Supreme Court: CCS Pension Rules | Gratuity Can Be Withheld During Pendency Of Criminal Or Disciplinary Proceedings Against Employee

The Appellant contends that the expression "departmental or judicial proceedings" in Rule 69(1)(c) must be construed to mean that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of either set of proceedings.

12. Such a submission totally misapprehends the nature of the Rule. As the learned Single Judge had rightly noted at the first instance, Rule 69(1)(c) operates as an 'embargo' or a statutory bar, not as an enabling provision. The use of the ordinary disjunctive "or" expands the scope of this bar, indicating that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending. 

13. Rule 69(1)(c) of the 1972 Rules has a wide import and operates in respect of any proceeding that may be pending against an employee at the time of retirement; indeed, the breadth of the provision reflects its protective character. If the Appellant's interpretation were accepted, an employee could contend that once any one set of proceedings against him/her stands concluded, the embargo stands lifted and gratuity must be released. This would altogether defeat the purpose of the provision, which is to safeguard the financial interests of the State.

14. Even in the instant case, where both the proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standard of proof remain fundamentally different. By way of illustration, let us consider if the converse were true i.e., the criminal case against the Appellant had concluded in an acquittal due to failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It would nevertheless be possible that the Appellant was eventually found liable in the pending departmental proceedings on a preponderance of probabilities. An acquittal in that case could not be determinative. If such an approach is impermissible in one direction, it cannot be countenanced in the other either. Moreover, this distinction assumes increased significance in the instant case, as the Inquiry Officer had expressly noted that the matter was sub judice and any definitive conclusion would rest on the outcome of the criminal trial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 14669 of 2025

Decided On: 07.04.2026

Bikram Chand Rana Vs. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prashant Kumar Mishra and V.M. Pancholi, JJ.

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 326,MANU/SC/0322/2026

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Supreme Court: Jail superintendents and Prison Officials providing special or preferential treatment to accused persons within jail premises are liable for disciplinary action including suspension

 Whether jail superintendents and Prison Officials providing special or preferential treatment to accused persons within jail premises are liable for disciplinary action including suspension -- Held, the day, the Court comes to know that the accused persons are provided with some special or five star treatment within the jail premises, the first step in the process will be to place the jail superintendent under suspension including all other officials involved in such misconduct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Can the court set aside the order of Compulsory Retirement if it Was Passed To Circumvent Disciplinary Proceedings?

 Dehors the aforesaid allegations of institutional bias and malice, having perused the material placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds taken by the appellant. It is noticed that though FR 56(j) contemplates that the respondents have an absolute right to retire a government servant in public interest and such an order could have been passed against the appellant any time after he had attained the age of fifty years, the respondents did not take any such decision till the very fag end of his career. The impugned order of

compulsory retirement was passed in this case on 27th September, 2019 whereas the appellant was to superannuate in ordinary course in January, 2020. There appears an apparent contradiction in the approach of the respondents who had till as late as in July, 2019 continued to grade the appellant as ‘Outstanding’ and had assessed his integrity as ‘Beyond doubt’. But in less than three months reckoned therefrom, the respondents had turned turtle to arrive at the conclusion that he deserved to be compulsorily retired. If the appellant was worthy of being continued in service for little short of a decade after he had attained the age of 50 years and of being granted an overall grade of 9 on the scale of 1 - 10 on 31st July, 2019 it has not been shown as to what had transpired thereafter that made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and invoke the public interest doctrine to compulsorily retire him with just three months of service left for his retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is inclined to pierce the smoke screen and on doing so, we are of the firm view that the order of compulsory retirement in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public. {Para 39}

40. In view of the above discussion, it is deemed appropriate to reverse the impugned judgment dated 31st May, 2022 and quash and set aside the order dated 27th September, 2019 passed by the respondents, compulsorily retiring the appellant. Resultantly, the adverse consequences if any, flowing from the said order of compulsory retirement imposed on the appellant, are also set aside. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6161 OF 2022;

CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ Vs UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

Coram: A.S. BOPANNA; J., HIMA KOHLI; J. 

Author: HIMA KOHLI, J.

Dated:  MARCH 03, 2023 

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Supreme Court: Basic principles for conduct of disciplinary enquiry

In State Bank of Patiala & Ors. vs. S.K. Sharma, MANU/SC/0438/1996 : (1996) 3 SCC 364, the Supreme Court summarized the principles applicable to a domestic inquiry as under:-

"33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):

(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.

(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.

(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under -- "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.

(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.

