Showing posts with label corporate debtor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corporate debtor. Show all posts

Sunday, 19 September 2021

Supreme Court: Moratorium Ordered U/Sec.14 IBC Does Not Apply To Proceedings In Respect Of Directors/Management Of Corporate Debtor

At this juncture, we must however clarify the right of the petitioners to move against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor, even though a moratorium has been declared under Section 14 of the IBC. In the judgment in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258, a three judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 against the Corporate Debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision under Section 14

of the IBC. However, it clarified that the moratorium was only in relation to the Corporate Debtor (as highlighted above) and not in respect of the directors/management of the Corporate Debtor, against whom proceedings could continue. Speaking through Justice Rohinton F Nariman, the Court held:

“102. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the

moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC, by which

continuation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the corporate

debtor and initiation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the

said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are

interdicted, what is stated in paras 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta

Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 :

(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] would then

become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14

IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be

instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus, for the period of

moratorium, since no Sections 138/141 proceeding can continue

or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a

statutory bar, such proceedings can be initiated or continued

against the persons mentioned in Sections 141(1) and (2) of the

Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case, it is clear that

the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC would

apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons

mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable

under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”

(emphasis supplied) We thus clarify that the petitioners would not be prevented by the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC from initiating proceedings against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor in relation to honoring the settlements reached before this Court. 

 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY/APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SLP (C) No. 12150 of 2019

Anjali Rathi and Others . Vs Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Others .

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: September 8, 2021.

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Tuesday, 25 May 2021

Whether liability of the Personal guarantor for Corporate debt will extinguish on approval of the Insolvency resolution plan?

  All creditors and other classes of claimants, including financial and operational creditors, those entitled to statutory dues, workers, etc., who participate in the resolution process, are heard and those in relation to whom the CoC accepts or rejects pleas, are entitled to vent their grievances before the NCLT. After considering their submissions and objections, the resolution plan is accepted and approved. This results in finality as to the claims of creditors, and others, from the company (i.e. the company which undergoes the insolvency process). The question which the petitioners urge is that in view of this finality, their liabilities would be extinguished; they rely on Sections 128, 133 and 140 of the Contract Act to urge that creditors cannot therefore, proceed against them separately. {Para 128}

129. In Vijay Kumar Jain v. Standard Chartered Bank67, this court, while dealing with the right of erstwhile directors participating in meetings of Committee of Creditors observed that:

“we find that Section 31(1) of the Code would make it clear that such members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, who are often guarantors, are vitally interested in a resolution plan as such resolution plan then binds them. Such plan may scale down the debt of the principal debtor, resulting in scaling down the debt of the guarantor as well, or it may not. The resolution plan may also scale down certain debts and not others, leaving guarantors of the latter kind of debts exposed for the entire amount of the debt. The regulations also make it clear that these persons are vitally interested in resolution plans as they affect them”

130. The rationale for allowing directors to participate in meetings of the CoC is that the directors' liability as personal guarantors persists against the creditors and an approved resolution plan can only lead to a revision of amount or exposure for the entire amount. Any recourse under Section 133 of the Contract Act to discharge the liability of the surety on account of variance in terms of the contract, without her or his consent, stands negated by this court, in V. Ramakrishnan where it was observed that the language of Section 31 makes it clear that the approved plan is binding on the guarantor, to avoid any attempt to escape liability under the provisions of the Contract Act. It was observed that:

“25. Section 31(1), in fact, makes it clear that the guarantor cannot escape payment as the resolution plan, which has been approved, may well include provisions as to payments to be made by such guarantor.…”

131. And further that:

“26.1 Section 14 refers only to debts due by corporate debtors, who are limited liability companies, and it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, personal guarantees are given by Directors who are in management of the companies. The object of the Code is not to allow such guarantors to escape from an independent and co-extensive liability to pay off the entire outstanding debt, which is why Section 14 is not applied to them. However, insofar as firms and individuals are concerned, guarantees are given in respect of individual debts by persons who have unlimited liability to pay them. And such guarantors may be complete strangers to the debtor — often it could be a personal friend. It is for this reason that the moratorium mentioned in Section 101 would cover such persons, as such moratorium is in relation to the debt and not the debtor.”

