Showing posts with label notional partition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label notional partition. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 February 2017

How concept of notional partition ensures female heir's share in interest of coparcener?

We are not impressed with the submission that Section 6 of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable for the
devolution of property of Jagan Verma. Section 6 deals with
the question of coparcener in a Mitakshara coparcener dying
after coming into operation of the Hindu Succession Act,
without making any testamentary disposition of his undivided
share in the joint family property. The initial part of
Section 6 stresses that the Act does not interfere with the
special rights of those who are members of Mitakshara property
except to the extent that it seeks to ensure the female heirs
as specified in Class I of the Schedule, a share in the
interest of a coparcener in the event of his death, by
introducing the concept of a notional partition immediately
before his death. Proviso to Section 6 operates where the
deceased has left surviving him, a daughter, or any female as
specified in Class I of the Schedule. In the case at hand,
Jagan Verma has left the female heirs namely his wife
Prabhavati and daughter Lajesh Saxena and, therefore, the

devolution of the property of Jagan Verma was governed by the
provisions of Hindu Succession Act and the High Court rightly
increased the share of Jagan Verma’s daughter Lajesh Saxena.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8665-8668/2010
RAMESH VERMA(D) TR.LRS
 V
LAJESH SAXENA (D) BY LRS & ANR. 
Dated:November 24, 2016.
Citation: (2017) 1 SCC257
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Wednesday, 28 December 2016

What is distinction between concept of joint ownership and co-ownership of ancestral properties?

It can be seen that the plaintiffs have not understood the concept of joint ownership and co-ownership of ancestral properties. Ancestral properties cannot be jointly owned. Joint properties survive to the joint holders entirely upon the death of one joint holder. Ancestral properties survive to all the members of the coparcenary. Ancestral properties can be co- owned by community of interest and unity of possession such that each party is an owner of an undivided share. Upon the incidents of joint family property or coparcenary property, this interest is augmented by the death of any coparcener (co-owner) and is diminished by the birth of any coparcener in the HUF. The fact remains that the properties in Exhibit A stated to be the co- owned or jointly owned are unmistakably and repeatedly stated to be ancestral properties. The ancestral properties would survive to the coparceners in a Hindu coparcenary owning such joint family properties. The only exceptions to that would be the interest of the deceased Hindu in such coparcenary.
Bombay High Court
Shalini Sumant Raut & Ors vs Milind Sumant Raut & Ors on 14 December, 2012
Bench: R. S. Dalvi
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Whether share of legal heirs in joint family property will become fixed after death of father by notional partition?