(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [MANU/SC/0237/1994 : (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704]. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice -- or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action -- the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.]

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.

(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (C) 3215/2018, CM Nos. 11594 and 11595/2019

Decided On: 18.05.2020

 Rajesh Singh Sehgal  Vs. Ministry of Civil Aviation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Chawla, J.

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Supreme Court: Disciplinary proceedings are not quasi criminal in nature

 At the outset, it may be noted that the High Court applied the wrong

test in exercising its power of judicial review with reference to disciplinary

proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings are not quasi criminal in nature. A

disciplinary inquiry is conducted by the employer to inquire into a charge or

misconduct pertaining to a breach of the rules and regulations governing

the service of the employer. The standard of proof is not that governed by a

criminal trial.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO 9520 OF 2019

Uttarakhand Transport Corporation Vs. Heera Singh Parihar 

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated:December 18, 2019

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What are duties of enquiry officer while conducting departmental enquiry?

The question relating to jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review in a Departmental proceeding fell for consideration before this Court in M.B. Bijlani v. Union of India and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/1857/2006 : (2006) 5 SCC 88 wherein this Court held:

It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi- criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2106 of 2012 

Decided On: 15.02.2012

Krushnakant B. Parmar  Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

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Whether causing simple hurt can be treated as crime involving moral turpitude for taking disciplinary action against employee??

There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

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Bombay HC: An employee can not be deprived of his employment unless charge of moral turpitude is proved against him?

 The learned counsel for the Corporation strenuously submits that, the Corporation was not dealing with the charge of theft, but intended to prove that the conduct of the petitioner, which was publicized in the newspaper, led to the tarnishing of its image and reputation. I am unable to accept the said contention for the reason that, unless the offence was proved against the petitioner, it cannot be concluded that, he was guilty of an act which amounted to moral turpitude. Unless a charge of moral turpitude is proved, an employee cannot be deprived of his employment.

23. The Learned counsel for the Corporation has gone into the charge sheet threadbare and has read it-out in the open Court. He submits that, the only charge leveled upon the petitioner was that the news of his arrest was published in Daily Pudhari dated 21.1.2017. Hence the management initiated the enquiry against the petitioner. So also, the petitioner was kept in Police custody for ten days, which is not disputed. The charge leveled upon him was that he has brought the employer to disrepute. I find that no employer can proceed against an employee for an incident unconnected with the establishment or its premises, alleging that that the employer was brought to disrepute, unless the employer can prove that the employee had committed an offense that brought the employer to disrepute.

24. In the instant case, the petitioner has been exonerated of the charge of having committed a theft, under section 392 of IPC. As such, no offence is proved against him. Consequentially, the Corporation cannot take a stand that, the petitioner has committed an act which amounted to moral turpitude. Had such an offence been proved in criminal trial, the Corporation could have then dispensed with the services of the petitioner, even without any enquiry, in view of the settled law that, if an employee is convicted, the employer can dispense with his services, without conducting an enquiry.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4418 of 2018

Decided On: 06.03.2019

 Sachin Charlus Mirpagar  Vs.  Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 189

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Whether disciplinary proceeding should be initiated against Judicial officer only on basis that he has passed wrong order?

 That is why we again repeat that one of the
responsibilities of the High Court on the administrative
side is to ensure that the independence of the District
judiciary is maintained and the High Court acts as a
guardian and protector of the District judiciary.
16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are
in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes
a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a
judicial officer passes orders which are against settled
legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous
influences leading to the passing of such orders then the
appropriate action which the High Court should take is to
record such material on the administrative side and place
it on the service record of the judicial officer
concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration
while considering career progression of the concerned
judicial officer. Once note of the wrong order is taken
and they form part of the service record these can be

taken into consideration to deny selection grade,
promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of
wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be
to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in
accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that
unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct,
extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc.,
disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely
on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the
judicial officer or merely on the ground that the
judicial order is incorrect.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8950 OF 2011

KRISHNA PRASAD VERMA Vs  STATE OF BIHAR 

Deepak Gupta, J. (oral)
Dated:September 26, 2019

Citation: 2020(2) MHLJ 296

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Whether employee acting beyond one's authority is guilty of misconduct liable for disciplinary enquiry?

Loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. In the case of a bank, every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear. The functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations.

In the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong

(Before Ajay Kumar Mittal, C.J. and H.S. Thangkhiew, J.)