132. In Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel (I) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta68 (the “Essar Steel case”) this court refused to interfere with proceedings initiated to enforce personal guarantees by financial creditors; it was observed as follows:

“106. Following this judgment in V. Ramakrishnan case [SBI v. V. Ramakrishnan, (2018) 17 SCC 394], it is difficult to accept Shri Rohatgi's argument that that part of the resolution plan which states that the claims of the guarantor on account of subrogation shall be extinguished, cannot be applied to the guarantees furnished by the erstwhile Directors of the corporate debtor. So far as the present case is concerned, we hasten to add that we are saying nothing which may affect the pending litigation on account of invocation of these guarantees. However, NCLAT judgment being contrary to Section 31(1) of the Code and this Court's judgment in V. Ramakrishnan case [SBI v. V. Ramakrishnan, (2018) 17 SCC 394], is set aside.”

133. It is therefore, clear that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by Section 31 does not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor's liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself. However, this court has indicated, time and again, that an involuntary act of the principal debtor leading to loss of security, would not absolve a guarantor of its liability. In Maharashtra State Electricity Board (supra) the liability of the guarantor (in a case where liability of the principal debtor was discharged under the insolvency law or the company law), was considered. It was held that in view of the unequivocal guarantee, such liability of the guarantor continues and the creditor can realize the same from the guarantor in view of the language of Section 128 of the Contract Act as there is no discharge under Section 134 of that Act. This court observed as follows:

 Under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, the liability of the surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. A surety is no doubt discharged under Section 134 of the Indian Contract Act by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor is released or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor. But a discharge which the principal debtor may secure by operation of law in bankruptcy (or in liquidation proceedings in the case of a company) does not absolve the surety of his liability (see Jagannath Ganeshram Agarwala v. Shivnarayan Bhagirath [AIR 1940 Bom 247; see also In re Fitzgeorge Ex parte Robson [[1905] 1 K.B. 462]).”


136. In view of the above discussion, it is held that approval of a resolution plan does not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee. As held by this court, the release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e. by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceeding, does not absolve the surety/guarantor of his or her liability, which arises out of an independent contract.

137. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the impugned notification is legal and valid. It is also held that approval of a resolution plan relating to a corporate debtor does not operate so as to discharge the liabilities of personal guarantors (to corporate debtors). The writ petitions, transferred cases and transfer petitions are accordingly dismissed in the above terms, without order on costs.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.)

Transferred Case (Civil) No. 245/2020


Lalit Kumar Jain  Vs Union of India 

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Friday, 21 May 2021

Whether prosecution for dishonour of cheque is maintainable against Corporate debtor after the declaration of Moratorium as per S14 IBC?

 WHETHER NATURAL PERSONS ARE COVERED BY SECTION 14 OF THE IBC

102. As far as the Directors/persons in management or control of the corporate debtor are concerned, a Section 138/141 proceeding against them cannot be initiated or continued without the corporate debtor - see Aneeta Hada (supra). This is because Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act speaks of persons in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company. The Court, therefore, in Aneeta Hada (supra) held as under:

“51. We have already opined that the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] runs counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is by a larger Bench and hence, is a binding precedent. On the aforesaid ratiocination, the decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] has to be treated as not laying down the correct law as far as it states that the Director or any other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless to emphasise, the matter would stand on a different footing where there is some legal impediment and the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia gets attracted.”

xxx xxx xxx

“56. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to highlight that there has to be strict observance of the provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be imposed affecting the rights of persons, whether juristic entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company. The learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently urged that the use of the term “as well as” in the Section is of immense significance and, in its tentacle, it brings in the company as well as the Director and/or other officers who are responsible for the acts of the company and, therefore, a prosecution against the Directors or other officers is tenable even if the company is not arraigned as an accused. The words “as well as” have to be understood in the context.”

xxx xxx xxx

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery [(1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

103. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC, by which continuation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the corporate debtor and initiation of Section 138/141 proceedings against the said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are interdicted, what is stated in paragraphs 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada (supra) would then become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14 of the IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus, for the period of moratorium, since no Section 138/141 proceeding can continue or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a statutory bar, such proceedings can be initiated or continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1) and (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case, it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha and K.M. Joseph, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 10355 of 2018


P. Mohanraj and Others Vs Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. 

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Thursday, 13 May 2021

Whether the borrower can initiate an insolvency proceeding against the corporate person who is a guarantor regarding the loan account given to the partnership firm?

