Showing posts with label privity of contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label privity of contract. Show all posts

Sunday, 15 December 2019

Whether occupant of structure would be entitled to claim tenancy in respect of land underneath structure?

Before adverting to their contentions in detail, it must be borne in mind that the creation of tenancy is a matter governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and not by the Rent Act. It has been held by the Apex Court in Raizada Topandas and another v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand, MANU/SC/0227/1963 : [1964]3SCR214 that the Rent Act does not create tenancy which is a matter of contract. Creation of tenancy must be established by a contract between the lessors (the plaintiffs) and the obstructionists in the present case. There has to be a privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the obstructionists. If there is no privity of contract between the landlord and the sub-lessees and where the landlord is the owner of the plot which has been let out to the lessee, who erects the structures and is the owner of the said structures and inducts licensees or sub-lessees the law recognises no independent right in the licensee or sub-lessee qua the landlord of the plot of land.

The Division Bench decision of this Court in S.R. Shetty's case make it clear that it would be almost impossible to accept the suggestion that the occupant of the structure would be entitled to claim tenancy in respect of the land underneath the structure. This would be all the more impossible where, in a multi-storied building, there are several tenants, one sitting on top of another and it would be impossible by any amount of ingenuity observed the Division Bench, for any Court to say on what portion of land, a particular occupant of the structure is a sub-tenant qua the land. There is thus no substance in the second contention of the petitioners.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2014, 2047, 2048, 2066 & 2093 of 1991

Decided On: 12.10.1999

Decided On: 13.10.1998

Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode  Vs. Anand Govind Kelkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.V. Savant, J.

 Citation : AIR 1999 Bom 89
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Sunday, 4 March 2018

Whether tenancy rights will be extinguished if tenanted building is destroyed?

The tenancy cannot be said to have been determined by attracting applicability of the doctrine of frustration consequent upon demolishing of the tenancy premises. Doctrine of frustration belongs to the realm of Law of Contracts; it does not apply to a transaction where not only a privity of contract but a privity of estate has also been created inasmuch as lease is the transfer of an interest in immovable property within the meaning of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act (wherein the phrase 'the transfer of property' has been defined), read with Section 105, which defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. (See observations of this Court in this regard in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand Vs. Raja Harmohinder Singh & Anr., MANU/SC/0179/1968 : 1968 (3) SCR 339). It is neither the case of the appellants nor of the respondents No.2 and 3 that the subject matter of lease was the building and the building alone, excluding land whereon the building forming subject matter of tenancy stood at the time of creation of lease.

20. In Woodfall's Laws of Landlord and Tenant (28th Edition, Vol.1) the relevant law is so stated:

Where the lessee covenants to pay rent at stated period (without any exception in case of fire), he is bound to pay it, though the house be burnt down; for the land remains, and he might have provided to the contrary by express stipulation, if both parties had so intended. And this rule applies, although the lessee's covenant to repair contain an exception in case of fire. Similarly, an action for use and occupation still lies in respect of the whole period of the tenancy notwithstanding the destruction of the premises by fire." (Para 1-0778)

In a lease of land with buildings upon it the destruction of even the entirety of the buildings does not affect the continuance of the lease or of the lessee's liabilities under it, unless so provided by express contract." (Para 1-2055)

A demise must have a subject-matter, either corporeal or incorporeal. If the subject-matter is destroyed entirely, it is submitted that the lease comes automatically to an end, for there is no longer any demise. The mere destruction of a building on land is not total destruction of the subject-matter of a lease of the land and building, so the demise continues. But if by some convulsion of nature the very site ceases to exist, by being swallowed up altogether or buried in the depths of the sea, it seems clear that any lease of the property must come to an end." (Para 1-2056)

21. A lease of a house or of a shop is a lease not only of the superstructure but also of its site. It would be different if not only the site but also the land beneath ceases to exist by an act of nature. In the present case the appellants who are the successors of the tenancy right have demolished the superstructure but the land beneath continues to exist. The entire tenancy premises have not been lost. Moreover, the appellants cannot be permitted to take shelter behind their own act prejudicial to the interest of the respondent No.1 under whom the respondents no.2 and 3 were holding as tenants and then inducted the appellants.

22. In D.G. Gouse & Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., MANU/SC/0330/1980 : (1980) 2 SCC 410, while dealing with Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, making a reference to Oxford English Dictionary, this Court has held that the site of the building is a component part of the building and therefore inheres in the concept or ordinary meaning of the expression 'building'. Referring to Corporation of the City of Victoria Vs. Bishop of Vancouver Island, AIR 1921 PC 240, it was held that the word 'building' must receive its natural and ordinary meaning as 'including the fabric of which it is composed, the ground upon which its walls stand and the ground embraced within those walls".

23. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the event of the tenancy having been created in respect of a building standing on the land, it is the building and the land which are both components of subject matter of demise and the destruction of the building alone does not determine the tenancy when the land which was site of the building continues to exist; more so when the building has been destroyed or demolished neither by the landlord nor by an act of nature but solely by the act of the tenant or the person claiming under him. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 115 of 2010

Decided On: 10.01.2012

 Pius Bonaventure Fernandes Vs. Manu Narang

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.S. Godbole, J.
Citation: 2012(2) Bom CR,2012(2) ALLMR 112,2012(2) MHLJ68
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Thursday, 1 December 2016

Whether court can grant injunction against person who is not party to suit ?

