Whether causing simple hurt can be treated as crime involving moral turpitude for taking disciplinary action against employee??

There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

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Whether employer can remove employee from service even if he was released on probation of offenders Act?

 Yet another reason given by the High Court for interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal court released the Respondent on probation only to permit him to continue in service. The release under probation does not entitle an employee to claim a right to continue in service. In fact the employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.1 The observations made by a criminal court are not binding2 on the employer who has the liberty of dealing with his employees suitably.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 2187

L. Nageswara Rao, J.

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Bombay HC: An employee can not be deprived of his employment unless charge of moral turpitude is proved against him?

 The learned counsel for the Corporation strenuously submits that, the Corporation was not dealing with the charge of theft, but intended to prove that the conduct of the petitioner, which was publicized in the newspaper, led to the tarnishing of its image and reputation. I am unable to accept the said contention for the reason that, unless the offence was proved against the petitioner, it cannot be concluded that, he was guilty of an act which amounted to moral turpitude. Unless a charge of moral turpitude is proved, an employee cannot be deprived of his employment.

23. The Learned counsel for the Corporation has gone into the charge sheet threadbare and has read it-out in the open Court. He submits that, the only charge leveled upon the petitioner was that the news of his arrest was published in Daily Pudhari dated 21.1.2017. Hence the management initiated the enquiry against the petitioner. So also, the petitioner was kept in Police custody for ten days, which is not disputed. The charge leveled upon him was that he has brought the employer to disrepute. I find that no employer can proceed against an employee for an incident unconnected with the establishment or its premises, alleging that that the employer was brought to disrepute, unless the employer can prove that the employee had committed an offense that brought the employer to disrepute.

24. In the instant case, the petitioner has been exonerated of the charge of having committed a theft, under section 392 of IPC. As such, no offence is proved against him. Consequentially, the Corporation cannot take a stand that, the petitioner has committed an act which amounted to moral turpitude. Had such an offence been proved in criminal trial, the Corporation could have then dispensed with the services of the petitioner, even without any enquiry, in view of the settled law that, if an employee is convicted, the employer can dispense with his services, without conducting an enquiry.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4418 of 2018

Decided On: 06.03.2019

 Sachin Charlus Mirpagar  Vs.  Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 189

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Whether a person can be denied judicial service on ground of moral turpitude?

Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of
suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual
deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by selfimprovement.
To make past conduct, irrespective of
all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may
not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact
situation of a case.
7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:
“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used
in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct
which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having
any connection showing depravity….”
8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at
the competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was

selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public
Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had
duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in
employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in
the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so
recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was
annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character verification report of
the police.
9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who
had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant
could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were
acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that
the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave
us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows:
6
“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of
this criminal case in which he has been honourably
acquitted, there is no other material on record to
indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the
Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to
the post….”
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called
for a confidential report of the character verification as also the
antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals
that except for the criminal case under reference in which he has been
acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse
material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a
competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no
reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can
come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the
appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer.
An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature,
if it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny
appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and
parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well settled
in this regard in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8
7
SCC 471. If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally
there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 10571 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.6599 of 2018)

MOHAMMED IMRAN Vs  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

NAVIN SINHA, J.
Dated:October 12, 2018.

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Whether unethical conduct of advocate amounts to moral turpitude?

“But different considerations arise where the
negligence of the Advocate is gross. It may be that
before condemning an Advocate for misconduct,
courts are inclined to examine the question as to
whether such gross negligence involves moral
turpitude or delinquency. In dealing with this
aspect of the matter, however, it is of utmost
importance to remember that the expression
"moral turpitude or delinquency" is not to receive
a narrow construction. Wherever conduct proved
against an Advocate is contrary to honesty, or
opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be
safely held that it involves moral turpitude. A
willful and callous disregard for the interests of
the client may, in a proper case, be characterised
as conduct unbefitting an Advocate. In dealing
with matters of professional propriety, we cannot
ignore the fact that the profession of law is an
honourable profession and it occupies a place of
pride in the liberal professions of the country.
Any conduct which makes a person unworthy to
belong to the noble fraternity of lawyers or makes
an Advocate unfit to be entrusted with the
responsible task of looking after the interests of
the litigant, must be regarded as conduct
involving moral turpitude. The
Advocates-on-record like the other members of
the Bar Advocates are Officers of the Court and
the purity of the administration of justice
depends as much on the integrity of the Judges
as on the honesty of the Bar. That is why in
dealing with the question as to whether an
Advocate has rendered himself unfit to belong to
the brotherhood at the Bar, the expression "moral
turpitude or delinquency" is not to be construed
in an unduly narrow and restricted sense.”10
[Emphasis Supplied]
12. On a careful reading of the aforesaid passage, it is
quite clear that concept of “gross negligence” cannot be
construed in a narrow or a restricted sense. It is because
honesty of an Advocate is extremely significant. The
conduct of an Advocate has to be worthy so that he can be
called as a member of the noble fraternity of lawyers. It is
his obligation to look after the interest of the litigant when is
entrusted with the responsible task in trust. An Advocate
has to bear in mind that the profession of law is a noble
one. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3860 OF 2007
T.A. KATHIRU KUNJU 
 V
JACOB MATHAI & ANR

