Supreme Court: Appellate Courts Must First Examine Pleadings Before Allowing Additional Evidence Under O 41 Rule 27 of CPC

 In our opinion, before undertaking the exercise of

considering whether a party is entitled to lead additional

evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code, it would

be first necessary to examine the pleadings of such party

to gather if the case sought to be set up is pleaded so as

to support the additional evidence that is proposed to be

brought on record. In absence of necessary pleadings in

that regard, permitting a party to lead additional evidence

would result in an unnecessary exercise and such

evidence, if led, would be of no consequence as it may not

be permissible to take such evidence into consideration.

Useful reference in this regard can be made to the

decisions in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal and Anr.,

AIR 2009 SC 1103 and Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin

and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 148. Thus, besides the

requirements prescribed by Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the

Code being fulfilled, it would also be necessary for the

Appellate Court to consider the pleadings of the party

seeking to lead such additional evidence. It is only

thereafter on being satisfied that a case as contemplated

by the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code has

been made out that such permission can be granted. In

absence of such exercise being undertaken by the High

Court in the present case, we are of the view that it

committed an error in allowing the application moved by

the defendant for leading additional evidence. {Para 8}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10458 OF 2010

IQBAL AHMED (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR. Vs ABDUL SHUKOOR 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1027

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Whether it is necessary to file pleadings, issues and judgment of previous suit to prove the plea of res judicata?

 The rule of res judicata does not strike at the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the subsequent suit. It is a rule of estoppel by judgment based on the public policy that there should be a finality to litigation and no one should be vexed twice for the same cause. {Para 11}

12. The plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found. It is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal (See: (Raja) Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb v. Gour Hari Mahato and Ors. - MANU/PR/0022/1936, Madeapati Surava and Ors. v. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi and Ors. - MANU/PR/0002/1947, Katragada China Anjanevulu and Anr. v. Kattragada China Ramava and Ors. - MANU/AP/0136/1965 : AIR1965AP177 ). The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in The State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal - MANU/SC/0492/1970 : (1971)ILLJ31SC . However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue, because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the Trial Court. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that the point of res judicata had through out been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged.

13. Not only the plea has to be taken, it has to be substantiated by producing the copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. May be in a given case only copy of judgment in previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors. v. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. - MANU/SC/0510/1976 : [1976]3SCR721 , the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata.

It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh v. Bhoralal - MANU/SC/0241/1964 : [1964]7SCR831 , placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State For India in Council and Anr. - (1887) 15 IA 186, pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issues in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.

14. That apart the plea, depending on the facts of a given case, is capable of being waived, if not properly raised at an appropriate stage and in an appropriate manner. The party adversely affected by the plea of res judicata may proceed on an assumption that his opponent had waived the plea by his failure to raise the same. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7653 and 7654 of 1997

V. Rajeshwari Vs. T.C. Saravanabava

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti and Ashok Bhan, JJ.

Author: R.C. Lahoti, J.

Decided On: 16.12.2003

Citation: MANU/SC/1057/2003,(2004) 1 SCC 551

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How to distinguish whether a particular endowment is public or private?

  In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Others,8 a bench of five Judges of this Court has held that:

“the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.

Endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it.”

 {Para 19}

20. Following the above ratio in The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. Sri Ratnavarma Heggade (Deceased) by his L. Rs.,9 this Court has observed that:

“Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country. Such dedications may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication. Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication, yet, they are not indispensable”

Thus, extinction of private character of a property can be inferred from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or public purposes.

Where the beneficiaries of a trust or charity are limited to a finite group of identifiable individuals, the trust or charity is of a private character. However, where the beneficiaries are either the public at large or an amorphous and fluctuating body of persons incapable of being specifically identifiable, the trust or charity is of a public character.”

