct position of a Summary Suit based on a dishonoured cheque has been expounded by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Laxmichand Udeshi @ Bhatia v. Pravin Hiralal Shah8 wherein the Court adverted to the effect of the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, while considering the prayer for leave to defend the suit based on a negotiable instrument.

33. The observations of the Division Bench in paragraph 14 and 15 of the said judgment are material and, hence, extracted below.-

14] When a summary suit instituted is based on a cheque which is dishonoured, effect of Sections 138 and 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act raising statutory presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of a liability, is a relevant consideration to be kept in mind. The said Sections cast a burden upon the defendant to rebut the presumption. Summary suits instituted on cheques which are dishonoured will, therefore, stand on a higher footing than summary suits instituted on the basis of other documents. In such cases, the Court will have to take into consideration the statutory presumption which is raised when the cheques are dishonoured. The object behind providing a statutory presumption under the N egotiable Instruments Act has to be kept in mind while judging the credibility of a defence raised by the defendant in summary suit. Thus, the test of more than “shadowy” and less than “probable” as adverted to by the Apex Court cannot apply in cases where the law requires a person to explain certain state of affairs. The judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel do not consider the effect of the statutory presumptions raised under the Negotiable Instruments Act when a cheque is dishonoured. In our opinion, when a cheque is dishonoured, the Court is enjoined with the duty to scrutinize the defence put up by the defendant with a much higher degree of care and circumspection. Such summary suits cannot be treated as on par with the cases instituted on contracts or invoices etc. where such statutory presumptions do not operate.

15] The legislative intent behind enactment of Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to prevent abuse of the banking system. Thus, one who issues a cheque extends a solemn promise to pay. Based on this promise and action, the recipients arrange their affairs and quite often enter into further transactions. Unless extra ordinary circumstances are made out, one who issues cheque is deemed to have undertaken to pay. Negotiable Instruments Act enforces the promise strictly by raising statutory presumption and treating it as an offence. This provision elevates a cheque to a higher status than the other instruments, such as written contract etc. to which no such statutory presumption is attached. What needs to be emphasized is that presumption in respect of a dishonoured cheque places a higher burden on the defendant to elucidate the defence than the burden which is cast on a defendant where the suit is filed on the basis of ordinary instruments. In the cases based on dishonour of cheques, the defendant must satisfy the conscience of the Court and cannot take shelter behind the rules formulated primarily in respect of suits based on ordinary instruments. The Court while exercising the discretion to grant leave or otherwise to the defendant in such cases cannot be oblivious of the legislative intent to place the promise made through a cheque on a higher pedestal than the promise made through an ordinary instrument. This is not to state that moment a Summary Suit is lodged based on a dishonoured cheque, it must be decreed without anything more. What needs to be emphasised is that the fact that there is a statutory presumption attached to the dishonoured cheque will constitute an important ingredient while considering the question whether leave to defend should be granted in cases of dishonoured cheques and the Court must scrutinise the defence strictly. The object of the summary procedure is ultimately to see that the defendant does not needlessly prolong the litigation by creating untenable, frivolous and casual defences so as to deprive the plaintiff of the monies due to him.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Under which circumstances defendant is not entitled to get leave to defend the Summary suit qua the interest component?

  Even the endeavor of Mr. Momaya to seek leave to defend by canvassing a submission that plaintiff has charged interest at an exorbitant and unconscionable rate does not advance the cause of the defendant. The plaintiff is seeking pre-suit, pendent lite, and future interest at the agreed rate of 12% per annum. In a business transaction in a commercial city like Mumbai, interest at the rate of 12% per annum can not be said to be exorbitant and unreasonable. Moreover, in the case at hand, there is an unequivocal undertaking to pay interest. In any event the award of interest on the amount covered by dishonoured cheques would be governed by the provisions contained in Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which stipulates rate of 18 % per annum. Therefore, I am not persuaded to accede to the submission on behalf of the defendant to grant leave to defend the suit qua the interest component. {Para 35}

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before N.J. Jamadar, J.)