Shri Gautam Dhar  v.  State Bank of India and Others

Writ Appeal No. 59 of 2017

In

WP(C) No. 191 of 2014

Decided on June 11, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Megh 105 : 2019 Lab IC 2650

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Whether person who is representing employee in departmental enquiry is entitled to get reimbursement of travel and other costs?

 It is thus clear from an analysis of the above Regulations and the Circulars that
the reimbursement of TA/DA have consciously and specifically been provided
only for serving, retired or dismissed employees of Respondent No.1 Bank who
are acting as Defence Representatives. The Petitioner has been unable to show
a single Regulation or Circular which would compel Respondent No.1 Bank to
reimburse the traveling expenses and/or TA/DA of a non employee / third
party Defence Representative. Accordingly, it is untenable for the Petitioner to
contend, on the basis of the Regulations and the Circulars, that the Respondent
is entitled for reimbursement of travelling expenses for Mr. Marpakwar, who is
admittedly not a serving, retired or dismissed employee of Respondent No. 1.
19. We cannot accept the submission of Mr. Singhvi that the non reimbursement of
travelling expenses would render the defence of Petitioner illusory. Nothing
stopped the Petitioner from engaging the services of an employee of
Respondent No.1 Bank, serving, dismissed or retired, in which case he would
have been entitled to reimbursement of travelling expenses. It is not as if the
Petitioner was not aware of the concerned Regulations, having himself
repeatedly invoked the same in the earlier rounds of litigation filed in this
Court. This being the position, being fully conscious of the Regulations

specifically providing for reimbursement of TA/DA only for employees, the
Petitioner chose to engage Mr. Marpakwar as his Defence Representative. The
Petitioner cannot simultaneously seek to invoke the Regulations when it suits
his purposes and yet seek to deviate from the Regulations or seek something
beyond the Regulations, as he is attempting to do in the present case. It is not
the grievance of the Petitioner in the present case that the Defence
Representative has not been heard, and accordingly, there is nothing illusory
about the opportunity to defend which is given to the Petitioner.
In the present case, there is an express provision in the
Regulations and in the Circulars for reimbursement to employees. The present
matter is a fit case where the expression expressio unious et exclusio alterius
would apply. The Regulations with which we are concerned, having expressly
contemplated a Defence Representative being both an employee and a nonemployee,
consciously provided for reimbursement of TA/DA only to Defence
Representatives who were employees. Thus, it was consciously provided that

only those persons would be entitled to reimbursement and non-employees
were specifically excluded from the ambit of reimbursement of TA/DA. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1999 OF 2018

Subhash S. Sawant Vs  Central Bank of India 

CORAM : AKIL KURESHI &
S.J. KATHAWALLA, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 16TH JULY, 2019

JUDGMENT ( PER S.J.KATHAWALLA, J. ) :

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When family members of person missing for seven years can claim all service benefits of missing person?

  I am inclined to follow the           view taken by the

learned Judges in the decisions quoted above. In Indira's

case (supra), a learned Judge of this Court has held as

follows:


              ". . . . . There may be cases where the missing person
       may be dead or permanently disabled mentally or
       physically which may not come to the notice of the Army or
       the family.      Even in such cases also, the Army may be
       justified in declaring him a deserter but the position will
       continue only until expiry of seven years from the date of
       missing of the person when presumption of death is
       available under Section 108 of the Evidence Act.
       Therefore, as and when presumption of death is available
       under Section 108 of the Evidence Act, the whole position
       changes and the presumption of death supercedes the
       declaration of the person a deserter under Section 106 of
       the Army Act. Consequently the family members can claim
       all benefits as if the man is dead on the date of his missing.


       Since it is admitted that the petitioner's husband has not
       surfaced and could not be traced after 5.10.1995 in spite of
       effort to trace him by the Police at the request by the Army,
       the presumption of his death as on 5.10.1995 is available
       under Section 108 of the Evidence Act. Since petitioner's
       husband was admittedly sick and had undergone major
       surgery, the possibility of his death could not be ruled out.
       It is regularly reported in newspapers and media that many
       dead bodies surfacing here and there are all buried without
       anybody identifying such bodies. Going by the statement of
       the respondents, petitioner's husband should have been on
       his way from Bangalore to Military Hospital on the date of
       missing that is, 5.10.1995. Apart from the presumption of
       death, the circumstances do not suggest any chance of
       petitioner's husband deserting the Army towards the end of
       his career."