25. Therefore, in view of the judgments quoted above and the aforesaid statutory provisions, it must be held that the case of the appellant that there was no endowment or specific endowment must fail and has no legs to stand on. The dedication of the suit jewellery does not require an express dedication or document, and can be inferred from the circumstances, especially the uninterrupted and long possession of the suit jewellery by the respondent/Temple. The private character of the jewels had extinguished long back and the appellant has no basis to claim that the suit jewellery was inherited by him from his adoptive parents. The endowment is clearly public in nature and for the purposes of performing religious ceremonies. As confirmed by three courts, with which we are in agreement, the suit jewellery was dedicated for a specific purpose and can only be used during the performance of the religious ceremony during the Adipooram festival.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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How to prove that a subsequent suit is barred by O 2 R 2 of CPC?

 In this regard, we would like to refer to judgment of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 wherein it has been observed:

“In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous  suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits.

Just as in the case of a plea of res judicata which cannot be established in the absence on the record of the judgment and decree which is pleaded as estoppel, we consider that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. As the plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits the defence which raises the bar has necessarily to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The cause of action would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed.”

The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2 Rules 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Is the plea of res judicata, constructive res judicata, and Order II Rule 2 of CPC available if the civil court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the previous suit?

 In fact, this argument would also recoil on the appellant insofar as he has raised the plea of res judicata and constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code, for the said pleas would not be available in case the civil court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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When rule of res judicata / constructive res judicata is not applicable to any subsequent proceeding?

 Where the former suit is dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of the plaintiff’s appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letter of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation, or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued, or for want of cause of action, or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision, not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) AIR 1966 SC 1332The reason is that the first suit is not decided on merits.

32. In the present case, the suit filed in 1981 for appointment of the receiver for preparing an inventory of the suit jewellery was not decided on merits but was dismissed on the ground that the respondent had prayed for mandatory injunction and had not made a prayer for declaration of title. Thus, the suit was dismissed for technical reasons, which decision is not an adjudication on merits of the dispute that would operate as res judicata on the merits of the matter. Further, to succeed and establish a prayer for res judicata, the party taking the said prayer must place on record a copy of the pleadings and the judgments passed, including the appellate judgment which has attained finality. In the present case, the appellant did not place on record a copy of the appellate judgment and it is accepted that the second appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed, giving liberty to the respondent to file a fresh suit with a prayer of declaration of title/endowment in respect of the suit jewellery. The liberty granted was not challenged by the appellant. The right to file a fresh suit to the Temple, therefore, should not be denied. The bar of constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code is not attracted.

33. The plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code also fails as the cause of action in the first suit filed in 1981 was limited and predicated on account of the failure of the appellant to open the locks of the safe and the main door of the Kudavarai, the keys of which were available with the appellant and required joint operation. Here again, the party claiming and raising the plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code must place on record in evidence the pleadings of the previous suit and establish the identity of the cause of actions, which cannot be established in the absence of record of judgment and decree which is pleaded to operate as estoppel.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated: JULY 11, 2022

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Whether court should dismiss an election petition at the threshold if pleadings of the petition are defective?

 Having gone through the contents of the election petition, we are satisfied that the High Court has not been right in directing the petition to be dismissed at the threshold by forming an opinion that the averments made in the election petition were deficient in material facts. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with reproduction of the several averments made in the election petition. The High Court has already done it. The test laid down in the several authorities referred to hereinabove and in particular in the case of Raj Narain (supra) is fully satisfied. The grounds of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action have been stated. Even the particulars have been given. However, if the Court feels that the particulars as given in the petition are deficient in any manner the petitioner can be directed to supply the particulars and make the deficiency good. In any case, deficiency in particulars could not have been a ground for dismissing the petition at the threshold. It is only the non- supply of particulars though ordered by the Court which could have led to either striking off of the pleadings or refusal to try the related instances of alleged corrupt practice. We cannot countenance the view taken by the High Court.