Shailesh Bhagoobhai Bhoolabhai Vs  Deepak Raheja.

Summons for Judgment No. 36 of 2021,

Decided on December 15, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCCONLINE Bom 11643.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Sunday, 21 July 2024

What is difference between summary procedure as provided under Civil procedure code and The commercial courts Act?

 Summary procedure is a legal process designed to expedite the resolution of certain types of cases, typically by allowing for a faster and simpler resolution than the regular court process. In the context of Indian law, both the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and the Commercial Courts Act provide mechanisms for summary procedures, but they differ in scope, application, and specific procedures.

Summary Procedure under Civil Procedure Code (CPC)

The summary procedure under the CPC is governed by Order XXXVII. Here are the key aspects:

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Thursday, 8 February 2024

Whether Summary suit based on settled account or Account stated is maintainable?

 In so far as the 'settled account is concerned,' it is no doubt true as noticed by the learned single Judge, that the various judgments adverted to, for holding that the summary suit would lie on a settled account, either of the Privy Council or of the Supreme Court did not arise from suits filed as summary suits. However, after the judgment of the Privy Council (Elvira L. Rodrigues) Sequeira (supra) which has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hiralal & Ors. (supra), a summary suit on a settled account, duly confirmed by the Defendant is maintainable as it is an acknowledgement by the Defendant in the ledger in which mutual accounts have been entered and the accounts settled between them. Such settling of accounts gives rise to a written contract on a fresh cause of action, with an implied promise to pay the amount settled. A summary suit would therefore lie on 'Settled accounts duly confirmed by the defendants. Issue (1) is answered accordingly.{Para 29}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Summons for Judgment No. 1117 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1551 of 2003 

 Jyotsna K. Valia and Ors. Vs. T.S. Parekh and Co. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

F.I. Rebello, V.K. Tahilramani and Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, JJ.

Author: F.I. Rebello, J.

Decided On: 26.04.2007

Citation: citations: 2007 (3) BomCR 772, 2007 (4) CTC 257, 2007 (4) MhLj 517,MANU/MH/0252/2007.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Saturday, 28 October 2023

Whether the court can infer that there was contract on the basis of exchange of Emails?

 I agree with the Plaintiff's Counsel submission relying on the case of Jyotsna Valia (supra) that a written contract need not always be a contract signed by both parties and may consist of correspondence exchanged between the parties without signature. In the present case the authenticity or veracity or truth of its contents of the emails exchanged between the parties are not in dispute. Thus the contentions of the Defendant with regard to no agreement between the parties to extend time upto 31st March 2020 is repelled as misconceived.{Para 30}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Interim Application No. 655 of 2023 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 75 of 2021 and Summons for Judgment No. 65 of 2021 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 75 of 2021

Decided On: 20.09.2023

Play Games 24X7 Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Loran Leasing And Infotech Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kamal Khata, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3838/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.


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Whether the court should grant unconditional leave to defend in Summary suit on the ground that defendant has raised a counter claim?

 I am in respectful agreement with the judgement of this Court in the case of First Rand Services Pvt. Ltd vs. Pantheon Infrastructure Ltd.2 which held that


"I find substance in the submission of Mr. Engineer. If the contention on behalf of the defendant that the defendant is entitled to an unconditional leave to defend the suit since the defendant has raised a counterclaim is accepted, the very object of providing summary procedure under Order XXXVII of the Code would be rendered otiose. It is one thing to contend that while seeking leave to defend the suit, the Defendant has raised a counterclaim which raises a substantive defence or at any rate triable issues. It is a completely different thing to assert that since the Defendant has raised a counter claim, irrespective of the nature and quality of the defence and/or counterclaim the Defendant is entitled to an unconditional leave to defend the suit. It all turns upon the quality of defence raised by the Defendant. The tests enunciated by a catena of decisions and reformulated in the case of Hubtown (supra) are required to be applied even in a case where the Defendant raises a counterclaim. An unconditional leave cannot be granted on the sole premise that the Defendant has raised a counterclaim."{Para 36}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Interim Application No. 655 of 2023 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 75 of 2021 and Summons for Judgment No. 65 of 2021 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 75 of 2021

Decided On: 20.09.2023

Play Games 24X7 Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Loran Leasing And Infotech Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kamal Khata, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3838/2023.

