Showing posts with label Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code2016. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code2016. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 February 2022

Whether an Additional Session Judge can try offences under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code2016?

  It may also be noted that Section 236 (3) of the I.B. Code creates a deeming fiction that the Special Court trying offences under I.B. Code shall be “Issue Process”, under Section deemed to be Court of

Sessions . If ”, under Section the intention of the legislature was that

offences under I.B. Code are to be tried by the Sessions Court, then this subsection would have been unnecessary. According to the Petitioners, this is an indication as to the true and proper interpretation of Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Section 436 of I.B. Code. Thus for all the above reasons, the impugned proceedings have been instituted by the Respondents (Complainant) in the Court of Addtional Sessions Judge, were not sustainable for want of jurisdiction. As a consequence order, ‘issue process’ passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the

Petitioners, in a complaint by the Respondents/Board was without jurisdiction and therefore not sustainable equally. It is therefore to be held that Special Court “Issue Process”, under Section which is to try offences under the I.B. Code is the Special Court established under Section 435 (2) (b) of the Companies Act, 2013 which consists of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate

First Class. The Petition is therefore allowed in terms of

prayer clause (a). {Para 14}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2592 OF 2021

 Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu Vs  Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India,


CORAM : SANDEEP K. SHINDE

PRONOUNCED ON : 14th FEBRUARY, 2022.
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Sunday, 9 January 2022

Whether Insolvency proceeding against a shipping company will bar a civil suit against its vessel?

The first argument canvassed by Mr. Arsiwala is that the present suit is not maintainable considering the bar contained in Section 33(5) of the IBC, 2016. 

22. What sub-section 5 of Section 33 
of the IBC, 2016 contemplates is that subject to Section 52, when a liquidation order is passed against the Corporate Debtor, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted by or against the Corporate Debtor. Section 52 deals with the rights of the secured creditor in liquidation proceedings. The proviso to Section 33(5) stipulates that a suit or other legal proceeding may be instituted by the Liquidator, on behalf of the Corporate Debtor, with the prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority. When one reads Section 33(5), it is ex-facie clear that the said provision prohibits the institution of a suit or other legal proceeding against the Corporate Debtor only. It does not in any way prohibit the institution of a suit or other legal proceeding against a ship/Vessel owned by the Corporate Debtor when invoking the Admiralty Jurisdiction of this Court. I say this because under the Admiralty Act, the Vessel is treated as a separate juristic entity which can be sued without joining the owner of the said Vessel to the proceeding. 

Bombay High Court

JUSTICE B. P. COLABAWALLA

Angre Port Private Ltd. Vs. TAG 15 (IMO. 9705550) & Anr.

INTERIM APPLICATION(L) NO. 112 OF 2021

3rd January 2022

Citation: 2022 NearLaw (BombayHC) Online 9

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Whether an appellant can claim condonation of delay in insolvency appeal if it has not made an application for a certified copy within limitation?

D. Conclusion

21. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgement- (i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under the IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed under the IBC – must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that the IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the “order is made available to the aggrieved party”, in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of the IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.

22. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants under the IBC. While it is true that the tribunals, and even this Court, may choose to exempt parties from compliance with this procedural requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as re-iterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, the discretionary waiver does not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the NCLAT as clearly barred by limitation.

 

Supreme Court

JUSTICE DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH JUSTICE B. V. NAGARATHNA

V. Nagarajan Vs. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd.& Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 3327 of 2020

22nd October 2021

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 588

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Sunday, 19 September 2021

Supreme Court: Moratorium Ordered U/Sec.14 IBC Does Not Apply To Proceedings In Respect Of Directors/Management Of Corporate Debtor

At this juncture, we must however clarify the right of the petitioners to move against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor, even though a moratorium has been declared under Section 14 of the IBC. In the judgment in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258, a three judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 against the Corporate Debtor would be covered by the moratorium provision under Section 14

of the IBC. However, it clarified that the moratorium was only in relation to the Corporate Debtor (as highlighted above) and not in respect of the directors/management of the Corporate Debtor, against whom proceedings could continue. Speaking through Justice Rohinton F Nariman, the Court held:

“102. Since the corporate debtor would be covered by the

moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC, by which

continuation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the corporate

debtor and initiation of Sections 138/141 proceedings against the

said debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process are

interdicted, what is stated in paras 51 and 59 in Aneeta Hada [Aneeta

Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 :

(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] would then

become applicable. The legal impediment contained in Section 14

IBC would make it impossible for such proceeding to continue or be

instituted against the corporate debtor. Thus, for the period of

moratorium, since no Sections 138/141 proceeding can continue

or be initiated against the corporate debtor because of a

statutory bar, such proceedings can be initiated or continued

against the persons mentioned in Sections 141(1) and (2) of the

Negotiable Instruments Act. This being the case, it is clear that

the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC would

apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons

mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable

under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”

(emphasis supplied) We thus clarify that the petitioners would not be prevented by the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC from initiating proceedings against the promoters of the first respondent Corporate Debtor in relation to honoring the settlements reached before this Court. 