So is the case with the defect pointed out by the High Court in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition alleging corrupt practice by the winning candidate. The proviso enacted to sub-Section (1) of Section 83 of the Act is couched in a mandatory form inasmuch as it provides that a petition alleging corrupt practice shall be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegations of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The form is prescribed by Rule 94A. But at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that failure to comply with the requirement as to filing of an affidavit cannot be a ground for dismissal of an election petition in limine under sub-Section (1) of Section 86 of the Act. The point is no more res integra and is covered by several decisions of this Court. Suffice it to refer to two recent decisions namely G. Mallikarjunappa and anr. Vs. Shamanur Shivashankarappa and ors. (2001) 4 SCC 428 and Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho Vs. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247, both three-Judges Bench decisions, wherein the learned Chief Justice has spoken for the Benches. It has been held that an election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does not comply with either the provisions of "Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the RP Act". The requirement of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt practice is contained in Section 83(1) of the Act. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act, however, does not attract the consequences envisaged by Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the Act, for alleged non-compliance with provisions of Section 83(1) or (2) of the Act or of its proviso. The defect in the verification and the affidavit is a curable defect. What other consequences, if any, may follow from an allegedly "defective" affidavit, is required to be judged at the trial of an election petition but Section 86(1) of the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case.

Having formed an opinion that there was any defect in the affidavit, the election petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity of removing the defect by filing a proper affidavit. Else the effect of such failure should have been left to be determined and adjudicated upon at the trial, as held in G. Mallikarjunappa and anr.'s case (supra).

Supreme Court of India

Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar vs Sukh Darshan Singh & Ors on 27 October, 2004

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Whether the party can confront another party's witness with the contents of pleadings or can ask to make comments or explain the party's pleadings?

 To wit, witnesses (other than the parties) have been confronted with the contents of the election petition or the written statement and asked to make comments or offer explanation as to passages therefrom, overlooking that Section 145 of the Evidence Act permits a witness being cross-examined as to previous statement made by him and not by a third person. How can a witness be confronted or asked to explain the contents of or averments made in writing or document to which he is not a party? 

Supreme Court of India

Makhan Lal Bangal vs Manas Bhunia & Ors. on 3 January, 2001

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Whether the court can convict wife for defamatory pleadings made by her against the husband in matrimonial proceeding?

Learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent/complainant in Criminal Revision Petition No. 152/2014, in her argument stating that the pleadings filed in a Court and the deposition given in a Court of Law are not privileged one and further stating that a pleading filed in the Court also amounts to publication, has relied upon few judgments in her support as follows.

In the case of Smt. Madhuri Mukund Chitnis Vs. Mukund Martand Chitnis and another reported in MANU/MH/0120/1990 : 1990 CRL. L.J. 2084, the Bombay High Court was pleased to observe that, the imputations made in a proceeding which is filed in a Court is clearly a publication. It further observed that even a publication to an authority over the person against whom the imputations are made must be held to be sufficient publication which falls within the purview of the said Section 499 of IPC.

In the case of M.K. Prabhakaran and another Vs. T.E. Gangadharan and another reported in MANU/KE/0074/2006 : 2006 CRI. L.J. 1872, the Kerala High Court, in a matter where it is alleged that defamatory statements against complainant were made in a written statement filed before the Court held that, once a statement has been filed in a Court of Law, that statement can be taken as published. If such a statement amounts to per se defamatory, then it is the duty of the accused to establish that, they are justified in making such a statement under any of the exceptions to Section 499 of IPC.

In the case of Sanjay Mishra Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & another, the Delhi High Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its judgment was pleased to observe as below:-

"11. In Sandyal V. Bhaba Sundari Debi MANU/WB/0241/1910 : 7 Ind. Cas. 803 : 15 C.W.N. 995 : 14 C.L.J. 31 the learned Judges, following the case of Augada Ram Shaha V. Nemai Chand Shaha MANU/WB/0132/1896 : 23 C.867 : 12 Ind. Dec.(n.s.)576, held that defamatory statements made in the written statement of a party in a judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged in this country, and that a qualified privilege in this regard cannot be claimed in respect of such statements, unless they fall within the Exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. Undisputedly, the case of the petitioner was not in any of these Exceptions.