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Saturday, 18 February 2023

Whether application for Summary Judgment is maintainable if Summary suit is converted into Commercial suit?

Assuming that plaintiffs' suit is initially filed as a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code, thereby taking it out of ambit of provisions of Order XIII-A of the Code, would it's subsequent conversion as commercial suit entail loss of both the rights viz. (i) to seek summary judgment under Order XIII-A as well as (ii) pronouncement of judgment under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 of the Code?. To paraphrase, would conversion of summary suit into a commercial suit would put a Plaintiff in a disadvantageous position where he loses right to seek pronouncement of judgment under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 of the Code as well as attracts the bar for seeking summary judgment under sub rule 3 of Rule 1 of Order XIII A of the Code?


15. Through Mr. Dawar strenuously pressed his objection about non-applicability of provisions of Order XIII-A to Plaintiff's application, upon being confronted with the above conundrum, he fairly concedes to the position that a Plaintiff in summary suit cannot be put to a disadvantageous position merely because his summary suit is converted into a commercial suit. The objective behind incorporating provision of sub-rule 3 of Rule 1 of Order XIII A of the Code is to prevent Plaintiff who once attempts pronouncement of judgment under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code and upon conversion of his summary suit into commercial one, seeks to have another bite at the cherry by seeking pronouncement of judgment under Order XIII-A of the Code. The provisions of sub-rule 3 of Rule 1 of Order XIII A cannot be interpreted to mean that Plaintiff in a summary suit which is converted into commercial suit would loose both rights of pronouncement of judgment under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code as well as seeking summary judgment under Order XIII A of the Code. Thus, the objection about non-maintainability of application for Summary Judgment filed by the Petitioners is repelled.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 10573 of 2022

Decided On: 31.01.2023

Ashok Commercial Enterprises and Ors. Vs.  Rajesh Jugraj Madhani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep V. Marne, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0251/2023,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 10.

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Saturday, 10 December 2022

What is basic concept of Account stated?

With that, let us consider what constitutes a "settled account" or "account stated". Before further discussing the issue, it would be relevant to refer to some judgments which, in our opinion, shed light on the issue and can be said to have conclusively decided that aspect of the matter. In Tulsiram Shrikisan Marwadi v. Zaboo Bhima Shankar MANU/NA/0041/1947, learned Division Bench was considering as to what would be an account stated. After relying on various judgments, the Court observed as under:

that a real account stated is a very different thing from an acknowledgment. In a real account stated there is consideration in the shape of an agreement that items on one side of the account be taken as paid by items on the other side. In an account stated it does not matter if some of the items are time-barred. It would be different thing if all the items are time-barred, and we see no reason to depart from the view expressed on this point in Ganesh prasad v. Rambati Bai I.L.R. (1942) Nag.369 : MANU/NA/0022/1941 .

The Privy Council had an occasion to deal with the issue in the case of (Elvira Rodrigues) Siqueira v. (Godnicalo Hypolito Construction) Noronha A.I.R. 1934 P C 144. The Privy Council was considering Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, 1872 and Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1908 whether - a suit could be maintained on a settled account. It is in that context, that Lord Atkin, speaking for the Privy Council, held as under:

Their Lordships think that what has been forgotten is that there are two forms of account stated. An account stated may only take the form of a mere acknowledgment of a debt, and in those circumstances, though it is quite true it amounts to a promise and the existence of a debt may be inferred, that can be rebutted, and it may very well turn out that there is no real debt at all, and in those circumstances there would be no consideration and no binding promise.

But on the other hand, there is another form of account stated which is a very usual form as between merchants in business in which the account stated is an account which contains entries on both sides, and in which the parties who have stated the account between them have agreed that the items on one side should be set against the items upon the other side and the balance only should be paid; the items on the smaller side are set off and deemed to be paid by the items on the larger side, and there is a promise for good consideration to pay the balance arising from the fact that the items have been so set off and paid in the way described.

