Showing posts with label coparcener. Show all posts
Showing posts with label coparcener. Show all posts

Tuesday, 8 September 2026

Bombay HC: Outsider's Alienation Of Joint Family Property Cannot Be Challenged In Partition Suit Between Coparceners

Here, the alienation is not done by a coparcener, but the same is done by an outsider i.e. Khot family. Therefore, the issue of alienation by Khot family to BCT cannot be a subject matter of suit for partition between Patil family members. Whether Khots had title to pass on to BCT is something which cannot be decided in suit for partition of joint family properties of Patils. Knowing this well, the alienation by Khots to BCT is consciously kept out of the scope of the suit by the Plaintiffs. The alienation made by Khot family in favour of BCT is questioned independently by a suit filed by Defendant No. 1. Knowing this difficulty, Plaintiffs have consciously kept the challenge to alienation not only outside the purview of the main suit, but have consciously not included the prayer for challenging the Indentures dated 14 January 1971 and 28 October 2009 even in the proposed amended prayers. Since the issue of permissibility to challenge alienation by a coparcener of joint family property in a partition suit is irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not necessary to discuss the ratio of the judgment of Calcutta High Court in Ganeshmull Surana and of Madras High Court in Chinnasamy Naidu (supra). {Para 27}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.1918 OF 2016

Arun Narayan Patil and Ors. Vs  Jayshree Jaywant Patil and Ors. 

CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

Dated : 27 August 2026.

Citation:2026:BHC-AS:35171
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Monday, 19 February 2024

Under which circumstances coparceners can challenge alienation of immovable property done by karta of joint hindu family?

  It is trite law that Karta/Manager of a joint family property may alienate joint family property only in three situations, namely, (i) legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii) with the consent of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant case, the alienation of the joint family property under Ex.P1 was not with the consent of all the coparceners. It is settled law that where an alienation is not made with the consent of all the coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not been obtained (See: Thimmaiah and Ors. Vs. Ningamma and Anr; (2000) 7 SCC409). Therefore, the alienation of the joint family property in favour of the second defendant was voidable at the instance of the plaintiff whose consent had not been obtained as a coparcener before the said alienation.{Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Coram:  S. ABDUL NAZEER; KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2582 OF 2010;

Dated: April 19, 2022

 K.C. LAXMANA Vs K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR.

Author: S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Sunday, 31 December 2023

Whether Karta Of Hindu Undivided Family Can Alienate HUF Property Even If Minor Has Undivided Interest In It?

The position on the rights of a Karta vis-à-vis an HUF property is well settled. This Court in Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar1 has held that the Karta has the right to sell/dispose of/alienate an HUF property, even if a minor of the family has undivided interest. The reason is that an HUF is capable of acting through its Karta or an adult member of the family in the management of the HUF property.

Thus, the father of the petitioner herein, as the Karta of the HUF, was entitled to mortgage the HUF property. The son(s) or other member(s) of the HUF need not be consenting parties to the mortgage. Post alienation, a coparcener may challenge the act of a Karta, if the alienation is not for legal necessity or for betterment of the estate, which is not the assertion established in the present case. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

 Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 2147621477/2023; 

N.S. BALAJI Vs THE PRESIDING OFFICER DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL & ORS.

Coram: SANJIV KHANNA; J., S.V.N. BHATTI; J.

Dated: 03-10-2023.

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Sunday, 2 April 2023

Can a court issue a partition decree with the consent of only some of the coparceners?

 


Indisputably, in the case on hand, the Plaintiff has not put her signature on the deed of settlement, which was produced before the High Court in first appeal. The Plaintiff has made herself very clear that she never joined in the settlement between her brother i.e., the Defendant No. 1 and her sister i.e., the Defendant No. 2. On this ground alone, the settlement could be said to be unlawful, being without any written consent of all the parties. In a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot be maintained.

{Para 94}

95. In Nityamoni Dasi v. Gokul Chandra Sen reported in MANU/WB/0534/1910 : (1911) 9 Ind Cas 210 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court observed:


... The decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the whole case retried, because as this is a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot possibly be maintain ed.....


96. In Vir Singh and Ors. v. Kharak Singh and Ors. reported in MANU/LA/0229/1924 : AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed:


...the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the Court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....