Of course, that is a case where the person missing was

declared as a deserter by the Army. Another learned Judge

of this Court in W.P(C) No. 24613/2006 applied the ratio of

that decision for granting compassionate employment to

the dependent of a person who was missing similarly. Of

course, there also was a First Information Report. But, I do

not think that registration or non-registration of a First

Information Report will             be fatal to the case of the

petitioner. The petitioner has reported the missing of her

husband to the police, the police had made investigation

pursuant thereto and             the police have issued          Ext.P1

certificate stating that despite investigation made in that

regard, the whereabouts of K.M. Samuel could not be

ascertained.        Once a complaint relating to missing of a

person is filed before the police, it is for the police to file a

First Information Report and do whatever is necessary. The

petitioner does not have any control regarding the same.


Therefore,      if a distinction is to be made in respect of

identical circumstances based on whether FIR has been

registered or not, it would result in injustice to the

petitioner for no fault of hers. I am of opinion that the ratio

of the decisions relied on by the petitioner would be equally

applicable to a case where a First Information Report has

not been registered also, if it is reasonably certain that the

person went missing and he has not been heard of for more

than seven years.      So, the disciplinary proceedings against

the petitioner's husband would hold good only for seven

years prescribed in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act

and    thereafter      what   would    be   applicable to  the

circumstances is Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act.

That means if an employee went missing he has not heard

of for seven years notwithstanding the disciplinary

proceedings, the consequences of presumption             under

Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act would follow,

meaning thereby that the legal heirs of the missing person

should be given all benefits presuming that that person is

dead and that the disciplinary proceedings were against a

dead person.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                              PRESENT:

                       MR.JUSTICE S.SIRI JAGAN

                      22ND DAY OF MAY 2012
                                   WP(C).No. 8107 of 2010 (K)
                         

                     MARIMMA SAMUEL, 
Vs

               STATE OF KERALA,

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When chatting on facebook by government servant will invite disciplinary action?

Some of the brief facts are, the petitioner was appointed as a 
Constable in Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) on June 16, 2000.
After completion of training at RTC Sidhabari, he was posted at CISF unit,
NALCO, Angul with effect from May 01, 2001 and thereafter with effect
from November 1, 2004 at Ranchi; from May 31, 2007 at BIOP DEP-5;
from March 1, 2008 at SSG Greater Noida, from October 17, 2009 at CISF
6
th Reserved Battallion, Deoli and with effect from November 1, 2010 at
STPP Simhadri till the first impugned order dated December 7, 2011 was
passed. It is his case that while working at NTPC Unit, Simhadri, he
received a movement order dated October 21, 2011 whereby he was directed
to proceed on temporary duty to CISF Headquarters, New Delhi on October
24, 2011. At the CISF Headquarters, the petitioner was asked by IG and
DIG about his Facebook account and he truthfully told them as to how he
joined the site and also told them that he neither did nor he could have
disclosed any kind of information. It is also the case of the petitioner that as
per the directions of the IG, the petitioner signed a written statement under
duress and was not given a copy of his statement despite his request. After
his return to the Unit, the petitioner was shocked to receive an order dated
December 7, 2011, whereby he was informed that since he has involved
himself in chatting on a social networking site namely Facebook with a 
person whose identity has been established by very reliable sources, to be a
person of neighbouring country and working as an under cover agent of that
country and he is alleged to have exchanged information with that person,
which is inimical to the interest of the organization and adverse to the overall
public interest and therefore, he was being dismissed from service, since the
respondent No.3 was of the opinion, it was not practicably possible to hold a
regular departmental inquiry.
Having said so, from the perusal of the aforesaid reasoning and noting
the allegation against the petitioner of divulging information with regard to
CISF Units and his colleagues, is surely an aspect, which is detrimental to
the security interest of the organization, moreso, when the person to which
the information has been divulged, is an under cover agent of a hostile
foreign country and such person to whom the information divulged, is an
important witness, who cannot be produced in the disciplinary proceedings.
The plea of Ms. Palli that the information divulged can be obtained from the
Facebook Inc. is also not sustainable, when such company is based abroad.
In any case, such is not the case of the petitioner also in his representation
made to the Director General of the CISF. It is not a case where there was
no material before the competent authority while dispensing with the 
inquiry. There was material in the form of a statement of the petitioner
himself and the information given by the Sister Intelligence Agency and on
analyzing the same, if the competent authority concludes that in the scenario,
it is not possible to hold an inquiry, this Court is of the view that the same
cannot be faulted.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: September 07 , 2016
W.P.(C) 1191/2015
BALKAR SINGH 
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO

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When disciplinary enquiry against Teacher can be quashed?

I find that the enquiry was conducted in a slip-shod manner.

The enquiry committee was not constituted as required by law.