This judgment was considered by the Supreme Court, in Gordon Woodroffe & Co. (Madras) Ltd. v. Shaikh M.A. Majid & Co. A.I.R. 1976 Sup Cou 181. The second question in issue before the Supreme Court was whether there was a settled account between the parties and whether it was open for the Plaintiff to reopen it. It was an admitted fact that to the statement of accounts, no objections were raised by the Plaintiff any time nor was a single document produced to show that the Plaintiff ever wrote to the Defendant raising an objection to the statements of account. At one stage, the Plaintiff sent a memorandum to the Defendant, accepting the accuracy of the accounts. It is in that context that the Court was considering the concept of "account settled" or "stated" We may gainfully refer to a portion of paragraph 14:

(14) The legal position is that the accounts are settled or stated if they are submitted and accepted as correct by the other side to whom the accounts have been rendered. Such a statement of accounts need not be in writing, nor is it necessary that before the accounts are settled, they should be gone into by the parties and scrutinised and supported by vouchers. It is sufficient if the accounts are accepted and such acceptance may be inferred by conduct of the parties. As observed in Daniell's Chancery Practice, eighth edition, Vol. I, p. 419:


The mere delivery of an account will not constitute a stated account without some evidence of acquiescence which may afford sufficient legal presumption of a settlement.

There is also the following passage in Bullenn and Leake's Precedents of Pleadings ninth edition, p. 584:


It is not enough for the accounting party merely to deliver his account; there must be some evidence that the other party has accepted it as correct. But such acceptance need not be express, contemporaneous or subsequent conduct may amount to a sufficient acquiescence.

After so observing, considering the contention of the Defendants that there has been a stated or settled account, the Court in paragraph 15 held as under:


In this connection it is necessary to state that the expression "account stated" has more than one meaning. It sometimes means a claim to payment made by one party and admitted by the other to be correct. An account stated in this sense is no more than an admission of a debt out of Court: while it is no doubt cogent evidence against the admitting party, and throws upon him the burden of proving that the debt is not due, it may, like any other admission, be shown to have been made in error. Where the transaction is of this character, it makes no difference whether the account is said to be "stated" or to be "stated and agreed": the so-called agreement is without consideration and amounts to no more than an admission. There is, however, a second kind of account stated where the account contains items both of credit and debit, and the figures on both sides are adjusted between the parties and a balance stuck.

Accounts stated which contains entries on both sides and parties who have stated the account between them have agreed that the items on one side should be set off against the items on the other side and the balance amount should be paid, would amount to a written contract for good consideration arising from the fact that the items have been so set off. Such an account stated gives cause to a contract in writing on a fresh cause of action, with an implied promise to pay. {Para 25}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Summons for Judgment No. 1117 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1551 of 2003 

 Jyotsna K. Valia and Ors. Vs. T.S. Parekh and Co. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

F.I. Rebello, V.K. Tahilramani and Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, JJ.

Author: F.I. Rebello, J.

Decided On: 26.04.2007

Citation: citations: 2007 (3) BomCR 772, 2007 (4) CTC 257, 2007 (4) MhLj 517,MANU/MH/0252/2007

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Monday, 17 May 2021

What is basic concept of liquidated demand in Summary Suit?

  Order XXXVII Rule 1 CPC applies to suits in which a debt or

liquidated demand is sought to be recovered. The term ‘liquidated demand’ has been defined by a ld. Single Judge of this Court in Rajinder Kumar Khanna v. Oriental Insurance Co., AIR 1990 Del 278 as follows:

“2. It was asserted by the plaintiff in the suit and

the petitioner before me, that the claim in the suit

was a “liquidated demand”. The petitioner seeks

to take advantage of the amendments made to the

Code of Civil Procedure, by which “liquidated

demand” became subject-matter of summary suits

for the first time.

