Supreme Court: Under which circumstances a subsequent change of law will not render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata

The second limb of the High Court's reasoning, that Vineeta Sharma constitutes a 'change in law' which overrides res judicata is equally unsustainable. It is true that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra), this Court in Para 9 held that a subsequent change in law can render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata. However, this exception applies only where the legal basis of the earlier decision has been undermined by the subsequent pronouncement. {Para 40}

41. The question, therefore, is whether Vineeta Sharma effects any change in the law relevant to the 2013 order. The answer, in our view, is in the negative. The 2013 order proceeded on the basis that even assuming the daughters are not coparceners and the partition is valid, the father died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. Vineeta Sharma (supra) deals with the scope of the 2005 Amendment vis-à-vis coparcenary rights and the saving clause for pre-2004 partitions. It holds, inter alia, that daughters become coparceners by birth, that the 2005 Amendment is retroactive in nature, and that Section 6(5) saves only partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree. What Vineeta Sharma (supra) does not do is alter the settled position which was the foundation of the 2013 order, that where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves Under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters. The "basis" of the 2013 judgment remains entirely undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma. The High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma (supra) did away with the basis of the 2013 order is, with respect, erroneous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

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Supreme Court: Hindu Succession Act ,2005 Amendment Does Not Limit Daughters' Pre-Existing Inheritance Rights U/S 8 of Hindu Succession Act

 (ii) Section 6(5) of the H.S. Act is a saving clause of narrow and strict application. It does not create a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit for partition. Whether a valid partition within the meaning of Section 6(5) has been effected, and whether such partition is binding on persons who were not parties to it, are contested questions of fact and law that must be adjudicated at trial. The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint at the threshold on the basis of Section 6(5).

(iii) The Appellants have an independent right Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act, 1956 as Class I heirs of the propositus who died intestate on 06.03.1985. This right accrued in 1985 by operation of the proviso to the erstwhile Section 6 read with Section 8, is independent of the 2005 Amendment, and is unaffected by Section 6(5). The suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the Appellants' claim in the share of the propositus.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

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Supreme Court: A partition carried out among the sons alone cannot defeat the daughters' succession rights in the father's share of the property

The operative reasoning of the High Court reads as follows:

In my opinion, even assuming that there is a partition in 2000 prior to 2004, even assuming that the daughters will not get the share, but it is not disputed that their father had died intestate. If they have a share in the father's share, still the suit can be maintained. If that is so, the Trial Court could not have rejected the plaint without even considering the scope of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. It is not for the Trial Court to find out whether the Plaintiffs would succeed or not. That is not the ground to reject the plaint. Even assuming that the Plaintiffs are likely to fail in the suit, that cannot be a ground to go into the merits and decide the matter Under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, rejection per se being misconceived, is liable to be set aside.

10. Two aspects of the 2013 order deserve emphasis. First, the High Court proceeded on the assumption most favourable to the Defendants, that the partition of 2000 is valid and that the daughters do not get a coparcenary share and still held the plaint to be maintainable because the father had died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8. In other words, the ratio of the 2013 order rested not on the coparcenary rights of daughters under the 2005 Amendment, but on the independent right of daughters as Class I heirs Under Section 8 of the Act. Second, this order was not challenged further by any party and attained finality. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court, issues were framed, and the suit was set down for evidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

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Whether daughter in law is legal heir of senior citizen if her husband is alive?

Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to many decisions of this Court to contend that the daughter-in-law has no right to live in the house of the father-in-law but all these decisions are not applicable at all to the facts and circumstances of this case because both father and son are conniving with each other for seeking eviction of respondent No. 3, who is also having a small girl child, from the house in question by using the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, Rules and the Action Plan in which it is categorically provided that the District Magistrate shall have the power only to dispossess a son, daughter or legal heir. The Act does not define son, daughter or legal heir rather it defined only children and relative but according to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a husband is alive, the daughter-in-law would not fall within the definition of legal heir either in Class 1 or Class II of the Schedule. In this regard, the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No. 3 in the cases of Ranjit Kaur (Supra), Ram Saroop Walia (Supra) and Amar Chand Sharma and another (Supra) would come to the rescue of respondent No. 3 and for this Court to form an opinion that the application filed by the petitioner under Section 22 of the Act was not maintainable because the petitioner has only tried to evict his daughter-in-law from the house in dispute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

CWP Nos. 5722 and 6917 of 2017

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Vimaljit Singh Vs  District Magistrate, SAS Nagar, Mohali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.