 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY/APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SLP (C) No. 12150 of 2019

Anjali Rathi and Others . Vs Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Others .

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: September 8, 2021.

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Friday, 7 February 2020

Whether limitation Act is applicable to S 7 and 9 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code?

As in the present case, and as is reflected in the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March, 2018, the legislature did not contemplate enabling a creditor who has allowed the period of limitation to set in to allow such delayed claims through the mechanism of the Code. The Code cannot be triggered in the year 2017 for a debt which was time-barred, say, in 1990, as that would lead to the absurd and extreme consequence of the Code being triggered by a stale or dead claim, leading to the drastic consequence of instant removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor permanently, and which may ultimately lead to liquidation and, therefore, corporate death. This being the case, the expression "debt due" in the definition Sections of the Code would obviously only refer to debts that are "due and payable" in law, i.e., the debts that are not time-barred.

It is thus clear that since the Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed Under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code from the inception of the Code, Article 137 of the Limitation Act gets attracted. "The right to sue", therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 23988 of 2017, 439, 436, 3137, 4979, 5819 and 7286 of 2018

Decided On: 11.10.2018

B.K. Educational Services Private Limited  Vs.  Parag Gupta and Associates

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Navin Sinha, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 11 SCC 633
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Sunday, 27 January 2019

Whether proceediing for dishonour of cheque can be stayed if there is moratorium prohibiting institution of proceeding as per S 14 of IBC 2016?

 As is the principle of interpretation of Statutes, these words would take colour from words preceding thereto. These words will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis with the words 'suits' used earlier thereto. So interpreted, the word 'proceedings' used therein and even the words 'order' and 'in Court of law' will have to be interpreted as a proceeding arising in the nature of a suit and orders passed in such proceedings and suits. Apart from the fact that the Legislature has not conspicuously used the words 'criminal' as an adjective to the word 'proceedings' and as an adjective to the noun 'Court of law', it must be assumed that the Legislature in its wisdom has consciously omitted to use such adjectives since it must have intended to prohibit only the suits and execution of the judgments and decrees or a proceeding of the like nature. Therefore, applying this principle of interpretation, one cannot put any other interpretation on this provision contained in Section 14 of the Code except that it only prohibits a suit or a proceeding of a like nature and does not include any criminal proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition 1437 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Tayal Cotton Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 312
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Saturday, 18 August 2018

Whether moratorium as per S 14 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 will apply to personal guarantor of corporate debtor?

State Bank of India managed to settle the prolonged issue in favour of the creditors who are facing procedural and legal hindrances in recovering public money after the judgement passed by Supreme court regarding the applicablity of moratorium on the assets of the personal guarantor to the corporate debtors which are undergoing insolvency process. Supreme Court setting aside the order of Appellate Tribunal held that since the personal guarantor's moratorium is covered under section 96 and 101 of the code and at present these sections are not notified , In such scenario moratorium will only apply to the corporate debtor and not on personal guarantors.This remarkable judgement came in the light of recent amendments in the insolvency code where section 14 (3) is substituted with "the moratorium will not be applicable to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor".This will allow the banks and other creditors to take actions against the defaulting personal guarantors which in most of the cases are promoters and directors of the company.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3595 OF 2018

STATE BANK OF INDIA  Vs V. RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR.

Dated: August 14, 2018.
Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 692
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Friday, 1 December 2017

Whether Arbitration Proceeding is maintainable after Imposition Of Moratorium U/S.14 Of Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code?

The mandate of the new Insolvency Code is that the moment an
insolvency petition is admitted, the moratorium that comes into
effect under Section 14(1)(a) expressly interdicts institution or
continuation of pending suits or proceedings against Corporate
Debtors.
6) This being the case, we are surprised that an arbitration
proceeding has been purported to be started after the imposition of
the said moratorium and appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act are being entertained. Therefore, we set aside the order of
the District Judge dated 06.07.2017 and further state that the
effect of Section 14(1)(a) is that the arbitration that has been
instituted after the aforesaid moratorium is non est in law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 16929 OF 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 18195/2017)

ALCHEMIST ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY LTD. Vs M/S. HOTEL GAUDAVAN PVT. LTD. & ORS. 
Dated:October 23, 2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5124
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