We have earlier seen that females can be the members of a Hindu joint family. The question now is whether females who inherits a share in a joint family property by reason of the death of a member of the family ceases to be a member of the family. It was very forcefully pressed upon us by the learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the decision of this Court in Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum & Ors. (2) that there was a disruption of the family in question on the death of Sham Rao as for the purpose of determining the interest inherited by Gangabai alias Taibai and Sulochanabai it was necessary to assume that a notional partition had taken place, immediately before the death of Sham Rao and carried to its logical end as observed in the above decision, Gangabai alias Taibai and Sulochanabai should be deemed to have become separated from the family. The facts of the above said case were these. One Khandappa died leaving behind his wife Hirabai, two sons and three daughters after the coming into force of the Act. Hirabai filed a suit for partition and separate possession of 7/24th share in the joint family property on the basis of section 6 of the Act. She claimed that if a partition had taken place between her husband and her two sons immediately before the death of her husband Khandappa, she, her husband and two sons would have each been allotted a one-fourth share in the family property and on the death of her husband the one fourth share which would have been allotted in his favour had devolved in; equal shares on her, her two sons and three daughters. Thus she claimed the one-fourth share which had to be allotted in her favour on the (1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 882.
(2) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 761.
national partition and 1/24th share (which was one-sixth of the one-fourth share of her husband) i e. in all 7/24th share. It was contended on behalf of the contesting defendant that she could not get the one-fourth share since actually no partition had taken place. Chandrachud, CJ rejected the said contention with the following observations at p. 768: .
"In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation I to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death. What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his caparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining, the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of heirs of the without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle. All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition can- not generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have, received in the notional partition."
We have carefully considered the above decision and we feel that this case has to be treated as an authority for the position that when a female member who inherits an interest in the joint family property under Section 6 of the Act files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family she would be entitled to get both the interest she has inherited and the share which have been notionally allotted to her, as stated in Explanation I to Section 6 of the Act. But it cannot be an authority for the proposition that she ceases to be a member of the family on the death of a male member of the family whose interest in the family property devolves on her without her volition to separate herself from the family.A legal fiction should no doubt ordinarily be carried to its logical end to carry out the purposes for which it is enacted but it cannot be carried beyond that. It is no doubt true that the right of a female heir to the interest inherited by her in the family property gets fixed on the death of a male member under section 6 of the Act but she cannot be treated as having ceased to be a member of the family without her volition as otherwise it will lead to strange results which could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament when it enacted that provision and which might also not be in the interest of such female heirs. To illustrate, if what is being asserted is accepted as correct it may result in the wife automatically being separated from her husband when one of her sons dies leaving her behind as his heir. Such a result does not follow the language of the statute. In such an event she should have the option to separate herself or to continue in the family as long as she wishes as its member though she has acquired an indefeasible interest in a specific share of the family property which would remain undiminished whatever may be the subsequent changes in the composition of the membership of the family. As already observed the ownership of a definite share in the family property by a person need not be treated as a factor which would militate against his being a member of a family. 
Supreme Court of India
State Of Maharashtra vs Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & Ors on 19 March, 1985
Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 716, 1985 SCR (3) 358

Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
MISRA, R.B. (J)

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Whether notional partition of joint family property can be treated as real partition?

 The concept of notional partition is a legal device used for purpose of demarcating interest of the deceased when the explanation (I) of Section 6 is attracted. Like any other legal fiction, the fiction of notional partition is meant for a specific purpose. It is not a real partition by metes and bounds. It neither effects a severance of status nor does it demarcate the interest of the surviving coparceners or of any females who are entitled to a share on a partition. It is well settled that the share of the deceased coparcener is required to be determined by notionally making allotment of his share which he was entitled to at the partition, on assumption that he was alive on that day and thereafter to divide his share amongst the legal heirs. The joint status of the Respondents was not impaired due to the introduction of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. There is no reason to hold that the joint Hindu family was disrupted.
13. In "State of Maharashtra v. Narayanrao MANU/SC/0309/1985 : [1987]163ITR31(SC) , the Supreme Court took survey of the earlier decisions including that of Gurupad's case MANU/SC/0407/1978 : [1981]129ITR440(SC) . The Supreme Court held that Gurupad's case has to be treated as authority only for the position that when a female member who inherits an interest in the joint family property under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, files a suit for partition expressing her willingness to go out of the family would be entitled to both the interest she has inherited and the share which would have been notionally allotted to her as stated in Explanation (I) appended to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. The applicability of Section 6 does not per se bring about severance of status among the surviving coparceners. The legal fiction can not be carried beyond the purpose for which it is enacted. Considering this legal position, the view taken by the learned District Judge appears to be incorrect and improper. It must be held, therefore, that the Respondents Nos. l to 4 continued to remain members of the joint Hindu family and the suit houses were part of the coparcenary properties held by them.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)
Second Appeal No. 220 of 1988
Decided On: 07.01.2009

 Shankarlal Ramprasad Ladha  Vs. Vasant Chandidasrao Deshmukh,

Coram:
V.R. Kingaonkar, J.
Citation:AIR 2009(NOC)2367 Bom
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Thursday, 25 February 2016

Whether requirement of registration of partition deed is applicable to statutory notional partition on opening of succession?