97. In Taraprasanna Sarkar and Anr. v. Kalikamohan Sarkar and Ors. reported in MANU/WB/0026/1923 : AIR 1924 Cal 80 Mookerjee and Rankin, JJ., held:


...There can be no compromise binding upon, all the parties to a partition suit until and unless all the parties have joined in the compromise:...

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here


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Whether gift/renunciation/relinquishment or alienation by one coparcener of his undivided coparcenary interest to another coparcener without consent of other coparceners void?


 Moreover, under Hindu Law, the gift/renunciation/relinquishment or alienation by one coparcener of his undivided coparcenary interest to another coparcener without consent of other coparceners is void.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Saturday, 9 April 2022

Whether the court can rely on the plea of a coparcener that property is a self-acquired property in the absence of a specific pleading and independent nucleus for acquiring property?

  It is an admitted fact that, plaintiff No.1 is the

legally wedded wife of defendant No.1 and out of the said

wedlock, plaintiff No.2 is born. The plaintiffs are claiming

share in the share of defendant No.1. According to the

plaintiffs, all the suit schedule properties are joint family

properties. Now by filing I.A.1/2020 under Order XLI Rule

27 of CPC, the defendants/appellants are attempting to

make out a case that, some of the suit schedule properties

are purchased by defendant Nos.2 to 4 and they are their

self acquired properties. However, on perusal of the

written statement of the defendants, no such plea was

raised before the trial Court. Further, there is no pleading

that, apart from the joint family nucleus, the defendants

had any independent nucleus so as to acquire any separate

property in the name of the respective defendants. In the

absence of specific pleadings, the documents which are

now sought to be produced have no relevancy.

15. The status of the plaintiffs is admitted in the

written statement itself. It is also an admitted fact that the

joint family is having sufficient properties and it has got

nucleus to acquire the properties. Under such

circumstances, when there is no specific plea in the written

statement, presumption is that, the properties acquired

subsequently are with the aid of the joint family properties

and as such, they acquire the character of joint family

itself. Hence, I.A.1/2020 does not survive for consideration.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

DHARWAD BENCH

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD

AND

 MR. JUSTICE RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR

REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.100256/2015


TANAJI S/O NAYAKU NIKAM, Vs  BHARATI W/O TANAJI NIKAM,


Author: RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR, J.,

DATED:  15th DAY OF MARCH 2022

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Friday, 1 April 2022

Whether step mother can execute agreement of sale regarding immovable property as karta if she has inherited it alongwith her step daughters from her husband?

There is no dispute about the fact that the suit properties were the separate properties of Dajiba. After his demise somewhere

in the year 1966-67 his widow i.e. defendant no.1 and daughters,

who are the plaintiffs simultaneously succeeded to his estate in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. However, in view of provision of Section 19 of that Act, all these heirs of Dajiba would inherit as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Once such a devolution is understood, the matter becomes clear like a day light. The very theory of existence of a karta and legal necessity presupposes that the sharers are joint, which is not the case in the matter in hand. By virtue of such mode of succession by the widow and four daughters of Dajiba receiving the suit properties as his heirs, they take their individual shares as tenants in common. In the bsence of the suit properties being joint, therefore, there was no question of the step mother - defendant no.1 acting as a manager or karta of the family. She, therefore, had no right to deal with the suit properties even for legal necessity.It has been held that under Hindu Law coparcenership is a necessary qualification for becoming a manager of joint Hindu family and since a widow cannot be a coparcener she is not legally entitled to become a manager. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO.1648 OF 2005

Kamalabai  Vitthalrao Jadhav Vs Darubai W/o. Dajiba

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.

Pronounced on : 31-03-2022

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Monday, 31 August 2020

Whether injunction application to restrain daughter-in-law from entering the marital home is maintainable?

 In the present case, the first defendant has squarely questioned the title, of the plaintiff, to the suit property, and has contended that it is joint family property. She has claimed her right, therein, not merely on the ground that it is her matrimonial home, but as the mother of a coparcener to the joint family. These disputes required to be adjudicated, in the suit, and no order, interlocutory or otherwise, can be passed on the premise that the plaintiff is right, and the first defendant is wrong.