There is no privity of contract between the
plaintiff and the Limited Liability Partnership which is the owner of the suit
property. Of course, the defendants are some of the partners of the said Limited
Liability Partnership firm. Plaint does not disclose that those defendants were
authorised by the said Limited Liability Partnership firm to enter into any
transaction relating to the suit property as agents of the said Limited LiabilityPartnership. No case of fraud has been made out against the defendants for
attracting the other provisions of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008,
such as Section 30 etc.
Thus, on reading the pleadings of the plaintiff as a whole, it appears to us
that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the owner of the said
property viz., the Limited Liability Partnership firm. As such, we hold that even if
the ad interim order of injunction which was passed by the learned Trial Judge is
not disturbed by us, still then the Limited Liability Partnership firm cannot be
held to be bound by the said injunction order. The said Limited Liability
Partnership firm is not even made a party to the suit.
Section 3 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 says that a limited
liability partnership is a body corporate formed and incorporated under the said
Act and is a legal entity separate from that of the partners. Section 14 of the said
Act provides that on registration, a limited liability partnership shall, by its
name, be capable of suing and being sued. The title deed which is annexed to the
injunction application shows that the Limited Liability Partnership firm is a
registered partnership firm. As such, we have no hesitation to hold that the said
Limited Liability Partnership firm is a separate entity which is a body corporate
and is capable of being sued in its own name. The said Limited Liability
Partnership firm has not been impleaded as a party in this proceeding. No relief
has been claimed against the said Limited Liability Partnership firm.
Since we are of the prima facie view that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the owner of the suit property viz., the Limited Liability
Partnership firm, we hold that the ad interim relief by way of injunction which is
prayed for by the plaintiff cannot be granted in the instant case for the simple
reason that even if such ad interim order of injunction is maintained, still then,
the Limited Liability Partnership firm, which is not a party in the said proceeding,cannot be restrained from dealing with the said property by virtue of such
interim order passed by the learned Trial Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Jyotirmay Bhattacharya
AND
The Hon’ble Justice Ishan Chandra Das
 F.M.A.T. 481 of 2016
 with
 CAN 4980 of 2016
 Rajesh Baid & Anr.
 v
 Mohammad Ibrahim

Judgement On : 20-07-2016.
Citation:AIR 2016 Cal 344
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Sunday, 13 November 2016

How to ascertain privity of contract in suit for specific performance of contract?

 In the present case, the averments in the plaint
suggests that the suit is filed for specific performance of an
agreement executed in the year 2000. The agreement of
the year 2000 also has recitals about the agreement signed
between the respondent no.1 and the respondent no.2 way
back in the year 1996. Besides the power of attorney in
favour of the respondent no.2 is also referred to by the
appellant in the plaint. On perusal of the recitals in the
agreement of 1996, it clearly inter alia provides that the
purchaser therein would also include the administrator,
executor and assignee. In such circumstances, the
agreement of the year 1996 also contemplates that the
purchaser could assign his rights in terms of the agreement
in favour of any person. In such circumstances, the
contention of Mr. Tamba that privity of contract has not
been spelt out, cannot be accepted at this stage. Needless
to say that the respondents can always raise such defence in
the written statement and the learned Judge would have to
examine such aspect, on its own merits, while deciding the
suit.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA.
First Appeal No.19 of 2015
Mr. Carlton Fortes,

 V
Shri Devkikrishna Ravalnath Devasthan

 CORAM : F.M. REIS & K.L. WADANE, JJ.
 Dated : 01st July, 2015.
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR298
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Saturday, 14 May 2016

What is term “entitled to defend” and its connection with principles of natural justice?

At this juncture, it is necessary to state that in Udit
Narain (Supra) question arose whether a tribunal is a
necessary party. Recently a two-Judge Bench in Asstt. G.M
State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey 
2015 (3) SCALE 39 referred
to Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and
 Ors.AIR 1955 SC 233
and adverted to the concept of a tribunal being a necessary
party and in that context ruled that:-
“In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger
Bench was dealing with a case that arose from
Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and
expressed the view how it is a proper party. In
Udit Narain Singh (supra), the Court was really
dwelling upon the controversy with regard to the
impleadment of parties in whose favour orders
had been passed and in that context observed
that tribunal is a necessary party. In Savitri
Devi (supra), the Court took exception to courts
and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite
to note here that propositions laid down in each
case has to be understood in proper perspective.
Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in
the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court
nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before
the superior court it does not contest. If the High
Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or
revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls
for the records, the same can always be called for
by the High court without the Court or the

Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party.
Similarly, with the passage of time there have
been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and
they have nothing to do with the lis. We may cite
few examples; the tribunals constituted under
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the
Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal,
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, the Sales
Tax Tribunal and such others. Every
adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as
a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different
that pure and simple adjudicating authorities
and that is why they are called the authorities.
An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank he
may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to
be made a party, for he can defend his order. He
is entitled to contest. There are many authorities
under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition
that can safely be culled out is that the
authorities or the tribunals, who in law are
entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are
necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as
parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not
maintainable or the court may grant liberty to
implead them as parties in exercise of its
discretion. There are tribunals which are not at
all required to defend their own order, and in that
case such tribunals need not be arrayed as
parties.”
The principle that has been culled out in the said case
is that a tribunal or authority would only become a
necessary party which is entitled in law to defend the order.
17. The term “entitled to defend” confers an inherent right
to a person if he or she is affected or is likely to be affected
by an order to be passed by any legal forum, for there would

be violation of natural justice. The principle of audi alteram
partem has its own sanctity but the said principle of natural
justice is not always put in strait jacket formula. That
apart, a person or an authority must have a legal right or
right in law to defend or assail.
18. We may first clarify that as a proposition of law it is
not in dispute that natural justice is not an unruly horse.
Its applicability has to be adjudged regard being had to the
effect and impact of the order and the person who claims to
be affected; and that is where the concept of necessary party
become significant.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6774 of 2015
(@ SLP(C) NO. 16650 OF 2012)
Poonam
 V
State of U.P. & Ors
Citation;(2016) 2 SCC779
Dipak Misra, J.
Dated;October 29, 2015
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