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Whether mere error of judgment amounts to misconduct?

MISCONDUCT:
8. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition as:
“A transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful
behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior,
its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior,
delinquency,impropriety,mismanagement offense, but not
negligence or carelessness.”
Misconduct in office has been defined as:
“Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to
the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces
acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts
performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an
affirmative duty to act.”
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at
page 821 defines ‘misconduct’ thus:
10“The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and
not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not
necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral
turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has
to be construed with reference to the subject matter and
the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the
scope of the Act or statute which is being construed.
Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper
conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity
may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness
are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule
of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the
actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law;
carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law.
Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden
quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct
in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect
by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been
affected.”
Thus it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though
not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its
connotation from the context, the delinquency in its
performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature
of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be
improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful
in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established
and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere
error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in
performance of the duty; the act complained of bears
forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be
construed with reference to the subject matter and the
context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the
scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to
serve….”.
(See also: State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable,
AIR 1992 SC 2188).
119. Mere error of judgment resulting in doing of negligent act
does not amount to misconduct. However, in exceptional
circumstances, not working diligently may be a misconduct. An
action which is detrimental to the prestige of the institution may
also amount to misconduct. Acting beyond authority may be a
misconduct. When the office bearer is expected to act with
absolute integrity and honesty in handling the work, any
misappropriation, even temporary, of the funds etc. constitutes a
serious misconduct, inviting severe punishment. (Vide:
Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. v.
Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69; Government of Tamil
Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy, AIR 1997 SC 3571; Inspector Prem
Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 566; and
State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594).
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2085 of 2012
Ravi Yashwant Bhoir V District Collector, Raigad & Ors. 

 Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.
Citation;AIR2012SC1339, 2012(2)ALLMR962, 2012(2)BomCR859(2012)4SCC407,

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Whether Railway can terminate contract granted in favour of contractor due to act of moral turpitude on his part?

Though it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner
that for any instance of licensee himself/his agent or staff, if found in
drunken condition/indulging in bad conduct or involved in activities
amounting to moral turpitude in Railway premises, the Contractor may be
penalized up to Rs. 5,000/- as per clause -19 of the Contract agreement,
we are of the view that Clause-23 referred to hereinabove is of
supervening import authorizing the Railway to terminate the contract
agreement in case of breach of any of the condition embodied therein and
effect forfeiture of the deposits as contemplated.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No. 9555 of 2012
An application under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India.
M/s. Sagar Vision Advertising

-Versus-
Sr. Divisional Commercial Manager,
East Coast Railway, Khurda Road
Division & Another.

PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AMITAVA ROY
AND
THE HON’BLE DR JUSTICE B. R. SARANGI


Date of Order
:
26.08.2014
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)349(ORISSA)

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Supreme Court: Suppression of material information amounts to moral turpitude in service law

Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2013) 9 SCC 363

Service Law

Termination of Service

Fraud/Misrepresentation/Suppression of information sought by employer or furnishing false information while seeking

appointment - Appellant while obtaining appointment suppressing material information sought by employer about his

criminal antecedents i.e. involvement in criminal case - Fact that final report was submitted by prosecution and accepted

by Judicial Magistrate concerned in criminal case against appellant - Effect of - Held, suppression of such material

information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is a separate and distinct matter than what is involved in criminal case -

In such a case, service of appointee concerned is liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or person

concerned stood acquitted/discharged - Thus, termination of service of appellant on ground of aforesaid suppression of

material information by him, held, proper - Not liable to be interfered with, 

Fraud/Forgery/Mala Fides

Order/Appointment obtained by fraud/misrepresentation - Effect and value of - Duty and approach of court while

entertaining petitions of persons committing such act, 

Supreme Court of India

Devendra Kumar vs State Of Uttaranchal & Ors. on 29 July, 2013

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