12. For criminal purposes "publication" has a wider meaning than it has in civil law, since it includes a communication to the person defamed alone. The prosecution for defamation in criminal cases can be brought although the only publication is to the person defamed as it is very likely to provoke a breach between the persons involved...."

In the case of Thangavelu Chettiar Vs. Ponnammal reported in MANU/TN/0132/1966 : AIR 1966 Mad 363, the Madras High Court was pleased to observe that, there can be no doubt that the defamation contained in the plaint was published by the plaint being filed in the Court.

20. In the instant case, to bring the statements made by the accused in Ex. P-4 which are contested to be defamatory as the one made with good faith and thus falling within the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of IPC, she has to show that she had made those statements with due care and attention. However, her own statement made at more than one place in her cross-examination as DW-1 that, she has stated that what she has stated in her statement of objections were the facts and they were the incidents occurred between herself and her husband i.e. the complainant. She has reiterated that they were the truth, as such, they were fact, in her further cross-examination also. Therefore, though the learned counsel for the accused contends that, she made the same in good faith, but according to accused, they were truth. If they are truth and falling under First Exception to Section 499 of IPC, then it is for her to prove that they were the facts.

Admittedly, except making those statements in her statement of objections at Ex. P-4 and reiterating it in Ex. P-1, she has not even attempted to show that they were the imputation of truth or that they were made in good faith. Therefore it can be safely held that the complainant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed an offence of defamation punishable under Section 499 of IPC, which is punishable under Section 500 of IPC.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 152 of 2014 and 1358 of 2010

Decided On: 01.10.2020

 Sushma Rani  Vs.  H.N. Nagaraja Rao

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. H.B. Prabhakara Sastry, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/3441/2020

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Whether court can prosecute parties for making false pleading as per S 209 of IPC U/S 340 of CRPC?

15. Conclusions

15.1 Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code, is a salutary provision enacted to preserve the sanctity of the Courts and to safeguard the administration of law by deterring the litigants from making the false claims. However, this provision has been seldom invoked by the Courts. The disastrous result of not invoking Section 209 is that the litigants indulge in false claims because of the confidence that no action will be taken.

15.2 Making a false averment in the pleading pollutes the stream of justice. It is an attempt at inviting the Court into passing a wrong judgment and that is why it has been be treated as an offence.

15.3 False evidence in the vast majority of cases springs out of false pleading, and would entirely banish from the Courts if false pleading could be prevented.

15.4 Unless the judicial system protects itself from such wrongdoing by taking cognizance, directing prosecution, and punishing those found guilty, it will be failing in its duty to render justice to the citizens.

15.5 The justice delivery system has to be pure and should be such that the persons who are approaching the Courts must be afraid of making false claims.

15.6 To enable the Courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like false claims have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail.

15.7 Whenever a false claim is made before a Court, it would be appropriate, in the first instance, to issue a show cause notice to the litigant to show cause as to why a complaint be not made under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for having made a false claim under Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code and a reasonable opportunity be afforded to the litigant to reply to the same. The Court may record the evidence, if considered it necessary.

15.8 If the facts are sufficient to return a finding that an offence appears to have been committed and it is expedient in the interests of justice to proceed to make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court need not order a preliminary inquiry. But if they are not and there is suspicion, albeit a strong one, the Court may order a preliminary inquiry. For that purpose, it can direct the State agency to investigate and file a report along with such other evidence that they are able to gather.

15.9 Before making a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C., the Court shall consider whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.

15.10 Once it prima facie appears that an offence under Section 209 IPC has been made out and it is expedient in the interest of justice, the Court should not hesitate to make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

16. This Court hopes that the Courts below shall invoke Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code in appropriate cases to prevent the abuse of process of law, secure the ends of justice, keep the path of justice clear of obstructions and give effect to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (supra), S.P. Chengalvaraya Naida v. Jagannath (supra), Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.(supra), Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (supra), Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (supra), Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) and Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India (supra).

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA 784/2010

Decided On: 22.01.2016

H.S. Bedi Vs.  National Highway Authority of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: J.R. Midha, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/0154/2016

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