Showing posts with label moratorium. Show all posts
Showing posts with label moratorium. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 June 2024

How proceedings under S 138 NI Act and Insolvency and Bankruptcy code affects each other?

  Insolvency Proceedings under IBC:

Scope:

  • Insolvency Proceedings: These are initiated to resolve cases where companies or individuals are unable to repay their debts. The objective is to either restructure the debt or liquidate the debtor's assets to repay creditors.

Proceeding:

  • For corporate debtors, insolvency proceedings are initiated by filing an application with the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).
  • Once the application is admitted, a moratorium is imposed on the debtor, staying all legal proceedings, including suits and arbitration, against the debtor.
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Sunday, 19 September 2021

Supreme Court: Moratorium Ordered U/Sec.14 IBC Does Not Apply To Proceedings In Respect Of Directors/Management Of Corporate Debtor

At this juncture, we must however clarify the right of the petitioners to move against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor, even though a moratorium has been declared under Section 14 of the IBC. In the judgment in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258, a three judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 against the Corporate Debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision under Section 14

of the IBC. However, it clarified that the moratorium was only in relation to the Corporate Debtor (as highlighted above) and not in respect of the directors/management of the Corporate Debtor, against whom proceedings could continue. Speaking through Justice Rohinton F Nariman, the Court held:

“102. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the

moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC, by which

continuation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the corporate

debtor and initiation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the

said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are

interdicted, what is stated in paras 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta

Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 :

(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] would then

become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14

IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be

instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus, for the period of

moratorium, since no Sections 138/141 proceeding can continue

or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a

statutory bar, such proceedings can be initiated or continued

against the persons mentioned in Sections 141(1) and (2) of the

Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case, it is clear that

the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC would

apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons

mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable

under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”

(emphasis supplied) We thus clarify that the petitioners would not be prevented by the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC from initiating proceedings against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor in relation to honoring the settlements reached before this Court. 

 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY/APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SLP (C) No. 12150 of 2019

Anjali Rathi and Others . Vs Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Others .

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: September 8, 2021.

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Friday, 21 May 2021

Whether prosecution for dishonour of cheque is maintainable against Corporate debtor after the declaration of Moratorium as per S14 IBC?

 WHETHER NATURAL PERSONS ARE COVERED BY SECTION 14 OF THE IBC

102. As far as the Directors/persons in management or control of the corporate debtor are concerned, a Section 138/141 proceeding against them cannot be initiated or continued without the corporate debtor - see Aneeta Hada (supra). This is because Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act speaks of persons in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company. The Court, therefore, in Aneeta Hada (supra) held as under:

“51. We have already opined that the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] runs counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is by a larger Bench and hence, is a binding precedent. On the aforesaid ratiocination, the decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] has to be treated as not laying down the correct law as far as it states that the Director or any other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless to emphasise, the matter would stand on a different footing where there is some legal impediment and the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia gets attracted.”

xxx xxx xxx

“56. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to highlight that there has to be strict observance of the provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be imposed affecting the rights of persons, whether juristic entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company. The learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently urged that the use of the term “as well as” in the Section is of immense significance and, in its tentacle, it brings in the company as well as the Director and/or other officers who are responsible for the acts of the company and, therefore, a prosecution against the Directors or other officers is tenable even if the company is not arraigned as an accused. The words “as well as” have to be understood in the context.”

xxx xxx xxx

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery [(1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

103. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC, by which continuation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the corporate debtor and initiation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are interdicted, what is stated in paragraphs 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada (supra) would then become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14 of the IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus, for the period of moratorium, since no Section 138/141 proceeding can continue or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a statutory bar, such proceedings can be initiated or continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1) and (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case, it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha and K.M. Joseph, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 10355 of 2018


P. Mohanraj and Others Vs Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. 

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Friday, 17 January 2020

Whether moratorium prohibiting institution of proceeding as provided in S 14 of insolvency Act applies to criminal proceeding?