3. The industry of counsel had not been able to

produce a single precedent of courts in India,

which explained what is “liquidated demand”.

However, reference has been made to Words and

Phrases Permanent Edition, in which reference is

made to Rifkin v. Safenovitz, 40 A 2d 188. It is

stated that “amount claimed to be due is a

“liquidated demand” within statute authorizing

summary judgments if it is susceptible of being

made certain in amount by mathematical

calculations from factors which are or ought to be

in possession or knowledge of party to be

charged”.”

It is therefore clear that any sum which can be ascertained from the documents on record would constitute a liquidated demand.{Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: 15th December, 2020

 C.R.P. 57/2020 & CM APPL.20305/2020

SURENDER KUMAR  Vs  MANOJ KUMAR

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Whether plaintiff can file a Summary suit based on the entry in the bank passbook about the transfer of money to the defendant?

 The brief background is that the Plaintiff filed a summary suit under

Order XXXVII CPC for recovery of a sum of Rs.21 lakhs along with

interest. The case of the Plaintiff is that the Plaintiff gave a loan to the Defendant to the tune of Rs.21 lakhs, which was transferred from the bank account of the Plaintiff in Bank of Baroda to the bank account of the Defendant’s firm i.e., MK Clothing, in HDFC Bank, Priyadarshini Vihar, Delhi. The payment of Rs.21 lakhs and receipt thereof on 8th August, 2015 is not disputed by the Defendant. 

14. Considering the fact that the amount, which was transferred by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was through proper banking channels for which clear evidence has been placed on record, the suit under Order XXXVII CPC would be maintainable as it is for a liquidated sum. The onus would be on the Defendant to show as to why the leave to defend should be granted.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: 15th December, 2020

 C.R.P. 57/2020 & CM APPL.20305/2020

SURENDER KUMAR  Vs  MANOJ KUMAR 

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)

Dated: DECEMBER 15, 2020
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Tuesday, 29 October 2019

Whether summary suit is maintainable against legal representative of deceased defendant?

The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment observed as under:-

"9. In our view, therefore, the difficulty expressed by the learned Single Judge in the case of Rajesh Steel Centre (supra) is misconceived. A summary suit can be filed against the heir and legal representative of a deceased defendant and the provisions of Order XXXVII CPC apply in full to such a suit also. The decree, however, can be executed only to the extent of the estate of the deceased in the hands of judgment debtor. We, therefore, agree with Variava-J that the summons for judgment against the heirs of the defendant No. 3 is maintainable."
16. The judgment of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court (supra) is the complete answer to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that in no case the suit against the legal representatives is maintainable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU

CR No. 30/2018

Decided On: 05.09.2018

 Rajesh Madanlal Anand  Vs.  Rakesh Madanlal Anand and Ors.
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Whether trial court can look in to merits of dispute involved at the stage of filing of summary suit?

 The trial Court at the stage of entertaining the suit cannot look to the merits of dispute involved and the probable defences that would be taken by the defendants and come to the conclusion that the suit involves complicated disputed questions of fact and triable issues. The trial Court cannot return such finding unless notice is served upon the defendants and his version comes on record in the shape of an application seeking leave to defend. As is appropriately provided in Rule 3 that the defendant, if within ten days from the date of service of summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise discloses such facts as the Court deems sufficient to entitle him to defend, the Court may grant him leave to defend either unconditionally or upon such term as may appear to the Court to be just. It is perhaps at this stage, the Court would try the suit in the same manner as is done in suits instituted in the ordinarily manner. As rightly submitted by the petitioner appearing in person, the trial Court jumped the gun and erroneously treated the suit as a regular suit.