Requirement of partition being registered can have
no application to statutory notional partition on opening of
succession as per unamended provision, having regard to

nature of such partition which is by operation of law. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7217 OF 2013
PRAKASH & ORS. 
V
PHULAVATI & ORS.
WITH
SLP (C) NOS.21814 OF 2008, 18744 OF 2010,
Citation;(2016)2 SCC36,2016(1)BomCR419,2016(1)MhLJ1(SC),
Dated;OCTOBER 16, 2015
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Sunday, 3 August 2014

Leading judgment on partition of joint family property

It is clear from the decisions in Sai Reddy (supra), Ganduri
Koteshwaramma (supra) and Prema (supra) that a partition of the
Hindu Joint Family – that crystallizes each member’s interest, and
thus makes the interests immune to further changes in the law – can
only take place in the manner prescribed by the HSA. A deemed
partition under the proviso to Section 6, HSA is not an actual partition
that crystallizes the interest of all members of the HUF, but only a
legal construction introduced by the legislature to determine how the
interests of the deceased would devolve upon his heirs if a Class I

female relative is alive. The purpose of this fiction of deemed partition as opposed to following the simple rule of survivorship otherwise) is
that Class I female heirs also receive a share in the coparcenary
property of the deceased male, as they would otherwise be excluded
(not being coparcenors themselves, pre the 2005 Amendment). To
argue that such deemed partition crystallizes the interest of the
daughters finally, and that any rights accruing to them at a later stage
which grant an interest in the coparcenary property are unenforceable,
is contrary to the terms and the spirit of the proviso to Section 6 as it
existed before the 2005 Amendment and the letter of the amendment
itself.
Sai
Reddy
Koteshwaramma
(supra),
Prema
(supra)
and
Ganduri
(supra) have all consistently held that the mere
severance in status, sought to be brought about by the institution of a
partition suit, does not result in immutable shares. These decisions
also took note of Phoolchand & Anr v. Gopal Lal AIR 1967 SC 1470
and even an older decision (of the Privy Council) in Jadunath Roy and
Ors. v. Parameswar Mullick and Ors., AIR 1940 PC 11, where it was
held that even after a preliminary decree in a partition suit is made, the
Court is not only powerless, but has the duty to reflect later
developments, which could necessitate re-adjustment of shares (of the
parties) on account of fluctuation in the coparcenary or the joint
family.
33.
From another and more fundamental perspective, if the
fluctuation of interests continued between the male coparcenors (the
brothers) – after the death of Bakshi Ram in 1960, and a division of
his interest to his sons and daughters – there appears no reason why

the daughter’s interest should be foreclosed. They continued to remain
members of the HUF (though not coparcenars), and thus entitled to
avail of any rights that accrued in their favour as female members of
the family, specifically the 2005 amendment in this case. In this case,
till date no final decree has been passed, and neither has any registered
partition deed been placed on record or relied upon by any of the
parties. Accordingly, the amended Section 6 of the HSA is applicable.


The 2005 amending act, thus, is unambiguous, that no past partition or testamentary disposition of property is to be affected or reopened, in order to include the newly created shares of female members of the HUF in the coparcenary. The intention of Parliament was not to create chaos by reopening previous family settlement, but rather, to indicate that for all future actions, the rules of succession, and not survivorship, would operate in default, and further, that female members would be entitled to share just as their male counterparts. Equally, however, the amending act clarifies what is meant by 'partition' in terms of Section 6, i.e. "any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court." Accordingly, only those partitions made by the execution of a duly registered partition deed or a partition effected by a decree of a Court, i.e. partitions recognized by Section 6 as valid, which have occurred before the cut-off date identified, are saved from the operation of the amended Section 6, which would, if operative, require a redistribution of shares within the HUF. Having defined the expression 'partition' in Section 6, Parliament clarified which partitions are left unaffected by the amendment, and those that are susceptible to this change in the statute, giving the Courts clear and unambiguous direction in this regard. Thus, if a partition, as envisaged under the explanation to Section 6(5) occurred before 20.12.2004, then only may the Courts ignore the amended Section 6.
25. Crucially, since the rights and shares of the parties are decided as on the date of partition, it is important to determine the date of partition. First, as discussed above, the notion that a partition occurs as on the date of the death of a male member, and shares crystallize into vested rights at that point in time, as held by the learned Single Judge, is not the correct approach. That event (i.e. the death) only determines how that person's share will be divided amongst the family members (either by survivorship or by succession), rather than effecting any broad-based changes in the family holdings or effecting a partition inter se that would hold against subsequent changes in the family composition or changes in the law. Secondly, neither is the proposition that the shares are defined at the time of filing of the suit for partition correct. Rather, the HUF, and specifically, the coparcenary, continues even after the filing of the suit. The filing of a suit by itself does not mean that a partition has taken place, until a decree of Court effects partition, or a registered deed of partition is signed inter se the parties. Accordingly, the death or birth of family members during the pendency of a suit quite obviously will affect the shares in partition. Similarly, any change in law during the pendency of the suit, as for example is the case with Section 6 of the HSA, would affect the ultimate shares of the parties. A contrary conclusion would not only fly in the face of the definition of 'partition' in Section 6(5), but would also mean, for example, that no partition suit can be withdrawn after it is filed, a proposition which has been rejected on various occasions.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 31.01.2014