The evidence was recorded in a weird manner. The petitioner was not given an adequate opportunity of cross-examining the management witnesses. Two additional charges have been surreptitiously introduced / levelled against the petitioner. The suspension allowance was not paid to the petitioner thereby causing inconvenience to the petitioner. It is for all these reasons that the enquiry deserves to be quashed and set aside.

Bombay High Court

Ashok Shahaji Gulbhile vs The Secretary Gramvikas Shikshan ... on 20 March, 2015

Bench: R.V. Ghuge

Citation; 2015(5) MHLJ678

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Supreme Court: Employee is not entitled to get increment when he is suspended

Increment has a definite concept in service law jurisprudence. It is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted in SBI v. Central Government Labour Court, (1972) 3 SCC 595, under the labour and industrial laws, an increment is when in a timescale of pay an employee advances from the lower point of scale to the higher by periodic additions. In other words, it is addition in the same scale and not to a higher scale. An increment is an incidence of employment and an employee gets an increment by working the full year and drawing full salary. During the period of suspension, the contract of service remains suspended. The order of suspension by the departmental enquiry has the effect of temporarily suspending the relations between the master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and, therefore, an employee is not entitled to increments during this period which is taken as period not spent on duty.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 5523 of 2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 9338 of 2012)

Decided On: 17.07.2013

State of Punjab Vs. Jaswant Singh Kanwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu and Dipak Misra, JJ.

Equivalent Citation:(2014)13 SCC 622

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Whether disciplinary proceeding against govt servant can continue even after retirement even though no pecuniary loss is caused to Government?

 It is therefore apparent, that it is not only for pecuniary loss caused to the Government that proceedings can continue after the date of superannuation. An employee can be proceeded against, after the date of his retirement, on account of “... grave misconduct or negligence ...”. Therefore, even in the absence of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, it is open to the employer to continue the departmental proceedings after the employee has retired from service. Obviously, if such grave misconduct or negligence, entails pecuniary loss to the Government, the loss can also be ordered to be recovered from the concerned employee. It was therefore not right for the High Court, while interpreting Rule 10(1) of the 1971 Rules to conclude, that proceedings after the date of superannuation could continue, only when the charges entailed pecuniary loss to the Government.

Supreme Court of India

State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Pronab Chakraborty on 15 October, 2014

Bench: Jagdish Singh Khehar, Arun Mishra

Citation; AIR 2015  SC 1278

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Delhi HC: Grounds for initiating disciplinary proceedings against quasi judicial officer clarified

Therefore, if the decisions in K.K. Dhawan case, Nagarkar case, Duli Chand case, Ramesh W.P.(C) No.3209/2012 Page 20 of 27 Chander Singh case and Inspector Prem Chand case are read together, it is necessary that before initiating disciplinary action, the Department must have a prima facie material to show recklessness and that the officer had acted negligently or by his order unduly favoured a party and his action was actuated by corrupt motive. In fact, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ in Ramesh Chander Singh‟s case even took an exception to the practice of initiating disciplinary action against Officers merely because the orders passed by them were

wrong."

Applying the aforesaid test in the case at hand, the Madras High Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal in the following manner:-

"16. If all these tests are cumulatively applied, the Tribunal in the present case had correctly found that there was no mala fide motive on the part of the first respondent in passing the order and that a Government servant cannot be punished for a wrong interpretation of law. In the light of the above discussion, we feel that the CAT has correctly understood the scope of judicial review and has set aside the order of recovery passed against the petitioner."1

Delhi High Court

U.O.I And Ors vs Ajit Kumar Singh & Ors on 5 August, 2013

Author: Pradeep Nandrajog

   CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO

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Charges should be specific, definite and giving details of incident which formed basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.

Where the chargesheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the chargesheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a chargesheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the chargesheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory, even if the delinquent does not take the defence of, or make a protest with against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair-play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.

Supreme Court of India

Anant R Kulkarni vs Y.P.Education Society & Ors. on 26 April, 2013

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Fakkir Mohamed Kalifulla

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Basic concept of honourable acquittal in departmental enquiry

The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

22. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, it was held even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari reported in 1972 SLR 45, this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 which is as follows:

“The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. 

Supreme Court of India

Dy.Inspector Gen.Of Police & Anr. vs S.Samuthiram on 30 November, 2012

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Supreme Court: Departmental Enquiry should not be terminated on account of Delay

The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion.

Supreme Court of India

Chairman Lic Of India & Ors. vs A Masilamani on 23 November, 2012

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