Important Judgments and articles on rights of woman

 

1) When Justice Takes Pause: The Shifting Landscape of Bail for Women, the Pregnant, and the Infirm Under India’s Criminal Laws

Part 2: Pregnant Women and Nursing Mothers—When Two Lives Are One

The Invisible Category

Neither Section 437 of the CrPC nor Section 480 of the BNSS explicitly mentions pregnant women or nursing mothers. Yet pregnancy may fall under two categories: “woman” and “sick or infirm.” This ambiguity has forced courts to venture beyond the statutory text and into constitutional territory.

The judicial approach has been transformative. Courts now treat pregnancy as a “super-category”—a condition that engages the rights of two distinct entities: the mother and the unborn child. Both are constitutionally protected; neither is justiciable as a criminal actor.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/12/when-justice-takes-pause-shifting.html

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Can the applicant take recourse to the Domestic Violence Act proceedings to enforce her property rights?

 It needs to be clarified here that resort to Domestic Violence Act can not be done to enforce property rights as for enforcement of property right the parties are supposed to approach the Civil Court. Resort to Domestic Violence Act can only be done where there is urgent requirement of the wife of maintenance or residence because of domestic violence and she has been rendered home less or has lost source of maintenance. In this case the husband had pleaded that he was giving monthly maintenance and the wife had refused to accept the same. The Magistrate shall consider all these aspect and consider the domestic incident report and contents of the application and then proceed with the case in accordance with law. {Para 23}

 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Anita Chaudhry, J.)

Crl. Misc. No. M-24058 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others Vs Shimla Garg .

Citation: 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 16071 : 2016 Cri LJ 3111 : (2016) 3 RCR (Cri) 310 : (2016) 3 RCR (Civil) 225 : (2016) 1 HLR 362

Decided on December 1, 2015.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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What is the difference between section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is a pivotal provision that transformed women's property rights under Hindu law. The two subsections work together but serve distinct purposes in defining a Hindu woman's ownership rights.

Section 14(1): General Rule of Absolute Ownership

Section 14(1) establishes the fundamental principle that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". This provision converts what was previously limited ownership into absolute ownership.

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Can You Commit Mischief by Destroying Your Own Property? Understanding Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code

 Introduction

In criminal law, the concept of mischief typically involves damaging someone else's property. However, a fascinating and counterintuitive aspect of Indian criminal jurisprudence is that you can actually commit the offense of mischief by destroying your own property. This principle, enshrined in Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), challenges our conventional understanding of property rights and criminal liability.

The Legal Framework: Section 425 IPC

Core Provision

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Whether Persons residing in Premises Gratuitously will Acquire Legal Right On The Property?

Having gone through the record, the submission of the appellants that the grand-mother of the respondent though did not have any right qua the premises was permitted to occupy purely out of love and affection is not without merit. The status of the grand-mother is thus of a gratuitous licensee and that of the respondent is purely of a relative staying with such gratuitous licensee.

Rame Gowda (supra) was a case in which two adjoining owners were claiming independent right of ownership in respect of a strip of land in between their holdings. That piece of land was in possession of the plaintiff and as such while dealing with the controversy, this Court held that a person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession. However, while dealing with the concept of “settled possession” it was observed in paragraph 9 as under:

“The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and

(iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.” The matter was further elaborated in subsequent decision of this Court in Maria Margarida (Supra) as under:

“97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallized as under:

(1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand.

(3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. (4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour.

(5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.” Thus, a person holding the premises gratuitously or in the capacity as a caretaker or a servant would not acquire any right or interest in the property and even long possession in that capacity would be of no legal consequences. In the circumstances City Civil Court was right and justified in rejecting the prayer for interim injunction and that decision ought not to have been set aside by the High Court. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment under appeal and restore the Order dated 29.04.2013 passed by the Bombay City Civil Court in Notice of Motion No.344 of 2013 in Suit No.408 of 2013.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Behram Tejani & Ors vs Azeem Jagani on 6 January, 2017

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Uday Umesh Lalit
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR 925 SC

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Whether right of user is property right which can be acquired?