Citation:AIR 2018 P &H 185

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Whether property inherited by minor U/S 8 Hindu Succession Act same can be termed as joint Hindu family property?

 In the present case, the suit property has devolved on defendant Nos. 1 to 3 under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and the same cannot be termed as joint Hindu family property. Defendant No.1 through defendant No.4 had agreed to sell the property of defendants No. 2 and 3 for necessity as is evidence from the petition filed before the Court under Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act by defendant No.4 on the basis of a lawful power of attorney executed in his favour Ex.4/D1,D2,D3. Thus defendant No.1 could have entered into an agreement to sell with the plaintiff in view of the necessity subject to the permission of the Court which was duly applied for though the same could be avoided by the minors on attaining majority. Issue No.2 is also decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 1047/2008 and I.A. No. 19099/2013 (O.7 R.14 (3) CPC)

Decided On: 13.08.2014

 Meera Narula  Vs. G.G. Malvankar

Coram:
Mukta Gupta, J.

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When property inherited by father can not be treated as ancestral property?

The whole argument of the learned counsel is placed on a wrong premise that there is a presumption of existence of joint family property for a joint family. The incident of joint family for Hindus is the normal rule and the presumption does not extend beyond the fact that thee exists a joint family. However, if an issue was to be brought before the Court, of whether the father was competent to execute the sale, the impeaching plaintiff as a son shall prove two aspects: (i) that the property is ancestral and (ii) that the sale was without necessity. Both must exist and if only one is admitted to be shown, the case will fail.

Without any discussion, I am prepared to accept that the father was selling the property without any necessity. If the matter would therefore require consideration of whether the property was ancestral, then it must be understood that the expression is legally loaded. The ancestral property is just not a property coming to a person from a father or grand father. The manner of such devolution is crucial. The property coming from grand father to father on intestate succession will be understood in legal parlance applicable to Hindus as unobstructed heritage. There is another form of devolution as obstructed heritage, which occurs when there is any form of transfer of right otherwise then under natural succession. Consequently, the property obtained by a Hindu male by sale or gift will be taken as property obtained by that person as an obstructed heritage and that property shall be separate property in his hands even vis-a-vis his own son. Consequently, the property that was obtained by the plaintiff's grandfather Shankar by way of Hiba from his father will be separate property and on his death after the Hindu Succession Act, the property inherited by his son namely, the 2nd defendant along with his own brothers and sisters will be the property taken as having devolved on them by the operation of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Hence the property inherited by father would partake the character of separate property, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chander Sen's case (supra). This decision was cited and proved in later decision of the Supreme Court in Yudhishtir Vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1987 SCC 558. If the property was, therefore, held by the father on succession along with his own brothers and sisters, that property cannot be said to be ancestral property in his hands vis-a-vis his son, the plaintiff, merely by  the fact that he did not earn the same but got it on succession from his father. The normal understanding of an ancestral property as that which has come from the ancestor and to be treated as such qua his own son will have to be understood and reinterpreted in the light of the change of law that came about by the advent of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Rajesh Kumar And Anr vs Gurmeet Singh And Anr on 7 December, 2015

                      

  RSA No. 2660 of 2015 (O&M)

Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)273(P&H)

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Whether grandson has right to claim partition in ancestral property during lifetime of his father?

Appellant had filed a suit for partition against his father and three uncles (brothers of father), claiming 1/8th share in the suit property on the footing that the suit property was ancestral property, and he being a coparcener has a right by birth as per the Mitakshara Law.

The suit was resisted on the ground that property was not ancestral by an earlier partition, father of the Appellant has become separate. Trial Court decided in favour of the Appellant. However, the First Appellate Court clarified that when Appellant’s grandfather died, his grandmother was alive and accordingly, his grandfather’s share will have to be distributed in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as if the grandfather of Appellant had died intestate, and once Section 8 steps in, the joint family property has to be divided in accordance with rules of intestacy and not survivorship. Once the above position comes up, no joint family property remained to be divided when the suit for partition was filed by the Appellant, and that since the Appellant had no right while his father was alive, the father alone being a Class I heir (and consequently the Appellant not being a Class I heir), the Appellant had no right to sue for partition, and therefore the suit was dismissed and consequently the first appeal was allowed.

High Court also dismissed the appeal filed against the above finding by holding grand-son has no birth right in the properties of grand-father and he cannot claim partition during lifetime of his father.

Thus, on the facts, it was undisputed that after the death of grandfather of the Appellant, there were four surviving sons as Class I heirs and the properties had devolved upon them when succession had opened. It was also proved that no earlier partition had taken place. Accordingly, Appellant being the grandson was held as not entitled to claim partition during the lifetime of his father since the Appellant has no birth right in the suit properties. High Court accordingly answered the issue against the Appellant by holding that the first appellate court had committed no error in dismissing the suit for partition.