RFA (OS) 11/2010, C.M. NO. 1950/2010
SMT. SWARAN LATA AND ORS. Vs SHRI KULBHUSHAN LAL AND ORS.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
 Citation: AIR2014Delhi86, 210(2014)DLT393, 2014(141)DRJ205
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Sunday, 26 May 2013

Any property which devolves under Section 8 of HSA upon death of a Hindu male would be his own individual property incapable of partition.


 Under that succession so long as the sons and daughters of Rajaram are alive, the grandsons or the great-grandsons of Rajaram would not succeed at all to any interest in the coparcenary property that Rajaram had. Such interest could have only survived to them as coparceners had there been no female heir of Rajaram. (i.e. had Rajaram left no daughters or, of course, any persons claiming through daughters i.e. the heirs of such daughters.)
17. Consequently the general rules of jointness of a Hindu family, being community of interest and unity of possession, the incidents of a joint family property, the coparcener surviving to the interest of a deceased coparcener, the share of a coparcener diminishing or augmenting upon the death or birth of another coparcener, the joint ownership of a coparcener, the undivided share of coparcenary etc. stand diluted upon any coparceners having any female heir since 1956 in respect of such interest. Hence any property which devolves under Section 8 of the HSA upon the death of a Hindu male would be his own individual property incapable of partition. It would be his own property in which his son or grandson would have no interest during his lifetime. The properties which devolve under Section 8 of the HSA are self acquired properties or partitioned HUF properties. They are not ancestral HUF properties which are not partitioned

Bombay High Court
Shalini Sumant Raut & Ors vs Milind Sumant Raut & Ors on 14 December, 2012






CORAM : MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.


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Sunday, 17 March 2013

Whether rights of parties who are added after preliminary decree can be adjusted at time of final decree?


To constitute a decision of a Court to be a decree, there must be an adjudication, i.e. a judicial determination of the matter in dispute. If there is no judicial determination of any matter in dispute, it is not a decree. The adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties with reward to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. The Code recognises three classes of decree: (i) Preliminary decree; (ii) Final decree; and (iii) Partly preliminary and partly final decree. A preliminary decree is passed in those cases in which the Court has first to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has then to stay its hands for the time being, until it is in a position to pass a final decree in the suit. In other words, a preliminary decree is only a stage in working out the rights of the parties which are to be finally adjudicated by a final decree. The preliminary decree adjudicates the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit, but does not completely dispose of the suit, such decree is called a preliminary decree. The Code provides for passing of preliminary decrees in the suit for partition and separate possession (Order 20, Rule 18). A partition suit in which a preliminary decree has been passed is still a pending suit and the rights of parties who are added after the preliminary decree have to be adjusted at the time of final decree. As regards the partition suit, the Apex Court in the case of Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal has observed that there is nothing in Civil
Procedure Code which prohibits passing of more than one preliminary decree, if circumstances justify the same and it may be necessary to do so. These observations are made by the Apex Court specifically dealing with the partition suit. The preliminary decree is only a stage prior to the passing of a final decree. A final decree can be said to be final in two ways:
(i) when within the prescribed period no appeal is filed against the decree or the matter has been decided by the decree of the highest Court, and
(ii) when the decree so far as regards the Court passing it, completely disposes of the suit. It is in the latter sense that the words "final decree" are used in Section 2.
22. A final decree is one which completely disposes of the suit and finally settles all the questions in controversy between the parties and nothing further remains to be decided thereafter.