35. In my opinion, it is not necessary to enter, deeply, into the circumstances in which mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, can be granted at an interim stage, as these principles are well settled. The decisions, on which Ms. Rajkotia relies, and which have been cited hereinabove, clearly indicate that, essentially, a plaintiff, in order to be justified to claim an interlocutory mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, has to establish (i) a strong case in his favour, the standard being higher than that of a prima facie case, (ii) that denial of prohibitory injunction would result in irreparable loss to her, and (iii) that the balance of convenience is decidedly in favour of grant of mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction at the interlocutory stage. Additionally, grant of mandatory or prohibitory injunction, at an interim stage, has been approved where the failure, to do so, would result in the suit becoming infructuous, or the final relief, sought therein, being rendered illusory. None of these criteria are satisfied, in the present case. Most importantly, the first defendant had been residing with the plaintiff, since 2002 (or, at the latest, 2014, even if the plaintiff's stand were to be accepted), and it was only on 10th May, 2020 the first defendant left the house of the plaintiff, to visit her mother. It cannot, therefore, be said, by any stretch of imagination, that, by allowing the defendant to return to the house, where she had been staying till 10th May, 2020, irreparable harm would ensue, to the plaintiff. Mere bald assertions, to the effect that the first defendant was harassing the plaintiff, can hardly suffice. Given the option between allowing the first defendant to return to her matrimonial home, where she had been residing since 2002, or 2014, and banishing her, at least during the pendency of the suit, therefrom, the balance of convenience is also, decidedly, in favour of the former, rather than the latter, alternative.

36. Ms. Rajkotia had sought to submit that, were injunction, as prayed by her, in this application, not granted at this stage, the suit would be rendered effectively infructuous, as it would linger on for years. The submission fails to impress. The prayer, in the suit, is for a decree of possession, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in respect of the suit property, and for the decree of permanent injunction, restraining the first defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the plaintiff. In fact, the prayer, in the present application, effectively seeks grant of the prayers in the suit, before the suit is tried and at an interlocutory stage. If this Court were to restrain the first defendant, at this stage itself, from returning to the suit property, the plaintiff would secure possession thereof, and, effectively, a permanent injunction, in terms of prayer (b) in the suit, would also be granted. The plaintiff, therefore, effectively seeks decreeing of the suit without a trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.A. 4618/2020 in CS (OS) 506/2018

Decided On: 02.07.2020

Anita Chopra  Vs.  Rohini Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1332/2020
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Friday, 24 July 2020

Whether the Court can treat the partition of self-acquired property by a father as a family arrangement or gift to sons?

It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing' all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.
 But in our opinion, the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the Courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sale and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present.
In view of our finding that Narayana Pillai dealt with his self-acquired properties under Exhibit A-1, the other parties to the document had no antecedent title. It could not be pretended that there was any bona fide dispute between Narayana Pillai and his children and grandchildren when he divided and gave his properties to them under Exhibit A-1. In Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi MANU/SC/0358/1965 : [1965]3SCR841 , relied on by Sri Vedantachari, it is pointed out that it is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangasami Gounden v Nachiappa Gounden (1919) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 523 : L.R. 46 IndAp 72: 36 M.L.J. 493, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property and that all that is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim on some other ground, as, say, affection. It is no doubt true that the children and grandchildren of Narayana Pillai had a claim to the affection of Narayana Pillai. But it could not on that ground be said that they had a claim or semblance of a claim against his self-acquired property. If the contention of Sri Vedantachari that even a semblance of a claim on some grounds such as affection is sufficient to support Exhibit A-1 as a family arrangement is accepted, it would lead to the result that every deed of gift by a father to his children or near relations could be treated as a family arrangement, though the other requisites of the family arrangement are absent. It is not possible to build an argument that Exhibit A-1 evidences a family arrangement solely on the stray observation in the above Supreme Court decision made in the course of a discussion whether a transaction which was a family settlement amounted to a transfer or creation of trust in the property. It is clear from the Supreme Court decision that the transaction in question in that case is a family arrangement entered into by the parties bona fide for the purpose of putting an end to the dispute among the family members. In the present case, neither the appellant nor the sixth respondent has stated that there were any disputes, or that any dispute was in contemplation which necessitated any family arrangement. In Jatru Pahan v. Ambikajit Prasad MANU/BH/0175/1957 : AIR 1957 Pat 570 , it has been held that the existence of a family dispute is not essential to the validity of a family arrangement, nor is the existence of a doubtful claim based on the allegation of an antecedent title essential for the validity of a family arrangement; such arrangement may bind the parties to it if it is for the benefit of the family, or for the maintenance of peace and harmony and the avoidance of future discord or for the preservation of the property, but there must be some kind of consideration before an agreement in respect to the division of family property can be held to be a valid family arrangement, though in such cases the Court will not scrutinize the quantum of consideration with meticulous nicety. Again in Gangabai v. Punau Rajwa A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 261, it was held that where a family arrangement was merely a cloak for the transfer it could not be upheld. In Natesan v. Commissioner of Income Tax I.L.R. (1964) 1 Mad. 502, it is pointed out that a separate property of a coparcener cannot be fragmented into shares and disposed of by allotment to sharers under the guise of partition without the element of transfer of property. Even if the document Exhibit A-1 is styled as a family arrangement, it is really a gift by Narayana Pillai to the several members of his family. It is true the parties to the document get rights under it. But it is not by virtue of any antecedent title or bona fide claim. For the foregoing reasons, we see no reason to differ from the finding of the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge that, though Exhibit A-1 purports to be a partition deed, it is really a gift deed by Narayana Pillai in favour of the members of his family.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 21.11.1969