It was observed that, on the death of Appellant’s grandfather, the proviso to Section 6 would apply inasmuch as his grandfather had left behind his widow, who was a Class I female heir. Equally, upon the application of explanation 1 to the said Section, a partition must be said to have been effected by operation of law immediately before his death. Accordingly the Appellant would be entitled to a share on this partition taking place in 1973 (as his grandfather has died in 1973). The Appellant however was born only in 1977 i.e. after his grandfather’s death. He nowhere sought allotment of share but claimed 1/8th share on dividing the joint family property between 8 co-sharers in 1998.

Court then went on to summarise law as it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of 2005 as under:

1. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, having at the time of his death an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary (vide Section 6).
2. To proposition (i), an exception is contained in Section 30 Explanation of the Act, making it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property is property that can be disposed of by him by will or other testamentary disposition.
3. A second exception engrafted on proposition (i) is contained in the proviso to Section 6, which states that if such a male Hindu had died leaving behind a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that Class who claims through such female relative surviving him, then the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, and not by survivorship.
4. In order to determine the share of the Hindu male coparcener who is governed by Section 6 proviso, a partition is effected by operation of law immediately before his death. In this partition, all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow get a share in the joint family property.
5. On the application of Section 8 of the Act, either by reason of the death of a male Hindu leaving self-acquired property or by the application of Section 6 proviso, such property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship.
6. On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.

In view of the above, on the death of Appellant’s grandfather, the joint family property which was ancestral property in the hands of Appellant’s grandfather and the other coparceners, devolved by succession under Section 8 of the Act. The ancestral property then ceased to be joint family property on the date of death of Appellant’s grandfather and the other coparceners and his widow held the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. Thus, on the date of the birth of the Appellant in 1977, the said ancestral property, not being joint family property, the suit for partition of such property would not be maintainable.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2360_of 2016

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.6036 OF 2014]

UTTAM  V SAUBHAG SINGH & ORS. 

Dated;March 2, 2016.

R.F. Nariman, J.

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Whether daughters can be denied share in coparcenary property on ground that cash and jewellery are given to them?

Learned Counsel for the appellants argued that Sannamadaiah purchased a site in the name of the third plaintiff and gave gold and silver jewellery as well as cash to the first and second plaintiffs and therefore plaintiffs cannot claim any share in the suit properties. Admittedly, the defendants have not stepped into the witness-box to substantiate their contention, nor is there any plea in the written statement to that effect. Even assuming that Sannamadaiah had purchased a site in the name of third plaintiff and given jewellery and cash to other plaintiffs, the same cannot take away their legal right as daughters to claim a share in the co-parcenary properties by virtue of Section 6 read with Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act. Point No. 4 is therefore answered in the negative.

 Equivalent Citation: AIR2016Kant4, 2015(4)KCCR3091

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

Regular First Appeal No. 58 of 2014

Decided On: 07.09.2015

 Lokamani and Ors.  Vs. Mahadevamma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N. Kumar and G. Narendra, JJ.

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Any property which devolves under Section 8 of HSA upon death of a Hindu male would be his own individual property incapable of partition.

 Under that succession so long as the sons and daughters of Rajaram are alive, the grandsons or the great-grandsons of Rajaram would not succeed at all to any interest in the coparcenary property that Rajaram had. Such interest could have only survived to them as coparceners had there been no female heir of Rajaram. (i.e. had Rajaram left no daughters or, of course, any persons claiming through daughters i.e. the heirs of such daughters.)

17. Consequently the general rules of jointness of a Hindu family, being community of interest and unity of possession, the incidents of a joint family property, the coparcener surviving to the interest of a deceased coparcener, the share of a coparcener diminishing or augmenting upon the death or birth of another coparcener, the joint ownership of a coparcener, the undivided share of coparcenary etc. stand diluted upon any coparceners having any female heir since 1956 in respect of such interest. Hence any property which devolves under Section 8 of the HSA upon the death of a Hindu male would be his own individual property incapable of partition. It would be his own property in which his son or grandson would have no interest during his lifetime. The properties which devolve under Section 8 of the HSA are self acquired properties or partitioned HUF properties. They are not ancestral HUF properties which are not partitioned

Bombay High Court

Shalini Sumant Raut & Ors vs Milind Sumant Raut & Ors on 14 December, 2012

CORAM : MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.

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