As can be seen from Clause (a) of Sub Section 1 of Section 14 of the Code, once the adjudicating authority declares moratorium for prohibiting institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceeding against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any Court of law, Arbitration Tribunal or other authority, the whole emphasis of the arguments of the learned advocate for the respondents 2 to 7 is on the words 'proceedings', 'order' and 'in any Court of law'. It has been submitted that these words do not precisely restrict its operation to only civil proceedings. The words are omnibus and even include a criminal proceeding including the one under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and a criminal revision arising therefrom.

13. As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

 Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mangesh S. Patil, J.

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Friday, 1 March 2019

Whether cheque dishonour case can be stayed if moratorium is declared as per S 14 of insolvency and bankruptcy code?

 As can be seen from Clause (a) of Sub Section 1 of Section 14 of the Code, once the adjudicating authority declares moratorium for prohibiting institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceeding against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any Court of law, Arbitration Tribunal or other authority, the whole emphasis of the arguments of the learned advocate for the respondents 2 to 7 is on the words 'proceedings', 'order' and 'in any Court of law'. It has been submitted that these words do not precisely restrict its operation to only civil proceedings. The words are omnibus and even include a criminal proceeding including the one under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and a criminal revision arising therefrom.

13. As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 312
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Sunday, 27 January 2019

Whether proceediing for dishonour of cheque can be stayed if there is moratorium prohibiting institution of proceeding as per S 14 of IBC 2016?

 As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 312
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Saturday, 18 August 2018

Whether moratorium as per S 14 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 will apply to personal guarantor of corporate debtor?

State Bank of India managed to settle the prolonged issue in favour of the creditors who are facing procedural and legal hindrances in recovering public money after the judgement passed by Supreme court regarding the applicablity of moratorium on the assets of the personal guarantor to the corporate debtors which are undergoing insolvency process. Supreme Court setting aside the order of Appellate Tribunal held that since the personal guarantor's moratorium is covered under section 96 and 101 of the code and at present these sections are not notified , In such scenario moratorium will only apply to the corporate debtor and not on personal guarantors.This remarkable judgement came in the light of recent amendments in the insolvency code where section 14 (3) is substituted with "the moratorium will not be applicable to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor".This will allow the banks and other creditors to take actions against the defaulting personal guarantors which in most of the cases are promoters and directors of the company.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3595 OF 2018

STATE BANK OF INDIA  Vs V. RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR.

Dated: August 14, 2018.
Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 692
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Sunday, 14 January 2018

Whether arbitration proceeding can be initiated after imposition of moratorium as per Insolvency Code?

The mandate of the new Insolvency Code is that the moment an
insolvency petition is admitted, the moratorium that comes into
effect under Section 14(1)(a) expressly interdicts institution or
continuation of pending suits or proceedings against Corporate
Debtors.
6) This being the case, we are surprised that an arbitration
proceeding has been purported to be started after the imposition of
the said moratorium and appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act are being entertained. Therefore, we set aside the order of
the District Judge dated 06.07.2017 and further state that the
effect of Section 14(1)(a) is that the arbitration that has been
instituted after the aforesaid moratorium is non est in law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16929 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18195/2017)
ALCHEMIST ASSET RECONSTRUTION COMPANY LTD. 
 Vs
M/S. HOTEL GAUDAVAN PVT. LTD. & ORS. 
Dated: 23-10-2017
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5124
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Friday, 1 December 2017

Whether Arbitration Proceeding is maintainable after Imposition Of Moratorium U/S.14 Of Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code?

The mandate of the new Insolvency Code is that the moment an
insolvency petition is admitted, the moratorium that comes into
effect under Section 14(1)(a) expressly interdicts institution or
continuation of pending suits or proceedings against Corporate
Debtors.
6) This being the case, we are surprised that an arbitration
proceeding has been purported to be started after the imposition of
the said moratorium and appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act are being entertained. Therefore, we set aside the order of
the District Judge dated 06.07.2017 and further state that the
effect of Section 14(1)(a) is that the arbitration that has been
instituted after the aforesaid moratorium is non est in law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16929 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18195/2017)

ALCHEMIST ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. Vs M/S. HOTEL GAUDAVAN PVT. LTD. & ORS. 
Dated:October 23, 2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5124
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