10. I have carefully gone through the provisions of Order 37 CPC and find that nowhere in the order, a power is conceded in favour of the trial Court to refuse to treat the suit based on cheque and otherwise complying with the provisions of Order 37 CPC Rule 2 as summary suit triable under Order 37 CPC and treat the same as a regular suit. In my considered opinion, learned trial Court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and has consequently caused serious mis-carriage of justice. The right of the plaintiff to have his suit tried in summary manner is a vital right conferred under Order 37 CPC and said right cannot be trampled by overstepping the jurisdiction and taking the view which is not countenanced in law. This Court, thus, finds it a fit case for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction vested under Section 104 of the Constitution of J & K.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU

CR No. 30/2018

Decided On: 05.09.2018

 Rajesh Madanlal Anand  Vs.  Rakesh Madanlal Anand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjeev Kumar, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC)228 (J&K)
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Saturday, 14 September 2019

Procedure to be followed by court in Summary suit if defendant has failed to appear

 Learned counsel submits that the trial court has erred in relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Neebha Kapoor v. Jayantilal Khandwala, (2008) 3 SCC 770. He submits that in the said case the defendant had entered appearance and the Supreme Court had noticed that no original documents had been produced before the Court and held that the plaintiff in any case had to lead secondary evidence to prove the documents and in those circumstances the Supreme Court was of the view that it was a fit case for grant of conditional leave to defend even though no application seeking leave to defend had been filed.
9. Learned counsel submits that in the present case no appearance had been entered by the respondent, so averments made in the plaint are liable to be admitted under Order XXXVII CPC and a decree is liable to be passed forthwith.
10. Learned counsel further relies on the judgment of the Division of this Court in Comba Telecom Ltd. v. S. Tel Private Ltd., 2016 (228) DLT 713 to which I was also a party. The Division Bench in the said judgment has held that in a Suit under summary procedure under Order XXXVII, where summons are duly served and the defendant has not entered appearance, the defendant could not defend the Suit, all allegations made in the plaint are deemed to be admitted and the consequences are that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree as indicated under Order XXXVII Rule 2 Sub Rule 3 CPC.
12. Order XXXVII Rule 2 Sub Rule 3 CPC specifically lays down that defendant shall not defend the Suit unless he enters appearance and in default of his entering appearance the allegations made in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for the sum not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons.
13. The learned Trial Court, though noticed the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Comba Telecom Ltd. (Supra), has held that the same is not applicable on the ground that the Suit is not maintainable under Order XXXVII CPC.
14. The Trial Court has clearly committed an error. In view of the specific provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 2 Sub Rule 3 CPC, it is not within the powers of the Trial Court at that stage, to assess as to whether the Suit satisfies the requirement of Order XXXVII CPC or not. Once summons in the prescribed form have been directed to be issued and duly served, the defendant is obliged to enter appearance within the statutory period, and on failure of the defendant to enter appearance within the statutory period, the averments in the plaint are deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree forthwith.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.)

S.S Steel Industry  v. Shri Guru Hargobind Steels 

C.R.P 42/2019
Decided on September 5, 2019
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9964
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Saturday, 4 August 2018

Whether court should give leave to defend in summary suit if suit is based on oral agreement?

Admittedly, in this case, as the suit is not based on the written contract, there is no question of considering whether leave to defend to be granted or not and whether it was to be granted conditionally. As the suit is not based on the written contract, the suit in present summary form is not maintainable. Therefore, reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the authorities of Supreme Court in cases of i) Southern Sales and Services and others v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH [MANU/SC/4488/2008 : (2008) 14 SCC 457 ii) IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., [MANU/SC/1490/2016 : (2017) 1 SCC 568] which deal with as to when leave to defend can be granted and on which conditions can be granted, cannot be applicable to the facts of the present case. In order to consider the question whether leave to defend should be granted or not, the suit should have been based on "written" contract, as per provisions of Order 37 Rule (1) CPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 13607 of 2017

Decided On: 30.01.2018

Yogesh Babanrao Vedpathak Vs. Ranjeet Singh Pyara Singh Kaura

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 35

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Sunday, 3 September 2017

What is basic concept of good defence in summary suit?