 P.L.N. Paramasivam Vs.  P.K. Ramaswami Gounder and Ors.
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Whether coparcener can throw his self-acquired property into common stock if there is no joint family property?

Sri R. Gopalaswami Iyengar, appearing for the contesting respondents 1 and 2 urged that as there was no joint family property, there could be no question of Narayana Pillai throwing his self-acquired property into common stock. Such a contention has been negatived in several decisions. Thus in Damodar Krishnaji Nirgude v. Commissioner of Income Tax MANU/MH/0103/1961 : [1962] 46 ITR 1252 (Bom) , it was held that it was open to a member of a Hindu undivided family to throw his self acquired property into the family hotchpot even though there was no joint or ancestral property. Again in Natesan v. Commissioner of Income Tax I.L.R. (1964) Mad. 502 , this contention has been negatived in the following passage:

It is now well settled that a separate property of a coparcener under the Hindu Law can acquire the character of a joint family property of the coparcener by his own voluntary act of putting it in the common stock or blending it with joint family properties. The process of blending connotes that there are two sets of properties, separate and joint family, and they are pooled so that the exclusive rights of the coparcener holding the separate property are abandoned; then there emerges only one kind of property, the whole of it becoming joint family property. Where, however, there exists no joint family property and the coparcener owning separate property desires to have it treated as joint family property, it will be open to him to do so and the Hindu Law does not require any formality to achieve this result. The act of the coparcener by which this conversion of separate property into joint family property takes place is described as throwing the property into the common stock or as treating the separate property as joint family property. It is, however, not necessary that there should be pre-existing common stock before it can be said that the separate property is thrown into it. In a case where the family has no joint family property, the common stock is a mere fiction and throwing into the common stock is only a convenient phraseology to describe the process of conversion. A clear, unequivocal and unambiguous declaration by the holder of the separate property that it is joint family property would sufficiently impress that property with the joint family character.
As pointed out in the above passage, the very concept of blending of self acquired property with ancestral or joint family property presupposes the existence of a joint family property. But it is clear from what we have already stated that the conversion of self-acquired property into a joint family property by what is known as throwing into common stock is only an application of the principle of abandonment or waiver of his rights by a coparcener with intention to treat his property as joint family property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 21.11.1969

 P.L.N. Paramasivam Vs.  P.K. Ramaswami Gounder and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R. Sadasivam, J.

Citations: (1970) 1 MLJ 592
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Sunday, 19 July 2020

What is difference between succession and survivorship as per Hindu Succession Act?