Bombay High Court
Anubai W/O Vishnu Savant vs Vithoba Shripati Savant ... on 24 April, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004 (1) MhLj 545

Bench: V Daga


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Saturday, 24 November 2012

Leading Supreme court Judgment on concept of notional partition


In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as they Very first step to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property , by dong that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly factional, that.
the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death. What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deemed and his coparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference, to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle. All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. it has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition.

Supreme Court of India
Gurupad Khandappa Magdum vs Hirabai Khandappa Magdum And Ors on 27 April, 1978
Equivalent citations: 1978 AIR 1239, 1978 SCR (3) 761
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Friday, 21 September 2012

How notional partition will affect distribution of assets between legal heirs of deceased?

We hold that according to Section 6 of the Act when a coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act or male relative specified in that class claiming through such female relative, his undivided interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would not devolve upon the surviving coparcener, by survivorship but upon his heirs by intestate succession. Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Act provides a mechanism under which undivided interest of a deceased coparcener can be ascertained and, i.e., that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. It means for the purposes of finding out undivided interest of a deceased coparcener, a notional partition has to be assumed immediately before his death and the same shall devolve upon his heirs by succession which would obviously include the surviving coparcener who, apart from the devolution of the undivided interest of the deceased upon him by succession, would also be entitled to claim his undivided interest in the coparcenary property which he could have got in notional partition.
 The rules of Hindu law on the subject in force at the time of the death of the coparcener must, therefore, govern the question of ascertainment of the persons who would have been entitled to a share on the notional partition."

Supreme Court of India
Anar Devi And Ors vs Parmeshwari Devi And Ors on 18 September, 2006
Bench: B Agrawal, P Naolekar
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4171 of 2006
Leave granted.
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Sunday, 25 March 2012

Whether Illegitimate child can claim right in ancestral property?

 It is further pleaded that defendant No. 3 Gopal could not have become owner of the land S.No. 250 under the previous compromise decree because he had no right being illegitimate son and hence, the exchange deed executed on his behalf by Vasant is also null and void. It is pertinent to note that plaintiff Kantabai did not claim any share during life time of said Vasant. The concurrent findings of the trial Court and the first appellate Court are that original plaintiff No. 2 -Kantabai is the first wife of deceased Vasant and that he performed second marriage with defendant No. 4 Shantabai from whom defendant No. 3 Gopal was born as the illegitimate son. There is no dispute about the fact that both the suit lands (S. No. 493 and S.No. 250) were the ancestral properties in the hand of defendant No. 1 Manohar. Whether he effected partition and gave those lands to deceased Vasant and Gopal is not the material question for consideration at this stage. There cannot be duality of opinion that being illegitimate son, original defendant No. 3 -Gopal could have no right of inheritance in respect of the said ancestral properties. The legal position is amply clear in view of Shantaram Tukaram Patil and Anr. v. Smt.Dagubai Tukaram Patil and Ors. . A Division Bench of this Court held that the
property to which an illegitimate child can lay claim must be the separate property of the parents and not the coparcenary property in which the parent has a share.
Bombay High Court
Subhash S/O Eknathrao Khandekar ... vs Sow. Prayagabai W/O Manohar ... on 20 August, 2007
Equivalent citations: AIR 2008 Bom 46, 2008 (1) MhLj 908
V.R. Kingaonkar, J.
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