Questions and answers on law {Part 92}

 Q 1:- What are Kinds of estoppel?

Ans:- “Broadly, estoppel is of three classical kinds: estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, and estoppel by conduct or representation. In modern law, promissory estoppel is also a well-recognized form, where a person who makes a clear promise, intending another to act on it, cannot later go back on it if the other has altered his position. Thus, estoppel prevents a party from denying what he earlier represented.

Brief classification

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Whether one party can withdraw consent in divorce by mutual consent if another party has performed its obligation?

Following the judgment in Prakash Alumal

Kalandari (supra),we hold that once the parties

agree to file a joint petition, pursuant to an

agreement/compromise in pending proceedings, then

the parties are estopped from resiling from the

agreement. Therefore, the unilateral withdrawal of

consent by the respondent, especially after the

appellant has performed his part of the terms in the

memorandum of agreement, is only a sharp practice

which cannot be permitted or tolerated for a moment

as it would shatter the faith of the litigants in the

justice delivery system and make a mockery of

alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

25. We are of the definite opinion that the

unilateral withdrawal of consent by the respondent is

unsustainable in law and the Family Court erred by

allowing the applications filed by the respondent and

dismissing the original petition.

 KERALA HIGH COURT

Mat.Appeal.No.1066 OF 2017

Dated this the 5th day of February 2021

C.S.Dias,J.

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Supreme court: Inter-relation between Promissory Estoppel, Legitimate Expectations and article 14 of Constitution of India

Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations

289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification.

290.....In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.

(emphasis supplied)

41. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary MANU/SC/0169/2016 : (2016) 4 SCC 236, speaking through Chief Justice T S Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327 : (1990) 170 CLR 1. It then observed:

This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.

Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

42. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries MANU/SC/0257/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 71, speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus:

7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review.

8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the Rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the Rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3860-3862 of 2020 

Decided On: 01.12.2020

The State of Jharkhand Vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0906/2020

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Whether promissory estoppel can be basis of an independent cause of action?

The above statement, based on various earlier English
authorities, correctly encapsulates the law of promissory
estoppel with one difference – under our law, as has been seen
hereinabove, promissory estoppel can be the basis of an
independent cause of action in which detriment does not need
to be proved. It is enough that a party has acted upon the
representation made. The importance of the Australian case is
only to reiterate two fundamental concepts relating to the
doctrine of promissory estoppel – one, that the central principle
of the doctrine is that the law will not permit an unconscionable
departure by one party from the subject matter of an
assumption which has been adopted by the other party as the
basis of a course of conduct which would affect the other party
if the assumption be not adhered to. The assumption may be of
fact or law, present or future. And two, that the relief that may
be given on the facts of a given case is flexible enough to
remedy injustice wherever it is found. And this would include
the relief of acting on the basis that a future assumption either

as to fact or law will be deemed to have taken place so as to
afford relief to the wronged party.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2480 OF 2008
M/S MANUELSONS HOTELS
PRIVATE LIMITED .

VERSUS
STATE OF KERALA & OTHERS 
Dated:May 11, 2016.

Citation:(2016) 6 SCC766

R.F. Nariman, J.

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When doctrine of promissory estoppel is not binding on govt?

 In M/s Motilal Padampt Sugar Mills Company supra, this
Court, on an exhaustive survey of the law pertaining to the doctrine
of promissory estoppel held that the same was an equitable doctrine
that would yield when equity so required. While propounding that
the same had been evolved to avoid injustice where it is
demonstrated that a party acting on the words or conduct of
another, amounting to clear and unequivocal promise and intended
to create legal relations or effect legal relationships to arise in the
future had altered his position, then the promise would be binding
on the promisor and he would not be permitted to renege therefrom
unless it would be inequitable to compel him to do so. While
extending this doctrine to the Government as well, it was
enunciated that if it can be shown that having regard to the facts as
had subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the
Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise
the equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against
the Government. Their Lordships held that the doctrine of the
promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on
the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be
held bound by the promise made by it. That aside overriding public
interest against enforcement of the doctrine qua the Government, it
would be still competent for it to depart from the promise on giving
reasonable notice which need not be a formal one, affording the
promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position was
underlined. We consider it inessential to dilate on the other
decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this theme as these
are in essence in reiteration of the above proposition.
 {REPORTABLE}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 3962 of 2011

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.  Vs. SHRI HANUMAN INDUSTRIES & ANR.

Citation: 2015VI AD (S.C.) 644, (2015)4MLJ470(SC), 2015(6)SCALE185, (2015)6SCC600
Amitava Roy, J.

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