Prior to enactment of Hindu Succession Act 1956,on the death of one coparcener of joint family,other coparceners of joint family were getting property of joint family by survivorship and was not inherited by his legal heirs. This rule was partly abrogated by Hindu Succession Act 1956 and totally abrogated by Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005.Now joint family property is inherited by legal heirs of deceased and not by other coparceners of joint family. Joint family property passes to legal heirs of deceased by succession or inheritance. 
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Sunday, 5 July 2020

Delhi HC: Tests to determine when a deed can be treated as release deed or relinquishment deed

From a reading of the above judgments, the test to determine whether an instrument can be considered as a Release/Relinquishment Deed can be summarized as under:-

a. In determining whether the document is a release or Gift/Conveyance, the nomenclature used to describe the document or the language which the party may choose to employ in framing the document, is not a decisive factor. What is decisive is the actual character of the transaction intended by the executants;

b. Determination of the nature of the document is not a pure question of law;

c. Where a co-owner renounced his right in a property in favour of the other co-owner, mere use of word like 'consideration' and 'transfer' would not affect the true character of the transaction;

d. What is intended by a Release Deed is the relinquishment of the right of the co-owner;

e. Co-ownership need not be only through inheritance, but can also be through purchase;

f. Where the relinquishment of the right by the co-owner is only in favour of one of the co-owner and not against all, the document would be one of Gift/Conveyance and not of "release".

THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (C) 9193/2019 and 3560/2018

Decided On: 20.05.2020

Tripta Kaushik Vs. Sub Registrar VI-A, Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Navin Chawla, J.

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Saturday, 28 December 2019

Whether daughter can claim share in joint family property prior to death of father?

 Section 6 of the Act has been amended on 09.09.2005 effacing devolution by survivorship through insertion of intestate succession in Mitakshara Coparcenary by substituting the concept of intestate succession for giving equal shares to daughter at par with sons by virtue of their birth. As evident in Section 6(3), the provisions of amended Section 6 can only be invoked in case of property being ancestral. However, it is significant to note that the phrase "devolution of coparcenary property" only takes place when succession opens and not before. It is well settled that succession opens on death of Karta i.e. Tulsiram in this case. As a necessary corollary, Tulsiram being alive, the suit in issue was not maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

S.A. No. 257/2015

Decided On: 05.08.2019

Chandribai   Vs.  Tulsiram 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Vandana Kasrekar, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 MP 206
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Wednesday, 2 October 2019

Whether it can be presumed that there was joint family property if there was HUF Bank Account?

HUF BANK ACCOUNT IS NOT RELATABLE TO ANY PROPERTY. THEREFORE, IRRELEVANT

86. As regards the HUF Bank account opened on 22nd November, 1985, it is not relatable to any property. It is an admitted position that the Public as well as the Private Limited Companies, Partnership Firms and Family Members of the defendant No. 1 had been filing independent Income Tax Returns. Therefore, the said HUF Bank account is wholly irrelevant.

87. In any event, showing in Income Tax Return, a HUF Bank account is meaningless unless the sufficient income is shown from nucleus of Hindu Joint Family Properties. The consistent legal position is that once there is no sufficient nucleus in Savings Bank Account, as in the present case, it will not make a Business/Property as a Hindu Joint Family property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 2223/2013, 

Decided On: 04.02.2019

Aarshiya Gulati  Vs.  Kuldeep Singh Gulati and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Manmohan, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 577 Del
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Monday, 2 September 2019

Leading Supreme court Judgment on share of widow in property of her deceased husband

Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it is necessary to remember that what Section 6 deals with is devolution of the interest which a male Hindu has in a Mitakshare coparcenary property at the time of his death. Since Explanation 1 is intended to be explanatory of the provisions contained in the section, what the Explanation provides has to be correlated to the subject matter which the section itself deals with. In the instant case the plaintiff's suit, based as it is on the provisions of Section 6, is essentially a claim to obtain a share in the interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the coparcenary property. Two things become necessary to determine for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff. One, her share in her husband's share and two, her husband's own share in the coparcenary property. The proviso to Section 6 contains the formula for fixing the share of the claimant while Explanation 1 contains a formula for deducing the share of the deceased. The plaintiff's share, by the application of the proviso, has to be determined according to the terms of the testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there is none in the instant case, by the application of the rules of intestate succession contained in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act. The deceased Khandappa died leaving behind him two sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and a widow are mentioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the provisions of Section 8(a) read with the 1st clause of Section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As between them the two sons, the three daughters and the widow will take equally, each having one share in the deceased's property Under Section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2 of that section. Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be 1/6th.

9. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a 1/6th interest in that share. Explanation 1 which contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased creates a fiction by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death. One must, therefore, imagine a state of affairs in which a little prior to Khandappa's death, a partition of the coparcenary property was effected between him and other members of the coparcenary. Though the plaintiff, not being a coparcener, was not entitled to demand partition yet, if a partition were to take place between her husband and his two sons, she would be entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son. (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para 315). In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth being Khandappa's wife, the plaintiff. Khandappa would have therefore got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons.

10. Two things are thus clears : One, that in a partition of the coparcenary property Khandappa would have obtained a 1/4th share and two, that the share of the plaintiff in the 1/4th share is 1/6th, that is to say, 1/24th. So far there is no difficulty. The question which poses a somewhat difficult problem is whether the plaintiff's share in the coparcenary property is only 1/24th or whether it is 1/4th plus 1724th, that is to say, 7/24th. The learned trial Judge, relying upon the decision in Shiramabai which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court, accepted the former contention while the High Court accepted the latter. The question is which of these two views is to be preferred.

11. We see no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she would have obtained had there been a partition during her husband's life time between him and his two sons. We think that in overlooking that 1/4th share, one unwittingly permits one's imagination to boggle under the oppression of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the plaintiff's husband and his sons. Whether a partition had actually taken place between the plaintiff's husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Explanation 1. That Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that in fact "a partition of the property had taken place", the point of time of the partition being the one immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share.

12. The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be given its due and full effect. Lord Asquith in his famous passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. [1952] A.C. 109/132. He said if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it; and if the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it cannot be interpreted to mean that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.

13. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to Section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mita-kshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death.

What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages.

To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle.
All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased.
The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition.
14. The interpretation which we are placing upon the provisions of Section 6, its proviso and explanation I thereto will further the legislative intent in regard to the enlargement of the share of female heirs, qualitatively and quantitatively. The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 conferred heirship rights on the son's daughter, daughter's daughter and sister in all areas where the Mitakshara law prevailed. Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. 1937, speaking broadly, conferred upon the Hindu widow the right to a share in the joint family property as also a right to demand partition like any male member of the family. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides by Section 14(1) that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explanation I in the manner suggested by the appellant, we shall be taking a retrograde step, putting back as it were the clock of social reform which has enabled the Hindu Woman to acquire an equal status with males in matters of property. Even assuming that two Interpretations of Explanation I are reasonably possible, we must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 1975

Decided On: 27.04.1978

Gurupad Khandappa Magdum  Vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., V.D. Tulzapurkar and P.N. Singhal, JJ.

Equivalent citations: 1978 AIR 1239, 1978 SCR (3) 761
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Thursday, 18 July 2019

Whether S 6 of Hindu Succession amendment Act 2005 is prospective in nature?

The text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a 'daughter of a coparcener' is 'on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005'. Section 6(3) talks of death after the amendment for its applicability. In view of plain language of the statute, there is no scope for a different interpretation than the one suggested by the text of the amendment. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24, Paras 22 to 27. In the present case, there is neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. Requirement of partition being registered can have no application to statutory notional partition on opening of succession as per unamended provision, having regard to nature of such partition which is by operation of law. The intent and effect of the Amendment will be considered a little later. On this finding, the view of the High Court cannot be sustained.

18. Contention of the Respondents that the Amendment should be read as retrospective being a piece of social legislation cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. In the present case, the legislature has expressly made the Amendment applicable on and from its commencement and only if death of the coparcener in question is after the Amendment. Thus, no other interpretation is possible in view of express language of the statute. The proviso keeping dispositions or alienations or partitions prior to 20th December, 2004 unaffected can also not lead to the inference that the daughter could be a coparcener prior to the commencement of the Act. The proviso only means that the transactions not covered thereby will not affect the extent of coparcenary property which may be available when the main provision is applicable. Similarly, Explanation has to be read harmoniously with the substantive provision of Section 6(5) by being limited to a transaction of partition effected after 20th December, 2004. Notional partition, by its very nature, is not covered either under proviso or under Sub-section 5 or under the Explanation.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013, 

Decided On: 16.10.2015

 Prakash Vs.  Phulavati 
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Saturday, 23 March 2019

Whether benami prohibition Act is applicable if father purchase property in the name of son?

In Sri Marcel Martins v. M. Printer and Ors. MANU/SC/0333/2012 : (2012) 5 SCC 342 it was held that Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (for short, "the Act") would apply only in case property was held benami. In case Section 4(3) is applicable it could not be said that property was held benami as such the provision of the Act would not apply.