Under Rule 6 of Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of this Court, upon an application of the plaintiff made under Rule 3 for final judgment for recovery of the suit premises on the ground that there is no defence against the claim of plaintiff, the Judge may - unless (emphasis supplied) the defendant by affidavit or otherwise as the Judge may direct for the purpose of satisfying himself that the defendant has a good defence to the claim on merits or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend - make an order refusing leave to defend and forthwith pronounce judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

10. In our opinion, the scheme of said Rule makes it clear that it is an exception to the general procedure to allow a defendant to defend himself against a plaintiff's claim. As such, the matter of granting leave or refusal of granting leave to defend should be decided first - that too, supported with cogent reasons - before the Court proceeds to pronounce a judgment on the merits of the case in an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules. In the impugned judgment, the First Court has made elaborate discussions on merits of the case without, at first, coming to any clear finding as to why the Court was satisfied that the defendant had no good defence to the plaintiff's claim on its merit. It is a vital omission. Such omission may destroy a valuable right of a defendant to adequately defend himself, causing prejudice to him. Simply by observing to the effect that the defence is sham or illusory or frivolous or bogus or moonshine or unconvincing (which is not even the case here) is not enough. It must be supported with cogent reasons as to why the Court considers the defence to be either sham or illusory or frivolous or bogus or moonshine or unconvincing. A matter under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules is always an exception to the general rule of procedure governing adjudication of civil disputes and requires to be considered only in a summary manner based on the statements made by the respective parties on oath. Scrutinizing controverted documents, which are yet to be tendered as evidence and thereafter analysing them in the backdrop of statements made by the respective parties while adjudicating an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of this Court will tantamount to usurping the general rule of procedure governing adjudication of civil disputes. Consideration of documents as evidence is a matter of trial. We may observe at this stage that a good defence does not necessarily mean that it shall always translate into defeating the claim of the plaintiff. However, such defence must not be sham or illusory or frivolous or bogus or moonshine. Such defence should be convincing to the Judge to the extent that the same reflects an arguable case made out by the defendant against the plaintiff's claim for the suit to ultimately proceed for trial. When necessity of trial can be palpably felt by the Judge while adjudicating an application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules, there shall not be any refusal to the defendant of an opportunity to defend himself against the plaintiff's claim. At the same time, it must also be borne in mind by the parties that they may not dare to file a false affidavit on oath in a proceeding under Chapter XIIIA, on pain of shouldering penal consequences, which can also tantamount to abuse of process of Court.

11. In this regard, apart from the oft quoted and relied upon judgment rendered by Justice S.R. Das of our High Court in Kiranmoyee Dassi and another v. Dr. J. Chatterjee reported in MANU/WB/0141/1945 : AIR (36) 1949 Calcutta 479, (which follows and relies upon a Division Bench judgment of our Court rendered in Radha Kissen Goenka v. Thakursidas Khemka reported in MANU/WB/0735/1925 : 30 C.W.N. 228), we also draw inspiration from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal reported in MANU/SC/0393/1990 : AIR 1990 SC 2218. Although the latter judgment was rendered in the context of Order 37 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following observations are squarely applicable while our Courts decide applications under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules:-

"Leave is declined where the Court is of the opinion that the grant of leave would merely enable the defendant to prolong the litigation by raising untenable and frivolous defences. The test is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sense that if the facts alleged by the defendant are established there would be a good or even a plausible defence on those facts. If the Court is satisfied about that leave must be given. If there is a triable issue in the sense that there is a fair dispute to be tried as to the meaning of a document on which the claim is based or uncertainty as to the amount actually due or where the alleged facts are of such a nature as to entitle the defendant to interrogate the plaintiff or to cross-examine his witnesses leave should not be denied. Where also, the defendant shows that even on a fair probability he has a bona fide defence, he ought to have leave. Summary judgments under Order 37 should not be granted where serious conflict as to matter of fact or where any difficulty on issues as to law arises. The Court should not reject the defence of the defendant merely because of its inherent implausibility or its inconsistency."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

APD No. 510 of 2015 and CS No. 201/2012

Decided On: 13.06.2017

W. Newman & Company Limited
Vs.
 Apollo Zipper India Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Biswanath Somadder and Sankar Acharyya, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 Cal 182
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