To get over this position, much reliance was placed on

Section 5(5A) of the Code, which defines the expression

“corporate guarantor” to mean a corporate person, who is the

surety in a contract of guarantee to a Corporate debtor. {Para 23}

24. Accepting the aforementioned argument of the appellant

would result in diluting or constricting the expression “corporate

debtor” occurring in Section 7 of the Code, which means a

corporate person, who owes a debt to any person. The “debt” of a corporate person would mean a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt. The expression “debt” in Section 3(11) is wide enough to include liability of a corporate person on account of guarantee given by it in relation to a loan account of any person including not being a corporate person in the event of  default committed by the latter. It would still be a “financial debt” of the corporate person, arising from the guarantee given by  it, within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the Code.

25. Notably, the expression “corporate guarantee” is not defined

in the Code. Whereas, expression “corporate guarantor” is

defined in Section 5(5A) of the Code. If the legislature intended to exclude a corporate person offering guarantee in respect of a loan secured by a person not being a corporate person, from the

expression “corporate debtor” occurring in Section 7, it would

have so provided in the Code (at least when Section 5(5A) came to be inserted defining expression “corporate guarantor”). It was

also open to the legislature to amend Section 7 of the Code and

replace the expression “corporate debtor” by a suitable

expression. It could have even amended Section 3(8) to exclude

liability arising from a guarantee given for the loan account of an

entity not being a corporate person. Similarly, it could have also

amended expression “financial debt” in Section 5(8) of the Code,

“claim” in Section 3(6), “debt” in Section 3(11) and “default” in

Section 3(12). There is no indication to that effect in the

contemporaneous legislative changes brought about.


26. The expression “corporate debtor” is defined in Section 3(8)

which applies to the Code as a whole. Whereas, expression

“corporate guarantor” in Section 5(5A), applies only to Part II of

the Code. Upon harmonious and purposive construction of the

governing provisions, it is not possible to extricate the corporate

person from the liability (of being a corporate debtor) arising on

account of the guarantee given by it in respect of loan given to a

person other than corporate person. The liability of the

guarantor is coextensive with that of the principal borrower. 

27. In law, the status of the guarantor, who is a corporate

person, metamorphoses into corporate debtor, the moment

principal borrower (regardless of not being a corporate person)

commits default in payment of debt which had become due and

payable. Thus, action under Section 7 of the Code could be

legitimately invoked even against a (corporate) guarantor being a corporate debtor. The definition of “corporate guarantor” in

Section 5(5A) of the Code needs to be so understood.

28. A priori, we find no substance in the argument advanced

before us that since the loan was offered to a proprietary firm

(not a corporate person), action under Section 7 of the Code

cannot be initiated against the corporate person even though it

had offered guarantee in respect of that transaction. Whereas,

upon default committed by the principal borrower, the liability of the company (corporate person), being the guarantor, instantly triggers the right of the financial creditor to proceed against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor). Hence, the first question stands answered against the appellant. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2734 OF 2020

LAXMI PAT SURANA  Vs  UNION BANK OF INDIA 

Author: A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari,B R Gawai JJ

Dated: March 26, 2021.

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Sunday, 27 January 2019

Whether proceediing for dishonour of cheque can be stayed if there is moratorium prohibiting institution of proceeding as per S 14 of IBC 2016?

 As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 312
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Saturday, 18 August 2018

Whether moratorium as per S 14 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 will apply to personal guarantor of corporate debtor?

State Bank of India managed to settle the prolonged issue in favour of the creditors who are facing procedural and legal hindrances in recovering public money after the judgement passed by Supreme court regarding the applicablity of moratorium on the assets of the personal guarantor to the corporate debtors which are undergoing insolvency process. Supreme Court setting aside the order of Appellate Tribunal held that since the personal guarantor's moratorium is covered under section 96 and 101 of the code and at present these sections are not notified , In such scenario moratorium will only apply to the corporate debtor and not on personal guarantors.This remarkable judgement came in the light of recent amendments in the insolvency code where section 14 (3) is substituted with "the moratorium will not be applicable to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor".This will allow the banks and other creditors to take actions against the defaulting personal guarantors which in most of the cases are promoters and directors of the company.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3595 OF 2018

STATE BANK OF INDIA  Vs V. RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR.

Dated: August 14, 2018.
Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 692
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