12. Section 2(a) of Act defined 'benami transactions' as under:

"2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

(a) benami transaction means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person;

(b) ....."

Section 4 of the Act is reproduced as under:

"4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami-

(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.

(2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.

(3) Nothing in this section shall apply,--

(a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or

(b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom fie is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity.

(Emphasis supplied)

The bare reading of the aforesaid provision contained in Section 4(3) of the Act makes it clear that where a person in whose name a property is held as coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family and the property is held for the benefits of the coparcener in the property, provisions of Section 4 containing prohibition of the right to recover the property held benami would not be applicable. The bar of the Act is not applicable to a transaction as contained in Section 4(3)(a) and (b). If the property is held in fiduciary capacity or is held as a trustee for the benefits of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity. Thus, the provision of Act could not be said to be applicable in the instant case.

13. In Vathsala Manickavasagam and Ors. v. N. Ganesan and Anr. MANU/SC/0612/2013 : (2013) 9 SCC 152, this Court considered the question whether the property was held benami or was joint family property. Where there was a tacit admission that the suit property was purchased by his father in his name for which he was not responsible, it was held to be joint family property.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. Nos. 4534-4535 of 2018 

Decided On: 26.04.2018

 Vinod Kumar Dhall  Vs. Dharampal Dhall and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 16 SCC 645
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Saturday, 26 January 2019

Whether members of joint family can claim interest in property if Hindu male has bequeathed it by execution of will ?

Section 30 of the Act, the extract of which has been
referred to above, permits the disposition by way of Will of a
male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property. The
significant fact which may be noticed is that while the
legislature was aware of the strict rule against alienation by
way of gift, it only relaxed the rule in favour of disposition by
way of a Will of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary
property. Therefore, the law insofar as it applies to joint
family property governed by the Mitakshara school, prior to
the amendment of 2005, when a male Hindu dies after the
commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 leaving at
the time of his death an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary
property, his interest in the property will devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary.
An exception is contained in the explanation to Section 30 of
the Act making it clear that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in
Mitakshara coparcenary property can be disposed of by him
by Will or any other testamentary disposition and in the given
facts and circumstances, the testator Patel Hanume Gowda
was indeed qualified to execute a Will bequeathing his


undivided share in the joint family properties by a Will

Exhibit D2
dated 16.6.1962.
8. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants
in claiming independent share as a member of the family in
the joint family properties is without substance for the reason
that the appellants have no independent share in the joint
family properties and their share could be devolved in the
undivided share of the testator in the joint family properties
and since the testator has bequeathed his share/his
undivided coparcenary interest by Will dated 16.6.1962, no
further independent share could be claimed by the appellants
in the ancestral properties as a member of the family as
prayed for.
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7092 OF 2010


RADHAMMA Vs H.N. MUDDUKRISHNA



Dated: January 23, 2019.


Rastogi, J.
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Friday, 23 November 2018

When daughter and wife of male Hindu is entitled to sue for partition of joint family property?

 As regards the entitlement and share of the appellant No. 1 in the suit property, now in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, in the case of Prakash-vs.-Phulavati (supra), which is further confirmed and reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Dhanamma Alias Suman Surpur and anr. -vs.- Amar and Ors. [MANU/SC/0064/2018 : (2018) 3 SCC 343], the legal position is unequivocal that now a daughter of a co-parcener acquires by birth the status of co-parcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. One of the incidents of co-parcenary, being the right of a co-parcener to seek severance of status, even a daughter can now avail right to partition. It was categorically held in this judgment that,

"Even when the daughters are born prior to enactment of Hindu Succession Act 1956, in view of the amendment to Section 6 of the said Act in the year 2005, they also acquire the status of a co-parcener by virtue of birth and hence they are entitled to sue for partition".

It was further held that,

"The amended provision of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, statutorily recognizes the rights of daughter as co-parcener since birth, as the Section uses the words "in the same manner as the son".

17. It is, therefore, apparent that both the son and daughter having been conferred the right of being "co-parceners by birth", and the right to partition being inherent in the co-parcenery property, it can be availed of by any co-parcener, even a daughter who is also coparcener. Therefore, as regards the right of appellant No. 1 of suing for partition of her share in the suit property, the legal position now being fairly well crystallized, the finding of the appellate Court denying her the said right, being against this legal position, is required to be quashed and set aside.