A. As laid down by this Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and
others v. State of Gujarat and another4
, the right of user is a property
right which can be acquired. Further, it is not necessary that the
acquisition should be of “whole” of property rights or ownership rights.
The acquisition could be “partial” and the principles land down in the
PMP Act are designed to give fair and just compensation for acquisition
of such right of user.
 As laid down by this Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others
(Supra), the term property in legal sense means an aggregate of rights which
are guaranteed and protected by law and would extend to entirety or group of
rights inhering in a person. It was observed by this Court as under:
“42. Property in legal sense means an aggregate of rights
which are guaranteed and protected by law. It extends to every
species of valuable right and interest, more particularly,
ownership and exclusive right to a thing, the right to dispose of
the thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to
exclude everyone else from interfering with it. The dominion or
indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully
exercise over particular things or subjects is called property. The
exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing
is property in legal parameters. Therefore, the word ‘property’
connotes everything which is subject of ownership, corporeal or
incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or
personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which
goes to make up wealth or estate or status. Property, therefore,
within the constitutional protection, denotes group of rights
inhering citizen’s relation to physical thing, as right to possess,
use and dispose of it in accordance with law. In Ramanatha
Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon, Reprint Edn., 1987, at p.1031, it is
stated that the property is the most comprehensive of all terms
which can be used, inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of
every possible interest which the party can have. The term
property has a most extensive signification, and, according to its
legal definition, consists in free use, enjoyment, and disposition
by a person of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”

19. We therefore proceed on the premise that the right of user sought to be
taken over under the provisions of the PMP Act amounts to acquisition of one
of the facets of property rights which inher in the owner/occupier. For the
acquisition of such right of user, the compensation is prescribed in terms of
Section 10 of the PMP Act. There are two elements of compensation under
Section 10. The first part deals with any damage, loss or injury sustained by
any owner/occupier as a result of exercise of powers conferred by Sections
4,7 and 8 of the PMP Act that is to say the actual damage, loss or injury
sustained because of entry upon and/or digging or marking levels and survey
of land under Section 4 or while actual laying of the pipeline including
digging of trenches and carrying of requisite material for such operations
under Section 7 or at any stage of maintenance, examinations, repairing and
altering or removing of pipeline in terms of Section 8 of the PMP Act. The
measure for determining such compensation is given with sufficient clarity in
sub-section (3) of Section (10). The idea is to compensate the owner/occupier
for actual damage, loss or injury sustained by him as a result of the operations
carried out in terms of Section 4, Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act. One of
the indicia under sub-Section 3 could be “any injury to any other property
whether movable or immovable, or the earnings of such persons in any other
manner”. All possible acts as a result of which the damage, loss or injury
could be so occasioned are taken care of and stipulated in said sub-section.
Over and above such compensation for actual damage, loss or injury,
additional compensation @ 10% of the market value of the land is given to
the owner/occupier under sub-section 4 of Section 10 for taking over the right
of user to lay the pipelines. This element of additional compensation is
independent of any actual loss or damage and is purely linked to the value of
the land for the purposes of computation. This element of compensation is
purely for acquisition of right of user simplicitor. 
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10019 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.2725 of 2010)
Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya & Ors. 
V
State of Gujarat & Ors.
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC791
Dated:October 05, 2016 

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What is term “entitled to defend” and its connection with principles of natural justice?

At this juncture, it is necessary to state that in Udit
Narain (Supra) question arose whether a tribunal is a
necessary party. Recently a two-Judge Bench in Asstt. G.M
State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey 
2015 (3) SCALE 39 referred
to Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and
 Ors.AIR 1955 SC 233
and adverted to the concept of a tribunal being a necessary
party and in that context ruled that:-
“In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger
Bench was dealing with a case that arose from
Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and
expressed the view how it is a proper party. In
Udit Narain Singh (supra), the Court was really
dwelling upon the controversy with regard to the
impleadment of parties in whose favour orders
had been passed and in that context observed
that tribunal is a necessary party. In Savitri
Devi (supra), the Court took exception to courts
and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite
to note here that propositions laid down in each
case has to be understood in proper perspective.
Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in
the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court
nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before
the superior court it does not contest. If the High
Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or
revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls
for the records, the same can always be called for
by the High court without the Court or the

Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party.
Similarly, with the passage of time there have
been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and
they have nothing to do with the lis. We may cite
few examples; the tribunals constituted under
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the
Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal,
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, the Sales
Tax Tribunal and such others. Every
adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as
a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different
that pure and simple adjudicating authorities
and that is why they are called the authorities.
An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank he
may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to
be made a party, for he can defend his order. He
is entitled to contest. There are many authorities
under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition
that can safely be culled out is that the
authorities or the tribunals, who in law are
entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are
necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as
parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not
maintainable or the court may grant liberty to
implead them as parties in exercise of its
discretion. There are tribunals which are not at
all required to defend their own order, and in that
case such tribunals need not be arrayed as
parties.”
The principle that has been culled out in the said case
is that a tribunal or authority would only become a
necessary party which is entitled in law to defend the order.
17. The term “entitled to defend” confers an inherent right
to a person if he or she is affected or is likely to be affected
by an order to be passed by any legal forum, for there would

be violation of natural justice. The principle of audi alteram
partem has its own sanctity but the said principle of natural
justice is not always put in strait jacket formula. That
apart, a person or an authority must have a legal right or
right in law to defend or assail.
18. We may first clarify that as a proposition of law it is
not in dispute that natural justice is not an unruly horse.
Its applicability has to be adjudged regard being had to the
effect and impact of the order and the person who claims to
be affected; and that is where the concept of necessary party
become significant.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6774 of 2015
(@ SLP(C) NO. 16650 OF 2012)
Poonam
 V
State of U.P. & Ors
Citation;(2016) 2 SCC779
Dipak Misra, J.
Dated;October 29, 2015

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Supreme Court: Family court has jurisdiction to decide any dispute between husband and wife relating to property given before or after their marriage

In our opinion, the courts have not gone into the question in its correct perspective. The trial court proceeded to negative the claim of the respondent-wife by holding that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the property rights of the parties and gave no opportunity to the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective claims. The finding of the trial court clearly overlooked the provisions of Sections 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act which unmistakably vests the jurisdiction in the court to pass an order, at the time of passing a decree in a matrimonial cause. In respect of the property presented, at or about the time of marriage, which may belong jointly to the husband and the wife. The learned single Judge also fell in complete error while concurring with the view of the trial court to say that there was no evidence on the record to show that the property claimed by the wife was presented to her at the time of her marriage. The learned single judge failed to take notice of the deposition of the respondent in that behalf. Moreover, the property which is given to the wife at the time of marriage only. It includes the property given to the parties before of after given to the parties before or after marriage also. So long as it is relatable to the marriage. the expression "at or about the time of marriage" has to be properly construed to includes such property which is given at the time of marriage as also the property given before or after marriage to the parties to become their "their property". Implying thereby that the property can be tracked to have connection with the marriage. All such property is covered by section 27 of the Act.

Supreme Court of India

Balkrishna Ramchandra Kadam vs Sangeeta Balkrishna Kadam on 4 September, 1997

Bench: A.S. Anand, K. Venkataswami

  Citation:1997(3) MHLJ(SC)597

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Whether wife can claim arrears of rent or possession of disputed property in Domestic violence case?

Under the provisions of Act, 2005, aggrieved person can claim the relief of share envisaged in Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22. Under these sections, no right is created for an aggrieved person to claim arrears of rent or possession of disputed property. Even for claiming the reliefs under the above referred sections, the aggrieved person must prima facie establish that there is domestic violence as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act. This Court in KUPPILI SRIDHAR KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs.KUPPILI SIVA SANTOSHI AND ANOTHER ( ) held as follows:

One of the main ingredients which has to be prima facie established before claiming reliefs under the provisions of the said Act is that there should be domestic violence as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act.

Andhra High Court

Kolli Babi Sarojini And Others vs Kolli Jayalaxmi And Another on 29 April, 2014

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE S.RAVI KUMAR  

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1160 OF 2008

Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL178

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