18. Once it is held that appellant No. 1, being the co-parcener by birth has right to sue for partition, it follows that in the said partition, appellant No. 2 who is legally wedded wife of respondent No. 1 is also entitled to claim partition and separate possession of her share in the joint family property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 607 of 2013

Decided On: 28.06.2018

 Ratnamala Vilas More  Vs. Tanaji Machindra Pawar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 345,AIR 2018 Bom260
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Sunday, 9 September 2018

Whether a person can claim that property standing in the name of wives of his nephews are belonging to him?

It is apparent that as per clause (1) of section 4 of BTA, no suit to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie on the plea that the property is held benami, with the exception that where the person, in whose name the property is held, is a 'coparcener' in the Hindu Undivided Family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners of the property or where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or stands in a fiduciary capacity to another.

7. From a reading of Section 4 of the Act, it is obvious that for a valid claim raised by the plaintiff, to bring the case in the exception provided in clause (a) of sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the BTA, following three requisites are essential to be pleaded:-

(i) Existence of a Hindu Undivided Family;

(ii) Defendants in whose name the suit property are held, are a coparceners of the said Hindu Undivided Family; and

(iii) Suit property is held by the defendants for the benefit of the coparceners in the family.

8. In the instant case, the defendants are the wives of the nephew of the plaintiff and thus they are not the coparceners under the definition of Hindu Undivided Family and thus exception carved out by the BTA is not available to the plaintiff in the present case as the exception contained in Section 4 (3) (a) of the BTA restricts its benefits only to property held by a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family as opposed to any 'Member' of such family. It is so, because coparceners are recognized by law to jointly by birth inherit rights in the joint property of the family property and in the event such property stands in one of their names for the benefit of others, the BTA is declared to not come in the way. Such benefit however cannot be extended to all/any members of such family who do not have any vested right in the property. The plaintiff, being the brother of deceased father in law of the defendants is not a coparcener in the Hindu Undivided Family of his deceased brother. In view of the fact that requisite (ii) noted above is not fulfilled, exception contained in Section 4(3)(a) of the Act has no application in the instant case.


13. In view of the aforesaid settled law, the defendants in whose names the suit property stands as per the pleadings of the plaintiff himself, they are absolute owners of the suit property by virtue of section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The plaintiff himself has pleaded in his plaint that the suit property was purchased in the names of wives of his nephew out of love and affection and if such fact is admitted in the plaint itself, it is not necessary for this court to go on trial to find out the fact or to lift the veil to come to the conclusion which is necessary for the parties by determining the question raised in the plaint. In my considered opinion once the plaintiff has admitted in his pleadings that the property had been purchased for the benefit of the defendants, he cannot be turned around at this stage and file a suit claiming himself as real owner/co owner of the property in question. Accordingly, I hold that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred under BTA and Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and thus the same is accordingly rejected. Ordered accordingly. File be consigned to record room."

(underlining added)

4. I completely agree with the conclusions of the trial court contained in the impugned judgment, inasmuch as, there is no entitlement to claim a right in a property which is benami by virtue of Section 4(1) of the Act. Benami property means a property which is purchased in the name of one person and funds are paid for purchase by another person with the intention that the benami owner is only a nominal owner and the actual owner is the person who has paid the funds. The Benami Act was passed in the year 1988 to nullify benami transactions as most of the benami transactions had their roots in illegalities, including existence of unaccounted or illegal moneys. The only two exceptions to the bar contained in Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act are as per Section 4 (3) of the Benami Act when firstly where there exists an Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) and the property is in the name of a coparcener and secondly where the property is purchased by a person standing in a fiduciary capacity or as a trustee. In the present case the exception which is pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff to avoid the application of the provision of Section 4(1) of the Benami Act is the existence of HUF and which will not apply because respondents/defendants being females are not coparceners and the exception under Section 4(3) of the Benami Act applies if the property claimed to be an HUF is in the name of a coparcener.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA No. 852/2017

Decided On: 10.10.2017

Lalsa Prasad Singh Vs.  Chanderwala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Valmiki J. Mehta, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 684 DELHI
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